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*Dealing with diversity in 21st century urban settings.*

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The Sceptical Citizen, The Mobile Citizen, and The Converted National:
Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore Negotiating “Skilled Diasporic Citizenship”

Sin Yee Koh

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PhD student
Department of Geography and Environment
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
s.y.koh@lse.ac.uk

Sin Yee Koh
s.y.koh@lse.ac.uk

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This paper examines how the cases of tertiary-educated Chinese-Malaysians who are/were Singapore permanent residents and/or citizens inform a grounded theory of “skilled diasporic citizenship”. By connecting two previously unlinked themes of “skilled diaspora” and “meanings of citizenship”, I argue for a critical analysis of assumptions underlying notions of (diasporic) citizenship, identity, loyalty and belonging that have been left unquestioned with respect to skilled diasporas. I hypothesise that skilled diasporas’ negotiations of such concepts (through reciprocal relationships with their sending and receiving states) inform their subsequent citizenship and migration decisions. The cases, exemplifying the sceptical citizen, the mobile citizen, and the converted national, further complicate notions of “citizen”, “diaspora” and “transnational migrant” in the context of Malaysia and Singapore’s interlinked colonial and contemporary trajectories.

Introduction

Theoretical Context

Globalisation and the age of migration have brought about challenges to the notion of “citizenship” through five dimensions. Firstly, geographies of citizenship – de-territorialised spaces, scales and boundaries (cities, regions, nation-states, global, transnational); secondly, relationships of citizenship – complexities in loyalty and social contract between citizenship-subjects and institutions conferring citizenships; thirdly, content of citizenship – differentiation and/or expansion of rights (social, political, democratic); fourthly, meanings of citizenship – as identity, belonging and membership or as rights, privileges and responsibilities; and lastly, strategies of citizenship – how actors (including citizen-subjects, migrants and institutions conferring citizenship) manoeuvre and capitalise on citizenship statuses in their various projects.

At the same time, globalisation and increased ease of mobility have catalysed international skilled migration. Some have referred to this as “skilled diaspora” (Brinkerhoff, 2006), and positioned this vis-à-vis the migration-development nexus. Debates have shifted from pessimistic (brain-drain, brain waste) to positive (brain-circulation). Emphases are now placed on roles of (1) sending states in engaging their diasporas and facilitating their contributions; and (2) diasporas in initiating and participating in homeland-development projects. For skilled diasporas, these take the form of diaspora networks, knowledge transfers, and return migration.
However, attention has been focused on economics of skilled diasporas from demand-side perspectives (remittances, competition for human capital). Consequently, there has been a lack of critical examination of “citizenship” in these debates: (1) an underlying assumption that skilled diasporas, by virtue of being citizens of sending states, are \textit{obliged} or \textit{genuinely desire} to contribute to development at home and/or return; (2) a lack of questioning of terms such as “citizens” and “nationals” in skilled diasporas’ relationships to sending and receiving states; (3) failure to recognise diversities within the assumed unified, collective diaspora; and (4) a lack of examination of these issues from \textit{diasporas’ perspectives} (i.e. supply-side).

\textbf{Empirical Context}

Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP) and its legacies have created a push for emigration, especially of the Chinese-Malaysians (Cartier, 2003; Hing, 2000; Yow, 2007). Here, I use the term “Chinese-Malaysians” in reference to people of Chinese ethnicity born in Malaysia, or of Malaysian parents. As Malaysia’s largest “diaspora”, many Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore have taken up Singapore permanent residence (PR) or citizenship. However, most continue to consider themselves Malaysians, and Malaysia as “home” (Lam & Yeoh, 2004). Although some feel strongly about retaining their Malaysian citizenship and harbour an “imagined return” (Long & Oxfeld, 2004), many have not actually done so, and do not have real course of actions in contributing towards the development of “homeland” in terms of existing interpretations of “diaspora”.

\textbf{Table 1: Number of Malaysian migrants with tertiary education in OECD countries}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resident in</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>34,716</td>
<td>39,601</td>
<td>14.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8,480</td>
<td>12,170</td>
<td>43.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>4,719</td>
<td>5,157</td>
<td>9.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9,812</td>
<td>16,190</td>
<td>65.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12,315</td>
<td>24,695</td>
<td>100.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2,607</td>
<td>4,508</td>
<td>72.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72,649</td>
<td>102,321</td>
<td>40.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2004)

In March 2010, the Malaysian government announced the New Economic Model (NEM), aimed at achieving “high income”, “sustainability”, and “inclusiveness” with benefits for the \textit{rakyat} (lit. the people) (Abdul Razak, 2010). Talent Corporation Malaysia Berhad (Talent Corp),

\[\text{An exception is Liu (2009). Leitner and Erhkamp’s (2006) study does so, but not specifically on skilled diasporas.}\]

\[\text{Where diversities are acknowledged, they often refer to heterogeneity of diaspora organisations or types of skilled diaspora (e.g. students, professionals, scientists), and not individuals.}\]
set up on 1 January 2011 under the Prime Minister’s Department, has been tasked to initiate and facilitate strategies to meet Malaysia’s talent needs, including attracting the Malaysian diaspora and foreign skilled migrants through appealing policies (e.g. open-ended visas, lowering restrictions in property acquisition). One of the key strategies is to revive the Brain Gain Malaysia (BGM) programme by attracting the “Malaysian diaspora” home (Yakcop, 2009). However, this specifically targets “Researchers, Scientist, Engineers and Technopreneurs (RSETs)” (MOSTI, 2010), effectively ignoring the increasing exodus of tertiary-educated emigrants who may not be RSETs (Table 1).

At the same time, amidst recent concerns on the increasing numbers of immigrants, PRs and naturalised citizens, the Singapore government has shifted its stand from open (skilled) immigration and naturalisation towards “ensuring quality and assimilability” (Wong, 2010:3). This will be implemented by moderating “the inflow of ... foreign workforce over time” (ibid.), tightening the PR/citizen assessment framework (ibid.:4), and establishing “a greater distinction in privileges and benefits between Singaporeans and PRs in the areas of education and healthcare” (ibid.:5). Between 2008 and 2009, the number of PRs granted has significantly dropped by 25%, while the number of citizenships granted has dropped by 3% (Figure 1). In addition, the National Integration Council was set-up in 2009 to “promote mutual trust and understanding, and foster a common sense of belonging to Singapore” (MCYS, 2009). These shifts signal the increasing emphasis placed on a Singaporean nation for Singaporeans.

Figure 1: Singapore’s PR and citizenship trends (2000-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New PR granted</th>
<th>New SC granted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>23,509</td>
<td>6,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>20,513</td>
<td>59,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>19,928</td>
<td>79,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>20,513</td>
<td>19,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>20,513</td>
<td>19,928</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>19,928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Wong (2010:Chart 2)

This Research

These recent developments present a unique and timely opportunity to investigate skilled diasporas’ politics of citizenship, identity and belonging in the Malaysia-Singapore
context. This research, conducted between January and August 2010, is based on questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews with Chinese-Malaysians who have resided in Singapore for at least two years. The cases of tertiary-educated Chinese-Malaysians who are/were Singapore PR or citizens challenge notions of “citizens”, “diasporas” and “transnational migrants”. Caught in between two “umbilically linked” (Lam & Yeoh, 2004:142) countries, I argue that their negotiations of citizenship, identity, home and belonging, shaped simultaneously by institutional and everyday life processes, subsequently inform and shape their citizenship and migration trajectories.

Although scholars calling for research grounded in everyday lives do so with respect to transnational migration (e.g. Conradson & Latham, 2005; Portes et al., 1999), I see this as equally relevant to skilled diaspora studies, especially in relation to issues of identity and belonging. Using Laguerre’s (1997) and Siu’s (2005) “diasporic citizenship” as starting points, I propose a grounded theory of “skilled diasporic citizenship” as a conceptual and methodological tool to understand skilled diasporas’ reciprocal relationships to both sending and receiving states in the Malaysia-Singapore context.

This paper is structured into 4 sections. First, I explain the theoretical framework for “skilled diasporic citizenship”. Second, I provide empirical background on skilled emigration from Malaysia into Singapore. Third, I focus on 3 citizen-types – the sceptical citizen, the mobile citizen, and the converted national – and consider questions they raise for “citizenship” in the context of skilled diaspora. Finally, I draw the discussions to a reflective conclusion and suggest future research questions.

Theoretical Framework
(Skilled) Diaspora: Meanings, Makings, Belongings and Loyalties

“Diaspora”, originally used in reference to the Jewish dispersal from Jerusalem, has connotations of exile, displacement, loss, alienation and a yearning for the homeland. However, there has since been an expansion of interpretations beyond its original context. “Diaspora” has been used to refer to a group, an identity, a process, a movement across space or border, and a state of mind. In reference to a group, it has been used to describe practically any “deterioralised” or “transnational” community (Vertovec, 1997), even those uprooted for political or economic reasons (Knight, 2002).

Here, I find Vertovec’s (1997) three classifications of “diaspora” particularly useful in conceptualising “diaspora” beyond a socio-political group, which may not be relevant to skilled diasporas. First, “diaspora” as social form includes (1) all specific kinds of social relationships (i.e. any community) bonded by a shared history and geography; (2) tensions of political affiliations resulting in divided loyalties between “home” and host country; and (3) all kinds of economic strategies. This effectively covers “diaspora” as any social construct – a group, an identity, a space, a process. These social constructs exist in a “triadic relationship” between (1) the
globally-dispersed community with a shared belonging; (2) host contexts where the group reside in; and (3) “home” contexts where the group or their ancestors originated from (Sheffer, 1986; Safran, 1991).

Second, “diaspora” as type of consciousness includes an “awareness of multi-locality” (Vertovec, 1997:282) and paradoxical duality. Hence, diasporas are constantly aware of a state of being “here” and “there”, and of not fully belonging to either contexts. It is here that “diaspora” overlaps with “transnational migrant” – members of both groups live a life of dual or multiple belonging – although these can be of different degrees. Being in a diaspora entails a struggle of being physically in one place, yet psychologically yearning for another (Safran, 2004). Transnational migrants, on the other hand, may maintain “multi-stranded social relations” (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995:48) across host and origin societies without necessarily yearning for either.

Third, “diaspora” as mode of cultural production sees the concept as a process of ongoing social construction (Vertovec, 1997). One way of establishing diasporic identities is through social construction of a collective memory rather than from an actual shared territory (Gilroy, 1999). Others include Anderson’s (2006) “imagined communities” and Cohen’s (1985) “symbolic construction of community” – the former refers to members of national communities (who may never meet in person) sharing an imagined membership and a nationalistic/patriotic allegiance, while the latter refers to how a community constructs its existence through symbols and boundaries.

Departing from Safran’s (1991) view of “diaspora” as a group experiencing involuntary dispersal from an original homeland, Clifford (1994) and Cohen (1996) argue for the need to go beyond viewing “diaspora” as being victimised. Cohen (2008) further suggests that the homeland could be imagined or constructed. In addition, he challenges the assumption that diasporas must experience a sense of alienation and loss. Similarly, Braziel sees diasporas as “global capitalist economic formations” (2008:26). Thus, diasporas could arise from positive (economic) motivations, and its members could be active agents contributing to the host society. However, she underlines the importance of diasporic remittances, suggesting that not all economic migrants can be considered diasporas³.

However, Ang (2007) points out that the concept of “trauma” is still very much relevant to contemporary diasporas, such as discrimination faced at the host society. On the other hand, Parreñas and Siu (2007) suggest that some migrants choose diasporic lives as a strategy to facilitate their immigrant experiences. For them, being in a diaspora means “reformulating one’s minoritized position by asserting one’s full belonging elsewhere” (ibid.:13). In other words, a diasporic existence might have been caused by external factors, but it is being continually perpetuated by choice, and more importantly, a conscious emphasis on belonging elsewhere. As

³ Braziel uses the term “diasporic workers” instead of labour migrants.
Sheffer observes, “new diasporas” emerge “as a result of migrants’ autonomous decisions” (1995:17) rather than through forces “from above”.

It is apparent that there has been a shift from viewing diasporas as being victimised and forced to disperse from their original homelands, towards increasing agency and choice. In other words, diasporas can be self-identified and self-propagating. However, some basic criterion remain – diasporas (1) reside in a location away from “home”; (2) possess or choose an awareness of not belonging to the socio-cultural context of the current or future location anywhere apart from “home”; and consequently (3) nurtures a constant (real or imaginary) yearning for return or for “home”.

Not fully-belonging “here” or “there” brings complications to diasporas’ loyalties. Sheffer (2002) identifies seven factors determining ethno-national diasporas’ loyalty patterns: (1) the stage of historical development the group is going through; (2) the relative weight of factors determining their diasporic identity; (3) the depth of commitment to its diasporic identity, including connections to its homeland and other communities of the same origin; (4) strategies of daily lives in relation to host communities; (5) degree of organisation; (6) presence and significance of transnational networks and activities; and (7) socio-political environments of host societies and the international arena. Thus, diasporic belongings and loyalties are resultant of a web of reactionary and iterative processes, formed between diasporas’ formal and informal relationships with their sending and receiving states and communities.

On the other hand, skilled diasporas, conceived as transnational migrants, could practice “citizenship of convenience” (Vertovec, 2009:92) by holding two or more passports to facilitate their transnational lifestyles. In taking-up more than one nationality, they demonstrate “an ambivalent political identity, multiple political identities or even an apolitical identity” (Koslowski, 2001:34). In other words, their multiple nationalities and citizenship could be a strategy in capitalising their privileged transnational (and diasporic) lifestyles. This does not necessarily compromise or contest their political allegiance and/or loyalties. However, this challenges normative understanding of citizenship, especially in relation to political membership, rights and loyalties.

**Citizenship**

“Citizenship” has been described with terms such as transnational (Bauböck, 1995), postnational (Soysal, 1994), cosmopolitan (Delanty, 2000; Held, 1995), multi-layered (Yuval-Davis, 2006), multicultural (Kymlicka, 1995) and differentiated (Young, 1989). Although different terms have been used, scholars across disciplines agree that traditional understanding of “citizenship” exemplified in Marshall’s (1950) work can no longer capture the multi-scale and multi-dimensions of “citizenship” today (e.g. Castles & Davidson, 2000). In other words, citizenship, identity and belonging can no longer be understood as a direct, exclusive, equal and absolute contract between individuals and the nation-state.
A few contributions warrant attention as they highlight *approaches* to “citizenship” pertinent to this research. First, Ong’s “cultural citizenship” emphasises the “process of self-making and being-made in relation to nation-states and transnational processes” (1996:737). This highlights the *reciprocal process* of citizenship meanings through citizen-subjects’ reactions to processes “from above”. Although Ong’s conceptualisation pertains to ethnic minority immigrants’ negotiations of cultural citizenship in host societies, I use her concept as an illustration of how skilled diasporas’ citizenship and identities could be constructed through *reactions to institutional processes*.

Second, Ong’s (1999) “flexible citizenship” informs how citizenship acquisition could be a strategy for transnational elites in propagating their transnational projects. Mavroudi’s “pragmatic citizenship” suggests a similar interpretation, but goes one step further in highlighting the “negotiation of dual or multiple attachments to place and territory” (2008:310) that are being challenged by “de/re-territorialisation” (*ibid.*) processes in themselves. Both authors’ ideas combined, inform how citizenship acquisition can (1) be a *strategic choice*; and (2) propagate further shifts in skilled diasporas’ belongings and interpretations of their citizenships.

Third, Faist’s (2000) “dimensions of citizenship” and “realms of membership” are important in distilling, contrasting and linking different aspects of “citizenship”. However, his discussion is limited to assimilation and integration into receiving contexts. Although he brings attention to the co-existence and tensions of *contractual* and *societal recognition* of “citizenship”, he fails to address (1) the *emotional* dimension of citizenship; and (2) how his framework can be applied to emigrants and their sending contexts.

Ho’s (2009) “emotional citizenship” and her (2008) critique of citizenship studies are particularly useful in this respect. She calls for (1) a more comprehensive investigation of emotions experienced by migrants, particularly those “ordinarily experienced emotions in everyday settings” (*ibid.*:6); (2) more attention on sending state experiences instead of privileging receiving state perspectives; and (3) a focus on experiences outside Anglo-American and European contexts. All three suggestions underlie my concerns and objectives for this research.

These approaches to “citizenship” highlight key points relevant to this research. Firstly, the *content* and *meanings* of citizenship can differ depending on whose perspective this is taken from. Secondly, citizenship negotiations are part of a continual and reciprocal *process*. Thirdly, *practices* of citizenship can be highly dependent on individual agency (e.g. following emotional meanings ascribed to citizenship, or citizenship as a strategy).

*(Skilled) Diasporic Citizenship*

Laguerre (1997) uses “diasporic citizenship” to trace the politics of citizenship and belonging of the Haitian diaspora in America. Siu’s (2005) “diasporic citizenship” examines
cultural belonging as an on-going process interacting with geopolitics at both national and international scales. While Siu emphasises (1) the reciprocal process and (2) cultural belonging of "diasporic citizenship", Laguerre emphasises the tensions between diasporas’ “personal agendas” (1997:12) and their “national and transnational outlook, attachment, and commitment” (ibid.:13). Thus, they depart from each other in their approaches and differential emphases on the same theme.

While both perspectives are useful in setting-up a framework for studying relationships between “citizenship” and “diasporic belongings”, theirs are derived from studies of diasporas in receiving contexts that are historically, ethnically, culturally, geographically and politically distinct from sending contexts (Haiti versus America; China and Taiwan versus Panama). The cases of Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore challenge this as (1) Malaysia and Singapore are “geographically adjacent countries sharing a common political history” (Lam & Yeoh, 2004:145); and (2) the Chinese are a minority in Malaysia (sending state), but a majority in Singapore (receiving state).

Also, theirs highlight negotiations at a collective community scale, while I propose an examination at the individual scale. This is possible for two reasons. Firstly, a common cultural or community identity and belonging is not necessarily crucial to the existence of tertiary-educated skilled migrants, as compared to ethnic-based diasporic communities such as Laguerre’s (1997) Haitian diaspora and Siu’s (2005) Chinese diaspora. Secondly, this approach does not necessarily mean that the individual does not conceptualise belonging to his/her communities.

In other words, my approach differs from theirs in methodological and epistemological terms – I commence the enquiry from each individual’s perspective, and explore how their conceptualisations and practices of citizenship identity and belonging are part of an iterative process of relationships with their sending and receiving states. “Community” is embedded within, and could form a crucial dimension for skilled diasporas. Here, I refer to “community” in the broadest sense, encapsulating families, ethnicities, nationalities, etc.

Thus, “skilled diasporic citizenship” is a conceptual and methodological tool to examine how the politics of belonging of skilled diasporas in relation to both sending and receiving states exist in tension between the legal-political, socio-cultural, and emotional spheres (Figure 2). This constant flux of continual and overlapping process of shifting identities, belonging and loyalties in turn inform, shape and transpire into skilled diasporas’ citizenship and migration decisions.

A final clarification on use of terms – “citizenship” is used to encapsulate legal rights and obligations, and more importantly, loyalties and belonging. “Skilled diaspora” is used to mean tertiary-educated migrants. However, I make a conscious departure from restricting this to only

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4 However, Laguerre mentions the need to consider the perspective of the citizen-subject in his conclusion.
Diaspora” has been used interchangeably with “transnational migration” in the literature with respect to simultaneous belonging and cross-national negotiations of migratory experiences. I differentiate the two terms in that the former captures the notion of not fully belonging to any one particular context, while the latter suggests equal, comparable or uncontested belonging to all contexts. I stress this as “diaspora” captures the tensions in politics of multiple belonging where “transnational migration” does not. The term “diasporic” further amplifies the experience of these tensions.

Figure 2: Theoretical framework

Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore: Citizens, Diasporas, Transnational Migrants

Background

“Citizenship” in Malaysia arose from contested beginnings. Prior to Malaysia’s independence, the British government had intended to accord equal citizenship on the basis of jus soli through its Malayan Union plan (Cheah, 2002). However, strong opposition by the Malay majority resulted in withdrawal of the plan. Instead, a “Social Contract” between ethnic-based political parties (UMNO, MCA, MIC) established the principles for “co-operation, partnership and administration” of the new nation-state (ibid.:3). This compromise set the stage for
unresolved tensions between the Malays’ desire to establish a Malay nation-state and non-Malays’ claims for rights to the Malaysia nation-state.

The ethnic divide between the indigenous Malays versus immigrant Chinese and Indian communities had been further crystallised by European colonial policies of assigning different ethnic groups to specific economic activities (Hefner, 2001; Mariappan, 2002). This resulted in a paradoxical distinction between bumiputra (lit. “sons of soil”, including the Malays) and non-bumiputra. Furthermore, the failure of the Malayan Union sealed the Malays’ political primacy and pro-Malay policies that have shaped the Malaysian nationality, social and political climate till today (see Cartier, 2003; Cheah, 2002; Daniels, 2005).

Amounting tensions during early stages of Malaysia’s nation-building culminated in the racial riots of May 1969. The NEP was introduced in 1970 as an “economic solution to ethnic problems” (Khoo, 1999:133). Specifically, the NEP sought to increase bumiputra share of corporate equity from 1.9 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1990 (ibid.:135). This meant redistribution of Chinese-Malaysians’ wealth to bumiputra (Freedman 2001). In addition, the Malays were prioritised in “job allocation, scholarships abroad, university seats” and “larger ownership stakes in Malaysian companies” (ibid.:418).

As a result of inequalities and discrimination subjected upon them, Chinese-Malaysians have emigrated as “second wave diasporas” (Cartier, 2003) The typical Chinese-Malaysian emigrant has been “a skilled, highly educated migrant” (ibid.:73) seeking better life opportunities. Another strategy is to convert “family economic capital” into other “deployable capital” (Nonini, 1997:209) such as overseas education for the next generation. These strategies are further facilitated by “Singapore’s close geographical proximity, historical and economic ties, and relatively high wages” (Pillai, 1992:25). In addition, Singapore’s active recruitment of
students, skilled and semi-skilled labour from Malaysia presents a strong pull factor for the exodus of Chinese-Malaysians. Indeed, Chinese-Malaysians continue to constitute the largest share of the Malaysian diaspora in Singapore (Figure 3).

Although Lam and Yeoh (2004) acknowledge Chinese-Malaysians’ diasporic identity in Malaysia, they choose instead to position Chinese-Malaysians as transmigrants in Singapore. On the other hand, Chee (2008) conceptualises Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore as a “diasporic community”. He argues that despite relative similarities in cultural and historical (colonial) background, Chinese-Malaysians continue to retain their separate identities from Chinese-Singaporeans and maintain “diasporic spaces” in Singapore. I agree with Chee’s conceptualisation, and argue that Lam and Yeoh’s (2004) “transmigrants” are effectively skilled diasporas. As I have set-out earlier, the term “diaspora” captures the tensions in politics of belonging, while “transmigrant” does not. This delicate state of conflict and contradictions is crucial to the research question: To what extent are Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore citizens, diasporas and transnational migrants?

**Methodology**

Respondents were selected through a combination of handpicked and stratified sampling based on criteria of: (1) age 25-45; (2) university-educated and professional/skilled workers; and (3) normally resident in Singapore for at least 2 years. Age criterion focuses this research on Chinese-Malaysians who left Malaysia as (1) first generation skilled diaspora for education or work; and (2) second generation skilled diaspora following their Malaysian parents’ family migration. The former typically spent at least 15 years growing up in Malaysia, while the latter were either born in Singapore or left Malaysia as infants.

15 self-administered questionnaires (including close and open-ended questions) were distributed as a pre-selection method, and to collate responses for follow-up interviews. 10 in-depth interviews were conducted with selected respondents based on responsiveness and overall representation of diversity. Interviews were conducted via instant messaging (msn, skype or facebook) and emails as I was in London and the respondents were in Singapore. This presents limitations due to lack of co-presence (Gibson & Brown, 2009). Firstly, I was unable to observe body language and detect speech nuances. Secondly, responses may not be instantaneous and interactive, even in real-time cases. This limits opportunities for probing reflective moments. However, conducting the “interviews” remotely also present advantages as concepts discussed often overlap with each other. For example, Andy, a respondent, finds it “difficult and tricky” to discuss these issues in a “live setting”. Instead, he finds it easier to have the questions “laid out” as he can “give a consistent picture” of his interpretations.
Skilled Diasporic Citizenship in Practice

The Sceptical Citizen

Paul (40-45, SPR\(^5\), married to Singaporean wife), the sceptical citizen, left Malaysia to further his studies at the age of 18. As an international student in Australia, he saw how “the Malay-Malaysians on scholarship enjoy life to the fullest by partying with the Australians, and did badly in school”, while he had to rely on his parents’ financial support as there was “no way of getting any scholarships to study overseas” as a Chinese-Malaysian then. Upon graduation, he tried to look for a job in the Malaysian public service. Facing “an insurmountable task to find a job in Malaysia”, he successfully found a position in the Singapore public service.

Perhaps as a result of experiencing discrimination first-hand, Paul is vocal about his disappointments in the Malaysian government, which he equates to the politically-dominant Malays. In addition, he feels strongly for the plight of Chinese-Malaysians, whom he perceives as second class citizens “blatantly discriminated and deprived” in their own country. When asked about what citizenship means to him:

Author : When you think of citizenship, do you think about it as a form of loyalty to a country?
Paul : Yes, very much so. No greater love than to give your life for the country.
Author : But that is not something you feel about your Malaysian citizenship?
Paul : But the country must give itself to you also. This is obviously not so in Malaysia.
Author : What do you mean by the country giving itself to you?
Pau : Disband all the [economic] privileges accorded to the Malays. Every citizen is equal.

However, despite criticising Malaysian citizenship as “not carrying weight” for a Chinese-Malaysian and experiencing unequal treatment in his previous Singapore public service job, Paul is in no hurry to take-up Singapore citizenship:

When I was younger [and] still in the civil service, I was “coerced” to change to Singapore citizenship by words of delay in promotion, etc by my seniors. I didn’t buy it then. That in a way has not impressed me a single bit. As a Malaysian, we are tasked to do sensitive work [between Malaysia and Singapore], but [are] required to leave the meeting room when the issues are discussed. No level of trust BUT required to work on it, isn’t it ironic.

So now that I am in [company X] (sort of a private entity), there is really no incentive for me to change unless there are really good perks from [Singapore

\(^5\) Singapore permanent resident.
government] to change. I did remind myself that 5 or 10 years from now, I may not be in Singapore. I just never know.

Furthermore, his Malaysian passport is provides easier travel to the Middle East for his work. Thus, he “may live in Singapore with a Malaysian passport” as this presents a convenient solution for him – sitting on the fence is “a safer bet” while he waits and see how the Malaysian government performs.

Living in Singapore as an SPR blurs Paul’s sense of national identity. On one hand, he sometimes finds himself being more nationalistic than Singaporeans, especially when it comes to international sporting events. On the other hand, he continues to feel strongly about Malaysia (albeit in the form of negative scepticism) and obviously desires change to better the plight of Chinese-Malaysians. When it comes to the everyday pragmatism of his Malaysian citizenship and identity, he practices another paradox – while he does not want to be associated with the “undeserving privileged Malays” through his Malaysian passport and identifies himself with Singapore for work purposes, he continues to use his Malaysian passport for the convenience it offers.

**The Mobile Citizen**

Michael (30-35, SPR and New Zealand PR, single) and Andy (30-35, relinquished SPR, married to Malaysian wife with a Malaysian child) typify the mobile citizen. Michael followed his family’s migration to New Zealand when he was 15. He came to Singapore at age 32 to gain overseas work experience. On the other hand, Andy was born in Singapore to his SPR parents. He relinquished his SPR status (gained by virtue of his parents) before he was due to serve National Service (NS). Andy has since “returned” to Malaysia with his Malaysian wife and child.

For Michael, taking-up SPR is a hedge against unpredictable economic conditions. He had initially planned to work in Singapore temporarily, but changed his mind and applied for SPR after working for 2 years in Singapore: “Bad economic condition in Singapore caused me to re-evaluate; being a PR [means] less likely chance of redundancy compared to a foreign worker.” Similarly, Andy articulates his feelings of having to act against an unpredictable future:

*I do not feel forced to leave Malaysia now, but having learnt more about Malaysian history and politics after I returned to Malaysia, I am very glad I have some savings in Singapore dollars, as you can never predict what might happen in future.*

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6 Male Singaporean citizens are enlisted for 2-2.5 years at age 18 or 19. Male PRs who took-up SPR through their SPR parents are subject to the same requirement.
Being a Malaysian citizen means different things to Andy and Michael. Andy thinks of citizenship as a legal obligation to a country of birth, while Michael thinks of his Malaysian citizenship in terms of a sense of loyalty and patriotism to a country of origin, or a country in which one has invested interests. In addition, he considers himself as having “the battler mentality” in the sense that he has “every right to be a citizen of [his] country of origin.” However, having strong attachments to Malaysia does not necessarily equate to intentions of “return” to Malaysia for Michael. Although he feels strongly about Malaysia as his “starting point” and returns regularly for short visits, he is weary of a permanent return:

I still think it’s important to understand where you came from. Malaysia is after all where I was born. [And] that connection has never been really broken. I’ve always brought my grandma back usually once every 2 years. The longest time away was 3 years I think. But between 2004-2007 I’ve been back every year.

... It’s also part of my formative years. I understand the Asian mentality much better [because] of it. And hence I don’t think I would have trouble living there again. But do I really want to belong in that environment now? Probably not.

He is acutely aware of his belonging to a Malaysia that has long past (“It’s the curry rice in Brickfields or the friends that I don’t see anymore”). For him to “return”, Malaysia needs to provide an attractive offer, including making “the social situation there better, where every Malaysian is treated equally, where there is less corruption, where people’s voices are heard”.

In contrast, Andy, who has “returned” to Malaysia, did so for a combination of factors:

Basically the crucial question is, why did I return? I have heard much of the opportunities in Malaysia, and also how non-Malays are treated poorly, and how it is near impossible to get Malaysian citizenship. My wife’s parents are elderly, and I want to avoid NS, and for some other minor reasons. So I’m taking it like a trial, to see if I can prosper in Malaysia. I am still open to job opportunities in Singapore and the world beyond.

At the same time, “no place is guaranteed to be home forever”, and he “will always go/stay if the conditions are right e.g. job, economy, school for kids”. Thus, Malaysia is just another migration destination like any others, and not necessarily a “homeland” he chose to “return” to.

The Converted National

Tim (30-35, SC, married to Singaporean wife with a Singaporean child), Lisa (40-45, awaiting SC application, single) and Joy (30-35, SC, married to SPR with a Malaysian child), the converted nationals, have relinquished their Malaysian citizenships and taken-up Singaporean

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7 Neighbourhood in Kuala Lumpur.
8 Singapore citizen.
citizenships. Tim and Joy came to Singapore to pursue their junior college education, while Lisa came to Singapore for work and personal reasons after graduating from the United Kingdom (UK). All three were previously SPRs before becoming SCs.

Respondents’ conceptualisations of citizenship can be divided into the “pragmatic” and the “emotional”. The former see citizenship as equivalent to “passport”, “benefits” and “future generation”, while the latter link citizenship to “loyalty”, “pride” and “patriotism”. In many ways, the “emotional” blurs boundaries between citizenship as rights and obligations, and citizenship conflated as national or ethno-cultural belonging to a socially- and culturally-constructed national community.

The pragmatists clearly separate citizenship as “benefits” from citizenship as “national belonging”. For Joy:

Citizenship is more onward-looking, it means how this will change [your] future. It’s like when [you] migrate [and] take up the citizenship say in Canada, it’s for the future [and] future generation... Do [you] have a sense of belonging in Canada ?? I doubt so ...

Others see citizenship as a form of membership, typically associated with positive connotations of progress and success. For Tim, this means being “part of a young, dynamic and vibrant city-nation”, one that is “brimming with possibilities and opportunities for success to those who do not set limits to what they can achieve”. Joy equates her Singapore citizenship as pride in a country that is “safe, orderly, has come semblance of a system in place, no clear corruption etc”. Lisa sees citizenship as the “ability to enjoy benefits of the country”, and took up her Singapore citizenship because she “wanted to feel settled and belonged”.

Yet, it is possible to be a citizen of a country, while feeling belonging to another. Lisa, who is awaiting her official Singapore citizenship, describes this paradox:

[A]s a Singapore PR, I have always thought [off] myself as a Malaysian citizen, and I think I will always identify with being a Malaysian perhaps even after I [get] my Singapore citizenship. Not to mean any disloyalty to Singapore who has graciously accepted me but I will think of myself as a Malaysian but a Singapore citizen, if that makes sense.

However, her loyalties are further complicated between “social network” and “country”:

My loyalty will always be with my family first and foremost. On the other extreme if Singapore and Malaysia is at war, I guess I will support Singapore, after bringing the rest of my mum and siblings over. But as things stand since I have family (and friends) in both Malaysia and Singapore, it is hard to choose to say where my loyalty lies.
In making their citizenship decisions, respondents are divided between those who place emotional significance in retaining their Malaysian citizenships, versus those who readily converted to Singapore citizenships. Lisa sought her mother’s consent before giving up her Malaysian citizenship. On the other hand, Tim’s Malaysian citizenship did not mean much – his father, wife and daughter are Singaporeans. Growing-up, he spent holidays in his father’s Singapore home, and had always been attracted to Singapore’s “architecture, cleanliness [and] public infrastructure”. Joy took-up Singapore citizenship for the benefits: “baby bonus, tax rebate, child care subsidy, monetary gain, school admission”. Her husband, a Chinese-Malaysian and SPR, did not do so because there are “no immediate economic [and] social benefit[s]”. In addition, he has property in Malaysia, and the couple did not want to complicate matters.

When asked which (Malaysia or Singapore) they consider as “home”, Tim chooses Singapore as it offers him things unavailable in Malaysia – amenities and culture to support his professional and personal interests in classical music and architecture. In contrast, Lisa’s choice of Singapore as “home” is a compromise between her dilemma of everyday life convenience and her desire to have friends and family close to her:

I don’t feel that I belong to Malaysia …. Conversely, I feel I belong more to Singapore because I have lived here enough years and make it my home. It is really a combination of things that makes me feel belong. I guess it is how I am able to ‘function’ as in work and my daily life here rather than having friends and family around, which though is essential, these things are not hemmed in by geographical boundaries.

Convenience of her daily life ultimately wins:

Like the walkways are nicely paved without a sudden pot hole or loose tile on the pavement jutting out like in [Kuala Lumpur], the streets are well lit at night which leads to less crime in Singapore. Like the streets are without litter. Like the cabs here don’t try to rip you off and things and the drivers are not some dodgy-looking fella asking you to lend them money. Stuff like these. I don’t know why it matters but it does. And I find many Singaporeans take it for granted.

Conclusion

Using Laguerre’s (1997) and Siu’s (2005) “diasporic citizenship” as starting points, I have proposed “skilled diasporic citizenship” as a conceptual lens and methodological tool to examine skilled diasporas’ relationships to both sending and receiving states in the Malaysia-Singapore context. My research, based on 10 in-depth interviews with tertiary-educated Chinese-Malaysians who are/were Singapore PRs and/or citizens, demonstrates that distinct diversities exist in meanings and practices of their diasporic citizenships despite similarities in ethnicity, age group and tertiary education.
Michael and Andy, the mobile citizens, will move anywhere (including Malaysia) for work and family. Paul, the sceptical citizen, experienced unequal citizenship rights first-hand and hence feels strongly for a Malaysia he equates to his family rather than to the government or the country. He is comfortable as a SPR, and see no significant benefits in taking-up Singapore citizenship. Thus, he adopts a wait-and-see attitude towards the Malaysian government. The converted nationals, Tim, Lisa and Joy, chose Singapore as their long-term “home”. They do not consider “returning” to Malaysia, nor do they consider leaving Singapore. Singapore presents a convenient solution, as it offers physical proximity to family in Malaysia, and important things in their everyday lives Malaysia could not offer. The act of taking-up Singapore citizenship demonstrates their commitment and decision to grow their roots in Singapore, although this may not mean that their loyalties and belonging are with Singapore.

Staeheli and Nagel argue that “it is possible to claim identity as a citizen of a country without claiming an identity as ‘belonging to’ or ‘being of’ that country” (2004:3). This is certainly true for the respondents – belonging is with “family” first, “ethno-national/cultural” second. Citizenship and migration decisions are deeply embedded in the individual and the family, although reciprocal feelings towards sending and receiving states play a part in the process. In this sense, meanings of “citizenship” – as multiscalar identity and belonging; as multiscalar obligations, rights and benefits; as multiscalar feelings of attachment and loyalty – become differentially conceptualised, interpreted, and subsequently acted upon accordingly.

The cases of Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore further challenge notions of “citizens”, “diasporas” and “transnational migrants”. As Malaysian citizens, they are not full citizens in the normative sense due to ethnic-based policies; as Malaysian’s skilled diasporas, they are not acknowledged as part of the “Malaysian diaspora” the NEM is targeting to attract “home”. As SPRs and/or SCs, they enjoy benefits accompanying these legal-political statuses, but may not subscribe to their cultural meanings and belongings. As citizens, diasporas and transnational migrants, they steer away from Malaysia’s politics and development (in participation or contributions), yet continue to feel strongly about being Malaysian.

Finally, my research has raised further questions by linking two previously unlinked themes in relation to migration decisions: skilled diaspora and the meanings of their citizenship. Within limitations of this paper, I have yet to address the following issues:

- **Universality**: Malaysia and Singapore are multiethnic nation-states with intricately-linked histories and geographies, and where citizenship is ambiguous. To what extent can “skilled diasporic citizenship” be applied to other contexts?
- **Diversity and specificity**: What are the specific differentiating factors influencing “skilled diasporic citizenships” for each citizen-type? Are there more citizen-types?
- **Theories**: How can “skilled diasporic citizenship” contribute to migration and citizenship theories?
References


