Post-multicultural polities: A comparison of minority politics in Amsterdam and Los Angeles, 1970-2010

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Abstract. Amsterdam and Los Angeles show divergent trends in minority politics. In Los Angeles, minority organizations that were divided along ethnic lines in the 1960s and 1970s have joined together in a broad alliance for social justice. This alliance has spawned a series of campaigns against neoliberal restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, it has successfully backed political candidates, including the present mayor, and resisted stricter immigration policy. In Amsterdam, in contrast, minority organizations have become increasingly divided. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s minority organizations were central actors in a broad alliance for social justice, they have been marginalized in the 1990s. Contemporary leaders with minority backgrounds in Amsterdam do not call for social justice but instead – in complete contrast to their counterparts in Los Angeles – allocate responsibility for minorities’ marginalization first and foremost to individual migrants and their culture. This paper develops a specific variant of field analysis to chart and explain these divergent developments in minority politics in both cities. It argues that the progressive alliance of Los Angeles could flourish because the local state did not have the capacity to selectively coopt migrant organizations. The Amsterdam government, in contrast, saw an increase in its power to selectively coopt migrant organizations.
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Introduction
This paper addresses profound changes in the minority politics of Amsterdam and Los Angeles over the last three decades. Both cities enacted variants of multiculturalism in the 1970s and in both cities these kinds of policies came under attack during the 1990s. Though the critiques of multiculturalism were in many ways similar in the two cities, they have resulted in divergent outcomes. In the city of Los Angeles, minority associations joined up with unions to create a broad social and political movement underpinned by the principles of social justice. The power generated through this movement has enabled minorities to play a more empowered role in shaping local policies towards their communities. In Amsterdam, ethnic minorities faced fewer opportunities to develop an autonomous base of political power, allowing city officials to dominate policies directed at minority communities. We believe that these cases provide strategic windows into the divergent directions of post-multicultural polities: with the first case reflecting a model of ‘bottom up’ empowerment firmly rooted in a discourse of ‘social justice’, and the second case reflecting a model of ‘top down’ control aimed at disciplining and civilizing minority groups.

The paper uses these cases to excavate the key features of these two variants of post-multicultural polities, but it also develops a ‘field analysis’ to explain for the changing character of minority politics in cities. The unique advantage of this theoretical approach is that it allows us to analyze minority politics as a set of dynamic relational exchanges subject to consolidation, challenges, and change. Thus, the aims of the paper are two-fold: to outline the trajectories of post-multicultural polities, and to develop a theoretical framework that will allow scholars to better interpret the dynamics of minority politics.

The paper examines these issues in three sections. First, it develops a specific variant of field analysis that explains for changes in minority politics. Second, we analyze the consolidation of a regime for multicultural governance in Amsterdam and its subsequent erosion and displacement. Third, we zoom in on Los Angeles and show how the multicultural regime in this city was first eroded and then displaced by another regime.
Explaining for Change: A Field Analysis of Minority Politics

The Contours of the Urban Political Field

Studies in Europe and the United States show that the position of minorities within polities differs strongly between cities. Depending upon the context, minorities can subsume themselves in working class organizations, mobilize as religious groups or operate under a broad category of ‘blacks’ or ‘foreigners’. To account for such variation, a number of authors have developed what we may refer to as an institutional paradigm. Researchers have demonstrated that state institutions influence the forms (i.e. formal politics or movements), scales (i.e. local, national, transnational) and frames of minority politics (Alexander, 2003; Ireland, 1994, 2004; Favell, 2001; Fetzer and Soper, 2005; Koopmans, 2004; Koopmans et al., 2005). These studies work on (and often corroborate) the hypothesis that there are distinct discursive and institutional structures that channel minorities in a variety of political directions.

These approaches have provided important insights into how institutions stabilize minority politics through path dependent mechanisms but they have underemphasized the conditions that make change possible within these structured pathways. According to Bader, ‘path dependency,’ in spite its critical edge, overemphasizes past institutional and discursive regularities and underemphasizes emergent developments that may serve as the basis for change at a later date. “In constructing patterns, one has to avoid the danger of presenting them as more stable over time than they actually are” (Bader, 2007: 875). Our cases illustrate that while institutions certainly play stabilizing roles, they are also subject to important changes. To understand the changing nature of minority politics in Amsterdam and Los Angeles, we turn to those scholars who employ the concept of the ‘political field’ to explore the dynamic undercurrents of politics (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu, 1994; Wacquant, 2005). We define the political field as a space regulated by certain ‘rules of the game’ where actors associated with political parties, private interests and civil society associations compete and cooperate to define, and act on, issues of public interest. Our definition of the field is broad and draws as much from institutionalist and neo-Gramscian perspectives (cf. Katznelson, 1981, 1992) as it does from Bourdieu.
In what follows, we first identify the processes through which power relations are consolidated and then identify the conditions that precipitate change in the urban political field.

**Consolidating Power Relations**

First, power relations consolidate when elite networks thicken. Strong elite networks permit the exchange of scarce information, facilitate shared understandings and meanings of their political worlds, and enable the coordination of action (Elias, 1994). Effective control over the political field is thus only possible when elites maintain cohesive ties to one another. When they succeed in fostering inter-elitewhat we call“civil brokers”. Positioned between minority communities and elites, civil brokers enjoy power and prestige in their communities because they are gatekeepers to scarce government resources (i.e. jobs, infrastructure, influence, etc.). Brokers gain compliance from their communities by employing their access to these scarce resources as ‘selective incentives’: distributing money and influence to those who comply with the rules and denying these resources to those who transgress. Just as important, brokers use the trust and prestige in their communities to legitimate elite rules and cajole potential challengers into compliance. In this way, elites enforce the rules of the game by developing institutional techniques to penetrate and steer complex community networks, with the civil brokers playing a crucial mediating role between elites and the urban grassroots.

Second, power relations consolidate when elite rules are enforced through the development of institutional techniques that connect elites with minority communities in the urban political field. Elites develop various techniques to co-opt and control community leaders and civil associations. These techniques include patron-client relations, service contracts or partnerships between associations and city governments, and corporatist institutions that mediate relations with different minority communities. Elites diffuse scarce monetary, political, and symbolic resources to targeted minority groups through community leaders or what we call ‘civil brokers’. Positioned between minority communities and elites, civil brokers enjoy power and prestige in their communities because they are gatekeepers to scarce government resources (i.e. jobs, infrastructure, influence, etc.). Brokers gain compliance from their communities by employing their access to these scarce resources as ‘selective incentives’: distributing money and influence to those who comply with the rules and denying these resources to those who transgress. Just as important, brokers use the trust and prestige in their communities to legitimate elite rules and cajole potential challengers into compliance. In this way, elites enforce the rules of the game by developing institutional techniques to penetrate and steer complex community networks, with the civil brokers playing a crucial mediating role between elites and the urban grassroots.

Third, power relations consolidate when they are undergirded by legitimacy. Power is enforced in part through defining the limits of ‘acceptable’ political speech and behavior (Bourdieu, 1994). Elites acting through the state wrest the power to define social
reality from other actors. When this is achieved, symbolic power can be routinely exercised as potential minority challengers cannot fundamentally question the discursive frameworks that orient and legitimize state action (Loveman, 2005). Actors who employ discourses or display behaviors that conflict with the underlying rules of the game can be stigmatized as deviants incapable of reasonable negotiations within the political field. Stigmatization does not only banish these outsiders to the margins of the political field but it also sets the threshold for acceptable language and behavior. Actors labeled as deviant are shown to have values, manners of speech, dispositions, and ideas that threaten the norms of political civility. Minority actors seeking to improve their positioning within the field adopt legitimate cultural and symbolic practices and distance themselves from illegitimate talk, symbols, practices, and people. Social and political distancing further marginalizes outsiders and seals their fate as outcasts with no real prospects of political power within the field.

It follows from the above three points that power relations in a field are consolidated when (1) elite networks are cohesive, (2) institutional techniques ensure compliance, and (3) dominant discourses mark the thresholds of legitimate behavior and speech. Facing cohesive elites with extensive institutional and symbolic powers, minority challengers have few alternatives but to conform to the dominant rules of the game. They must present their claims in a language that complies with dominant norms, they must develop alliances with civil brokers to transmit their concerns and wishes to elites, and they must avoid discourses, practices, and people that could precipitate their marginalization. When challengers operate in consolidated political fields, they can only improve their positions by recognizing and accepting its basic rules (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu, 1994).

*Changing Power Relations in the Political Field*

While elites can achieve a certain degree of hegemony within the field, cracks emerge which precipitate changes and transformations in power relations. We highlight three main factors that can weaken elite power and open up possibilities for change.

First, *elite fragmentation* weakens the capacities of elites to define a cohesive governing agenda and build a consensus about the basic rules of the urban political game. As the governing consensus breaks down between elite factions, certain factions may become willing to offset losses of support with past allies by developing new alliances with outsiders and challengers to (Tarrow, 1998). Elites therefore have greater difficulty in setting common
rules and they also become more willing to accept alliances with outsiders who may have been shunned in the past.

Second, weakened institutional capacity can result in a failure to effectively incorporate minority groups and ensure their consent. The declining ability of elites to maintain channels to minority communities through corporatism, patronage, and partnerships makes it difficult for civil brokers to gain the compliance of others in their communities. Civil brokers facing less access to government resources (e.g. money, jobs, infrastructure, influence, status, etc.) have greater difficulty of gaining community compliance through selective incentives. Their declining abilities to tap these drying government wells undermine their prestige within minority communities, which makes it more difficult to achieve their ‘order-maintenance’ functions within these communities The declining position of civil brokers can open up a ‘power vacuum’ in minority communities. Such vacuums can precipitate chaos but they can also present increased opportunities for challengers to realign minority community networks around themselves. Such challengers can include religious organizations, unions, parties, and criminal organizations, among many others. When challengers deploy their own autonomous resources and gain sufficient levels of support across community networks, they can assert themselves as the dominant forces in their communities and in the broader political field.

Third, discursive challenges can undermine the naturalized constructs and categories that undergird extant power relations. Minority challengers facing greater freedom can employ alternative media and work with insurgent intellectuals to produce alternative representations that resonate with large segments of their community. This discursive work helps create legitimacy for a political vision that was once unthinkable. While these subversive ideas are fostered outside of the formal public sphere, in what Fraser (1991) refers to as counter publics, opportunities made available because of elite fragmentation open the door for challengers to diffuse their discourses in the broader political field with reduced risk of banishment.

The breakdown of power relations usually takes a long time. Intra-elite conflicts can simmer below the surface for years, institutional controls may be neglected but still maintained, traditional civil brokers may be weakened but still powerful enough to dominate challengers, and alternative discourses may take time to develop sufficient resonance within minority communities and across the broader field. Change in the political field is therefore
more piecemeal than revolutionary and the piecemeal nature of these changes introduces innumerable cracks into slowly declining fields. The incremental decline of elite power within a political field can be disrupted by critical events. Contingent historical events like riots, assassinations, financial crises, etc. introduce important breaches which can accelerate the decline of old power alignments and the emergence of new ones.

*Research approach and data*

To understand the important changes in the nature of minority politics in Amsterdam and Los Angeles, we have developed a theoretical approach inspired by field analysis. This approach to urban minority politics starts from the assumption that there are three distinct processes which result in stable and consolidated power relations: the formation of elite alliances (coupled with the fragmentation of outsiders’ networks), the monopolization of discursive constructs (coupled with the stigmatization of alternative discourses and their agents) and the provision of institutional resources through civil brokers (coupled with the inability of outsiders to access different sources). However, none of these three processes of consolidation is ever permanent or complete. Slowly evolving forces present challengers with openings to create different alliances, develop alternative discourses and find other institutional resources. Disruptive events can accelerate these changes by presenting challengers with important opportunities to present themselves and their visions as viable alternatives to the status quo. In applying this theoretical framework to the cases of Amsterdam and Los Angeles, we identify the processes that resulted in the consolidation of multicultural political fields, the factors that precipitated the weakening of power relations within these fields, and reasons why they took such divergent paths in recent years.

The empirical material is derived from interviews and secondary research conducted during previous research projects. The Los Angeles case is based on 15 semi-structured interviews performed with strategic actors in the field. The questions were directed at political developments during the 1980s and 1990s. This material was supplemented with secondary scholarship on urban politics in the city. The Amsterdam case is based on semi-structured 20 interviews conducted in 2004 as part of a joint research project and 25 interviews conducted between 2007 and 2009 as part of a dissertation project. As in the case of Los Angeles, interviews focused on the position of actors within the dynamic urban political field. In
addition, the case study draws on secondary research as well as archival research into subsidy relations between minority associations and the government.

Minority Politics in Amsterdam: from Class Empowerment to Religious Containment

Consolidating Power Relations in the 1970s and 1980s: Multicultural Corporatism

The arrival of sizeable groups of migrants in the 1970s coincided with the proliferation of new social movements. The squatting movement established countless autonomous social centers throughout the city. The student movement revolted in and outside the university. Labor union radicals fought against corporate downsizing and for workers’ rights. Actors from these various sectors forged coalitions of which migrant groups formed an integral part. Especially left-wing political refugees from Turkey and Morocco were very active in progressive and radical circles. Moroccan dissidents were united in KMAN, Turkish Communists in HTIB, Turkish Socialists in DIDF and Kurdish separatists in FKN. Guest workers formed the numerical majority in these associations but political refugees controlled the leadership. The left-wing associations and their radical leaders could come to be officially recognized as civil brokers in the new minority policy field that was forming in the late 1970s and early 1980s because they were part of cohesive networks, mobilized powerful discourses and tapped into institutional resources.

Political refugees and militant workers formed integral part of progressive movement scene that was booming in the 1970s and 1980s. Associations like KMAN and HTIB took central roles at May Day demonstrations, protests for migrant rights, and campaigns against various wars. No progressive protest against imperialism or racism was credible without a considerable presence of migrants, which the left-wing minority associations could provide. The associations, in turn, could connect their constituents to a large and resourceful progressive network. Activists, volunteers and state-employed community workers gave Dutch lessons, helped out with forms, lobbied politicians and so on. The left-wing associations thus strengthened progressive networks and were strengthened by them.

The cohesion of progressive networks was thus predicated in part on the exclusion of large groups of migrants who did not fulfill progressive norms. Some organizations indeed
served as an extension of the Moroccan regime (the Amicales) or were militantly opposed to the left (the Turkish Grey Wolves). Other organizations were simply indifferent or culturally conservative (including mosque associations). The fascist groups were meticulously monitored and occasionally confronted on the streets but all non-left groups were discursively excluded. In discussions, progressives would take care to say that democratic minority associations should be included, implying that non-left associations should not be considered legitimate partners.

The discursive division between democratic and undemocratic associations not only mediated access to the progressive networks but also to the institutional resources available within the policy field. When the Amsterdam government began implementing the early 1980s, it erected a comprehensive institutional structure consisting of advisory councils, specialized welfare organizations and subsidy funds. The governance field that emerged in Amsterdam in the early 1980s can be characterized as ethnic corporatism – elite actors were connected to minority communities through ethnic advisory councils and ethnic representatives (Soysal, 1994). The secretaries of the councils had contracts as civil servants and were stationed at city hall. Thanks to their strong connections and the stigmatization of their opponents, the left-wing minority associations could obtain much of the resources available within this unfolding field. Under ethnic corporatism, subsidy relationships and political representation went hand in hand: associations with a central place in advisory councils also received substantial structural subsidies. Between the full consolidation of ethnic corporatism (in 1985) and its erosion (1995; see below) left-wing associations received well over 70 per cent of the subsidies (Uitermark, 2010: 150).

**Eroding Power Relations and the Slow Decline of Multicultural Corporatism**

Between 1975 and 1985, the left-wing associations consolidated their position. With the help of their allies and thanks to their privileged access to resources, the associations could develop extensive institutional infrastructures and move to the core of the policy field. However, the networks, discourses and institutions that had given wings to the left-wing associations started showing fissures over the course of the 1990s.

The left-wing organizations thrived on the progressive momentum of the 1970s and 1980s. This momentum withered away as the 1980s drew to a close. While the leftist associations thus lost some of their natural allies, they were increasingly forced to cooperate
with their conservative counterparts. The conservative associations occupied a marginal position within the ethnic councils due to the factors identified above but as time progressed they became more vocal. Within the Moroccan council, the left-wing associations reluctantly agreed to work together with mosque associations. This broadened the coalition of Moroccan associations but the old lefties and conservative elderly were not welcoming to younger generations. The Turkish associations were traditionally better organized than their Moroccan counterparts (Fennema and Tillie, 1999) and did not face the difficulty of attracting young recruits (Sunier, 1996). However, the strength of conservative organizations did increasingly pose a problem for the left-wing elite. Turkish mosque associations, especially Milli Gorus, had no interest in reproducing a structure controlled by their opponents. The conservative organizations did take seats in the council and established ties to the left-wing organizations (Vermeulen, 2006) but at the same they by-passed the left-wing organizations and connected directly to the government. In short, the political refugees dominating left-wing organizations had been the most assertive within their ethnic communities when they arrived in the Netherlands but the strength and cohesion of their networks eroded as they failed to incorporate younger generations and conservatives.

The demise of the old order also had a discursive dimension. The left-wing associations organized on the basis of ethnicity but they articulated their claims through a broader discourse opposing racism and social inequality. While the left-wing associations stuck to this discourse, public discourse moved in another direction. In the late 1980s there were growing concerns over the high levels of unemployment and crime among second generation youth (e.g., WRR, 1989). While only after the rise of Fortuyn (2002) problems of migrants were routinely framed as cultural pathologies, policy makers in the 1990s pointed attention to the accumulation of problems among migrants (e.g., Gemeente Amsterdam, 1989). As the privileged partners of the government, the left-wing associations were the first to be asked for advice but they did not give the concrete and targeted proposals the government demanded. In response, the Labor Party and senior civil servants increasingly referred to the left-wing organizations as “old” organizations. A new class of professionals specializing minority affairs responded to the demand for “new” initiatives. Some of these professionals argued for a strict approach while others adopted an optimistic ‘can do’ attitude. Diversity, they said, was not a problem but an opportunity (Uitermark et al., 2005). These professionals – who were younger, better educated and more often born and raised in the Netherlands – offered a welcome alternative to policy makers as they did not persistently blame the
government (or racism or capitalism) for the precarious position of migrants. The left-wing associations responded to these challenges by defending their turf and criticizing the professionals but only ended up confirming the idea that they were the anachronistic remnants of a bygone era.

While the alliances and discourses of the left-wing associations weakened, the institutions on which they had relied eroded. The subsidies that the leftist organizations had secured were so-called structural subsidies for which reservations are made on the municipality’s budget. Structural subsidies fit in a model where the government funds civil society associations without demanding (exactly) what they do. This model came under pressure in many policy domains in the 1990s. Administrators, politicians and civil servants were increasingly felt that the government should ensure efficiency and compliance. Structural subsidies were abolished in 1997 and replaced with project projects (for activities rather than organizations) and periodic subsidies (which are allocated for a maximum of one year). These changes marked a move away from ethnic corporatism and undermined the power of the left-wing associations which now had to compete with other organizations. Whereas 22 organizations received subsidies in 1995, the number grew to 42 in 2000 and to 62 in 2005 (Uitermark, 2010, p. 155). Left-wing organizations increasingly had to do the government’s bidding to retain funds. Moreover, the advisory councils that the left-wing organizations had traditionally controlled were marginalized over the course of the 1990s and formally abolished in 2003 (Uitermark et al., 2005).

In sum, between 1995 and 2005, the left-wing associations lost their central position in the field. They suffered from the growing power of challengers and the withering of their allies. Changes in the rules of the game meant that they had to prove their worth to retain their position whereas before they were considered as the only legitimate partners of the government. The erosion of their position and the emergence of challengers was a long-term process but it was marked by some events revealing the inadequacies of the status quo and unleashing questions over the possibility of alternatives. Here we focus specifically on the demonstrations in which the leftist elites were involved.

Disrupting Events: Accelerating the Decline of Multiculturalism
The institutions of ethnic corporatism – the advisory councils, the structural subsidies, the support of professionals – functioned not only as an infrastructure for service provision but
also as a base from which large-scale demonstrations were developed. These projects were reasonably successful in that they allowed minority associations to present themselves as and alongside central actors.

However, the protests organized by left-wing groups became less significant over time. Especially the protests of the Moroccan left-wing associations for Palestine increasingly turned into fiascos. This was one of the few issues around which they could mobilize a relatively large crowd of migrants and native Dutch. But the protests against Israeli violence resulted in media coverage that stigmatized the protesters. The most extreme example was a protest in support of the Palestinian intifada in 2002, when a number of banners compared Israel with Nazi Germany, equating the swastika with the Star of David. Youths also attacked a gay night club – the It – with stones. They assaulted people whom they could recognize as Jews and threw stones at the Krasnapolsky Hotel (Krebbers and Tas, 2002). The stewards of the organization unsuccessfully tried to persuade protesters to remove the anti-Semitic banners and to prevent a confrontation with the police. Other protests where the organizers lost control over groups of second-generation migrant youth included protests following confrontations between youths and police (in 1998 and 2003) and further protests against Israel (in 2000 and 2004). While politicians and civil servants had become increasingly annoyed and irritated with the left-wing leaders (which had lost power but not their righteous anger), these events confirmed the bankruptcy of ethnic corporatism to audiences beyond the state bureaucracy.

Reconsolidating a Post-multicultural Field: Religious Containment

By the time Theo van Gogh was killed, the leftist elite had already been marginalized and there were no clearly defined rules and institutions to effectively deal with multicultural tensions. The sudden discovery of Islamic extremism in Amsterdam and the need for initiatives for civil repair (Alexander, 2006) triggered attempts on the part of the government and its social-democratic ruling elite to recreate a regime capable of dealing with social tensions. The assassination thus accelerated processes of reconsolidation.

Already in 2002, Amsterdam’s mayor, Job Cohen, had stated that he sought to connect migrants to Dutch society through religion (Cohen, 2002). His appointment tipped the balance in favor of social-democrats who wanted to use religious institutions to incorporate minorities. The most privileged partners in this endeavor were liberal Muslims who had roots in Islamic
communities and were members of the Labor Party. Central figures included the Milli Gorus’ liberal leader Haci Karacaer, the spokesperson for the Moroccan mosque association Ahmed Marcouch and the alderman for diversity Ahmed Aboutaleb. Apart from consolidating a small core of Labor elites committed to promoting liberal Islam, networks were created to traditional, conservative and orthodox associations. They received invitations to engage in dialogue meetings and funding to support to initiatives.

The new alliances were undergirded by new discursive categories. Moroccans and Turks were no longer addressed as ethnic groups but as putative Muslim citizens (cf. Buijs, 2009). Cohen’s mission to ‘keep things together’ in practice meant that the city tried to connect Muslims and non-Muslims, though the former received much more attention than the latter. Through large public events as well community initiatives, the government and its elite partners attempted to diffuse the idea that a commitment to Islam allows or even implies adherence to civil norms. Whereas the old leftist elite had identified inequality and racism as the main factors behind high crime rates and poor school performance, the new elite argued that these should be seen as cultural pathologies resulting from bad morals and a tendency among minorities to blame others for their insolence and misbehavior.

The new generation of civil leaders (liberal Muslims at the top of the Labor Party) received not only symbolic but also institutional support. Some smaller organizations, like the Muslim Youth Amsterdam, were created on the initiative and with the financial help of the government. The government made comparatively large funds available to subsidize the Ramadan festival; a month-long program of events organized around the Islamic month of fasting. The government moreover provided funds to Marhaba, a center for debate on Islam; the initiator was the former director of Milli Gorus (Haci Karacaer) and the board consisted in large part of liberal Muslims, including several prominent figures from the Labor Party. The government furthermore provided a discount of multiple millions on a vacant plot to the liberal leadership of Milli Gorus in the hope of keeping the organizations out of the control of conservative financers.

In sum, between 2000 and 2005, new alliances were created, alternative discourses developed and new institutional resources made available, often with the express purpose of incorporating minority communities as Muslim citizens. By sponsoring these liberal Muslims affiliated with the Labor Party, the government hoped to marginalize radical and extremist elements and to engage indifferent or recalcitrant Muslims. The elite alliances were united
through their conviction that Islam was a key political marker and that (liberal interpretations of) religion can and should be used to combat cultural pathologies.

**Minority Politics in Los Angeles: From Multicultural Clientelism to Class Empowerment**

*Consolidating power relations: Multicultural Clientelism*

During the period of the 1960s, Blacks and Latinos experienced some success in building up new political machines, financed largely by the local Democratic Party and marginalized Jewish elites. Black and Latino politicians employed this support to build a political infrastructure among the many minority associations concentrated in these areas. The election of liberal African American Tom Bradley for mayor in 1973 transformed this alliance into a successful electoral coalition (Sonenshein, 1993). The new governing coalition was therefore characterized by an alliance between economic and emergent minority political elites on the one hand; and connections to working class minority communities through civil brokers (i.e. Churches, community organizations, etc.) on the other. This ushered in a period of multicultural clientelism.

An emerging and increasingly dominant discourse in urban politics concerned racial justice and multiculturalism. The Black and Latino associations operating in the city viewed the struggles to ‘empower’ their communities as part of the broader struggle to achieve racial equality. Within these minority communities, there were strong radical currents that embraced more radical anti-colonial and ethno-nationalist themes. Bradley and his associates believed that the discourses of radicals alienated white middle class liberals. This required him and his allies to distance themselves from radicals and categorize their discourses as illegitimate (see Pulido, 2002). In this way, the emergent regime constructed a non-radical multicultural discourse that stressed the importance of ethnic-racial injustices and proposed reforms to distribute government resources (e.g. money, jobs, infrastructure, influence, etc.) more equitably between ethnic and racial communities.

The political elite employed federal welfare funds to provide their supporters in Black and Latino communities with public jobs, infrastructure, and support for community associations and programs. National funding for these kinds of programs increased dramatically during the early years of his administration, with the ‘urban’ part of the federal
budget growing from 2% to 12% between 1968 and 1973 (Florida and Jonas, 1991: 374). The mayor’s office distributed these new resources to organizations in Latino and Black neighborhoods in exchange for ensuring order and stability within these communities. In Black neighborhoods, the Black pastor assumed the pivotal role as civil broker in these neighborhoods while radicals were systematically marginalized (a similar situation found in New York, see Katzenelson, 1981). The. As the Catholic Church played a marginal role in Latino politics, a handful of community development organizations assumed a similar role in Latino neighborhoods (Valle and Torres, 2000; Pulido, 2002).

Eroding Power Relations and the Slow Decline of Multicultural Clientelism

The foundations of multicultural clientelism were eroded during the 1980s and early 1990s. In the 1980s rivalries between liberal and conservative elites turned into open conflict while economic restructuring resulted in rising levels of unemployment, crime and poverty in minority communities (Soja et al., 1983). Furthermore, national discourses increasingly stigmatized Black and Latino inner-city residents as ‘undeserving poor’ and attributed the decline of inner city areas to their moral failings rather than broad structural forces (Davis, 1990; Wacquant, 2008). These discourses, coupled with severe economic restructuring, aggravated the fears of ‘dangerous’ minorities among of middle class voters and weakened their overall support for the multicultural status quo. Responding to the fissures in the Bradley coalition and a turn away from the multicultural status quo, conservative elites in the 1990s launched a new electoral coalition made up of themselves and the disenchanted middle class.

In addition to changes in alliances and discourses, the institutional supports for multicultural clientelism eroded during the 1980s. Following the passage of Proposition 13 in 1977, revenue from property taxes in California fell far below the national average. By the mid-1990s, the average resident of California paid 38% less in property taxes than residents of New York (Davis, 2000). At the same time, federal funding for urban programs declined dramatically. The ‘urban’ part of the federal budget fell from approximately 12% to 7% between 1978 and 1984 (Florida and Jonas, 1991: 374). This meant that the “The average federal share of the municipal income stream declined from 22 per cent in 1980 to a mere 6 per cent in 1989 while the share of funding from states remained constant” (Davis, 1993: 11). Federal funding for urban programs declined dramatically during the decade, with annual
funds being reduced for Community Block Grants ($6.3 to 4 billion), Employment Training ($14.3 to $4.2 billion), and Assisted Housing ($26.8 to $8.9 billion) (Eisinger, 1997: 3).

Declining revenues contributed to an important realignment in the city’s power relations. The priority for city officials was now to attract investments from tax-generating middle class residents and new business elites. The Bradley regime invested approximately $1 billion in public money to make Los Angeles into a ‘world class city’ (Davis, 2000). As scarce public resources were diverted into projects that benefited the upper middle class and business elites, the city cut economic development programs to low income areas by 82%, housing programs by 78%, and job training programs by 63%. The city sought out additional savings by outsourcing many of its social service functions to professional non-profit organizations (Wolch, 1990, 1996). This severely impacted local minority associations and civil brokers. First, civil brokers and traditional associations were compelled to compete with highly professionalized non-profit organizations for declining government resources. The smaller associations disappeared and the more powerful ones barely held on to fraying patronage ties. Second, declining access to government patronage and influence resulted in a decline in prestige for civil brokers in minority communities, undermining their abilities to exert community control on behalf of local authorities. In the eyes of these increasingly neoliberal authorities, civil brokers had ceased being of value because they no longer fulfilled their ‘order maintenance’ functions in these neighborhoods. Thus, a sharp decline in tax and federal revenue therefore required the city to restructure the institutional underpinnings of the political field, binding city officials to pro-growth, neoliberal elites and marginalizing their traditional support bases in minority and working class communities.

As discursive and political support for traditional minority civil brokers declined, new challengers emerged in Latino communities and presented a new pole of contention within them. First, a large influx of political refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala spurred the emergence of a new cluster of activists. Solidarity associations financed by liberals and the Catholic Church became magnets for left-wing refugees with already developed pools of ‘activist capital’. These organizations served as the launching pads for a new generation of immigrant and minority rights associations (Hamilton and Chinchilla, 2001). In addition to this, the Catholic Church provided financial and moral support to the emerging immigrant associations (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2008). Second, a new generation of labor union militants emerged that had been trained by Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers and various
civil rights struggles during the 1970s (Milkman, 2006). These militants targeted immigrant saturated service industries, adopted social movement tactics and employed social justice discourses. The first campaign to put these principles into practice was Service Employee International Union’s ‘Justice for Janitors’ campaign in 1987 (Waldinger et al., 1998). This and a series of other campaigns resulted in new partnerships between immigrant associations, churches, and university intellectuals.

In response to the declining resonance of ‘multicultural’ discourses in the broader public, these new Latino activists (i.e. militant unionists and political refugees) began to formulate an alternative discourse. In particular, union militants, in collaboration with university intellectuals, had begun to fuse discourses on ethnicity with those on class, creating a new discourse that centered on the concept of social justice (Nicholls, 2003; Soja, 2010). This new discourse posited that Blacks and Latinos occupied the same class position as a hyper-exploited urban proletariat in the global city. Conceived in this way, working class minorities were presented with a strong rationale to struggle together for greater social justice rather than compete against one another for diminishing government patronage. While these discourses remained subordinate during the 1980s, they nevertheless provided a potent alternative to the neoliberal discourses of the emergent conservative block.

Lastly, these new challengers possessed alternative resources to finance their operations. Labor militants depended on the resources of their national organizations and membership dues and immigrant associations depended on local and national foundations. Thus, these changing institutional conditions severely weakened traditional brokers in Black and Latino neighbourhoods, but these same conditions limited the co-optation capacities of the local government and carved out a space for a new generation of Latino activists to organize in relative autonomy.

*Disrupting Events: Accelerating the Decline of Multiculturalism*

Several major events in the mid-1990s dramatically accelerated the pace of change described above. The first major event of the decade was a large-scale riot that resulted in 53 deaths and $1 billion of property damage. The riots combined with a series of natural disasters and a deep recession to create a permanent sense of disenchantment among the city’s white, middle class residents. This political sentiment accelerated the demise of multiculturalism, politically and ideologically. In 1994, Richard Riordan – a well-established real estate developer – won the
mayoral race on a law-and-order and neoliberal platform. In the same year, residents of the state voted overwhelmingly to support a referendum (proposition 187) to cut all assistance to undocumented immigrants. Two years later, Proposition 209 passed with another strong majority, banning ‘affirmative action’ in the state. Lastly, in 1998, Proposition 207 banned bilingual education in public schools.

Reconsolidating a post-multicultural field: Social Justice and the City
The rightward shift prompted union activists and immigrant organizations to accelerate their own organizing activities. In particular, the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor provided resources to assist immigrant rights associations to naturalize immigrant residents and organize them into a new electoral block. The percentage of the Latino electorate in California increased from 7% in 1990, 14% in 2000, and an estimated 21% in 2010 (Barreto et. al., 2005: 794). By 2001, the alliance between immigrant rights associations and labor unions came into full force. The two main candidates in the run-off for the mayor’s election were left-wing progressives. In exchange for the support of the Latino-dominated County Federation of Labor, elected officials (from the city to the state) were expected to support labor and immigrant activists in their various campaigns. In sharp contrast to the top-down Bradley government, the power in this new alliance largely rested with labor unions and their allies in immigrant and social justice associations.
This insurgent political force was rooted in the Latino community but the County Federation of Labor sought also to create an alliance with the Black community based on common class positions. While the older generation of Black civil brokers (mostly church Pastors) remained resistant to these entreaties, a younger generation of Black activists was more willing to develop relations with the new labor movement. Pivotal figures like Karen Bass, Anthony Thigpen, and Mark Ridley-Thomas were the first of this generation to work directly with the County Federation of Labor on common areas of concern. Lastly, the Federation also launched an effort to gain the support of wavering clergy by forming a new clergy-based association, Clergy and Lay United for Economic Justice (Honda Sotelo, 2008). By recruiting a number of influential pastors, labor hoped to use their prestige and social networks to build support among other pastors in the Black community. The County Federation of Labor therefore aimed to create its own civil brokers who would assist their efforts to realign grassroots networks away from ethnic patronage and towards a new logic of multi-ethnic class empowerment.
The leadership of the labor movement embraced a class-based social justice discourse over traditional discourses that stressed racial distributive justice and multiculturalism. Ethnic differences and claims were by no means silenced but they were made subordinate to commonalities based on social class. The more unions became a powerful force in the political field, the more their discourses of social justice became commonplace among important segments of the political class. Political elites remained dependent on economic elites but their dependence on unions and immigrant associations for funds and electoral support required them to adopt the social justice discourses of the movement.

The election of a new progressive block in 2001 and new revenue from economic growth made new institutional resources available to support associations in Latino and Black neighborhoods. While many associations began to receive public subsidies for various programs, they also received much of their funding from local and national foundations. The diversified funding base enhanced the autonomy of minority and immigrant associations. Moreover, union and association leaders were appointed to important governing commissions including the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA/LA) and commissions charged with the management of Port of Los Angeles and the airport. They used their influence to create a more supportive environment for various campaigns, including efforts to unionize the ports and airport, provide affordable housing, and make the Port of Los Angeles more ecologically sustainable. Thus, alliances, discourses, and institutions aligned in a way to not only shift the field away from ethnic to class politics, but also to introduce a period of ‘empowered’ governance for minorities and their organizations in the city.

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Conclusion

The political fields of Amsterdam and Los Angeles transformed drastically over the last decades (Table 1). Old players have withered, new players emerged and the rules of the game have changed. Between the 1970s and 1980s, the ties between political elites and minority communities helped give rise to distinctive ‘multicultural’ strategies in both cities. Whereas associations expressing ethnic-racial visions were favored in Los Angeles, associations favoring a more Marxist reading of multicultural politics were favored in Amsterdam. From
the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, the field of minority politics underwent important changes. In Los Angeles, immigrant associations joined with labor unions and later with a new generation of Black associations to create a broad alliance based on the principles of class and social justice rather than ethnicity and multiculturalism. The high mobilization capacities of this coalition and their financial independence have allowed them to elect friendly politicians and pressure them to support social justice issues. In Los Angeles, change in the field of minority politics is thus characterized by a double shift: a discursive shift from multiculturalism toward social justice; and an institutional shift from clientelism toward bottom-up and empowered governance. In Amsterdam, by contrast, the fading of ethnic corporatism has given way to growing concerns over the integration of Muslims. This has prompted city officials to shift their support from leftist minority associations to ‘moderate’ religious based associations. The aim has been to employ religious leaders as civil brokers to civilize minority communities. In Amsterdam, change in the field of minority politics is also characterized by a double shift: a shift from minority corporatism to ethno-religious containment; and a shift toward the increased power of the local government over the networks of minority associations.

Even though it would be an oversimplification to say that the two cities moved in opposite directions, they interestingly diverge in a number of ways. First, whereas left-wing associations in Amsterdam formed cohesive alliances during the 1970s and 1980s, such forms of cooperation emerged in Los Angeles in the 1990s and reached their zenith in the new millennium. Second, whereas religious discourses and associations grew stronger in Amsterdam, religious organizations in Los Angeles (especially the Black church) have played a declining and secondary role as the union has assumed a dominant role. Third, the local state in Amsterdam gradually tightened its grip over minority associations as subsidies were provided under stricter conditions to an increasing number of small associations while the local state in Los Angeles lost its institutional capacity to coopt and discipline insurgent associations.

We therefore explain for these divergent expressions of post-multicultural politics by highlighting the strategies and capacities of elites to steer the behavior and discourses of minority actors. When confronted with the slow demise of leftist civil brokers in Amsterdam, city officials possessed the institutional capacities to select and support new civil brokers and provide them with the material and symbolic resources needed to achieve control in minority communities. By contrast, Los Angeles officials lacked the institutional capacities to respond
to the decline of multiculturalism in a similar way because of severe revenue cuts. Such cuts undermined elite abilities to provide old or new minority actors the resources needed to maintain control in their communities. This presented an opening for challengers to construct an autonomous base of power and contribute to reshaping minority politics from the bottom up. These findings suggest that the vibrancy and cohesion of coalitions for social justice today may be inversely related to the level of social movement incorporation in the 1980s. These derivations are obviously tentative but our goal was less to come to definitive conclusions than to show that field analysis opens up new avenues for studying the contentious dynamics of urban politics.

**
REFERENCES:


Bronfenbrenner, S. Friedman, R. Hurd, and R. Oswald (Eds.) *Organizing to win.* Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY.


Table 1. Consolidating, eroding and reconsolidating power relations in minority politics in Los Angeles and Amsterdam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AMSTERDAM</th>
<th>LOS ANGELES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1970s and 1980s</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consolidating power relations: Multicultural Corporatism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consolidating power relations: Multicultural Clientelism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliances</strong></td>
<td>Strong alliance between left-wing minority associations and other progressive movement organizations</td>
<td>Strong elite alliances (minority political elite and white economic elite) and top-down incorporation of minority organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discourses</strong></td>
<td>Focus on the class emancipation of migrants and the exclusion of 'undemocratic' minority associations</td>
<td>Focus on racial-ethnic justice and the redistribution of opportunities to previously excluded minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions</strong></td>
<td>Left-wing associations incorporated with structural subsidies and through ethnic councils</td>
<td>Federal subsidies used to support minority organizations on an ad hoc basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990s</strong></td>
<td><strong>Eroding power relations and the slow decline of multiculturalism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Eroding Power Relations and the Slow Decline of Multicultural Clientelism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliances</strong></td>
<td>Internal friction within ethnic councils</td>
<td>Intra-elite conflict and declining support for coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discourses</strong></td>
<td>Focus on diversity and individuals rather than marginal groups</td>
<td>Urban problems associated with behavior and values of minorities and less on racial injustices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions</strong></td>
<td>Project subsidies for associations willing to cooperate</td>
<td>Declining revenue to support minority organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2000s</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reconsolidating a Post-multicultural Field: Religious Containment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reconsolidating a post-multicultural field: Social Justice and the City</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliances</strong></td>
<td>Government, specifically the Labor Party, establish relations with prominent Muslims and Islamic associations</td>
<td>Labor unions and immigrant associations establish a social justice alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discourses</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Keeping things together&quot; - religion is viewed as a social cohesion tool</td>
<td>Social Justice - class is viewed as the primary basis for making rights claims in the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions</strong></td>
<td>Differential inclusion: incentives for most assimilated Muslims, disincentives for stigmatized groups</td>
<td>Bottom Up: Political and symbolic resources concentrated in hands of social justice alliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governments in the Netherlands are typically coalitions, both at the municipal and the national level. The Labor Party has been the dominant party within Amsterdam’s coalitions. In the Netherlands, mayors are appointed through an intricate consultative procedure which formally does not take into account the party affiliation of candidates but Amsterdam always has had a mayor from the Labor Party.

This regime was not fully consolidated. It was precarious because some of its key proponents have left Amsterdam and because it drew a lot of criticism for its tendency to breach the division between church and state. Amsterdam’s current mayor, Eberhard van der Laan, does not thematize Islam and integration as much as his predecessor.