The struggle to belong
_Dealing with diversity in 21st century urban settings_

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Abstract

More than one billion people in the world could be considered as “squatters”. Literature usually focuses on unruly places like slums in the suburbs of the global cities in the South and in exponential and uncontrolled growing metropolitan areas in emerging countries. Yet, there are many illegal settlements persisting at the doors of European cities in different forms, namely, squats in buildings or illegal occupations of land. I propose here to address these two kinds of occupations. In this paper, we consider the case of Paris at the metropolitan scale. Squats and slums are both illegal occupations of space in order to get a house and a place to live or survive. The paper addresses the features of the public policies implemented towards urban spaces’ illegal occupations. Three dimensions could be underlined concerning the government of squats and slums: the housing problem, the metropolization governance and the question of ungovernability of urban societies.

This paper only considers the illegal occupation of urban spaces as a departure point for an analysis of policy implementation. I assume that the study of squats and slums enables us to demonstrate that urban authorities are able to implement public policies towards these illegal settlements even if these occupations seem, by definition, ungovernable. I try to characterize these urban policies and I address three main features. Firstly, I consider squats and slums as challenges to urban policies. Secondly, squats and slums become public problems which are put on the local agenda and are targets of public policies. Thirdly, I examine the policy instruments used by local actors in order to control illegal occupations in the Ile-de-France Region.
More than one billion people in the world could be considered as “squatters” (United Nations, 2003; Neuwirth, 2004; Davis, 2006). Literature usually focuses on unruly places like slums in the suburbs of the global cities in the South (Fernandes and Varley, 1998; Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995) or in exponential and uncontrolled growing metropolitan areas in emerging countries. Illegal settlements and squats are considered as targets of public policies and particularly of large scale regularization programs. There are few studies on this topic focusing on Europe, though the phenomena described above are equally present in many urban areas in Western societies. Sociologists interested in “marginality” address the problems of ghettos or “quartiers sensibles” (Wacquant, 2006; Avenel, 2007; Lapeyronnie, 2008; Kokoreff, 2009), but the question of illegality is often put aside. Slums are approached by sociologists and geographers who analyze the Roma and Sinti situation at the margin of European metropolises (Legros, 2010; Vitale, 2010). Finally, some French scholars try to understand the logics of “refugee camps” (Agier, 2002, 2008; Bernardot, 2008).

Yet, there are many illegal settlements persisting at the doors of European cities in different forms, namely, squats in buildings or illegal occupations of land. I propose here to address these two kinds of occupations. This paper addresses the case of Paris at the metropolitan scale. Squats and slums could appear as two different practices but they are both illegal occupations of space in order to get a house and a place to live or survive. Many differences can be underlined: forms of mobilizations, locations, populations living in, temporaliies and spaces. However, here, I wish to integrate these two kinds of occupations in the same analysis in order to understand the features of the public policies implemented towards urban spaces’ illegal occupations as well as the underlying logic.

The question of squats and slums is deeply related to three main problems. The first concerns the housing. The European cities experience an important housing shortage and the recent global crisis has reinforced this trend. In France, the last national survey on housing (Annual Report of Fondation Abbé Pierre, 2011) shows that more than 3.6 millions of people live in precarious housing conditions. Among them, more than 600,000 people don’t have a roof. Paris is one of the densest European capitals and space is a scarce resource. However, paradoxically, we estimate that 9% of the housing in Paris is vacant2 (more than 120,000 free housing)3. Public actors are not able to provide housing to all citizens because of a lack of funding, of space and sometimes of political decisions.

This governing failure generates and reinforces the development of sub-systems (Mayntz, 1993) of self organization to get a place to live with the minimal vital services. Legality is too expensive (De Soto, 2000) and actors survive by developing alternative strategies beyond the logic of property ownership and beyond public control of space.

We are coming here to the second main point: the metropolization. I conceive metropolization as a three dimensions process. The first dimension concerns spaces and territories. A metropolis spreads continuously and public actors have to keep control on extending spaces. The study is concerned with the way in which they try to exercise power on informal and hidden spaces. A geographical perspective could be adopted to underline the different logics. The second dimension is related to the citizenship question: do citizens participate to the construction of their city? Do they have any role in the urban and local governance? Can squatters and slum dwellers be considered as full citizens? The third dimension concerns the governance of illegal spaces. Who is in charge to build and govern the metropolis? Who governs squats and slums, and how?

However the last dimension of metropolization (who governs the city and how?) supposes to ask another question which is central for my research: is the city governable? Some scholars propose the hypothesis of the ungovernability of society (Mayntz, 1993) and of metropolises (Jouve and Lefèvre,

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2 Nevertheless, these vacant housings are not only vacant during long period but are mainly the results of “turn over”, relocations or renovation programs. Thus, we cannot estimate precisely how many houses are vacant for a long period (Driant, 2009).
2002). In 2003, Dominique Lorrain and Patrick Le Galès highlighted this crucial question for urban studies. The economists who study metropolises developed models which put aside the question of policies and politics by describing “global cities” stripped of their prerogatives and dominated by the global market forces (Storper, 1997; Veltz, 2000; Scott, 1998, 2001): “[In these models] the question of steering are structured by the competition dynamics between big globalized mega-regions, particularly concerning the infrastructures. However, the questions of democracy, of legitimacy and State are put aside” (Lorrain and Le Galès, 2003: 306). The authors refuse the “chaotic” vision of the metropolis (Davis, 1997) and the interpretations in terms of “post-modern cities” which invite us to think about ungovernable cities (Scott and Soja, 1996; Soja, 2000; Dear, 2001). These last models push us to think that the Parisian metropolis may be ungovernable because there are too many actors – private and public – involving in the urban governance. Lorrain and Le Galès rather propose to show that cities have “political capacities” and are able to govern their territory (Le Galès, 2002, 2003): “In most major metropolises forms of government exist” (Lorrain and Le Galès, 2003: 310). Thus, the latter denounce the ungovernability hypothesis as a “lazy choice”. However, this hypothesis pushes us to examine how public actors develop strategies in order to implement programs and to build governance frameworks.

This paper only considers the illegal occupation of urban spaces as a departure point for an analysis of policy implementation. Some authors have described “arrangements” with illegalisms and forms of regulation (Fischer and Spire, 2009). Nevertheless, they don’t mention the authorities’ capacity to govern or to organize a governance framework. Squats and slums constitute the hidden side of metropolization and a dilemma for public actors. I assume that the study of squats and slums enables us to demonstrate that urban authorities are able to implement public policies towards these illegal settlements even if these occupations seem, by definition, ungovernable. I try to characterize these urban policies and I address three main features which constitute the structure of this paper. Firstly, I consider squats and slums as challenges to urban policies (I.). Secondly, squats and slums become public problems which are put on the local agenda and are targets of public policies (II.). Thirdly, I examine the policy instruments used by local actors in order to control illegal occupations in the Ile-de-France Region (III.).

I. Squats and slums as challenges to urban policies

1.1. Literature on squats and slums: where are the governors?

The European literature on squats is very significant but squats are usually studied from a sociological and anthropological point of view. Squatting is seen as a deviant occupation of the urban space and a reaction to the housing shortage. Many scholars study squatters and the strategies used to build an alternative place and way of life, at the margin of norms and legality. The squat is considered as a shelter which permits homeless people to find a house and, above all, as a community that builds a new social link (Bouillon, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2009 and Coutant, 2000). This work, based on qualitative interviews and participative observations, usually needs a monographic approach and the studies are often limited to case studies (Bailey, 1973; Berthaut, 2008). Besides, a wide literature is dedicated to describing squatting as a collective action. These scholars are more interested in studying “political” squats: alter-globalization and counter-culture dynamics (Martinez, 2004)
2007; Adell and Martinez, 2004; Vivant, 2008) or housing right protests (Péchu, 2001, 2006, 2009, 2010). The main purpose of these studies is to analyze the organization of squatting, their stories and the discourses of squatters in order to understand this urban practice. The squatters have many resources to mobilize and occupy new spaces. Some authors consider the squat as an element of “urban fragmentation” (Pattaroni, 2007). A series of works focus on the processes of institutionalization and cooptation - asking if these processes are inevitable for the movement to survive and to preserve its identity - in order to understand the impact of the different squatting strategies on their political treatment (Pruijt, 2003; Uitermark, 2004; Martinez and Lorenzi, 2010). All these works however put aside local and national governors and decision makers. They usually do not deal with the public policies which could be implemented beyond eviction strategies.

As I suggest in the introduction, the literature on slums usually focuses on the important southern metropolises like in Mexico (Azuela and Duhau, 1998; Varley, 1985, 1995, 1999, 2002), South America (Pasternak, 1995; Perez Perdomo and Bolivar, 1998; Fernandes and Rolnik, 1998; Valladares, 2006; Rafael Soares, 2010), Africa (Fernandes, 1994; Mitullab and Kibwana, 1998; Huchzermeyer, 2003, 2008; Tayyab, 2010) or Asia (Berner, 2000, 2002; Smart, 1995, 2001, 2002, 2006; Chui et Smart, 2006). Nevertheless, this literature is more diverse and relevant from a political science point of view. Indeed, we can distinguish four main research tracks of reflection developed by these studies. The first one concerns obviously the eviction and clearance programs implemented by the State and the Municipalities (Smart, 2002) often accompanied by resettlement programs (Chui and Smart, 2006). There is a constant in the political treatment of slums all over the world: the struggle against poor and illegal settlements which disturb the normal expansion, the life of the metropolis and the public order (Berner, 2000; Varley, 1998). The second axe concerns the urban land rights regimes. Many works underline the link between property right and illegal settlements. Indeed, they show that slab dwellers don’t have any property rights for land and/or houses. The inhabitants fail in entering into a legal situation. Property rights generate conflicts (Razzaz, 1998) and their absence prevents inhabitants to have access to normal urban services and employment (De Soto, 2000). But for public actors, property rights are at the same time the main problem for dwellers and one of the main vectors of action for public programs. This is the third topic addressed by the literature. Urban planners try to normalize the slums’ legal status in order to be able to implement housing, transportation, health and social policies. Giving a property title enables public actors to control the land and the population living on (Jenkins, 2001) and to regulate the informal activities taking place in these “unruly spaces” (Smart, 2001). For instance, since two decades almost every Southern “XXL cities” (Lorraine, 2011) have implemented “regularization programs” (Varley, 2002) or “upgrading programs” (Huchzermeyer, 2008). The fourth topic seems more theoretical. Some scholars interpret these “illegal cities” (Fernandes and Varley, 1998) through a dualisation process. Two cities cohabit: the legal and the illegal or informal one (Yonder, 1998; Perdomo and Bolivar, 1998). This phenomenon pushes public actors and especially local actors to implement dual policies. Therefore, this paper attempts to direct the debate toward the “public policies dilemma”: these policies oscillate between tolerance (normalization, regularization, upgrading and resettlements programs) and repression (eviction and forced resettlements) (Betancur, 1995).

1.2. Illegal cities, poverty and spatial configurations: the case of the Île-de-France Region

By definition, this work is concerned with invisible occupations. Illegal occupations are transitional, sometimes unknown to public actors and urban planners and there is no available data that lists all the squats and slums in France while for example Alan Smart uses the data base from the “Squatter Control and Clearance Division of the Hong Kong Department” (Smart, 2003) or Ann Varley from the “Dirección General de Regularización Territorial” in Mexico (Varley, 1998). The first step of my work is precisely to collect data in order to give an exhaustive landscape at the metropolitan scale in Paris.
1.2.1. Squats in Paris and IDF: the poorest parts of the territory?

At this moment, my data base is still fragmented between squats and slums, and between the territories. Most of the squats are in the north and east of Paris on the right side of the Seine: a clear geographical correlation appears between location of squats and local income levels. The 18th district is the poorest of Paris. A process of pauperization left vacant shelters and squatters (precarious families, drug addicts, immigrants but also artists) found these spaces to live in. This district is the drug market of Paris and attracts many drug addicts. The renovation program implemented by social developers generated the eviction of squatters and their transfer in the north of Paris (Porte de la Chapelle). We find also many squats in the 19th district. There are many vacant spaces and Brownfield sites. Squatters can easily settle there. Many artists live in this district and there is a vibrant and active cultural life (the local city council sometimes support them). The 13th district hosted many squats during the 2000’s (les Frigos, l’Atoll 13, la Glacière, le Barbizon) but the renovation program and the intense surveillance device built around the social housings prevent squats nowadays.

![Figure 1 - Geography of squats in Paris (January 2010-December 2010)](source: Aguilara, 2010)

However, the squats in Paris are more what can be called squats of “activity” which mainly shelter social centers and artists. They represent up to 80% of the squats in Paris. The rest of the occupations

![Figure 2 - Incomes (median) in Paris (INSEE, 2008)](source: SIG Politique de la ville)
are composed of “emergency and precarious” (10%) and of “political squats” (10%). A broader perspective is presented in the AORIF data (AORIF, 2006). However, this only concerns the squats of social housings (owners are social housing developers) (N=661) and we estimate that there are 1800 squats in the whole region (1 200 squats are in private buildings) if we follow the unique survey on squats in Ile-de-France (Quercy, 2002).

![Figure 3 - Squats in social housing Ile de France Region](image)

At the regional scale, the squats are spread according to the income distribution and the quality of the buildings. Some observations and interviews with housing developers leads to the assumption that they have a stronger capacity to protect themselves in the richer departments (south and west). The department of Seine-Saint-Denis is deeply impacted because of the co-presence of a precarious population, illegal immigrants who cannot legally afford a house and a very vulnerable precarious housing stock. The general geography seems to be almost the same concerning the illegal occupation of land.

1.2.2. Slums in the Ile-de-France Region

In France, the issue of slums is deeply linked to the Roma question even if all the slum dwellers are not Roma. Indeed, we estimate the Roma population to 15 000 people living in France (legally or illegally) and 3 000 among them living in the Ile-de-France Region. Most of them live in precarious situations and particularly in slums and shantytowns. Paradoxically, the data is more easily available on slums that on squats because many NGOs and associations are involved in social programs towards Roma people. The data bases are still fragmented because each actor acts at a small scale. Again, it is very difficult to update the data base because of the frequent evictions but the local associations can help us to follow the slum dwellers on the territory. Again, the department of Seine-Saint-Denis (93) hosts most of the slums in Ile-de-France. The estimation is that there were 1790 slum dwellers in December 2010 in Seine-Saint-Denis (more than the half in IDF). Again, we observe a link between local income levels and location of slums. However, if most of the investigators and journalists focus on Seine-Saint-Denis, slums still exist in other departments. For
instance, in the Val-de-Marne (94, south of Paris) around 500 people would live in slums. Three main cities concentrate these populations in the south of the department: Orly, Villeneuve-le-Roi and Choisy-le-Roi. In the Hauts-de-Seine Department, which is the richest French department, some dwellers illegally occupy lands but the municipalities use to evict them quickly. The biggest slums in France were settled in Nanterre and in the 93rd department (Spanish, Portuguese, Algerian and French dwellers) (Pétonnet, 1979), but a large scale eradication policy has been implemented and the geography of slums has been remodeled (Gastaut, 2004).

Figure 4 - Slums and slum dwellers in Ile-de-France (“Petite Couronne”: 75, 92, 93, 94) (per city) in December 2010
Map: own conception / Data from CAM (Health Assistance Committee) and own sources

Figure 5 - Incomes (median) in Ile-de-France (“Petite Couronne”: 75, 92, 93, 94) (INSEE, 2006 : SIG Politique de la Ville)
Carrying out this quantitative and geographical work prior to the analysis is important in order to avoid being limited to case studies or to the micro analysis which prevents us to draw general and macro conclusions. After this empirical presentation, I present the need to gather the analysis of squats and slums and I address the different configurations of illegally occupying urban space to live, survive, and/or develop activities.

1.3. Illegal cities: a plurality of configurations in Paris

Illegal settlements like squats and slums host poor inhabitants who try to organize themselves to face housing shortages, discrimination in the access to social housing and housing policies unable to cope with this situation. Squats and slums are both problems and solutions (Aguilera, 2010; Bouillon, 2011): a solution to get a house, a problem for public actors and in terms of security, public health and poverty. Sometimes, these occupations are accompanied by movements of collective action but not necessarily. For instance, many inhabitants in slums don’t have the resources to mobilize themselves. Nevertheless, I am precisely interested in understanding the different forms of struggles to get the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1968) or sometimes the absence of active struggle and rather “passive occupations” subject to public policies.

Squats and slums could appear as two different modes of occupying space. Nevertheless, as I suggested above, I think it is relevant to analyze them in parallel for three main reasons. First, from a juridical point of view, squats and slums both correspond to illegal occupations of the urban space (buildings or land). Furthermore, more than simple occupations, the illegal occupation is a mode of action to resist, contest and claim while being a first response to this claim and a survival strategy. If we follow Cécile Péchu, we are dealing with “sectorial illegalisms” (Péchu, 2010: 10): “an illegal spot for the immediate realization of the claim. The squat is at the same time a negotiation tool and a response to the request that it supports”. This definition enables us to understand that the squatters and slum dwellers build their own place while claiming (more) spaces to live or survive.

Three main features appear here. The first is that squatters short-circuit and “hack” the urban housing and cultural policies (Aguilera, 2010). Indeed, they are out of the legal and traditional frame for resource allocation of spaces provided by the city council and public and private developers. For example, they usually do not subscribe for a social housing or a workshop, and this for many reasons: sometimes by choice because they refuse to wait for institutional allocations but more usually because they don’t have access to the “official channels”. They are in a situation of “non recours” (Warin, 2008, 2009, and 2010). They do not have the social resources nor the “administrative and legal knowledge”. This can be because they live in an illegal situation or, concerning Roma people, because of transitional status imposed by the law, and of course because they cannot pay a rent and legally afford housing. Thus, they find the ways to obtain these resources: « the urban poor often have to step outside the law in order to gain access to housing » (Azuela et Dubau, 1998:157). Legality is too expensive so people self-organize in order to find the means to survive.

The second remark is that these spaces of illegality are, in general spaces of precariously. Some squats in the core center of Paris have nothing to do with slums in Seine-Saint-Denis, but the general trend is that people occupy places because they cannot afford houses. Moreover, this financial fragility assures the transition to a legal fragility: “The very fact that a city is divided into « legal » and « illegal » areas has profound implications for society as a whole, since a truly public order, in the sense of social norms to which all members of society must adhere, does not exist. As long as a substantial part of the population gains access to land by a different set of process from the rest of society, it is clear that not all individuals are subject to the same rules, regardless of whether or not those rules can be formally classified as “law” ”(Azuela et Dubau, 1998:157). Squats and slums constitute the dark side of metropolization: a parallel building of the city.
The third feature is that squats and slums appear at the same time as a critique of the urban policies, a tool to ask for a roof and a strategy to survive without public support. The squat as mode of action (Péchu, 2010) combines a radical political discourse against housing policies (DAL, Jeudi Noir) or the political order in general (for example for the anarchists’ squats of Montreuil, East-Paris), with claims for welfare, housings (from the State or the municipalities) and shelter for homeless people. The most striking example seems to be in 2009 in the Parisian squat of “Rue Baudelique” (18th district of Paris) which hosted during one year more than 2000 undocumented immigrants coming from 25 different nationalities and claiming for regularization. They inhabited illegally a place to get into the legality. Furthermore, we can interpret this mode of action as anti-free rider (Olson, 1987), in the sense that to benefit from the squat (a roof and the relocation) people have to be squatters (Péchu, 2010). Concerning slums, we observe the same logic. Occupying a land is the only way to get a place to live, to be visible and request houses from the local authorities. Thus, we understand that we come back to an old debate concerning squats. Is it used as a tool or as an end? Even if we can show that illegal occupations combine both dimensions (Merklen, 2009), I try here to distinguish them in order to understand the differences between various configurations and, especially between squats and slums. I propose a factorial analysis with two components: one concerning the tool/end cleavage, the other one representing the level of resources of the dwellers. I call “resources” the social (networks), economic (financial resources) and political (links with officials, representatives, lawyers and police) capitals held by the squatters and slum dwellers. In the two next sections I will present each configuration. I will distinguish squats and slums and try to expose in the conclusion the minimum basic common points.

Hans Puijt exposes the phenomena of institutionalization of squats wondering if “institutionalization of urban movement is inevitable”? (Pruijt, 2003). He defines three configurations. The first one is the terminal institutionalization. It “implies that, in the repertoire of action, convention replaces disruption. The second is flexible institutionalization, when conventional tactics complement disruptive ones” (Pruijt, 2003:136). The third is the cooptation whereby one part of the squatters, usually the less radical or the leaders, is absorbed into leadership. This analysis is linked to the resources/goals question as according to the logic of occupying the process of institutionalization would be very different. For Hans Pruijt, the squat as an aim is more vulnerable to repression from
public actors and is less likely to persist while the squat as a mean, as a tactic to get other resources (mainly a house) allows some positive results. Thus, he distinguishes the squatting movement and the housing movement. In Paris we have both kinds.

In a precedent paper (Aguilera, 2011b) I proposed three hypotheses. First, I assumed that the struggle within illegality presents some features that influence the result of the mobilization and the treatment by public actors. Some actors without any legal resources can use “negative resources” (Wilson, 1961; Fillieule, 1993) by disturbing public order (mass challenge) and get some considerations from public actors (Piven and Cloward, 1977): welfare and houses. Second, I assumed that the level of institutionalization and of social, economic and political capital of the dwellers impacts on the mode of action used. I showed that some squatters have legal resources and use it in order to conserve alternative spaces in the city. But most of slum inhabitants are not able to develop a large network of resources. Third, I assumed that the radicalism of such occupations drives decision makers and officials to implement specific urban policies at the local level.

As Daniel Mouchard suggested (Mouchard, 2002), the groups we describe depend on the State which decides to allocate resources or chooses not to. This relationship is politicized because the main issue for groups which try to mobilize themselves (from inside or outside) is to go beyond this link of dependence by building the State as an enemy. Daniel Mouchard talks about “conflictualization” of this link. The choice of the repertoire of the “sectorial illegalisms results from specific constraints due to the weak resources of the group as the unavailability of more institutionalized means (the strike for example), and the impossibility to act under the central political system” (Mouchard, 2002: 433). Moreover, I observed that squatters and associations helping slum dwellers use the Law to defend themselves and advance claims. Law is at the same time their enemy and their main instrument to struggle. It becomes a positive resource (Israel, 2009). The illegalisms build a dialectic situation between illegality and legitimacy: “the choice is: dying within legality or living within illegality. People are forced to live within illegality and claim strongly the housing right and the right to live”.

Poverty and illegality become resources to struggle by disturbing public order, by denying private property right, by fragmenting urban order (Pattaroni, 2007). These radical occupations force public actors to react and to find other responses than repression. It has been ten years since in the Ile-de-France Region, municipalities have innovated by finding some ways of normalization and integration of the population in the legal framework (Breviglieri and Pattaroni, 2011; Aguilera, 2011a).

The last section of the paper focus on the public policies implemented towards squats and slums through a multi-level governance analysis. First, I show to what extent illegal settlements become public problems and are put on the local agenda.

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II. Squats and slums as targets of Public policies: from heterogeneous agendas to local decisions

Squats and slums correspond to illegal occupations. Although we could think that the only response from public actors would be the eviction, local actors build public policies beyond repression. The first steps consist on building a public problem (2.1.) and on putting the question of illegal occupations on the agenda. One of the main results of the research is that the national agenda does not exist while the local one (of municipalities) is very active (2.2.). These agendas are activated following different cycles. However, the activation can come from the grassroots level (2.3.).

2.1. Illegalisms and public problems: diverse approaches

The construction of a public problem is a fundamental part of the public policy field (Becker, 1985; Gusfield, 1981; Céfaï, 2009). The problems of squats and slums are differently constructed, by different actors and in different arenas.

2.1.1. Squats: between legality and legitimacy

Squatting is an illegal, collective or individual, occupation of a building in order to get a house and to claim housing rights without the permit of the owner. The squatting problem is defined between two different juridical and constitutional rights. The first is the private property right which is fundamental. It is defined by the first article of Human Right Declaration and is one of the rights at the top of the French Constitution. It is one of the most powerful Right in France. On the other hand, squatting introduces another right: the Housing Right. It is also constitutional but less important in the juridical hierarchy. However, squatters know how to mobilize and use the “legitimacy” of their action: they need a roof, the Law says “every citizen can ask a house to the State” (Law DALO) and the State is not able to provide them. Squatting creates a public arena where private ownership defenders and housing right activists struggle to become the “owner of the housing problem” (Becker, 1985). Moreover, many squatters’ movements like Jeudi Noir or DAL denounce the illegality of the State which doesn’t implement two different laws: the DALO9 and the requisition law of 194510. Actually, actors claim that the law be enforced.

2.1.2. Slums: between precariousness, spatial exclusion, immigration and security

As I suggested above, in the Ile-de-France Region the question of slums is related to the immigrants and Roma people. During the 1960s, the topic of slums was addressed within the global question of housing precariousness. Nowadays and since the 2000s, the Roma population is heavily stigmatized and many prejudices developed: for instance, the idea of their mobility and that Roma are nomad, their poverty (Asséo, 1994, 2007). Above all, State officials and media strongly contribute to criminalize them. At the national level, the discourses focus on the immigration, the security and health problems. This approach is linked to the European Union vision.

The problem seems quite different at the regional and local level and above all for left wing city councils. In fact, the Regional Assembly as well as the municipalities insists on the spatial

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9 The DALO (Droit Au Logement Opposable- Rights to Housing Law) was voted in 2007. The aim is to increase the right of people waiting for a social housing to attack the State during a juridical procedure. This law has been inefficient because the queue to get a house in Paris is too large.

10 The Law of Requisition was voted in 1945. It allows the State to requisition housings in shortage period to rent social housings. It was used during the 1950s during the reconstruction post-war period, during the 1990 and the 2000 but it seems that it was not very efficient because the owners succeeded in finding alternatives.
consequences and the implications for urban and regional planning (Legros, 2010). Also, it underlines the deep housing shortage in Ile-de-France. This vision is supported by the action of NGOs and local associations which defend Human Right and Roma populations. Moreover, left wing local associations emphasize the fact that a city needs cultural diversity and promote the Roma people’s culture. There are also some cases of right wing association and neighborhoods’ committee which struggle against the illegal occupations because they disturb the district.

2.2. Multilevel Agendas and Governance conflicts: local vs. national, cities vs. State.

Public problems are differently framed at different scales, depending on different visions of the problem. The State has the national legitimacy to impose one framework with the law, but the municipalities (left wing local officials) act at the local level and succeed in developing another “public arena” (Gusfield, 1981).

2.2.1. The national agenda: Agenda denial, redefinition and crisis

The agenda building is fragmented depending on the institutional scale. We have to distinguish the national and the local agendas. On the one hand, the national agenda for squats and slums is “dead” and “empty”. The French President’s speech about Roma people last summer was an exception. It was part of the large scale criminalization process driven by the national right wing government. Beyond this moment, the State only intervenes for evictions. An eviction needs the juridical agreement from the judge who can require the intervention of the police. Then, the local State representative (the Prefect) sends the police. Concerning squats, however two moments which could reflect an attempt to implement a policy since the 2000s can be observed. The first initiative came from social housing developers which are very concerned by squats. The latter asked the local State and the ministry to organize debates between the juridical institutions, the ministry of Internal Affairs, the Housing Ministry and the Regional Assembly in order to make the national Law evolve and to find solutions. A first meeting was organized in 2002. The Ile-de-France Regional Institution financed a survey on squats at the scale of the Region (Quercy, 2002). The survey is the first one which gives exhaustive data. However, the survey was not followed by concrete action and has been thrown out. A strong lack of political willingness led to a governing failure.

“Nobody wanted to build anything. The problem seemed to be a juridical problem and nobody wanted to change the law. Thus, after the meeting we forgot everything. If the Housing minister wanted to put it on the agenda it could have work but nothing was done. So, no policy has been implemented at this moment” (Prefect and Former advisor of the prime Minister and of the Housing Minister).

A second attempt took place in 2005 in a similar context. Housing developers asked a survey to the Region which organized a meeting (AORIF, 2006). Again, nobody was interested in this problem and the topic has been left to the responsibility of private owners and local actors. This failure in creating an agenda on squats and slums could be interpreted as an “agenda denial” situation (Cobb and Ross, 1997). The State decision makers avoid putting the problems on the agenda because they know that they don’t have the resources and are not able to resolve it because of juridical deadlocks and because of the municipalities’ involvement in this field. Thus, the ministers and the Prefects have no incentive to engage a large scale action.

\[11\] In France the Law is quite tolerant towards squats. Indeed, squats are considered as a “civil” problem and not a “penal” problem as in Spain for instance.
Instead of opening an agenda, national officials and representatives reformulate, reframe and redefine the problem (Cobb and Ross, 1997). Indeed, as I suggested in the first section of the paper, squats and slums are poor spaces. The main problems concerning these places are housing, poverty and unstable status. Yet, national officials’ discourses seem to focus on the problems of security, immigration and crime. They open a strong process of criminalization of these “unruly places” by changing the focus on minor problems. For example, in July 2010, the French President initiated a large scale operation of illegal settlements just after an incident: a policeman was killed during an operation and the police, media and officials accused a Gypsy. This accident was the beginning of a large amalgam between Gypsies, Roma, travelers and slum dwellers. The fact is that two days after, the prefects received an official circular ordering them to evict the illegal settlements.

Official Circular from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Immigration, of Integration, of the National Identity and Solidarity to the Prefects (June the 24th of 2010).

The Government intends to fight against the development of illegal settlements, particularly in large cities. In fact, these settlements give rise to three main concerns: they violate the ownership right; living conditions are unacceptable in terms of security and safety, and incompatible with any credible plan for integration. Finally, these settlements can harbor criminal activities (...). You [the Prefects] can:
- evacuate illegal settlements;
- expulse inhabitants from France if they are not French citizens and live illegally on our territory”.

This example shows how the stigmatization and criminalization process enable the State to put the question of squats and slums on the agenda after “crisis” and particular events like fires, crimes, drug traffics dismantling or robberies.

2.1.2. The local agenda: from a spatial problem to the political action

On the other hand, the local agenda is very active. Thus, I observed two levels of action. The first concerns the social housing developers. Their ownerships usually are subjects to squats and they have to deal with squatters. In order to face the inability of the State to act, they developed strategies to protect their buildings. They mainly invested in private surveillance societies and technical tools.

The second level concerns the municipalities. The City Councils, above all left wing ones, usually affirm their resistance to the national government and their support to local committees’ actions. Local representatives in the Seine-Saint-Denis department (traditionally communist and socialist) have put the question of illegal and precarious housings on the agenda for a long time. The rest of the City Council in the Ile-de-France Region has followed this behavior.

Declaration of Nanterre City Council on “discrimination policy of the government, and the situation of Travelers in Nanterre” (September, 14th of 2010):

“For several weeks, through a series of statements and announcements, the President of the Republic and several ministers designate communities and population groups as being the subject of special measures to fight against crime. Roma, Travelers and foreigners are stigmatized. The stigma is dangerous and unacceptable. It poses serious question the principles that underpin the Republican identity. It leads to what the law no longer apply depending on what you are doing but what we are. Such a drift has no legitimacy, and the debate on the fight against crime can in no case be an excuse. In a city like Nanterre, which is a welcoming population and mix of cultures for many generations, it is our duty to denounce the racist character of this government policy, and to contribute, by deeds, to allow all our citizens to live together with dignity (...)

Therefore, the City Council of Nanterre:
- Condemns the racist declarations and announcements from the President of the Republic and several ministers designating certain groups as being responsible for prior delinquency and insecurity,
- Supports the mobilizations brought against the government policy that violates the principles of republican equality and threatens social cohesion,
- Undertake to adopt, within a maximum period of one year, a resolution defining the concrete layout of an area in Nanterre Home Travelers, in accordance with the Act of July 5, 2000 and PLU, and to implement as soon as possible,
- Ask the Préfet of Hauts-de-Seine to implement the scheme county home Travelers so that all the municipalities concerned are in conformity with the law”.

The national State is only responsible for the Law enforcement. Municipalities, closer to their citizens, implement policies to counteract this legalistic action. Above all, left wing City Councils try to moderate the right wing policies implemented by the National Government. In the third section of the paper, I focus on the municipalities’ policies implemented towards squats and slums.

2.3. “Cycles of attention”

The agenda is heterogeneous and follows different cycles (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005) due to different factors. Sometimes the squatters themselves are able to push the housing problem on the agenda. Sometimes, crises trigger the opening of the attention from the media and politics.

2.3.1. An agenda from the bottom. The media logic of squatters: the case of one squatting collective (Jeudi Noir)

Jeudi Noir is one of the most famous squatting group in Paris. This collective was founded in 2006 to denounce the high prices of housing in France. Its first action was to invite journalists in flat visits to show the extremely high prices of housing for students and precarious families. Then, it entered into another repertoire of collective action with squatting in 2007. The activists have since opened 13 squats. They seek and find vacant buildings to squat and draw the attention on the inefficient housing policy of the municipality and of the State. One of the specificities of the action group compared to the other Parisian squatters is the massive use of Media: “we don’t want more activists but more Media” (Collectif Jeudi Noir, 2009). The media logic is the central dimension of their action. The squat is only a tool to draw the attention of the media and thus of national and local representatives. I call them “agenda builders” because they are able to create two kinds of “cycles of attention” (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005). The first agenda concerns squats. Each occupation of Jeudi Noir increases the number of articles about squats in newspapers and television. The second agenda is Housing policies. Each occupation represents the opportunity to challenge politics. I represent below the change in the number of newspaper articles (from the local newspaper Le Parisien Aujourd’hui en France) depending on the opening of squats by Jeudi Noir. I also mention the period when evictions are prohibited (“winter truce”). This law only concerns legal renters and not squatters but the squatters and lawyers use it to defend themselves because the State often avoids evicting during this period to prevent a delegitimization its action.
A brief sociology of the members of the group shows that they are students, artists but also activists (ecologists, socialists, and extreme-left activists) who don’t necessarily need to squat. They have many resources (cf. Figure 7) and use it in order to mobilize journalists, officials and representatives (Aguilera, 2011b).

2.3.2. Crisis, events and conjuncture as factors of attention

Some events and conjunctures cause specific cycles of attention which push public authorities to intervene. The first factor of decision is the accident. When there is a fire, when children die in a squat or a slum or after a building collapses officials usually announce specific public policies in order to avoid other such catastrophes. The second factor is the political agenda. Specific temporalities like electoral campaigns push officials to answer to social movements. Squatters and NGOs know that candidates are quite vulnerable in the sense that they are building programs and they cannot refuse some claims from civil society. During these periods, political opportunity structure open and the conjuncture appears as an opportunity for housing movements’ groups to get consideration from the political sphere. Thus, the agenda follows the “politics of attention” described by Baumgartner and Jones in 2005: representatives and media focus on one topic at a certain moment.

Squats and slums are targets of public policies but not always and for the same reasons. In the next section, I focus on the policy instruments implemented by local public actors.
III. Governing the illegal city through policy instruments to govern the ungovernable?

The literature on squats and slums usually emphasizes the “dark side” of public policies: the eviction process (Vitale, 2008, 2009). It underlines the modern societies’ general and dominant repression paradigm. The State Law appears as the enemy of illegal and deviant practices. However, as distinguished above, local actors implement different policies. Indeed, they follow alternative strategies to the national policies in order to control and develop projects with marginal populations rather than repress and evict them. The “public policies dilemmas” evoked in introduction lies here: the government of illegalisms oscillates between repression (from the State) and tolerance (from municipalities). This last section of the paper describes the different policy instruments built by municipalities in order to govern squats and slums: the contract (3.1.) and the urban project (3.2.). With these instruments, public actors integrate squatters and dwellers in to the urban governance framework. They authorize negotiations and representatives usually take the place of a mediator between squatters and owners.

3.1. Normalizing illegal occupations through the contract

The judicial contract enables the local officials to make squatters and dwellers participate to the urban governance. They negotiate a transitional and precarious occupation in order to normalize their situation without deciding an eviction.

3.1.1. The precarious lease for squatters and slum dwellers

The precarious lease is a contract between squatters or an association of slum dwellers and the owner of the building or the land. It is an instrument of normalization of the relationship between squatters and owners. Thus, it is a first step to reduce the tension between property right and housing right. Moreover, it is a means for the municipality to legally control illegal spaces. Public actors are concerned by this contract in two ways. When the state or the municipality are the owners of the squatted building or land, they can draft and propose a lease. Furthermore, even if they are not the owners, they can intervene in the procedure by taking the lawyer’s place. The municipality often tries to give a specific orientation of the lease during the negotiations: the kind of occupation, the period, the rent, the number of dwellers.

Concerning squats in Paris, the director of the Housing Department always sets security norms. For instance, the “Petite Rockette” didn’t get a lease because the building was not appropriate to host so many people and artists’ workshops at the same time. The squatters and the owners are both winners through this procedure and they usually accept it. The squatters can stay and the owner avoids a juridical procedure of eviction which is quite a burden. From illegal to contractual, squatters change their status but they stay on the same place and keep, more or less, the same activities. Although the Law is the squatters’ enemy, it is also a resource which they know how to use. The precarious lease establishes a social regulation norm which becomes the main solution in squats affairs. Moreover,

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12 I also analyzed this side in my precedent works (Aguilera, 2010b).
13 Policy instruments are defined as “both technical and social systems which organize particular social relationships between political power and people governed, functions of the representations and the meanings it supports” (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004: 13).
14 Through this contract the owner allows the squatters to stay in the building during a short period if they pay a small rent (around 200 or 300 Euros per month).
15 In Paris, on May 2010, 18 squats were under agreement with the City Council with this precarious contract.
the lease appears as an efficient means to introduce the law and some norms within an illegal space. The aim of the municipality is to diffuse rules everywhere in Paris to preserve public order. This instrument has been recently adopted by the municipalities to govern slums. Indeed, since 2007, the left wing officials of the Seine-Saint-Denis Department began to avoid systematic eviction without relocation of the dwellers who cannot afford legally a house. For example, in April 2011, the municipality of Saint-Denis proposed a precarious lease for a land occupied by almost 100 Roma people living in a slum. The aim is to give a stable land occupation status in order to avoid evictions from the police and to be able to develop legal social services and infrastructure. Other municipalities in Ile-de-France are following this experience which appears as a good compromise between transitional settlements and the goal of sustainable city.

3.2. Governing through the urban project

Just like the precarious lease contract, the urban project is a policy instrument. The urban project is not neutral, as all policy instruments. It is not only “a space or a sequence of action but a mode of action” (Pinson, 2004: 200). It presents three fundamental dimensions. Firstly, it is a social mobilization instrument: it brings together different actors around a common problem. Secondly, it is based on the past, on the traditions and the practices of a place. It establishes a dialogue between the resources, the heritage of a territory and the objectives of a public policy (Pinson, 2004: 202). It enables to create a compromise between squatters, owners and public actors. Finally, it legitimates the “ordinary” citizens’ knowledge giving them the opportunity to participate in the collective management of their neighborhood. Regarding our topic, I examine the project through three characteristics. The project is a powerful instrument to control illegality.

3.2.1. Call for project for squats

“Squatters are urban planners”...

The project is used by policy makers to “select” the occupations of space by using democratic procedures of competition when they want to change the use of a squatted building. Through the project procedure, squatters are welcomed to participate in imagining the future of this building. Squatters have to enter the legal sphere and accept the status of urban planners or experts. They have to present a file to candidate as the squatters of the “Petite Rockette” did with the help of the NGO “Médecins du Monde”, or the artists of the “Forge de Belleville” in 2009. This process forces squatters to respect administrative norms: budgets, security norms, public order. They have to determine the allocation of the place (artistic place with workshops, living place with bed rooms…). They have to accept the ground rules of the urban planning. For the Paris City Council, it is a real vector of power because the officials are able to control small spaces which are usually irrelevant to their political skill. The request for proposal is open and free. If squatters win the competition they have to respect the contract and the rules. Thus, they are under control. If they lose they are evicted. Nevertheless, in Paris they usually lose the request for proposal. It is a great means to justify and legitimate squatters’ evictions. It is a very useful instrument of urban planning by accepting a link between durability and the short-life of some urban practices like squatting.

Besides, the project is employed to impose a new use of the place. When the municipality is the owner of the building, it often imposes its project without organizing a request for proposal. Usually, its project concerns social housing (35% of the cases), day-nurseries (40% of the cases) or social residences (10% of the cases). For squatters and their lawyers these projects are not “valid”, but rather ad hoc projects, and represent an excuse to evict them. Many actors claim that the day-nursery argument is useful to show the judge during the procedure that it is necessary to evict the squatters who are disturbing the citizens.
“They [successive directors of the Housing Department] always impose day-nurseries! Or schools...so, when you go to courts, even if there is no real project, the judge concedes this project because in Paris we need many day-nurseries” (Interviewed Lawyer of many squatters)

However, the housing department director of Paris argued that all these projects had been planned for a long time and that they were delayed because of the squatters. This instrument enables officials and representatives to avoid the blame of the eviction by Parisians once again. However, the squatters, who accept to leave when a social housing project is suggested, ask for guarantees. They want to be sure that the social housings will be built and ask the name of the developer, the building delay and the proof that the budget is ready. Indeed, the contract is usually not respected and the project is almost never achieved (only 7 projects were achieved in Paris in 2010, among more than 30 proposed since 2001).

…but also squatters are “urban parasites”

For public actor, squatters are parasites for two reasons. First of all, they occupy vacant spaces which are designed for a public or private development. So they prevent managers from completing it. They introduce a disruption within the order of urban planning because investors and developers can remove their investments or owner cannot sell their good. Usually, when a social project is at stake, squatters leave without a procedure making a point out of the fact that these kinds of policies are what their actions claim. It was the case of the squatters of Jeudi Noir who decided to leave the squat of “La Bonne Graine” where the company ADOMA had a social residence project for immigrant workers. Nevertheless, it is the second reason why squatters are considered as “undesirable”, the main problem of squatting in Paris for the housing department officials is the matter of relocation, when squatters want a new building or a flat once they have been evicted. Indeed, for the housing department it couldn’t be acceptable to give a house to squatters who disturb public order, while people who are legally waiting for one are not given one. The example of the “Law DALO” in France illustrates this. Squatters usually denounce this law for its inefficiency but then they mobilize it to get a house. If they get a house “DALO” they are privileged because there is no reason to give it to them before giving it to people who are subscribed in the official waiting list:

“There is no reason to legitimate their action giving them a house or a workshop!” (Housing Department Director of the municipality of Paris).

We can analyze some examples of artists’ relocations. We can analyze this fact through the scope of the cultural policy of Paris which tries to promote an alternative culture in the city. The most famous example in Paris is the “59 Rivoli”. The mayor Bertrand Delanoë decided to relocate them, during the period of rehabilitation of the squat, to another squat called “La Tour” in the north of Paris. He said that it was an exception but it can be argued that it created a kind of precedence for many other squats. However, the relocation of artists seems to be easier than for other squatters such as drug addicts, precarious families or illegal immigrants. This different application of the policy during the implementation is what we call a differential management of illegalisms (Sutherland, 1983; Cicourel, 1968; Foucault, 1975, 2001; Fischer et Spire, 2009). The law is not applied to all spaces, to every people. The application of the law and the implementation of policies depend on the target population. We can identify two logics here. Firstly, the municipality acts according to the location of the squat. It is easier to tolerate a squat in a peripheral district (the 18th, 19th, 20th districts for example) than in a central, touristic and rich district. Secondly, if squatters are integrated in a neighborhood and have developed strong social relationships with the population of the district, assuming a social and cultural mission, they could be tolerated. If the “animators” (artists and
political friendly activists) are considered as actors, the “troublemakers” (drug addicts, illegal immigrants, poor families) are evicted (Aguilera, 2010a and 2010b).

3.2.2. “Les villages d’insertion” for slum dwellers: an integrative or exclusive logic?

The project as a policy instrument has been used by the Paris City Council at the beginning of the 2000s for squats of buildings. As it appeared as a successful experience, the procedure has been transferred to other municipalities and to other kind of occupation like slums. As I presented in the first section of the paper, the biggest slums in Ile-de-France are in the north of Paris, in the Seine-Saint-Denis Department. In order to face the increasing number of slum dwellers, the local officials decided to think an alternative action to eviction. The officials understood during the middle of the 2000s that evicting one camp of their territory merely moved dwellers to the neighboring city. Indeed, each slum eviction causes the fragmentation and the proliferation of slums. The more the State expulses, the more it becomes difficult to control slum dwellers and urban planning (Legros, 2010). Olivier Legros describes a “coproduction” of slums: “The land evictions also contribute to the slums’ development”. The municipalities had to find a means to avoid this fragmentation of their territory. Periurban cities usually work as “clubs” in Europe but a form of solidarity emerged on this particular problem because of the metropolitan cooperation (Communauté d’agglomération). The cities of Plaine Commune CA\(^{16}\) were the first to consider alternative program for slums. The idea was to find a solution that would keep Roma people on the territory by trying to integrate them into a legal and stable status.

Thus, in 2007 the City Council of Aubervilliers created a new tool. It created the first “village d’insertion”. This “village” is a closed settlement which hosts very few people coming from a slum in “modular” and transitional housings. The principle seems very simple: these villages are “transition airlocks”. The aim is to select slum dwellers in a slum (those who are the more susceptible to get a house after, a job, who speak French, who put children at school), putting them in the camp. The logic is to evict a slum, select a small part of the dwellers and fix them in a legal place. A dialectical dynamic is built to control lands and populations: “fix and eject” (Bernardot, 2008). “Fix”: social workers can follow them and help people during the administrative procedure to get jobs and houses. “Eject”: the urban renewal policies need land and space. In 2009, Saint-Denis, Bobigny, Saint-Ouen and Montreuil provided the same villages. I focus in the following section on the genesis of the first project in Aubervilliers.

The genesis of the project: a local decision facing a local emergency

The “village” instrument has been produced by a process of coordination between many different actors. At the beginning, the decision was taken by the City Council of Aubervilliers with the local Prefect and the Department Assembly\(^{17}\). This decision was taken after the Regional Assembly voted a declaration to provide subsidies for a new project implementation in 2005: the MOUS (Maîtrise d’Oeuvre Urbaine et Sociale)\(^{18}\). This MOUS is more a “practice”, a dispositive of governance rather than a new institution. The law defines two main missions: a technical side and a social side:

\(^{16}\) Plaine Commune is a group of cities (CA) which includes eight towns of the north of Paris: Saint-Denis, La Courneuve, Aubervilliers, Stains, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Ile-Saint-Denis, Epinay-sur-Seine and Villetaneuse.

\(^{17}\) Nevertheless, some interviews enable me to suppose that the idea of a social “airlock” for precarious squatters had been evoked during the first meeting with Housing Developers and representatives from the State concerning squats in 2002. This idea had been abandoned but updated in 2007.

\(^{18}\) This tool of governance was created by a national law of 1989 and modified by a Circular in 1995. The dispositive is financed for 50% by the State, and 50% by the municipality.
“The technical program for the production of adapted housing includes prospecting, identification of land and real estate opportunities and assistance with project management for installation projects. Social support is to bring out the household needs, build with them a consistent housing project with the expressed needs and technical financial constraints, to involve them in the site either directly (participation in) or indirectly (working with information and cooperation for technical decisions) and to assist in carrying out administrative procedures prior to entry into the premises”19.

In June 2005, the Regional Assembly proposed 500.000€ to subsidize the project in Aubervilliers. In December, the City Council voted the implementation of the MOUS after negotiations with the Prefect who wanted to evict the slum dwellers. In fact, at this moment, the slum dwellers situation called an emergent intervention from public actors in order to face the expansion of slums. Aubervilliers hosted 370 slum dwellers in three main sites. The health conditions were very poor and the City Council judged that it was impossible to implement an upgrading program. The local officials decided to create specific areas to host and help dwellers.

“The municipality took the decision to clearly intervene and not only regulate some practices by implementing garbage collections and timely aids. We decided to create a specific site to host extreme precarious people” (Official in charge of the MOUS).

Actors and techniques: controlling people and disciplining spaces

The first issue was to find a land to host the dwellers. The City Council chose a vacant land (3 000 square meters) it owned close to the highway20. The second was to find actors to manage and finance the project. The public problem has been framed around the housing questions. In fact, the decision makers chose the housing actors in Ile-de-France to manage the project. The local officials and representatives proposed a public call for project and the PACT ARIM 9321 won it because of its important experience in this field. The “Fondation Abbé Pierre” gave caravans to transiently host slum dwellers and opened the debate on slums and poverty. For the village project, it financed the social work around families. A youth and housing association has been mobilized: the ALJ 93. The latter won the second call for project in 2009. These actors brought their experience and skills, their human capital and funds. However, the Aubervilliers City Council has been put aside since the beginning and has not been able to face the challenges of this complex governance. If the decision clearly came from local officials and representatives, the multilevel urban governance process during the implementation phase has reduced the local political willingness.

Once land and actors have been selected, the latter had to select the dwellers. The PACT ARIM and the City Council gave criteria to select the “acceptable” inhabitants. The main criteria were: the emergency of the family situation and the motivation to stay in France, work and find a house. Finally, 64 dwellers were selected: 13 men, 18 women, 23 children hosted in 18 houses22. The rest of the slum dwellers have been evicted from the dispositif and from the land. The “village” has been created for 64 people while more than 300 people were living in slums. The “lag” still causes strong and controversial debates between the actors concerned by slums. Moreover, for some of them the

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20 This land was also dedicated to host travelers.
21 The PACT ARIM is an agency which finances housing rehabilitations.
evaluation of the project is not so positive after 5 years. In April 2011, 59 people were still living in the village. 2 inhabitants got a stable job, 7 an unstable job. 4 families are involved into a professional training. Since July 2010 two families have been relocated in a stable house. The managers of the project argue that “it is better than nothing”. The “village” instrument enables local authorities to control lands and populations. The urban project frame actors and public authorities are able to govern their behavior (Foucault) as well as they can reclaim land. Beyond the political willingness to provide welfare to poor people, this project could be interpreted following two hypotheses. The first is a blame avoidance strategy (Weaver, 1986): local officials want to legitimate the eviction of a slum and to avoid the blame from voters who usually protest against such practices. The second is a discipline strategy: in order to keep control on the territory with technical dispositive, local actors build statistics and provide minimum social services. We observed a differential government of illegalisms again in the sense that the selection process categorizes differently the same populations and normalizes some of them in order to evict the former.

Conclusion

To give a general perspective of the urban governance around squats and slums we could say that the State (National Government) evicts the illegal settlements and squats and also give funds to realize local projects. However, we do not observe a real public policy towards squats and slums implemented at the national scale. The local level seems more relevant in that field. I showed that many initiatives coming from the municipalities push officials and decision makers to implement specific urban policies and tools in order to normalize and control illegal occupations. The project and the contract are used as urban planners’ instruments in order to build a more sustainable city on a short-life place like squats or slums. On the one hand, squatting is limited in time and eviction is unavoidable. On the other hand, the main claim for policy makers is to build a sustainable city. Squatting seems to be a relevant transition between these two dimensions and the project could be the procedural link. The city council is in charge of controlling its territory but is not able to make use of all available spaces: vacant spaces persist in Ile-de-France (for instance, some as industrial waste land). The project and the precarious contracts are means to struggle against these vacant spaces by occupying them while waiting for a more sustainable project. Above all, these instruments are powerful tools of control over the population and lands. The ungovernable city becomes governable at certain moments, for certain populations and certain lands. Moreover, governing squats and slums aims at building public order in the city. Public order is built with four main vectors. The first is the ownership right: the Law has to enforce it. The second vector is the public health and security. Many problems emerged in these places and public actors have to provide welfare to the inhabitants. The third is the project. Governing a society or a city consists in developing project and building strategies to attract investments and increase the economic growth, to limit the urban expansion and build a sustainable city. Furthermore, it involves the provision of services and infrastructures for citizens. The fourth is the “nuisance”. Nobody can disturb the “normal” life of the city. As Pierre Favre suggested, “the Government governs, of course, but it does not govern everybody and all the time (...) the Governor governs only certain sectors of society and at certain times” (Favre, 2003). Thus, municipalities try to decrease the ungovernable interstices and to increase their political capacities by enlarging the territories that are normalized, framed by rules and on which an urban project assures the building of a sustainable metropolis. I propose to explore the urban governance by the bottom, by the negative. Understanding the government of the “margin” and the

illegal city helps us to better understand the whole process of metropolization. The second main proposition of this paper is that a multilevel analysis can help explain the discrepancies between state and municipality policies. Cities play the role of the mediator between the local population and the central government, but more than that they are able to implement policies that challenge policies proposed at the centre.

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