The struggle to belong

Dealing with diversity in 21st century urban settings.

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Social cohesion and economic competitiveness in six global European cities

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Abstract

Global cities in Western Europe have been historically characterized by a strong association between social cohesion and economic competitiveness. However, in the last decade this stability has been affected by strains induced by the trends toward globalisation and by rising social inequalities. On the theoretical side, these facts have raised the need for a new understanding of the different forms the relationship between cohesion and economic growth can take in specific urban contexts.

This paper looks at how this interconnection is shaped in six Western Europe big cities, characterized by high levels of globalization and a leading economic role in their respective national contexts: Barcelona, Copenhagen, Lyon, Manchester, Milan, and Munchen. Four crucial aspects will be considered: increasing social inequalities within the cities in relation to the specificity of their local production regime; the tradeoffs between local interests protection and capacity to attract global flows of financial and human resources (i.e. tensions in the relationship between space of places and space of flows); new social morphologies emerging in these cities as consequence of their globalization (such as gentrification, or urban sprawl contributing to the formation of big city regions); and finally, tensions and conflicts due to the increasing multiethnic composition of their population.

Data and qualitative information have been gathered about all these aspects and have been organized in four distinct reports. This paper is a first attempt to synthesize the main results of such research. All the cities considered have carried out relevant urban projects that are aimed at promoting their international functions and attracting foreign investments and high-quality human resources. These globalised economic functions seem to be efficiently performed independently of the social quality of the urban context. Nevertheless, the impact of such processes has been different in the cities considered, and it basically depends on the peculiar development pattern of each city. Generally speaking, the growth of global functions has contributed to deteriorate the internal organization of the city. For example, heavy traffic problems have worsened because of the intensification of internal and external flows; new social and territorial polarization has taken place as a consequence of the rise of the new urban elite occupied in the global economy as well as of the increasing housing costs; finally, risks of ethnic segregation are recently increased as a consequence of the recent growth in immigration flows. As a whole these facts show that the six cities examined, though embedded in different welfare capitalism regimes, are characterized by a common trend towards higher internal disorganization.
1. Introduction

The analysis presented in this paper is grounded on an empirical study which focused on the relationship between competitiveness and social cohesion in six European big cities. A previous comparative analysis of 50 large Western European cities (Ranci 2011) showed the absence of a statistical correlation between global competitiveness and social cohesion, thus supporting the hypothesis that different patterns of urban development are present in Europe. It emerged from this previous study that an increase in the level of global competitiveness of cities is not necessarily matched by an increase in their levels of inequality or social exclusion.

This finding confirmed the idea that in Western Europe the issue of social equity is relatively distinct from the dynamics of economic competitiveness and growth. Some specific factors, such as the solid tradition of national welfare systems and the weight of the middle classes in the occupational structure of the European cities, seem to explain this result. Such factors, notwithstanding their progressive erosion, still anchor the West European population to a base of social rights and public protections that is able to attenuate economic and social disparities. This analysis showed that welfare policies at national level still perform a crucial role in defending the urban population against the new risks deriving from globalization. Hence, large part of the marked differences in the degree of social cohesion among West European cities seem due to national rather than local characteristics. Intervention by the welfare state still makes the difference in the affluent and well-protected context of Western Europe (Letho 2000; Hausserman and Haila 2005).

However, this previous study also showed that there is a clear disconnection in West European cities between global competitiveness and social cohesion. While on the one hand this finding indicates that the European cities are not at any great risk of inequality, on the other it means that a high level of global competitiveness does not have any positive impact on the living conditions of the urban population. If globalization is one of the crucial components of urban competitiveness today, this does not mean that a high degree of global connectivity ensures economic returns and additional opportunities for urban populations. Whereas high urban competitiveness and strong social cohesion were tightly interwoven in the age of Keynesian development.
that characterized the West European cities for several decades after the Second World
War, today these two elements are much less interdependent.

Partly in contrast with current interpretations of the cohesion/competitiveness nexus, this general finding suggested that more detailed analysis should be conducted in order to understand the potential interdependencies between these two aspects. The purpose of this paper, in fact, is to investigate the specific mechanisms whereby social cohesion and economic growth are interconnected in six large West European cities.

2. Methodology

The analysis considers six European cities: Barcelona, Copenhagen, Lyon, Manchester, Milan, and Munich. These cities have been selected because they have a number of characteristics in common: they play a central, if not dominant, economic role in their respective national economies; with the exception of Copenhagen, they are not the capitals of the nation-state in which they are situated; they are of large urban size (being at least the third largest cities in their respective countries); they exhibit a strong tendency to globalization and are embedded in transnational urban networks. Choice of them makes it possible to control for one of the decisive factors identified by the previous study: the coverage and generosity of welfare programmes. The six cities considered in this paper pertain in fact to different welfare models: the Social-democratic regime (Copenhagen), the Liberal regime (Manchester), the Corporatist regime, including both the Francophone (Lyon) and the German (Munich) variants, and the Mediterranean regime, with its two variants: Spanish (Barcelona) and Italian (Milan). This broad research design allows control to be kept over variations in the levels of social cohesion due both to the presence of different welfare regimes, and to different degrees of wealth in Western Europe.

The research reported in what follows was carried out in two distinct phases. In the first step, detailed information was collected on the situation of the six cities on the basis of research protocols. The cities were divided among the researchers, who spent a period of time in their cities in order to conduct interviews with experts and key informants and gather useful materials. All the information collected was included in intermediate
reports for each city. The field analysis was repeated various times in order to fill gaps in the information and to obtain sufficiently complete and comparable data.

The intermediate city-reports were then collated for cross-city analysis, identifying the four thematic areas considered in the sections that follow. The heterogeneity among the information on each city (due to the presence of different urban scales, different criteria for the collection and organization of the data, etc.) has prevented the systematic comparison of homogeneous data. These problems were circumvented by comparing cities on the basis of a description of emerging mechanism and tendencies, while forgoing detailed comparisons on specific data. We would call this method as a “soft” comparison that combines the methodology of the case study with a quantitative comparison.

3. Global competition and social cohesion

The six cities analysed in this paper are, albeit to different extents, fully integrated into contemporary global economy. They are equipped with advanced economic, infrastructural, and logistical systems, and they are endowed with an abundance of financial and productive resources, human and social capital. They are all major players in the international market, and they have invested in their capacity to compete, substantially completing their transition to post-Fordism. They are cities that devote significant resources to launch urban projects, on various scales, aimed to improve or consolidate their international positionings.

In point of fact, they are not cities in competition as such. Not all of their productive and social components take part in the global market. Nor are their urban politics exclusively geared to economic competition. The six cities considered are highly complex, only partially globalized, urban systems. More than economic entities defined by boundaries and identifiable assets, they are what Amin and Thrift describe as “assemblages of more or less distanciated economic relations which will have different intensities at different locations” (Amin and Thrift, 2002, 52). These cities are composite economic, social, and organizational entities. Their global importance depends primarily on the fact that they attract resources and promote exchanges. That is to say, their importance depends on their attractiveness, and on their capacity to
intercept and relaunch flows of people, capital, and information: in other words, on their capacity to act as nodes in the global network.

Again according to Amin and Thrift, contemporary cities are places of sociability helping to strengthen economic transactions. Here the significant point is that such places of sociability must be organized and maintained if they are to yield long-term benefits. Global flows must be organized within cities, and they must be combined with local relationships (Castells, 1996). In the Fordist age, competition and social cohesion were two elements in strong equilibrium. Cities were simultaneously the principal places of both production and consumption. Economic growth was fuelled by strong demand for consumption to a large extent concentrated in the cities. At the same time, if the production functions were to be efficient and stable, they required the organization of social reproduction through stable industrial relations, housing policies able to make residence in the city affordable, measures to protect the vulnerable and to support consumption. The economic system’s strong need for stability found its pivot in the industrial city, and it was supported by high growth rates and by the generosity of welfare systems. Today, by contrast, social stability is less economically important than flexibility, and this entails that the search for greater competitiveness no longer requires a high level of social integration. Indeed, the latter becomes an obstacle, a social superstructure which hampers the development of the new, post-industrial economy. The disconnection observed between social cohesion and competitiveness, therefore, is not so much a problem as an economic necessity.

However, the issue of the relationship between social cohesion and global competitiveness is not entirely irrelevant. The node-cities in the global network favour the transmission of flows, so that they primarily develop a capacity for interconnection with the outside. But at the same time, a certain level of internal organization is necessary if the activity of a node-city is to be efficient. On the one hand, cities are specifically positioned in the global arena; on the other, they organize their flows, both internal and from/to outside, consistently both with their international positioning and with the interests and structure of local society. The existing connection between interior and exterior is therefore one of the main fields of analysis on the local impact of globalization on cities; but also the internal conditions that foster, or hinder, the development of cities’ global competitiveness have to be considered.
4. Cities that attract

The six cities considered are specialized, in various ways, as *poles of attraction*. Numerous initiatives, policy measures, infrastructural projects, and schemes for the localization of services are undertaken to enhance the cities’ attractiveness to foreign direct investments and high-quality human capital (see table 1). These flows are governed only in part by the allocative decisions of the global players; they also depend on the capacity of cities to attract them on the basis of the quality of places or specific factors. All the cities analysed have made investments in this regard, not only through the usual urban marketing strategies, but also through specific projects aimed at improving accessibility and at encouraging the location of new productive activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign direct investments in number of projects 2003-2006</th>
<th>Foreign white collars (highly skilled workers + foreign students)</th>
<th>Presence of tertiary activities with international extension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>7% + 6%</td>
<td>Biotech, Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>3,6% (only students)</td>
<td>Hi-tech, Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Tourism, Creative ind., Entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>9% + 10%</td>
<td>Biotech, Aerospatial, Finance, Media, Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Insurances, Finance, Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>7% + 10%</td>
<td>Biotech, Auto</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here we mention only some of the most significant projects (see also table 2). Barcelona has invested in attractiveness through prolonged policies of “great events” and through the strong promotion of arts and tourism. Copenhagen has developed a large-scale area project (Oresund) with which to catalyse the knowledge economy by enhancing links with nearby Malmö. Munich has developed various programmes to support the installation of new productive activities in brownfield areas through generous financing policies and infrastructuration (also promoted by the *Länder* and the German state). Lyon has mounted numerous cultural initiatives and has profited from the infrastructuration obtained from government investments in high-speed railway
lines. Manchester and Milan lag slightly behind, but they too have invested in attractiveness (see Milan’s candidacy for Expo 2015 as an example).

Table 2. Policies aimed at attracting people/capitals: hard factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public investments to attract/support new international economic activities</th>
<th>Investments in infrastructure and/or public long-distance transportation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>Biotech (Medicon Valley): city image</td>
<td>New automatic metro-Oresund bridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>Small enterprise: handwerk</td>
<td>Metro development-Road Pricing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>City of Knowledge (Poble Nou): city image</td>
<td>New regional train network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>Hi-tech Offensive-Cluster Offensive (Martinsried, Garching): start up of new technologies enterprises</td>
<td>New metro lines-Airport empowerment and high speed train to the Airport. Bycicle+train solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>Services Insurances</td>
<td>Metro and bus, bycicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>Biotech (Gerland)</td>
<td>High speed trains system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although these policies have had different outcomes (the most successful cases being those of Munich, Barcelona and Copenhagen), some problems are nevertheless shared by these cities. These problems mainly concern the capacity to balance inside and from/to outside flows. All the cities considered have had to deal with the internal effects provoked by the growth of flows and mobility, and they have had to adjust their urban transport systems accordingly. More than as city-attractors, they have had to develop their capacities as city-organizers of flows. We now discuss the main problems which have emerged in this regard.

One of the principal issues has concerned the new areas for installation of advanced economic activities. Knowledge-intensive services tend, in fact, to concentrate internally to cities, whence they are attracted by the benefits of physical proximity (easier coordination, access to social capital, synergies in the use of services, accessibility, etc.) and by the availability of human capital. Moreover, the demand for centrality produces large flows of people and private vehicles towards the centre of metropolitan areas, causing traffic congestion and the strong growth of commuting. Some cities have reacted to this tendency by decentralizing advanced economic activities to peripheral areas of the metropolitan region (see also table 2). The most evident cases are those of Copenhagen (Oresund), Munich (massive investments in
brownfield areas), and Barcelona (upgrading of working-class districts). This strategy has been accompanied by aggressive policies of urban marketing focused on cultural and symbolic actions (in the case of Barcelona and of Lyon), the explicit promotion of new local production clusters through the offer of good public incentives (Munich and Lyon), the building of large infrastructures (for instance, the bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö). In general, it seems that policies aimed at promoting diffused localisation of new attracting economic activities in the urban region have achieved good results, especially when interconnections and the mobility of people (both radial and transverse) have been simultaneously enhanced. This has made it possible to aim at not only productive diversification, but also at the distribution of the population across a broad area, thereby partly decongesting the central areas.

Infrastructures, transport, services to businesses, and logistics constitute the most relevant “hard factors” of attractiveness (Musterd 2010). All the cities considered have made substantial investments in both long and short distance transportation infrastructures (see table 2). One crucial issue has been the capacity to invest in public transportation in order to reduce the concentration of private traffic and to make it sustainable. But also high speed interconnections have become of crucial importance. This has required a larger and effective multilevel governance on a metropolitan scale.

Some cities have made progress in this direction by creating strategic plans for the urban region and by introducing policies for decentralizing the location of new firms of excellence (Munich, Barcelona).

A further aspect of urban attractiveness concerns the development of “soft factors”. “Soft factors” are related to the quality of urban life in order to attract skilled workers and to influence the location decisions of multinational companies. The six cities analysed have developed specific soft factors: Barcelona has promoted culture by emphasising the city’s creative identity; Munich has promoted green spaces and the quality of life in decentralized areas; Copenhagen has concentrated on its image as a “city of knowledge” and on environmental sustainability; Barcelona and Milan have promoted large-scale events; and Lyon has relied on cultural programmes. While the efforts have been diversified, the results in terms of attracting high-skilled workers have not been particularly satisfactory so far. The amount of foreign high skilled workers or foreign students is still low in many of the cities considered, with the exceptions of
Munich, Barcelona, and partly Manchester (see table 1). More than contributing to attractiveness of talented workers and students, soft factors have played an important role in the urban marketing strategies by enhancing the public image of the cities and increasing tourist flows (see the cases of Barcelona, Copenhagen, Munich, but also Milan to lesser extent). Moreover, soft factors are important positional goods for the new urban elites that live in the cities, increasing the prestige and desirability of specific areas.

In general, therefore, the growth of an urban economy based on international flows has required the development of urban policies able to act systemically on the internal and external linkages of the metropolitan area. The growing demand for centrality by advanced services and high-skilled workers, as well as the centralization of economic of excellence, has increased the congestion of urban centres and have deteriorated their habitability. Consequently public intervention aimed at improving mobility and enhancing soft factors have become necessary. The capacity of these cities to compete in attracting global flows of capital and talent is grounded on these aspects.

In this respect the case of Milan is emblematic of the persistence of conflicts between external attractiveness and quality of the “space of places” (Castells 1996). The strong international attractiveness of Milan is mainly favoured by the multi-sectoral nature of the local economic system and by the strength of its financial sector. Nevertheless, external attractiveness is off-set by various obstacles: the persisting inadequacy of the urban public transportation system; its scant endowment with soft factors; the absence of multilevel governance on the scale of the urban region. These three aspects instead explain the competitive strength of cities like Munich and Barcelona, which have launched processes of political innovation and have invested massively in these aspects. If the existing economic structure of Milan, and its marked capacity to attract global flows, has favoured the high international connectivity of Milan for a long time, today these features may not be enough.

5. City-region: mission impossible?

Governing large urban regions is one of the main challenges facing urban policies. It is significant that this research found it almost impossible to precisely identify the
boundaries of the analysed cities. The six cities that we studied adopt different territorial scales in the provision of data and information about their urban reality. Therefore it is the concept itself of ‘city’ that becomes blurred. Contemporary cities are open urban systems, constantly changing and with broad areas of porosity and mixage between their insides and outsides.

At the level of the urban region, locational dynamics and commuter flows show that the dominant dynamics at present do not assume the features typical of urban sprawl. Rather than creating an indistinct urban continuum around the main urban centre, new productive and residential locations occur in areas where local centralities already exist, or they contribute to creating new ones. The six urban regions are characterized, in fact, in their urban continuity, by the existence of “decentralized centres” specialized in specific productive functions and offering distinct residential quality. These urban regions include a plurality of territories with specific identities and do not merge into a magmatic “diffused city”.

In these regions the relationship between the main urban centre and the surrounding area has become highly complex. In some cities an integrated regional pattern is strongly evident. It results from specific policies aimed at transferring high-quality productive and residential urban functions to the regional government: this is the case of Munich, Copenhagen, and to a lesser extent Barcelona and Lyon (see table 3). This refocusing (recentrage) of metropolitan areas has generally very positive effects because it reduces central congestion (Munich), eases commuter flows and the consequent traffic problems (Lyon), and revives former industrial areas at strong risk of decay (Barcelona). Where this process is not pronounced, as in Milan and Manchester, a traditional dualism persists between the core city, which is hyper-specialized in advanced tertiary services, and the peripheries, increasingly characterized by scant attractiveness, in which industrial areas remain. This failure to refocus is responsible for persisting problems of traffic congestion, but also for the increasing social and economic dualism between centre and periphery.

Table 3. Main projects of urban regeneration in central and/or peripheral areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>Kgs. Enghave in Vesterbro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Holmbladsgade in Amager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Central areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Milano     | *Garibaldi-Repubblica*  
*Milano City Life*                                     | *Santa Giulia* (stopped because of the bankrupt of the real estate company managing it)  
*Arese: new space for the Milan Fair* |
| Barcelona  | *Garibaldi-Repubblica*  
*Milano City Life*                                     | *Santa Giulia* (stopped because of the bankrupt of the real estate company managing it)  
*Arese: new space for the Milan Fair* |
| Monaco     | *Soziale Stadt*: regeneration programs in many peripherical distressed urban areas, integrating social, occupational, mobility and environmental intervention:  
*Milbertshofen (2004)*  
*Hasenbergl (2007)*.  
Since 2001 regeneration programs have been started also in district 14 (Berg am Laim), district 16 (Ramersdorf - Perlach), district 17 (Obergiesing), district 18 (Untergiesing-Harlaching).  
*Big urban projects*  
*Messestadt Riem*: a public area close to the previous airport (560 ht.).The new plan locates a new fair, new spaces for manufacture, high tech industry and advanced services (13800 new jobs), residence (14500 new residents) and an urban park. |  

But even when policies are introduced to create a multipolar and reticular regional system, the chances of improvement and the resources invested are not equally distributed across the urban region. Some areas have such large amount of resources (in terms of human capital, productive system, spaces available, and connections) to be in the best conditions to develop new regional centralities. Where marked differentiations already exist in the urban region, the pressure to refocus tends to radicalize them and to create strong territorial imbalances if urban policies do not intervene: this is the case of the territorial disparities along the north-south axis of Manchester, but also of the inequalities arising along the east-west axis of Lyon. Areas strongly industrialized in the past, or with major problems of accessibility, may therefore fail to grasp the new
opportunities and remain marginal, while other areas will acquire the status of new urban or metropolitan centralities.

6. Unequal cities

The positioning of cities in the international economy has relevant impacts on their occupational structures, and therefore on the distribution of the opportunities and risks that are connected with the labour market. There is in fact a close relation between the characteristics of local production system of the cities and the structure of social inequalities.

European cities have been historically characterized by the presence of a large middle class mostly employed in the public administration or in highly stable professional or white-collar occupations. This presence of a large middle class has long been an important factor in social stabilization and political consensus. The stability of the middle class has been a source of attractiveness and internal equilibrium.

Current theories put forward two interpretative models, both of which emphasise the crisis, or the change, in the urban middle classes. On the one hand, the dual city model has highlighted the existence of acute social cleavages within the population due to the concomitant increase in high-skilled workers and in low-skilled workers (underpaid and often working in the informal economy) (Sassen, 1991, 2000). On the other hand, the theory of the professionalization of the middle class (Hamnett, 2003) has stressed the emergence of new social differentiations which mainly affect upper classes. These cleavages are due the growth of a new class of highly-skilled professionals working in advanced services.

The pattern predominant in the six cities analysed is characterised by a limited professionalization consisting in the growth of high-skilled jobs matched by a decrease, or immobility, of low-skilled ones (see table 4). The theory of the dual city, therefore, does not seem entirely applicable to these cities. The emerging dynamic confirms the substantial resilience of the European model of social cohesion. In these cities, moreover, professionalization does not have the magnitude and pace exhibited by the first-generation global cities. While it is true that the international positioning of cities has generally required large-scale investments in high-productivity and knowledge-
intensive services, this has given rise to a visible, yet moderate, concentration of high-skilled workers in the same urban areas. This modest trend is a feature shared by all the considered cities (see table 4).

Table 4. Indicators of professionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Proportion of high skilled workers (professional and managers)</th>
<th>Proportion of employment in advanced tertiary services</th>
<th>Proportion of people with higher education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The crucial role performed by this new urban elite, characterized by its expertise in sectors of medium-to-high specialization, makes it indispensable for cities to invest in human capital and to attract high-skilled workers. The functional interdependence between the training system and the labour market is consequently of crucial importance. Some cities have adopted policies specifically targeted on this aspect, as in the cases of Lyon and Munich; others have found it difficult to align training provision with opportunities in the labour market. Copenhagen offers advanced training programmes that are unable to match the demand for high-skilled workers. In spite of its large investments in advanced training, the local production system of Milan is still based on medium-level skills and is hardly able to absorb skilled workers. The professionalization process has therefore come about in different ways, creating professional elites mainly in the cities of continental Europe, while in the cities of southern and northern Europe professionalization has been less intense because of persisting mismatches between the training system and the labour market, or an inadequate capacity to exploit talents.
The tendency to professionalization therefore coincides with the rise of a new urban elite driven by the capacity of the new professions to grasp the opportunities offered by economic globalization and ongoing changes in the urban production system. However, this growth does not affect many other layers of the urban population, including a substantial section of the middle class. Professionalization is therefore a process which creates new inequalities and new forms of social stratification.

One of the most serious problems is related to the impact of the growth of the new urban elite on the housing market. Higher demand for elite housing, together with the financialization of the housing market, has given rise to a marked increase in the house prices in all the six cities, which has gradually pushed a section of the middle class towards peripheral areas. While on the one hand this process of substitution may increase the city’s attractiveness to the outside, on the other it widens the gap between the urban elite and the urban middle classes. This is a phenomenon reported in the case of numerous cities (mainly in Copenhagen and Milan), even though it takes different forms (see tables 5).

### Table 5. Housing prices disparities between core and ring areas in Copenhagen and Milan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Inequality index and trends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>Housing prices are higher in central Copenhagen (+78% in respect of the nation-wide average) and in the County Area (+81%) than in the Oresund area. In 1995 the housing prices in central Copenhagen were 10% less than the nation-wide average, while in the County Area were +15%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milano</td>
<td>In the ring area (Province of Milan) the average housing prices are 50% less than in Central Milan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further consequence is that income differentials increase considerably in numerous cities, creating a new gap between the urban elite and the middle class. The middle class is not impoverished, but it suffers a relative deprivation in respect of the most affluent social groups. This is a phenomenon especially evident in the cities of southern Europe (Milan and Barcelona) where the size and stability of the middle class were already lower (see table 6).

### Table 6. Dynamics of inequality and relative deprivation of the middle class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Inequality index and trends</th>
<th>Relative deprivation of the</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
middle class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Gini Index: 0.28 in 2005. Between 2000-2005 decreased number of lowest incomers and increase in higher incomers</th>
<th>From 2000, due to the growth of housing prices in CPH, many low-medium income families have moved to the suburbs or to Sweden (thanks to Oresund Bridge)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milano</td>
<td>Gini Index: 0.51 in 2005 Between 2000-2004 stability in the number of lowest incomers and increased number of highest incomers (the richest decile earns 22 times more than the poorest)</td>
<td>Social mobility is blocked. The 9% of the population concentrates the 60% of the total income. The only relevant mobility is in the number of families entering into the top range &gt;70,000 euro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Gini Index: from 0.29 in 2000 to 0.31 in 2005</td>
<td>Due to the growth of housing prices in Barcelona, many low-medium income families have moved to the suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>No data about income The difference between highest and lowest wages is decreasing (2006)</td>
<td>Shrinking middle class; high level of occupational polarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>The richest decile earns only 5,6 times more the poorest. Stability of income inequalities from 2005 to 2007</td>
<td>Still many “middle skilled workers”: 50% population ranking alongside the middle of the income distribution ladder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, while on the one hand the recent development of low-cost sectors (for instance, construction and tourism Barcelona, in-home care provision and construction in Milan) has contributed to reducing unemployment in all the cities studied until 2008, on the other it has created a marginal sector of the labour market characterized by low skills, modest incomes, and occupational insecurity. This marginal labour market has caused higher social polarization insofar as it exposes workers in these sectors to the risk of entrapment in precarious and low-cost occupations.

Table 7. Dynamics of social polarization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Proportion of people at risk of poverty</th>
<th>Proportion of temporary workers</th>
<th>Proportion of low skilled workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>12.6% cash benefit</td>
<td>11% work force in 2004; increase</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milano</td>
<td>17.5% (2006)</td>
<td>46% people hired as a temporary worker between 2005-2007</td>
<td>45% (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>18.5% (2007);</td>
<td>19% of total work force in 2007</td>
<td>68% (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>13% (2005)</td>
<td>It was 6.5% in 1986</td>
<td>In 2007, 17,000 employed as temporary workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>20% of benefit claimants (2007)</td>
<td>Trend +300% during last 15 years</td>
<td>45% (2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The professionalization of the middle class has therefore had some negative effects: the expulsion of a significant portion of the middle-low class from the central city; an increase in income disparities; the growth of job precariousness; and the risks of occupational segregation on ethnic bases. These dynamics are apparent in all the cities considered, though to different extents and with different features. The impacts of these phenomena on the urban middle class is under scrutiny because of the possible consequences on local consensus and social stability. That’s why some cities have adopted specific political strategies intended to mitigate these processes (see table 8).

One of the most significant of them is the preservation of a substantial industrial system able to offer job security and average wages to medium-skilled workers. This strategy has been accompanied by suitable training schemes. Lyon and Munich have adopted a model of urban economic development centred on sectors of excellence, complementary to which new industrial investments have been fostered by *ad hoc* local and national policies.

An alternative strategy consists in the maintenance of a generous welfare system able to guarantee adequate incomes for low-paid workers. In Copenhagen the introduction of work flexibility has been accompanied by the development of generous income-support policies aimed at developing a flexicurity system.

Social inequalities are much more widespread in cities where international competition has led to the development of highly attractive production sectors (finance, tourism, high tech) in greatly weakened local productive contexts. These cities have seen the growth, in parallel with the new advanced sectors, of a low-skilled service sector in which workers at high risk of poverty are concentrated. In these cities the tendency to professionalization has given rise to a new urban elite, but it has not in parallel created a general upward shift of the whole population. This is a pattern that characterizes cities...
like Milan and Barcelona: a model of the Mediterranean city characterized by the co-
presence of excellences and traps which configure a urban dual development.

Table 8 - Policies aimed at limiting inequalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>High (and still growing) percentage of workers into the public sector. Good investment in highest education and urban policies oriented to high-tech industry. Lack of skilled workers due to brain drain; restrictive policies on immigration; high taxation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milano</td>
<td>Recent investment in highest education, but low request of high skilled workers. Creative economy hiring at low wages. Still presence of manufacture with medium-low technology hiring low skilled workers. Great importance of the construction sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Good investment in highest education and urban policies oriented to high-tech industry. At the same time, strong development of construction and touristic sector (hiring low skilled workers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>Strong policies oriented to high technology, R&amp;D; balanced supply/demand match for high skilled workers. Presence of manufacture hiring medium skilled workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>Strong investment in highest education, finance and other advanced services. At the same time, strong development of services requiring low skilled workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>Strong policies oriented to high technology, R&amp;D; balanced supply/demand match for high skilled workers. Presence of manufacture hiring medium skilled workers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. New social morphologies

All the six cities considered are affected by relevant changes in the housing market and in the social morphology. The growth of house prices and rents is a general trend which reaches the highest level in Manchester and has less strong effects only in Copenhagen, where the housing market is subject to close public regulation.

This increase in prices is accompanied by several other phenomena which can be grouped under the heading of “gentrification”: urban renewal; the embellishment of working-class districts, the creation of commercial services of various kinds catering to gentrifiers, renewed attractiveness of urban centres for affluent social groups and new professionals. All the cities considered, though with considerable differences among them, have had part of their territories markedly transformed by these processes.
Gentrification have also gradually spread, in the case of Munich for instance, through the urban region, affecting specific districts and residents in the metropolitan area. The main factors responsible for this general increase in house prices are the capitalization of the real estate market, the growth of demand for high-cost properties, and the partial privatisation of the public housing stock (see table 9).

**Table 9. Trends in the housing market**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Average price of housing (2004, euro/mq)</th>
<th>Dismissal of the public housing stock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>2.770</td>
<td>Since 1995 20,000 public apartments have been sold to co-operative housing agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milano</td>
<td>2.715</td>
<td>the public housing stock (45,000 units) is constantly decreasing: 800 units are sold every year on average.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>2.778</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>2.500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>3.137</td>
<td>The Right to buy Scheme (since 1980) has caused a great privatization of the public housing stock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Firstly, in recent years the increased demand for housing of the new urban elite has been matched by a larger supply of high-priced properties driven by capitalization of the real estate market. Supply-side and demand-side factors have coincided, therefore opening the way for incremental gentrification. This process has not only generated replacement effects but has also gradually changed the urban environment.

Secondly, the property market has received a considerable boost from the sell-off of the public housing stock in several cities (Manchester, Copenhagen, Milan) in order to reduce the deficits of the municipal agencies managing such properties, or from a relaxing of public control over rents (as has happened more recently in Copenhagen and previously in Milan with abolition of the controlled rent system). The privatization of the public housing stock has been extolled as salutary not only for the finances of public institutions managing it, but also for the large number of middle and lower-class people who have become home-owners at subsidized prices. In several cities, however, the concentration in social housing of the poorest classes, unable to purchase homes
because of insufficient income or job precariousness, has generated new processes of social segregation, progressively turning working-class districts into marginal ghettos. The most marked social effect of these processes has been, in various cities, the gradual expulsion from the centre of low-to-middle class families, especially with children, who have increasingly moved to the outlying areas of the urban region in search of affordable housing. This process is very evident in Milan, where in recent years several tens of thousands of people have been expelled. Only Copenhagen, by virtue of its strong endowment with welfare services and the development of ad hoc urban policies, has been able to attract new families to the gentrified central areas, thereby reversing the progressive ageing of the population. Copenhagen is therefore no longer a city of elderly people, students, and welfare recipients as it was perceived in the past. This has nevertheless caused the partial substitution of the population to the detriment of medium/low income groups. The other cities have lost part of their capacity for generational exchange because of the exodus of families with small children. This process has been paralleled by the growth of a new urban elite which progressively moves into the most valued areas of the urban centres. The substitution nevertheless has come about gradually and with limited social impacts. The potential disruptive effects of gentrification have been dampened by various factors, including the role played by public policies. In fact most of the substitution effects have been harmful mainly because of the mitigation policies adopted by local administrations. These policies have taken a wide variety of forms: the introduction of measures providing economic support for house purchase; new forms of regulation of the rental market; public rent support schemes for needy families; a role attributed to nonprofit organisations or housing cooperatives to enable protected house purchases or controlled forms of leasehold (see table 10).

A further factor working in favour of mitigated gentrification has been the mixed nature of the urban territory of the cities. Gentrification in these contexts has contributed more often to the creation of new urban social mixes than to the wholesale replacement of lower-class groups by wealthy ones.

**Table 10 - Policies aimed at moderating gentrification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Measures to sustain housing for low income groups (public housing, rent regulation, income support)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


Copenhagen
- Rent regulation,
- Cohoperative housing for low income social groups
- Rent allowances (means tested)

Milan
- Social housing for the poorest social groups
- Agreements between private owners, trade unions and the local administration to offer moderate rents
- Rent allowances (means tested, the amount of benefits is yearly variable and very low)

Munchen
- Urban development planning aimed at increasing the target construction rate of new housing units to 7,000 per annum
- “Housing in Munich IV”: a development plan of subsidized housing units for low and medium income social groups

Manchester
- Rent control
- Rent allowances

Lyon
- Rent allowances: aide personnalisée au logement
- Social housing for the poorest social groups

However, despite their mitigation, some effects of these processes are still problematic. Firstly, as already pointed out, the effects on the distribution of the population across the territory are not equal. While gentrification creates privileged urban areas, it also produces, or expands, marginal areas which remain extraneous to the positive dynamics in progress. There are various situations of this kind in Manchester, Lyon, and Barcelona (see table 11). Secondly, the privatisation of the public housing stock, though accompanied by public measures to support purchases by tenants, has created areas of degraded social housing in which the poorest social groups are concentrated, with high risk of social segregation (examples as provided by Copenhagen, Milan, and Manchester). In many cases, this polarization effects have proved to be very difficult to remedy with public intervention.

Table 11 - Territorial segregation of ethnic /most disadvantaged groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>Social housing has increasingly become a tenure for marginalized groups: from 1994 to 2002 the share of ethnic minorities in the social housing sector increased from 12% to over 20%, with uneven concentration of immigrants over 50% in specific areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milano</td>
<td>In 2009 41% of social housing residents in Milan are over 65s, 14% are lone elderly and 9.5% are immigrants. Higher concentrations of immigrants in small areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>High concentration of immigrants / ethnic groups in a few social housing areas (like La Mina with high concentration of Spanish gypsies) or in degraded areas (Raval)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>As consequence of the Right to buy scheme, social housing areas with</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Multiethnic cities

Multiethnicity may prove damaging to social cohesion of the cities analysed. While on the one hand the advent of a post-industrial economy promotes the mobility and the migration of skilled workers, on the other this seems to be at the price of the progressive marginalization of certain ethnic minorities. In fact, the problem of ethnic segregation in the European cities is not solely a consequence of economic globalization. It is therefore necessary to understand the effects exerted by recent urban changes on the situations of ethnic groups in the six cities considered.

Two different situations have been identified. On the one hand, there are the cities which already experienced large immigration inflows during the 1950s and 1960s. These cities have therefore long had large ethnic populations, to a large extent constituted by second-generation immigrants born in the city: this is the case of Lyon, Munich, and Manchester. In these cities, ethnic minorities represent at least 20% of the overall population (up to Munich’s record level of 24%). On the other hand, there are the cities where immigration is a more recent phenomenon (Milan, Barcelona, and in part Copenhagen), and where in recent years immigrant numbers have risen to represent between 15% and 20% of the population. In these cities, immigration has been very rapid, and has constituted an unprecedented phenomenon, reaching a percentage of the ethnic population close to those of the cities of older immigration within only one decade. More than the amount of immigration, therefore, it is the timing that matters. Moreover, the experiences of the cities of long-standing immigration illustrate what the trends of the cities of more recent immigration may be.

In the cities where immigrants have formed a stable component for fifty years, there is a persisting situation of disadvantage and discrimination in the labour market which assumes a substantially more ethno-racial nature in the case of Lyon and a socio-economic one in Manchester. In these cities, ethnic groups are more affected by unemployment and employment precariousness, and they have been the social groups...
most damaged by the recent economic crisis. This form of long-lasting discrimination is due both to ethnic and racial factors and the cumulative effect caused by time itself. Ethnic minorities, in fact, are subject not only to discrimination because of their ethnic identity or race, but also because of the social reproduction of economic disadvantages from generation to generation. These groups are today discriminated by a mixture of factors whereby ethnic identity interweaves with other factors, such as lower education levels, low skills, a strong concentration in economic sectors ethnically connoted. They therefore suffer discrimination which is due to ethnic membership but also to more traditional mechanisms of social reproduction of inequalities.

However, in the cities of long-standing immigration some forms of mitigation of labour-market discrimination have arisen over time, also as a result of policies implemented by city governments. Ethnic discrimination, therefore, has not necessarily been inevitable for all immigrants. For instance, in these cities the stratification by occupational category of ethnic groups has increasingly come to resemble the stratification of the native population, to indicate that stable entry into the labour market creates more equal opportunities. In the cities of long-standing immigration there has slowly formed an ethnic-minority middle class, while the concentration of ethnic groups in specific sectors of the labour market has gradually decreased. Finally – and this is the most interesting finding – striking differences among ethnic groups have emerged across the generations. While some ethnic groups have been highly hit by unemployment, others have gained entry into better occupational sectors. Some ethnic groups, in specific cities, have moved into crucial professional positions operating in the global network.

As a consequence, in these cities, the specific features and different trajectories of ethnic groups has to be recognised.

More severe ethnic discrimination is instead manifest in the cities of recent immigration. Here the immigrant labour force is strongly concentrated in low-skilled sectors (domestic services, construction, tourism, cleaning services, small trade, and so on) at high risk of unemployment and precariousness. There are signs of discrimination on racial bases. In these cities, a notable discrepancy is also emerging between the education levels of numerous immigrants – which are not particularly low for some ethnic groups – and their chances of labour-market entry. The gap between education level and occupational position shows that discrimination, in the initial phases of
immigration, depends both on factors inherent to the immigration process itself (such as difficulties in obtaining regularization), and on ethnicity (cultural differences, language difficulties, difficulties of social and cultural integration) as well as, in some cases, on racism.

Finally, our research has shown that the territorial concentration of ethnic minorities has a significant impact on their segregation in the labour market. The place of residence matters in access to education and employment of ethnic minorities. Our research confirms that ethnic-based or racial-based territorial segregation is less apparent in the cities analysed than in American cities. The concentration of the ethnic groups in the urban areas (considered on different territorial scales according to the city) almost never exceeds 30%.

This does not mean, however, that immigration has spread uniformly in the six European cities. Some effects of concentration are in fact clearly visible, which are driven by mechanisms such as house prices or migratory chains. Even though these mechanisms are not so powerful to create outright segregations, they nevertheless distribute the ethnic population across space. Moreover, on a very detailed territorial scale, some urban districts in various cities have assumed an overt ethnic character even though they are embedded in mixed urban contexts.

The scant residential concentration of ethnic groups (which is paralleled by their concentration on a micro scale) therefore creates mixed districts which seem typical of multiethnic cities. The social mix has long been an explicit objective of most urban social inclusion programmes in many cities. In some examples, however, the social mix has generated, besides positive effects, also local conflicts. Milan and Lyon exhibit various foci of racial or inter-ethnical tensions. But the proximity of diverse ethnic identities has caused problems in numerous other cities as well. In these cities, in fact, multiethnicity has given rise to social boundaries on ethnic bases which have significantly hindered access to the labour market or public services by ethnic minorities. A reaction in many cities has been the growth of avoidance practices among the middle-class native population. These practices consist, for instance, in educational choices which exhibit marked ethnic discrimination, and which foster the reproduction over time of discrimination in the labour market.
Multiethnicity is therefore an outcome which the six European cities find difficult to achieve. Over time, they reproduce forms of discrimination which resist elimination. These European cities do not produce strong ethnic segregations, but they indubitably fuel considerable disparities on ethnic bases. The notable territorial contamination that seems characteristic of European cities does not help remove these disparities. Indeed, it often increases discrimination, provoking local conflicts or social avoidance practices. Moreover, discrimination in the labour market receives a partial solution which often does not depend on the social mix, but rather on the mobilization of economic resources and social capital that is present within ethnic relationships. In some cases, the use of these resources facilitates the integration into the labour –through ethnic entrepreneurship, for instance. While on the one hand ethnic entrepreneurship is a partial solution to the problem of ethnic segregation in the labour market, on the other it is a selective process which requires substantial start-up resources and involves mainly individuals with higher education levels.

9. End of the city?

The classic theories on urban development have always considered the city as not only a circumscribed portion of space comprising a large share of population and economic activities. It is also an organized system endowed with specific forms of internal coordination and a certain degree of functional interdependence. The idea that the city is a specific form of local society has been proposed by Bagnasco and Le Gales (2000) to point out that the economic and social organization of the city is founded upon a variety of elements that have adjusted to each other over time. Situated within this framework is the interdependence between competitiveness and social cohesion on which this paper has concentrated.

That cities have since long ceased to constitute unitary local societies it is unanimously acknowledged. Unitariness and internal coherence are by now exceptional features which occur only in specific temporal phases and under very particular conditions. Today predominant are differentiation, fragmentation, and the diversification of logics and interests. In this regard, the European cities have been described as “incomplete societies” (Le Gales 2002) characterized not only by a profound social and economic
disarticulation and marked inequalities, but also by a wide array of actors and interests that are difficult to assemble together.

On applying these general considerations in the more circumscribed field of analysis addressed by this paper, it can be concluded that the global European cities that we studied have exhibit a pattern of largely incomplete development. This incompleteness consists in weak internal coherence and a modest ability to confine economic logics within a socially acceptable framework. In these cities incongruity and fragmentation seem largely to prevail over the capacity to organize and coordinate urban development. Although they belong to diversified systems of welfare capitalism, all the cities analysed exhibit a high degree of entropy and a lack of coordination.

From a strictly economic perspective, this lack of organization may indicate that competition among cities today comes about on parameters increasingly less dependent on the social quality of places. If globalization requires the high mobility of capital, commodities, and people, it may be concluded that our analysis has shown that this view of globalization (Friedman 2005) has also gained ground in traditional Europe.

While the purpose of this study has been to determine the links between social cohesion and competitiveness in six European cities, the conclusion to be drawn is that social integration and economic competitiveness are two distinct dimensions, and that greater competitiveness does not necessarily lead to greater social well-being or to better chances of social mobility for the most disadvantaged social groups.

From this perspective, cities are not only incomplete societies but also local societies at risk of progressive disappearance. If the lack of interdependence between global competitiveness and social cohesion does not produce specific inefficiencies, it is likely to disappear from the urban agenda.

Perhaps it is precisely the traditional idea of the city which is outmoded. The European cities that we have considered emerge as urban systems characterized by tensions that reduce internal coherence. The nodal economic function performed by these cities is juxtaposed with others, and it develops independently from the interests of the economic and social actors embedded in the local setting. Success as a global node does not depend, except for some functional aspects, on the quality of the local social and economic system.
Does this mean the death of the city as a local society? We do not believe that this is the fate of the metropolises studied in this paper. Some coordination functions, even if they are not decisive for their nodal activities, are nevertheless still important. Cities are the custodians of the resources, spaces and capacities on which global players draw in their competitive strategies. But at the same time, cities must organize their internal flows, create linkages among different economic actors, and reconcile the dominant exogenous interests and the multiple local ones. Also social and territorial inequalities, to the extent that they are deeply rooted and radicalized, require the development of urban policies aimed at softening the trends towards polarization. If multiethnicity is not addressed with policies for social inclusion, it may polarize the city further on, and prevent ethnic groups from contributing to the economic development of their cities.

With respect to the functions connected with the activities of a global node, these maintenance and coordination functions may seem weak. But they are crucial not only for social cohesion but also for the maintenance of a minimal amount of internal consensus. Alongside the nodal activities situated in the space of flows, in fact, there still survive localized economic activities absorbed in the space of places. Even if the six European cities are constructed on these two different spaces, both the logics that are inherent to these spaces require ad hoc policies. Sometimes the two functions may act in synergy, when investment in the global competitiveness of the city helps to improve also the living standards of the urban population. It is sometimes social cohesion policies that are economic investments by spurring the start-up of new businesses and improving the international attractiveness of cities.

The connection between competitiveness and social cohesion has been addressed in various ways by urban policies. This study has shown that European cities are by no means dead from this point of view. Although local governments are subject to increasing strains, they are active in promoting forms of coordination between economic and social actors, and in encouraging new economic and urban planning investments to attenuate the more severe social contradictions. It is precisely the disconnection between competitiveness and social cohesion that creates an important space for these policies. They are aimed at channelling local resources to actions that make it possible to resolve, or at least to manage, the problems of social disorganization that constantly arise. Such policies cannot aspire to reposition the city in the global arena; nor can they fully
reconstruct a strong interdependence between social cohesion and economic growth. But they can aspire more modestly to manage some significant elements of such development. Our study has shown, in fact, that some urban policies are intended to protect the middle class or to create new opportunities for the most vulnerable population.

This requires not only a high capacity for resources mobilization and coordination, but also a systemic vision that is able to see interdependence where neither the dominant economic interests nor local ones are interested or able to perceive it. This is a difficult task, in accomplishment of which the cities analysed in our research differ greatly in their performances. Not all the cities, in fact, are endowed with similar capacity. The futures of the heterogeneous communities that live and work in these cities will depend greatly on this strategic capacity.

References


