“Creative” urban movements and the rise of experiential mobilization

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Abstract
This paper examines political dynamics of protest over redevelopment in Santiago, Vilnius, Istanbul, and Hamburg. The goal of the project is to identify the conditions under which residents were able to organize protest and influence policy outcomes. Experiential tools emerge as a critical addition to the repertoire of contention by creative producers. The comparison indicates that urban movements’ success in mobilization depends on the dual activation of experiential tools and local networks. The degree to which mobilization leads to actual policy changes depends on the political context, and in particular: a significant far left party in city council, high rule of law, and political competition between national and local executives. Data is based on archival research, press analysis and in-depth interviews with experts, government officials, activists and members of civil society.

Keywords: Creative; urban movement; redevelopment; Santiago; Hamburg; Vilnius; Istanbul

Introduction
This paper examines selected urban movements (Snow 2013) against redevelopment in Santiago (Chile), Hamburg (Germany), Vilnius (Lithuania) and Istanbul (Turkey). These cases are part of a project investigating resistance against urban redevelopment in aspiring global cities. I focus specifically on cities fulfilling the following characteristics:

- They rank high among the second ties of global cities in the major indexes (i.e. they are not structurally global cities, but rather their status as global cities is linked to specific policy choices);
- They are key cities in the respective national economies, richer than the national average, and major centers of business and politics;
- At least over the past decade, they have been governed by pro-business parties, which have embraced neoliberal policies with the aspiration of turning them into global cities;
- As a consequence, these centers have experienced major and controversial redevelopment;
- Their government is selected through regular competitive elections, with a relatively stable party system.

Among cities fulfilling these desiderata, I then select those that provide satisfactory variation on the independent variables and regional spread. Due to space limitations, this paper does not elaborate on this background, and focuses instead on resistance strategies.

The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of experiential tools. These instruments of mobilization join the activist’s repertoire of contention (Tilly 1976) and are aimed at heightening the enthusiasm and commitment of participants by providing an experience that helps them define their identity, gives them a sense of self-worth and embodies values with which they seek association. Experiential tools are typically presented as primarily social, and only secondarily political moments. The emphasis is on the activity, which elicits positive feelings such as joy, hope, belonging, and hipness. Political messages are rare and usually left implicit. Political goals are then not imposed from above, but rather they result from the self-discovery that comes from experience.

Participants’ perception of coming to a political stance through self-discovery as opposed to instruction greatly raises the level of commitment to the cause (Aronson 1999) and the level of commitment is further heightened if the experience involves self-sacrifice (Grant, Dutton, and Rosso 2008). A successful experiential tool therefore actively engages participants, and even requires some kind of contribution. It does not put participants in a passive, listening position, and it avoids explicit political messages.

Because of their educational and professional background, creative producers are especially endowed with the skills suited to the creation and deployment of experiential tools. Thus the emergence of this approach to mobilization is accompanied by a new prominence of this group in resistance (Novy and Colomb 2012). In addition to positive feelings, the artists’ sophisticated communicative and evocative skills enable the use of irony, which is often part of experiential tools, and not by chance. As Bertold Brecht (and before him the Russian Formalists) understood, such forms of de-familiarization (Verfremdung) intrigue the audience, and shock it into questioning underlying conditions and becoming a conscious critical observer. As opposed to being instructed, this approach allows participants the agency involved in self-discovery and interpretation. And that is the core of experience.

Experiential tools are often expressed as activities or events that promote memories and emotional linkages and thus develop loyalty among residents. In addition, these activities or events can provide the occasion to present specific initiatives or campaigns. They also offer the occasion for core activists to coalesce around a challenge and be energized by its success. Finally, these activities or events mobilize previously latent observers, as well as outsiders (including municipal institutions, other levels of government, and civil society actors). Therefore, successful experiential events and activities are designed to suit broad tastes and transmit catchall values and political messages. The emphasis on inclusiveness implies that messages are often left vague and open to different interpretation. What is constant is that the experiential events and activities promote pride in belonging to the resistance. Among a great variety of activities and events, one or two are selected as flag carriers and become persistently linked with the group or movement.
The recent emphasis on experiential tools in mobilization turns some social movement and urban movement theory on its head: collective entertainment, in the form of festivals, games and fairs, is no longer the result of successful urban movements (Castells 1983) but rather the cause. Behind these initiatives lie the initial crucial operations of mobilization, and the cultural strategists that devise them display the most accurate pulse for their constituencies. Yet, experiential tools do not exist in the strategists’ heads: they only materialize when participants appropriate them, through life-stories, but also in their material experience of the neighborhood. Therefore, the approach of experiential tools combines top-down strategic framing (Snow et al. 1986) with a bottom-up perspective that ranges from narrative life-stories (Polletta 2006) to physical interaction with the neighborhood (Auyero 2003).

The four cases below discuss deployments of experiential tools and their effects. They find that experiential tools on their own are not sufficient to achieve broad mobilization. In addition, protestors must mobilize networks of like-minded groups. Local networks (more than international ones) signal the group’s broad and heterogeneous embeddedness. They lend the legitimacy and political clout needed to pursue claims on behalf of the neighborhood. Scaling provides the possibility to replicate success, increasing endurance and long-term impact.

Experiential tools and network activation facilitate mobilization, but even successful mobilizations can fail to change policies. My argument joins others in proposing that the impact of protest on policy outcome requires mobilization, but ultimately depends on the political and institutional context (for a recent overview and analysis see Goodwin and Jasper 2012). This project seeks to isolate specific institutional features, which are easily identifiable and measurable ex ante (as opposed to the widely used concept of political opportunity). Three main variables are explored to capture the context’s favorability to protest.

First, the study indicates that rule of law helps movements reach their goals. Effective courts and unbiased auditing bodies allow movements to have their concerns heard and acted upon even against the political establishment. Ironically, these extra-institutional actors are crucially dependent on functioning institutions, thus confirming recent findings (Collier and Handlin 2009).

Second, the number of parties present in city council indicates the openness of the institutional environment to the movement’s alternative perspective. However, even more important is their ideological span. In particular, movements find institutional support and thus avenues to influence policy outcome from within institutions if far left parties have a foothold in municipal councils.

A third key consideration applies to unitary states, especially those with a high degree of centralization (such as Turkey, Lithuania and Chile). When the local government enjoys the backing of the national government over redevelopment projects, it is extremely unlikely that local resistance will have any impact on policy outcome. If on the other hand, the national and municipal executives are political rivals (usually because they are
governed by different parties), protestors can find in national institutions (such as the ministry of culture) a natural ally.

This study reveals much also by the variables it dismisses. Legacy (i.e. previous mobilization in the neighborhood) plays only a minor role in the cases examined below, another finding that sets this analysis apart in social movement theory. “All politics is local” especially in social movements: networking is vital at the local level, but not so at the international level. The latter provides visibility and legitimacy but does not deliver political clout (Tarrow 2005). (This result does not limit the role of the Internet, heavily deployed in local mobilization.) Finally, while GDP per capita is low in cases of failed mobilization, it is far higher in Hamburg than in Santiago, indicating that its impact is not linear.

The project is in its early phase and additional cases will be selected to provide better variation on the independent variables. The analysis thus far indicates that the failure to reach policy outcomes Istanbul is over-determined by the lack of both institutional openness and appropriate mobilization strategies. The case of Vilnius is helpful in highlighting the necessary role of local networks. The case of Hamburg highlights the need to look beyond legacy and GDP per capita. The case of Santiago highlights the powerful effects reached when both strategic and institutional factors align. The table below summarizes the case studies that follow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement’s location</th>
<th>Santiago</th>
<th>Hamburg</th>
<th>Vilnius</th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement’s overall impact</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Impact on mobilization</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Impact on policy &amp; institutions</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explaining impact on mobilization</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Experiential tools</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Local scaling &amp; heterogeneous base</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explaining impact on policy &amp; institutions</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Rule of law</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Far left party in municipal council</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>-National-local executive alignment</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tbody>
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Alternative explanations

| Legacy | Medium | High | Low | Low |
| International networks | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| GDP/capita (city level, 2010 values, USD) | 23000 | 64000 | 16500 | 14000 |

**Santiago**

Vecinos por la Defensa del Barrio Yungay (Neighbors in defense of Barrio Yungay), the neighborhood association that I examine in Santiago, stands out for its effectiveness. Not only did it mobilize residents, but it was also able to stop redevelopment and prevented
residential displacement by obtaining landmark status for the area from national authorities. On the basis of its legitimacy and clout among residents, it also made important institutional gains, including the shift from mayoral appointment to competitive elections for a key municipal governing body. Moreover, it gained seats on city council and on the national civil society council. In other words, the group succeeded in extraordinary mobilization, in long-term policy changes, and even in changing the rules of local representative government, thus altering the structural balance of power in decision making itself. The association then embarked on a scaling up process by instituting a national league of neighborhood associations and deploying its strategies to other areas, thus reshaping barrio policy at the national level.

Founded in 1839, Barrio Yungay was an elegant upper and middle class neighborhood. Starting in the 1930s, the area experienced emigration to the new (and now affluent) municipalities in eastern Santiago and slowly deteriorated, with a decline in maintenance and increasing subdivision of its buildings. Thanks to its many low-rise and quiet streets, it enjoyed a provincial air and close community relations. Compared with other neighborhoods of Santiago, Yungay’s legacy of leftist activism is not strong, and most importantly current members do not refer to that legacy to explain their actions.

Gentrification pressure was significant in the last two decades. Real estate development in downtown Santiago (i.e. Santiago municipality) has favored large construction companies, as can be evinced from the average size of new buildings, which increased from 11-storey in 1996 to 18-storey in 2006, while the number of apartments built per condominium also soared from 78.5 in 1991 to 207.5 in 2005 (López-Morales 2010). The effect was an appreciation per square meter during the 1990s four times higher in Santiago municipality than in the whole of Greater Santiago (Trivelli 2006).

The association Vecinos por la Defensa del Barrio Yungay formed in the fall of 2005 when neighbors met and organized over the poor quality of their garbage collection. Over 2000 signatures were collected and sent to the Municipality, the regional executive, the General Secretary of Government (Secretaría General de Gobierno) and to the metropolitan health office (Servicio de Salud Metropolitano del Ambiente). Over 25 demonstrations were organized over the fall and winter to protest against the conservative mayor Raúl Alcáíno. In May 2006, almost by chance, the group attended a public hearing at the municipality, in which was discussed the intention of the authorities to modify the Plan Regulador Comunal de Santiago, Sector Parque Portales (the sector of Barrio Yungay) by raising the building height to 20 floors and removing several buildings from the heritage protection list (Departamento de Urbanismo de la Dirección de Obras de la Municipalidad de Santiago 2006). The association held meetings, organized signature collections and, thanks to the collaboration of various professionals from the barrio and the neighbors’ mobilization, succeeded in halting the initiative. Soon the focus of the group complemented original issues of neighborhood protection with quality of life concerns (e.g. noise and the placement of antennas). Coordinated by Rosario Carvajal, an energetic and committed historian who was born and resided in the neighborhood, a handful of professionals and academics in the field of architecture and law mobilized low-income residents. The neighborhood narrative became the glue and the catalyst for mobilization, and was able to obliterate obvious differences in socio-economic status.
The association started mobilization and protest with traditional tools: signature collections, street protests, sit-in’s, and teach-in’s, and they established links with traditional media (the press, radio and television). However, they also developed media outlets that they could directly control, such as a website, a listserv, a glossy monthly magazine, radio programs and even an Internet television channel. These communication tools were accompanied by activities and events, which defined a barrio identity that was powerful but also highly inclusive (interview with Rosario Carvajal, March 2009).

The activities ranged from guidebooks and tours; to a photo and audiovisual archive that was assembled with the contributions of residents; to “memory workshops” in which residents came together to construct the history of the barrio and elaborate its cultural significance. The “heritage registry” was an especially strategic invention with the dual goal of mobilizing residents’ support and stopping real estate speculation. It consisted of an archive of local family histories, and therefore deployed cultural and emotional heritage to legitimize and anchor residents and small businesses in the neighborhood. This experiential tool aimed to construct a narrative that privileged a cross-cleavage and highly inclusive message about the identity of the neighborhood, while at the same time it froze that identity in its state of early gentrification.

The events were timed to bring residents together every few months. In January, the Festival del Roto Chileno (the Common Chilean Festival) commemorates the battle of Yungay of January 20, 1839 between the Peru/Bolivian Confederation and the Peru/Chilean United Restoration Army. The victory by poor and untrained soldiers (hence the name Common Chilean) led to the end of the Peru/Bolivian Confederation. This traditional event in Santiago enjoys renewed status thanks to the organizational input of the association and in January 2010 it had 13,000 attendees. In May, the association started a tradition of the Día del Patrimonio en Yungay (Day of Yungay Heritage). In June, the association organizes a council called the Cabildo de Santiago, which attracts increasingly influential participants and hundreds of residents (in June 2009 among the attendees were the Ministry General Secretariat of Government, members of Parliament, regional councilors and municipal councilors). Council organizers required participants to bring photos of the neighborhood, describe the hoped changes and select committees in which to volunteer. Each September since 2007, the association organizes a grand celebration of the founding of the barrio. Recently the 170th anniversary was celebrated with a communal open-air dinner for hundreds of residents and an artistic gala. Finally each November since 2007, the barrio celebrates the Festival del Barrio Yungay, in which more than 200 artists participate in multiple locations at the same time, with a myriad of activities and attractions, ranging from dozens of bands and musicians of different genres; to baby football games and other sport events; to theater plays, art walks, carnival parades and children activities. On these occasions, lectures, public readings, photo exhibitions and arts workshops deal with representations of the barrio ranging from historical depictions to the latest graffiti.
The association pursued a continuous mobilization and education effort, aiming to build its status and legitimacy within the community. Over 2009, it put in place an elaborate program of education articulated through workshops, seminars, conferences, and schools to continue to incorporate neighbors in the movement and management of the barrio and the association. Conferences covered community participation in the defense and management of heritage as well as public policies for heritage development. Schools and courses were held in various locations with lessons in community organizing, cultural management, identity development, and heritage-related mass communication. The most prominent school was inspired by a visit to Colombia in July 2009 and showed the movement’s ambition to affect the economic structure as well as involve usually marginalized individuals, while reinforcing the association’s values. Invited to Cartagena to present strategy and results of the association, its leadership observed a masonry school that helped teenagers at risk by providing them skills to repair local historical buildings and contribute to the local art and craft tradition, thus dealing with both unemployment and heritage. As there was no such school in Chile, upon its return, the association Vecinos de Yungay begun to campaign for the Escuela Taller de Artes y Oficios Fermín Vivaceta. The initiative gained urgency with the earthquake of February 27, 2010, and the school opened its doors on April 5, 2010.

Strong of the legitimacy gained by its broad mobilization and its articulated identity, the movement could initiate the legal proceedings towards its key goal: the establishment of the Zona Típica (Heritage Area) according to the Law 17.288 governing national monuments. The status of a Zona Típica for 280 acres was obtained in January 2009 and since then a major extension has been pursued, that would enlarge the Zona Típica to the entire north west of the municipality of Santiago. At the same time, numerous petitions continually work to extend protection also to individual buildings by seeking the status of Monumento Nacional (national monument).  

Political influence was also pursued, from the very beginning, through lobbying local politicians, especially in the municipal and regional councils, and in the ministry of culture. This strategy was successful, judging from the fact that increasingly prominent politicians were recorded as attending events sponsored by the association. Usually, on these occasions, the officials were interviewed and both videos and transcripts were posted on the association’s website. Political influence was also pursued through successful participation in electoral competition by members of the association. For example in October 2008 a candidate from the association gained a seat on the municipal council of Santiago (the association subsequently gained two supporters in the municipal council, among them Carvajal herself). In September 2009, Vecinos pursued a hard but successful fight to introduce popular elections for the Consejo Económico y Social Comunal (Cesco), a consultative organ of the municipality composed by representatives of organized civil society. The association’s candidate won a seat on its first competition. Finally, in November 2009, Carvajal was offered a seat on the Civil Society Council (Consejo de la Sociedad Civil), recently established under the Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno. The political influence across levels of government brought increasing prominence to the association.
Institutional successes led to scaling, increasing the movement’s ambition and authority. First, the association built a coalition based on sectorial interests, with a variety of cultural agents in the neighborhood of Yungay (foundations, museums, artisan and artists’ groups, heterogeneous cultural centers and movements). Subsequently the network was extended to areas outside the neighborhood, producing *hermaniamentos* (twinnings) with Juntas de Vecinos and like-minded groups around Metropolitan Santiago. There, linkages are characterized by mutual support in the respective challenges and often with *hermaniamentos* the association brings its expertise to mobilize a petition for Zona Típica, as was the case for the quarry area of Colina, a municipality north of Santiago that faced major redevelopment.

After expanding the outreach to the regional level, the association Vecinos de Yungay established links internationally with groups in Argentina (and in particular the Buenos Aires neighborhoods of San Telmo and Haedo), Montevideo, Uruguay and Colombia. The association was recognized as pioneering and unique in Latin America, because it managed to build a model of local development from a heritage perspective that included an important role for popular participation. Finally, the association began to develop a network at the national level. In July 2009 the Asociación Chilena de Vecinos y Organizaciones de Barrios y Zonas Patrimoniales (Chilean Association of Neighbors and Barrio Organizations and Heritage Areas) was founded to promote a national movement – with the added complexity of connecting urban and rural heritage – and by April 2010 it already had members from seven of the 13 regions of Chile.

In sum, the association pursued an effective multipronged strategy, for which it followed no obvious model. In the course of a handful of years, and especially over 2009, this strategy obtained important results that catapulted the association to the forefront of Chilean civil society in the field of culture and heritage.

**Hamburg**

Political and economic elites have pursued pro-business policies with major redevelopment projects and branded Hamburg as a global and creative city (Florida 2002, Overmeyer 2010). The same market logic has affected housing policy, shifting it from the provision of rental housing to low-income residents, to the prioritization of land returns and gentrification.

Hamburg stands out for the historical legacy in urban movements. In the 1980s urban movements gained important victories against the municipal government, above all obtaining permanent squatting rights and cooperative ownership of several buildings and open areas along the Elbe shore in St. Pauli, turning Hafenstrasse into a historical landmark for activists. These movements deployed militant means typical of the period, which included violence and prolonged barricaded conflict. However, the effect of legacy on recent resistance was neither in networks nor strategy, but rather, as interviews with activists revealed, simply in the form of hope, of knowing that it is possible to undo developers’ plans.

In recent years, urban movements have reemerged with victories in squatting and possession of prominent spaces. The most heralded recent victory is over Gängeviertel, a
dilapidated city block in a prized location, which the local government sold and slated for redevelopment, then bought back from the foreign developer at a premium and assigned to squatters for cultural use. In a city that distinguishes itself for the activity of its squat community, there are dozens of sites differing in political orientation, openness to outsiders, and claims — yet, throughout, creative producers play a pivotal role in both designing and conducting resistance, and they also typically benefit from the positive outcomes with access to inexpensive living, working or performing quarters in prime locations.

The literature that has emerged on these cases is justly vast (most recently see for example Mayer 2009, Holm 2010, Twickel 2010, Novy and Colomb 2012, Hohenstatt 2013, Kirchberg and Kagan 2013, Flender 2013, Gängeviertel e.V. 2012) and explores the role of creative producers in resistance over redevelopment, as well as the contradictions that emerge when neoliberal governments focus on creative industries for growth purposes. For reasons of space I will focus the empirical analysis on the struggle over Park Fiction, the first instance of resistance led by creative producers that deployed experiential instead of militant tools. My argument is that the success of Park Fiction presented local activists with a road map for subsequent struggles, and that these can largely be understood as strategic and tactical re-elaborations of that first “revolutionary” (in terms of methods) case of resistance.

Park Fiction is located in St. Pauli, a neighborhood of old multi-story apartment buildings that ranks among the poorest and most diverse in the city. Its location is spectacular, adjacent to the city center, on a hill that slopes down to the Elbe shore, bordering some of the richest areas of the city. The privileged site, the nearby conversion of the port into Hafencity, and its historical buildings and artistic milieu make St. Pauli an ideal area for redevelopment and gentrification (for an illuminating analysis of recent redevelopment see Bude, Sobczak, and Jörg 2009). In addition to physical redevelopment, the government developed an extensive program of events and festivals that bring to St. Pauli and neighboring Altona millions of visitors every year.

Faced with real estate pressure on the river shore, local artists connected and decided to fight back instead of relocating. In 1995, Cristoph Schäfer and Cathy Skene began mobilizing to stop redevelopment and build instead a community park, named Park Fiction. They networked with the local school, church, neighborhood association, and music scene and formed a core group of about twelve activists that met weekly.

The project offered the opportunity for reappropriation of the neighborhood by its residents, and the space for multi-generational, multi-racial and multi-class exchange of prospects, ideas, everyday practices, and family values. Like the case of Santiago, the success of the movement relied on its broad appeal, based on a carefully balanced definition of “resident” that enabled participation through self-placement and self-expression, rather than a class-driven structural placement. Like in Santiago, participants sought to pursue their own version of authentic and legitimate urban living, and in the process affirmed their self-worth and agency.
A dense calendar of events sustained broad participation, aimed at celebrating the “unique” and “authentic” distinctiveness of the neighborhood from different perspectives. Events allowed residents to interact with artistic displays, from music, to sculpture, to handicrafts; as well as with games such as face-painting, gymnastics, puppets, stilts-walkers - all producing a carnevalesque, light-hearted, hopeful, but also very conscious festival of appropriation. Gentrification was vilified in an ironic rendition of Monopoly, Gentropoly, and events were often accompanied by home-cooked food - the ultimate community binder.

At the same time the group devised a parallel and participatory planning process to collect ideas for the park. Accessible learning processes were devised to inform neighborhood residents about the proceedings in the form of a garden library (with documents, maps, questionnaires and even modeling kits for children) and an enclosed infotainment space. Game boards were designed to make the process more interactive and entertaining. Workshops brought residents together. Organizers wore yellow jackets with the organization’s logo and became visible points of reference, as residents would approach them on the street to ask for updates and information. Audio archives recorded residents desires, stories and aspiration for the neighborhood. Tours through St. Pauli displayed the physical reality of gentrification and Park Fiction’s website had regular postings often in the form of self-made YouTube videos and protest testimonies. The city turned into the primary stage of citizenship - the space in which citizenship was experienced and performed. While all of these interventions were not explicit protest, they certainly constituted implicit protest, because they represented a conscious opposition to city plans. Their peaceful and family-friendly nature, combined with a creativity that attracts media attention, hid an effective strategy of subversion that led to the realization of Park Fiction in 2005.

The conundrum of the experiential approach to resistance is that it feeds into the alternative appeal of the neighborhood, further promoting gentrification (Schäfer 2010, 132). Overlooking the long struggle, the Office of Urban Development was quick to incorporate Park Fiction in its brochures as “a new park for a variegated society… in this place the ethno-pop impression is not a cliché but symbolizes a cosmopolitan, future-oriented Hamburg.” In response, artists devised a variety of responses, including a “de-gentrification kit”, an ironic toolbox of recommendations on how to devalue buildings, turning them into sites of “broken windows” that scare gentrifiers away and keep rents down. The most influential reaction was “Not in our Na,” a manifesto published in an ironically glossy magazine. In that statement, reprinted throughout German and international media, the artist community distanced itself from the government’s focus on creative industries as complementary to neoliberal growth and marketing strategies (NION 2010).

Activists saw the struggle over Park Fiction as fundamentally new and different from the earlier conflicts, such as Hafenstrasse. Protestors were different, as the chronically unemployed, petty criminals and marginalized population behind the Hafenstrasse barricades were substituted by low and middle class cultural producers and families with much to lose from open and violent confrontation. The style was different with a new emphasis on an inviting, happy and ironic message. The ambition was also different, and
aimed to go well beyond repair-squatting (Instandbesetzung) to become instead “a resource for the city” thanks to its production of knowledge and social integration as well as the introduction of a new participatory approach to planning. Experiential tools were the most dramatic innovation: “reaching a goal through a party was huge and new” (interview with Cristoph Schäfer, July 2011).

Like in Santiago, albeit at a slower pace, the organization networked first at the local and international level, and only later nationally. In the early 2000s Park Fiction, in collaboration with the sister organization Es Regnet Kaviar (It Rains Caviar), promoted a network of anti-gentrification groups in other neighborhoods. They coordinated and organized demonstrations, parades, music festivals, flash mobs and artistic happenings. Park Fiction presented its project and method in Germany and in 2002 at Documenta XI, a leading international exhibition of contemporary art. It also connected with similar endeavors in Europe, Argentina and India, which it brought together in the Unlikely Encounters in Urban Space Congress organized in 2003. In 2008, Hamburg led the German version of Right to the City umbrella coalition with 54 local organizations, each with its own brand and a dense calendar of events and protest initiatives. Similarly to the Santiago movement, the network formalized its message and in March 2011 organized its first nationwide conference with the theme: “To Whom Belongs the City?”

Yet, pressure to gentrify continues to be high in St. Pauli, and too many sites are under contention to be discussed in this paper. Interestingly, developers are learning from activists. A recent example was the development of the Bernhard-Noch-Quartier, which involved the demolition of three residential buildings and the upgrading of a further seven. The location was directly adjacent to the iconic squat-turned-cooperative blocs of Hafenstrasse, which did not bode well for the developer. Yet, as part of an eventually successful effort, the developer plastered walls with posters that in esthetic and language emulated the protestors’ image-making: passersby had to focus closely to recognize that the funky graphics and hip slogans in support of the project were sponsored by the developer’s marketing campaign, and not by opposition activists.

Throughout, the deployment of experiential tools able to captivate broad audiences emerges as key. A prominent failure was the inability to obtain heritage status for a landmark at 1 Reeperbahn, which from 1926 to 1945 was one of the most distinct cinemas in the country, the Schauburg St. Pauli, and was turned into a bowling hall after the war. Once abandoned, the space was taken over by Skam, a coalition founded in 1992 by a handful of artists, which grew to 120 members. The lot was ultimately purchased by Strabag Gmbh, the largest real estate developer in Europe, which planned two iconic towers, the “Dancing Towers,” that emulated sister versions in Dubai by Zaha Hadid. Skam petitioned to keep the bowling alley as a place for alternative culture. Even Richard Florida encouraged city council to give the building to the artists in order to maintain the neighborhood’s caché and redistribute proceeds to those that brought the brand about. Instead, in 2009, Skam was forced to move two kilometers north, and the bowling hall was razed to make space for the towers. The inability to involve supporters beyond the cultural sector seems a glaring reason for the failure of this initiative.
The contrary can be said of Gängeviertel. Despite being a facility primarily devoted to cultural production, activists carefully communicated broad social embeddedness, from the slogan “Komm in die Gänge” (“Come to the Alleys” or “Get moving”) to the photos gracing the website, with images such as mother and child walking through a dark passage out into the radiant alleys. Creative producers won their surprising victory by persuading the population at large that withholding redevelopment would benefit art for all citizens. The message was carefully crafted: what was advertised as a party cum art exhibition was unveiled at the end of the evening to be a squat by not the artists, but rather by their artworks. This move caught the authorities off guard, because removing artworks was more awkward and than removing squatters (interview with architect and Gängeviertel activist Heiko Donsbach, July 2011). Given its own emphasis on Hamburg as a “creative city” the government was pressured to give in or lose face.

In Hamburg, creative producers thus developed a repertoire of contention that fit with their comparative advantage in creativity, knowledge and networking. The innovative strategy undertaken in Park Fiction and in later resistance is well summarized by a leading activist: “We are less militant. We occupy with paintings. We protect ourselves with art. We try to get through differently, without black masks, by gaining sympathy instead” (interview with Nicole Vrenegor, journalist and activist, July 2011).

**Vilnius**

While international visibility keeps alive the artistic dimension of protest, it potentially undermines mobilization through its sophistication and potential emphasis on art rather than opposition. As the Vilnius case illustrates, while artistic creativity can provide a set of effective tools for protest, the extent of their efficacy depends on the sustained effort to set them in a context of popular mobilization.

In Vilnius, the government privileged medieval and faux-medieval restoration, while activists called for a more heterogeneous and inclusive understanding that also celebrated buildings from the soviet time. It was therefore a struggle over collective memory and the role of the soviet legacy. The core of the protest took place over buildings in the old town district, Senamiestis.

The analysis focuses on Pro-Test Lab, which, in the words of its founders, is both a project and a method. As a project it aims to reclaim public space, and as method of protest against privatization and the destruction of public memory it deploys an interplay of language and signs in performative interventions to “encourage people to … reconstruct citizenship.”

The group’s founders are two academics with international reputations for socially interactive and interdisciplinary approaches to struggles resulting from the social, economic and political contradictions in the former Soviet countries. International linkages are present in all the urban movements described in this paper, yet the backgrounds of Pro-Test Lab founders bring the notion of international linkage to a new level, as at the time of the protest they were both employed in elite institutions outside Lithuania: Gediminas Urbonas was associate professor in the Art, Culture and Technology Program at MIT and his partner Nomeda Urbonas was a doctoral researcher.
at the Norwegian University for Science and Technology. They opened art spaces in Vilnius, cofounded art programs and publications on media culture and criticism, and exhibited their work related to Pro-Test Lab in North and South America, Asia and Europe, which included winning the Prize for the best national pavilion at the Venice Biennale (2007).

The occasion for the formation of Pro-Test lab was the 2005 plan to turn an old cinema into a supermarket. The Liuteva movie theater, in the old-town, was the largest soviet modernist pavilion-type building in Lithuania. Artists squatted the ticket office in demonstration against “the corporate privatization of public space.” The Liuteva thus became a place where people were invited to propose creative approaches to protest, with a strong influence by the Situationists.

It thereby also turned into an event space, with music performances, installations, reading rooms, workshops, lectures, debates, TV programs and Internet chat-rooms. Different types of public protests at the intersection of art, technology and social criticism were joined by performative game formats, for example a Vilnius version of Monopoly, in which city buildings up for sale were rebuilt as wood models and placed on a mock city-grid in the square facing the cinema. Activists placed huge posters with the word “Sold-out” on bridges and monuments every Sunday morning. Branded scarves and a camouflage clothing line were created and worn as a sign of belonging to the protest. City tours illustrated the sites where landmark buildings were being torn down to make space for new developments.

An interesting commonality that emerges in Santiago, Hamburg and Vilnius (but significantly not in Istanbul) was the development of an archival approach to protest that merged symbolic, linguistic and participatory strategies to challenge notions about the neighborhood and “to produce new evidence that otherwise is silenced, privatized or excluded.” The Archive of Alternative Voices in Vilnius encouraged “a different kind of cultural and political imagination” and even a “space for dreaming” and scripting alternative institutional and collective identities. The Archive proposed new scenarios for public spaces of the soviet era about to be privatized and razed, like cinemas and swimming pools. Pro-Test Lab tried to create a community driven by “cultural and political imagination” to collectively produce tools of contention. Yet the Archive was not the result of grassroot input like in Yungay. Instead it comprised a formal exhibition that drew a stark boundary between the producers of the Archive and its (passive) visitors. While valuable, the initiative failed as experiential tool because it does not involve the public. Other initiatives were more successful in mobilization. For example, disappointed by the lack of reaction of the city government, activists brought together dozens of dogs in front of the cinema. The amplified and cacophonous barking, together with sampling of real voices, resulted in a loud cry, titled “Like Dogs Barking to Clouds,” which was intended to bring attention to the government’s unwillingness to listen. More traditional tools were also used, for example a petition was initiated and signed by 8000 people.

There was an aspiration to promote cross-cleavage mobilization: the founders argued that “the citizens of Vilnius who have joined the Pro-Test lab come from different, sometimes even antagonistic, communities and social groups - young and old, students and
pensioners, intellectuals and workers - but all trying to imagine a positive kind of protest.” Yet, despite the intention, resistance failed to involve broad sectors of the citizenry and participation remained largely limited to cultural producers and students. The reason was the high degree of theoretical sophistication behind most events. The following snippet describing the Archive renders its elitism and the difference with the more popular approach in Yungay. The artists described a key prop, the project maps, as: “attempts to stage an autonomous platform for action through art projects that can penetrate reality through political acts. This develops both inside and outside the art system by simultaneously considering the tension and synergy that such a relationship produces.” Complex language such as this discouraged laypeople from getting involved in organizing.

The protest took place mostly over 2005-2006, but the mobilization did not translate into a sustained long-term movement. The intellectual sophistication of the movement (and the superb artifacts that it produced) led to a circumscribed cult following - mainly by artists, academics and students. In Yungay, artists followed the lead of architects, planners and lawyers and the effect was to keep the message of political protest at the forefront. Where artists were leading the protests alone, as in Vilnius, their eccentricity sometimes caused frustration among “common folk” and the group was even accused of de-policizing the issues.

In the end, Pro-Test Lab was unable to reverse the elimination of the cinema (and several other buildings it was campaigning to save), which led to a last demonstration in 2008 with activists dressed as widows. However, construction on the site was halted by the controversies, which devalued the lot. As a result, the owner sued the activists for half a million euro and the real estate company charged activists for harming the redevelopment project. In sum, despite valuable international networks and great inventiveness, the experiential tools deployed in Vilnius failed to mobilize broadly because of their excessive sophistication.

Istanbul
Since 1994 Istanbul has been governed by Islamist mayors, and the two most prominent have been Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1994-98, prime minister 2003 to present) and Kadir Topbaş (2004 to present), both from the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The central government and Topbaş joined forces to pursue profound systemic changes. When campaigning for reelection in 2008, Topbaş made clear his ambitions for the city: “Istanbul will become a planned world center as a result of urban regeneration projects. But of course living in this kind of center is going to be expensive. Just like it is in Paris, London, or New York” (Topbaş, Kadir, "Istanbul için Yeniden Adayım" Bugün, 20 January 2008, quoted in Aksoy 2010). Thus, the government embraced urban transformation to speed the country’s integration into the global economy (Mutman and Turgut n.a.). The government focused on the inner city, clearing away obsolescent urban space to encourage capital accumulation by private investors (Dinçer 2011). Thus over the last decade, 50 neighborhoods in Istanbul were slated for regeneration, coordinated by the national housing authority TOKİ, its metropolitan counterpart KİPTAŞ, the metropolitan government (IMM) and the district municipalities.
The shift from piecemeal interventions in the 1980s and 1990s to the systematic redevelopment of the last decade owes much to specially designed legislation. The most controversial is the 2005 Urban Renewal Law No. 5366 or Law for the “Preservation by Renovation and Utilization by Revitalization of Deteriorated Immovable Historic and Cultural Properties.” Contrary to its name, the law is deployed for land development rather than restoration (Gulersoy-Zeren et al. 2008), because Law No. 5366 grants extraordinary powers to local authorities to declare urban renewal areas, and to implement regeneration plans in run-down areas within historic heritage sites. The law allows large private developers to turn whole blocks of historic areas over to new uses, and to demolish listed buildings and replace them with replicas. The key feature is that the law grants authority to municipalities to make developers into partners of property owners without consulting the property owners (on the background of Law No. 5366 see Dinçer 2011). As a result, owners are expropriated and compensated with a fraction of their living space (usually 42 percent). Renters usually do not receive any direct monetary compensation. Law No. 5366 also changed planning oversight by replacing the Conservation Committee under the Ministry of Culture with a Renewal Area Committee, which answers directly to the prime minister (moreover while the former had three academics, the latter only has one).

Renewal projects are often challenged by residents, academics, professionals (conservationists, architects, planners), NGOs, and by international organizations such as UNESCO, both in courts of law and in local and international forums. However, until the 2013 Taksim protests the opposition was fragmented and largely ineffective, and the level of mobilization among residents low. Due to space limitations, I focus on the neighborhood of Fener and Balat because it presents the least unsuccessful struggle against regeneration. Resistance was most articulated and prolonged in this neighborhood; unusually, opposition was organized from within the neighborhood, and among those threatened, it was the neighborhood with the highest income level. Therefore it is the most likely case for successful resistance.

Fener and Balat are two adjacent areas of Fatih municipality, respectively with historic Greek and Jewish populations (non-Muslim areas are especially targeted for renewal). This working class neighborhood is the last low-income residential area along the shores of the Golden Horn, and commands stunning views. It has about 17,000 residents, of which about 80 percent originate from the Black Sea and Marmara regions (and many are born in Istanbul) while about 13 percent arrived in the 1980s and 1990s from southeastern Anatolia. Over the last decade, a small wave of early gentrifiers also arrived. Relatively high rates of ownership allow decent living conditions despite the low incomes because multigenerational and multifamily cohabitation in the same building facilitates tight social systems of cooperation and exchange. Yet, the splits between Halevi and Sunni Muslims and between renters and owners undermine resistance.

A EU funded project undertaken between 2003 and 2007 intended to rehabilitate the neighborhood while maintaining social cohesion. More than 300 houses were restored, the infrastructure was improved, and a boutique hotel and refreshment spaces added (Durhan and Özugüven 2013). However, the municipality was not behind such a
redevelopment model and finalized plans to redevelop the shore including the ancient Jewish market and an architecturally prized portion of the neighborhood. The project was contracted to Gap Construction Company (Çalık Gurubu'nun İnçat'la's Gap), a subsidiary of Çalık Holding, the preeminent real estate developer in the city inner-core, of which Erdoğan’s son-in-law is the CEO. The urban renewal project that is going to be carried out in the area comprises about 28 hectares over a strip about 150 meters wide and 1.5 km long. According to some estimates, 70 percent of the buildings in Fener and Balat are scheduled for demolition, resulting in the removal of 900 families (Gunay and Dokmeci 2012). Even 33 buildings renovated under the EU project are slated for demolition.

Despite being contracted to Gap in April 2007, the project was only made public in 2009, when throughout the inner city “renewal projects” replaced the earlier “rehabilitation projects” on the basis of the newly implemented Law No. 5366. Real estate prices in the area slated for renewal rose up to ten-fold between 2009 and 2011. Since the local economic activity did not change, the price hikes were paving the way for gentrification and displacement (Gunay and Dokmeci 2012, Limoncu and Çelebioglu 2012). Even after the announcement, there was no project office or website where plans, models and renderings of the new development could be viewed (Schwegmann 2012).

Members of the local neighborhood association became aware of the project in July 2009 when they received notices informing them that 58 percent of their properties were included in the redevelopment and contracted to Gap without their consent (interview with Cigdem Sahin, general secretary of Febayder, December 2010). In August 2009, a full two years after the contract was signed, and just a month after the plan was made public, owners quickly founded a neighborhood association called Febayder, short for Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray Property Owners and Tenants Association for Rights Protection and Social Assistance. The association was co-founded by Cigdem Sahin, an economist with teaching experience in the United States, who bought a property in the neighborhood in 2007 and was thus an early gentrifier.

The core of the struggle took place between November 2009 and July 2010. Febayder organized three public protests between December 2009 and February 2010: in front of the municipality, in front of the association’s headquarters and in the neighborhood on the occasion of a press conference with CNN Turk. Despite claims that they had more than 100 participants, photos and videos show less than 50 attendees, all elderly males with the exception of 8 women and 5 children.

The association also launched a petition and bought a billboard. When the billboard was taken down by municipal agents, the association turned to a poster campaign on windows throughout the neighborhood, stating “Hands off my house!” Throughout the spring of 2010 the association networked intensely. Local linkages were developed with professional bodies; sympathetic architects, planners, NGOs and activists; and local officials of the opposition party CHP (Republican People’s Party). International linkages were setup with the London School of Economics and the University of Rennes, which hosted workshops on the renewal plan; with a German radio and the television channel Euronews, which broadcast stories about the neighbors’ struggle; and with Unesco’s...
Project Monitoring Committee. These linkages depended on Sahin’s commitment, yet her gender, progressive political affiliation, professional background and secular outlook set her apart from the majority of the association’s members, and raise doubts about her ultimate clout (Schwegmann 2012). Indeed as of November 2011, she was no longer listed as part of the board of directors of the association.

The association also filed three court cases concerning three different types of houses potentially affected by the renewal project: non-historic buildings, historic buildings and restored historic buildings of the EU rehabilitation project (Schwegmann 2012). However, the courts offered no effective avenue for recourse. Schwegmann found that courts were inactive, stalled the process, and declined the cases. A recurrent strategy by local authorities was to tweak the plans to invalidate the court proceedings, while the substance of the plan remained unchanged. Thus legal actions, at most, delayed project implementation. Activists argued that institutional approaches to the struggle were futile: “the result is all too often over-determined: when the growth coalition cannot obtain the desired outcomes with existing institutions, it simply invents new ones” (interview with Murat Cemal Yalçintan, December 2010).

As opposed to the struggles in the cities described above, Febayder resorted to a traditional repertoire. The association’s website circulated press releases and documents but it had nearly no postings after 2011. The only community-based social event was a children street festival, and photos suggest about 40 participants. The association collaborated with SOSIstanbul, an organization that promotes regular guided outings to endangered areas, but participants were overwhelmingly students, with a few professionals, and were all from outside the neighborhood. Tours were interrupted by a lecture in the association’s offices (held by Sahin on my attendance). While informative, the event was top-down and did not contribute to building a local community or strong emotional connections with the struggle.

Overall, the association was unable to mobilize broadly on the basis of a neighborhood identity. Many residents remained uninformed of the impending project, and viewed the association with skepticism. Distrust was also fed by the municipality, which funded its own association to split support and entice residents with the prospect of gains and nicer homes. International networks spread visibility but delivered no political clout locally. Given that the Law No. 5366 and Çalık Holding are behind most regeneration projects in the inner city, it is surprising that networking did not translate into coordinated mobilization in support of protest actions across neighborhoods.

**Conclusion**

The above analysis of urban mobilization and the new emphasis on experiential tools raises several concerns. Among them, a key one is the question of determinism. On the one hand, how stuck are failures? The dramatic mobilization in Gezi Park, Istanbul in June 2013 confirms the paper’s hypotheses. While mobilization in inner city neighborhoods such as Fener and Balat was weak, the turn to experiential tools much like the ones described in Santiago and Hamburg delivered mass mobilization. Creative producers anywhere can add to the repertoire of contention tools that build on their comparative advantage in creativity, knowledge and networking. Yet, while mobilization
outcomes are open to new strategies, policy impact remains less fluid because it depends on the underlying political and institutional conditions.

On the other hand of determinism, winners surely cannot rest on their laurels – and their behavior is highly revealing of the underlying politics of experiential mobilization. Groups able to resist redevelopment are under palpable pressure to pursue social relevance in order to keep the public’s sympathy on which their autonomy depends. As a result, these initiatives distinguish themselves from previous urban movements also for their utter emphasis on deliverables that broadcast their contribution to society at large. To maintain a catchall appeal these social outputs and the overall communication are depoliticized (Mayer 2009) and pragmatic (Kirchberg and Kagan 2013). Punctually advertised on the groups’ websites with catchy slogans and hip imagery, they are a stark reminder of a willy-nilly embeddedness in a broader market logic, where competition over scarce resources is constant, and where there truly is “no free lunch.”

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Endnotes

1 The cities under examination also differ in size, ranging from Istanbul with nearly 13 million inhabitants, to Vilnius just over half a million. However, the lowest level of political institution in these cities ranges only between 200,000 and 560,000 inhabitants: the municipality of Santiago (200,000); the submunicipal districts of Altona and Hamburg-Mitte (250,000 each); the municipalities of Beyoglu (250,000) and Fatih (430,000) in Istanbul; and the municipality of Vilnius (560,000).


3 In all the cases in the period under examination there are several parties in municipal council (at least five). However, when they span only as far as social democratic parties, i.e. moderately leftist, movements do not find significant support within city council. The presence of a far left party aids protestors. In Istanbul, five parties fielded mayoral candidates who received more than 1 percent of votes in the last election, spanning from social democratic to nationalist. Parties in Lithuania represent the same ideological span. On the other hand, both Hamburg and Santiago have parties of the far left that have significant roles in the respective municipal councils.

4 When higher levels of governments are politically aligned with municipal executives, the result is a powerful front in favor of the government. In Istanbul, overlapping control of key submunicipal districts, the metropolitan government, the province, and the national government by the same party makes the environment hostile to protestors. However, the opposite is not true: during the periods under examination, in both Santiago and Vilnius (the analysis is not applicable to the federalist context of Hamburg) mayor and national governments were from different parties, yet the movements’ result were divergent. In Vilnius the central government did not align itself with protestors, while in Santiago protestors found a useful ally in the ministry of culture and other national level institutions. To conclude this brief institutional analysis, two interesting but ultimately inconclusive variables are the presence of metropolitan governments and the degree of executive accountability.

5 Soon after reaching the status of Zona Típica and gaining some political visibility, the association embarked on a mission to solidify its status by reaching financial autonomy. This goal was for example pursued with the establishment of a sister foundation, Fundacion Patrimonio Nuestro (Our Heritage Foundation), because foundations have better access to public funding than associations, both nationally and internationally.

6 Cesco representatives have a mandate of four years and the statute is up to the mayor, who has to submit it to the city council for approval. Representatives are typically invited by the mayoralty and not elected. This was the case in Santiago as well, until 2009. The approximately 30 members are drawn largely from institutions of territorial representation (neighborhood councils or Junta de Vecinos), but also from organs of functional representation (associations focused on women, sport, culture, charity, youth, and foundations). There are also representatives from secondary and tertiary education and the Chamber of Commerce.

7 The shift in housing policy was led by the Hamburg Office of Urban Development and the Environment (Behörde für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt) and the municipal housing company (SAGA). The shift was crystallized with the 2005 purchase by the municipal housing company SAGA of the municipal real estate developer (GWG). Several factors have turned against low-income renters. Investors are given more freedom over developments, as the city abandons a tradition of bargaining to extract social benefits such as price ceilings for the sale or rental of new units. A number of developments have been allowed to move to ownership, thereby cutting
previous residents out of the market. The rent control regime was relaxed and now the owner can charge market prices upon re-letting. Also, the rent index (Mietenspiegel), which is set by SAGA to regulate rent increases outside of re-letting, has accelerated because it is biased upwards by rentals in new developments and upgraded buildings.

8 St. Pauli has 10 percent unemployment (against a city average of 6.5) and its 23,000 residents display one of the most diverse populations (with 21.8 percent of foreign born, against a city average of 13.6). It is a tight residential neighborhood (population density is 9,173 residents per square kilometer against a city average of 2,295). Since it is a working class neighborhood, many of its buildings are public housing, offering residents subsidized rents (19 percent of apartments are public housing against a city average of 11.1). In 1994 newly let flats in St. Pauli cost 7.70 euro per square meter, and in 2008 11.40 euro. (The average rent in Hamburg was significantly lower at 9.75 euro per square meter.) Unsurprisingly, poor people are leaving the neighborhood. Harz IV social support recipients fell from 18.5 percent in 1998 to 11.4 percent in 2003, while according to a different set of statistics (SGB II) overall social benefit recipients fell from 20.6 percent in 2008 to 19.2 in 2011, the latest year available. See http://www.statistik-nord.de.

9 The area of St Pauli and in particular its famous vice street Reeperbahn are key to the city’s economy, attracting the largest portion of tourists. Starting in the 2000s the city tourist board concentrated in St. Pauli a variety of mass events that raised the number of visitors to 25 million yearly. Rowdy parades to celebrate soccer victories, Harley Davidson yearly motorcades, or other events that attract tens of thousands of participants disrupt ordinary life and create filth and noise, in a crass invasion of space. Festivals in Altona are more oriented to the arts, such altonale (since 1998) and STAMP (since 2010).

10 While the group had an internal agenda to mobilize the underrepresented minorities (for example with leaflets in Turkish), and Turkish women would attend meetings and provide input, they were less involved in campaigning. On the other hand, musicians were active in events, but not in the weekly organizational meetings. Overall, despite the efforts, it was hard to truly involve the Turkish community (interview with Irene Bude, artist and author of a documentary about gentrification in St. Pauli, July 2011).

11 See http://das-.info//zukunftskonzept.html
12 www.nugu.lt
13 www.nugu.lt
15 www.nugu.lt
16 www.nugu.lt
17 Academic circles have been key in mobilization. One of the most prominent is Solidarity Studio, a group of architects and planners who organized resistance in two gecekondu slated for regeneration on the Asian side, starting in 2005. Other groups are Imece (Urbanization Movement of Society), Direnistanbul (Resist Istanbul) and SOSIstanbul.

18 This was in part because “unlike Galata and Tarlabasi the area never lost its neighborhood and community qualities in spite of the declining urban conditions” (Inceoglu and Yürekli n.a.).
19 According to official statistics, only 24 percent of the population has an educational level higher than the 9th grade, and 78 percent of the population has incomes below 160 USD per month. 60 percent are renters and 39 percent are property owners, and of the latter 40 percent reported owning the property for longer than 20 years (Schwegmann 2012).
20 Rehabilitation did not require any financial contribution from the respective owners. However, beneficiary owners had to agree they would neither sell their houses within the next five years nor raise the rent of their tenants. For more detail see: http://fenerbalat.org/.
21 As a result gentrification accelerated, and now there are online real estate agencies that specialize in the neighborhood and guide foreign buyers, e.g. http://www.kemhaemlak.com/
As a UNESCO report explained: “The major threat to the achievements and sustainability of the project is insufficient input by Fatih Municipality, the beneficiary of the project, in terms of both commitment and personnel. The Fener-Balat Districts Programme was conceived as a pilot project that could establish a methodology for restoring deprived historic districts, while at the same time uplifting the social, economic and living conditions of the inhabitants. … Up to the present, the Municipality has restricted its input to the minimum” (Unesco 2006).

More specifically, the project covers an area of approximately 280,000 square meters including 297 buildings, 181 of which are listed civil architecture examples and 34 of which are monuments. The project proposes a mixed-use development including 53 percent residential, 12 percent commercial, 16 percent accommodation, 8 percent office and 2 percent cultural use (Fatih Municipality, 2011a in Gunay and Dokmeci 2012). The project builds on a park strip along the waterfront built after the cleanup of the Golden Horn shores and the removal of the dockyards 35 kilometers east to Tuzla in the 1980s (Turgut and Sismanyazici 2012). See Gunay and Dokmeci (2012) for a general discussion of waterfront redevelopment of the Golden Horn.

Earlier in the decade, the neighborhood had been outside the focus of redevelopment because the ownership structure discouraged investors. Buildings are often owned by as many as 10–12 owners, some of whom live outside Istanbul or even abroad. This discouraged large scale investors and promoted other parts of the city (Bezmez 2008). Surely, Law no. 5366 did much to solve this problem.

While tenants are part of the name of the association, they are not mobilized. They are largely Kurdish, locked in a clientelistic dependency with the municipality and eager to avoid conflict (see interviews in Schwegmann 2012). However the global city is a formal city and with renewal governments are also eliminating the informality that no longer serves the political purposes of electoral patronage and cheap industrial labor.

In addition the municipality tries to negotiate with owners individually, to undermine the cooperation of the association. In order to create a climate of mistrust and undermine solidarity among resistance, the municipality intentionally pursued misinformation, withheld information and failed to respond to requests to buy time (Schwegmann 2012)