Disciplining the informal service sector in Delhi, India*

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Abstract:

Governance in Indian metropolises is increasingly geared toward transforming urban space rather than ‘improving’ the poor. This ‘shift of emphasis’ is accompanied by the rapid growth of the informal service sector (ISS), whose workers provide cheap services to affluent sections of society but whose presence jeopardizes municipal authorities’ goal of making ‘world-class’ cities. This article identifies the emergence of a new disciplinary regime that manages this permanently out-of-place population. I present original research on street hawkers in Delhi – an archetypal sub-population of the ISS – and show that this disciplinary regime differs significantly from Foucauldian disciplines. Instead of fixing street hawkers in prescribed places, enumerating and acting upon them, municipal authorities raid places where hawkers are known to operate and this forces hawkers to remain dispersed and highly mobile. In order to counter this enforced mobility, hawkers practice strategic (in)visibility, whereby they seek to remain invisible to the state on a daily basis, but occasionally assert their presence in specific times/places in order to secure recognition from authorities in the form of official documents which can serve as the basis for future claims to urban space. This article shows that the EuroAmerican urban experience is far from universal, and demonstrates the need for theory that can better represent urban processes in Southern metropolises.

Key words:

informal economy Delhi discipline urban governance urban space 21st century metropolis

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Introduction

Municipal governments in Indian cities are reworking their relationship with the poor. According to Gidwani and Reddy (2011: 1640) the state’s engagement with the poor in this “post-development social formation” is increasingly “fitful, contractual, and individualized”. This is a departure from the relationship that emerged after India’s independence, which was informed by an ideology of development and an ethics of poverty alleviation. Meanwhile, municipal authorities in Delhi are committed to creating a so-called ‘world-class’ city. The ‘world-class’ city discourse has become hegemonic – it drives rapid urban transformation and informs an imaginary of the city’s future. There is a scholarly consensus that there is little space in the world-class city for the poor, yet we lack an understanding of how the poor are managed and disciplined, beyond the vague notion that they are considered a nuisance and criminalized. I draw on Foucault’s concept of discipline to show that the state continues to manage the poor, but in very different ways from earlier modes of urban governance that relied on a collection of familiar Foucauldian tactics.

Foucault narrates a “shift of emphasis” (Foucault 2007: 363) from territory to populations as the focus of the state’s regulatory powers in eighteenth century Europe. The city became the most important site of governance, where bureaucracies were created to manage “the circulation of men and goods in relation to each other” (ibid.: 355) through disciplinary regimes that included fixing people in space, enumerating and classifying them, and correcting deviant behavior (Foucault 1995[1977]). I argue that in the case of contemporary Delhi the state’s objectives have changed as state-led development has given way to post-developmentalism, and its overriding objective is to transform the built environment rather than ‘improve’ the poor. While the elements whose imbrication and circulation municipal authorities manage and regulate have remained unchanged – i.e. people, resources, capital, waste, energy, the built environment, etc. – urban governance has undergone a a ‘shift of emphasis’ from population to territory, as the main object which the state seeks to transform and improve. Nevertheless, as providers of cheap services the poor are an integral element of this project, and they must be regulated if Delhi’s transformation is to be achieved. This article seeks to theorize the emerging disciplinary regime that governs the marginalized who work in Delhi’s informal service sector, specifically street hawkers, in this context of post-developmentalism and urban transformation.

Street hawkers require access to urban space in order to earn a livelihood, and their use of public space such as markets, parks and sidewalks commonly draws unwelcome attention from municipal authorities. I show how municipal authorities do not subject street hawkers to the disciplinary tactics outlined by Foucault (i.e. naming, classifying, organizing, fixing in space, observing, correcting, etc.). Instead, municipal authorities distinguish street hawkers from citizens and construct the poor as a homogenous “undifferentiated mass” (see Foucault 1988[1965]: 48). This precludes street hawkers from making legitimate claims to urban space, so they are forced to operate illegally and are subjected to periodic raids in which authorities attempt to confiscate their goods. This fails to significantly reduce encroachment on public space, but it does serve to disperse street hawkers throughout the city. Since they must remain highly mobile, they are unable to invest in anything that could augment their livelihoods but compromise their mobility such as a push-cart. Street hawkers
maintain access to urban space and counter this regime in two ways. First, they form alliances with non-state actors who can protect them from the state. Second, they practice what I call *strategic (in)visibility*, whereby they remain invisible to the state on an everyday basis, but appear at particular times/places in order to obtain legal recognition (i.e. documents) that can serve as the basis of future legal claims to urban space. This article focuses on the latter tactic.

I begin this paper by reviewing Foucault’s narrative of the emergence of discipline in early-modern Europe, and its application in European colonies. My objective is to show that disciplines are a response to time- and place-specific challenges as authorities pursue both economic and social goals. In the third section I show how India’s contemporary development trajectory differs from ‘classical’ cases in Europe; its distinguishing factor is the inability of the formal economy to absorb a large surplus population as wage-laborers. This population is disconnected from means of subsistence in rural areas yet unable to sell labor for a wage within the formal economy in cities. Many of these people earn subsistence livelihoods in the informal service sector and managing urban transformation while regulating this population that is inherently out-of-place in the ‘world-class’ city is the main challenge faced by the Delhi government. In section four I present original fieldwork that shows how this emergent disciplinary regime is applied to street hawkers, and I examine the strategies street hawkers have developed to counter these new disciplinary tactics. By showing how the genesis of Delhi’s new disciplinary regime is inextricably linked to the growth of the city’s large informal service sector, this article demonstrates the importance of studying 21st century metropolises (Roy 2009a) in the context of their unique historical and development trajectories (see Parnell and Robinson 2012).

**The Emergence of the Disciplines**

Michael Foucault (2007) documents the emergence of modern techniques of rule – what he calls the “art of governance” – in Europe at the dawn of, and during, the Industrial Revolution. He argues that the objective of the modern state ceased to be the maintenance of the sovereign and his power, and became the management of “the intricacy of men and things” (2007: 97). Governments had hitherto focused their attention on controlling territory rather than populations. Foucault charts this “shift of emphasis” (ibid.: 365), after which the main concern of states was to “improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health” (ibid.: 105), by classifying them into various populations and carefully managing their relationships. Thus, the elements remained the same – people, resources, capital, the built environment – but states developed new techniques of managing their configurations. Bureaucracies were established and they employed various techniques to identify and correct deviance. Foucault identifies the emergence of modern discipline (1995[1979]: 142), which he defines as “a procedure…aimed at knowing, mastering and using” the resources – including populations – within a given territory. To ‘know’ their

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1 Foucault distinguishes between ‘discipline’ that operates at the scale of the individual, and ‘biopolitics’ which regularize and condition populations (for a brief discussion of the differences between discipline and biopolitics see Foucault 2003: 242-253). These tactics operate at different scales and are complementary, and at times the boundary between them is blurry. For the purpose of brevity I conflate them in this paper and refer to them collectively as ‘discipline.’
territory and populations governments conducted cadastral surveys and censuses, created schema that divided populations into clearly recognizable groups and classified territory according to its use. Governments began to order the “human multiplicities” within their territories (Foucault 1995[1977]: 218), and groups that were deemed dangerous were closely observed and subjected to interventions (e.g. incarcerated in workhouses or asylums) (Foucault 1988[1965]; 1995[1977]). For example, groups that were highly mobile were considered deviant because they were difficult to observe and manage, so they were subjected to disciplinary techniques that reduced their mobility: “one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique” (Foucault 1995[1977]: 218). The ‘mastery’ of populations required predictability, so disciplinary regimes ensured that “each individual has his own place; and each place its individual” (Foucault 1995[1977]: 143). To this end, states sought to “eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation” (ibid.: 143), and then impose an all-encompassing order of circulation (Foucault 2007: 333-361).

The disciplines were developed for the express purpose of overcoming time and place-specific challenges that arose in the course of managing incipient industrialization under the emergent capitalist mode of production. As Marx explains at the end of Capital, the state contributed to the making of the English working class during the Industrial Revolution by enclosing land and thereby prohibiting peasants from accessing their traditional means of subsistence. This state-sanctioned “class robbery” (Thompson [1966]: 218) left dispossessed peasants with no choice but to migrate to cities and sell their labor for a wage: “when there are no more independent peasants to get rid of, the ‘clearing’ of cottages begins; so that the agricultural laborers no longer find on the soil they cultivate even the necessary space for their own housing” (Marx 1990[1867]: 889). Marx goes to great lengths to describe the violent nature of the disciplinary regime that manages this transformation of peasants into proletariat: “[peasants were] turned into vagabonds, and then whipped, branded and tortured by grotesquely terroristic laws into accepting the discipline necessary for the system of wage-labor” (Marx 1990[1867]: 899). He was equally aware, however, that a range of disciplinary tactics were used in cities to manage the labor force: “Direct extra-economic force is still used of course, but only in exceptional cases” because “the advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws” (ibid.: 899). Thus, we see in Marx the transition highlighted by Foucault whereby states transform the “confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities” (Foucault 1995[1977]: 148).

The transformation of an unknowable mass of peasants into standardized groups of wage-laborers was an integral first step towards “the adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces” (Foucault 1990[1978]: 141). Ultimately the transformation of populations and the production of commodities became inseparable: “the two processes – the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital – cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using them” (Foucault 1995[1977]: 221). In order to manage the expansion of industry and avert unrest that could result from rapid social
and technological change, governments employed disciplinary tactics both inside and outside the factory. Marx focuses extensively on how the widespread introduction of machinery in production processes required “the technical subordination of the worker to the uniform motion of the instruments of labor,” and “gives rise to a barrack-like discipline” (1990[1867]: 549). Governments regulated the labor force by confining ‘vagabonds’ to workhouses in times of high unemployment, thereby ensuring the availability of “cheap manpower in the periods of full employment and high salaries; and in periods of unemployment, reabsorption of the idle and social protection against agitation and uprisings” (Foucault 1988[1965]: 51).

As an integral part of this productive apparatus, populations became subjects that required improvement through state intervention, rather than simply objects that required protection from, say, marauding armies. To this end a host of institutions and sciences (e.g. demographics and later eugenics) were established to manage the orderly reproduction and improvement of populations (Foucault 1990[1978]). James Scott (1998: 92) notes that during the nineteenth century ensuring the welfare of its citizenry became the overriding task of the state, which “set about engineering its society according to the most advanced technical standards”.

Nowhere was the dual character of discipline – i.e. the pursuit of economic as well as social goals – more evident than in colonial territories. Ranajit Guha (1997: 25) traces a shift in India, from colonialism’s “predatory, mercantilist beginnings” into “a carefully ‘regulated empire’” whose goal was to extract a surplus and create ‘civilized’ citizen-subjects. David Scott (1999: 40) argues that modern colonial states created the conditions – i.e. the field of power – in which economic and social goals were interdependent by operating with a “distinctive political rationality—a colonial governmentality—in which power comes to be directed at the destruction and reconstruction of colonial space so as to produce not so much extractive-effects on colonial bodies as governing-effects on colonial conduct.” In this sense the state’s pursuit of economic goals became “inseparable from (and hence concurrent with) attempts to transform wasteful forms of moral conduct” (Gidwani 2008: 14). In other words, colonial authorities sought to extract an economic surplus by managing the “complex of men and things” in a way that simultaneously required and produced ‘civilized’ citizen-subjects whose conduct was both predictable and productive. Thus, although violence and coercion were important elements of the modern colonial state’s disciplinary repertoire, they ideally sought to exercised power that “works not in spite of but through the construction of the space of free social exchange” (Scott 1999: 26).

In order to elicit desirable conduct, modern colonial states set about fixing their colonial subjects in observable, surveyed space, and enumerating and categorizing these ‘inferior races’ into populations (see Cohn 1996; Benton 2001). For example, with the passage of the *Criminal Tribes Act 1871* the colonial state in India constructed inherently criminal population groups whose deviance it sought to correct through relocation and incarceration (Sen 2000). The regulation of personal conduct in India differed from discipline in England in that the application of micro-power “intrude[d] again and again into many such areas of the life of the people as would have been firmly kept out of bounds in metropolitan Britain” (Guha 1997: 28). The British imposed disciplinary tactics in urban areas very early

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2 I adopt this term and its ironic usage from J.A. Hobson (2006[1902]).
in their colonization of India (Guha 1997), with the objective of enforcing a strict social hierarchy through the spatial division of populations. Legg (2007: 22) shows how urban space in Delhi “became heavily impressed with the spatial insignia of sovereign power,” which served to reinforce the narrative of European superiority as divisions of populations and hierarchies – of nation, ‘race,’ caste and gender – were inscribed into the built environment. The city became a material manifestation of the colonial field of power upon which the colonial state imposed an authoritarian version of liberalism – what Guha (1997: 4) calls “liberalism grafted onto colonial conditions.” As a result, it became common sense in colonial India that the state was the major agent of social change, and this axiom was internalized by the indigenous bourgeoisie across the political spectrum by the time India became independent in 1947 (Kaviraj 2010). Thus, rather than dismantle the colonial government after India’s independence, the indigenous bourgeoisie sought to control the machinery of state in order to engineer society (Kaviraj 2010: 68-69; Guha 1997; Gooptu 2001).

**Decolonization and development in India**

The leadership of the Congress Party that came to power after India gained its independence in 1947 wielded a state apparatus whose *raison d’être* was to accelerate economic and social development. While Congress leadership set about managing the economy and engineering society, their objectives were nation-building and social welfare. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru consolidated power within the Congress Party and sought to lead India down a path of modernization well-worn by European predecessors and undergirded by what Corbridge and Harriss (2000: 120) refer to as “mythologies of rule”: socialism, federalism, secularism and democracy. While the Indian bourgeoisie did not incorporate subaltern demands wholeheartedly (Chibber 2013), policy was informed by a “radical sense of horizontal solidarity” between elites and subalterns (Gidwani 2008: 78).

The Government of India’s (GOI) first step was to transform its citizenry into an informed electorate whose demands could be channeled – and managed – through a liberal-democratic framework. Guha (2008) reminds us of the difficulties faced by the GOI as it sought to elicit political participation of a largely illiterate electorate. The major thrust of the GOI’s development strategy was in the field of economy, and involved nurturing heavy industry under the careful management of an elite cadre of appointed bureaucrats. A relatively orthodox development strategy was pursued, in which rural-urban migration was encouraged; given the low productivity of agricultural labor relative to industrial labor, this was viewed as a means of boosting overall industrial output (see Lewis 1954).

The Nehruvian state positioned itself as a lynchpin between capital and labor, with the hopes of forestalling antagonism on the shop floor (see Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). Furthermore, it embarked on a strategy of regional development by steering investment to so-called ‘backward’ areas. In one example, Parry (2003) explains how the Government of India built the Bhilai steel plant in a ‘backward’ area of Madhya Pradesh, which attracted a diverse labor force – what he calls a “mini-India” – of over 50,000 workers. The Nehruvian state’s claim to legitimacy rested on its ability to foster economic growth, and theoretically both capital and labor willingly subordinated themselves to the state apparatus in return. The capitalist class declared its support for Nehruvian developmentalism in the Bombay Plan
while organized labor placed its trust in the state and its ability to take collective action was circumscribed by the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. Scholars have questioned the extent to which both capital and labor consented to its development program (Chibber 2003; Teitelbaum 2006), and the limitations of consent were exposed during the Emergency in which Indira Gandhi suspended civil liberties from June 1975 until January 1977. Rajagopal (2011: 1003) considers the Emergency a watershed in contemporary Indian history because it signaled a “shift away from the Nehruvian focus on the economy as the crucial arena of nation-building…[and] instead, culture and community became the categories that gained political salience in the period of economic liberalization”.

The GOI’s exercise of power through new forms of communication and media on culture and community during the Emergency was indeed unique, but events in Delhi indicate that the field of power remained remarkably stable. According to Emma Tarlo (2009: 69), authorities simply used the suspension of civil liberties to implement policies that “had long been sitting on the back burner of Indian politics.” This meant reinscibing a social and spatial order in Delhi that had been lost under an “avalanche of refugees” from Punjab and Sindh during Partition (see Guha 2008; Khan 2008). Tarlo (2009) explains how Delhi authorities implemented a policy of slum demolition and resettled the poor to working class neighborhoods in East Delhi. According to her (ibid.: 80), the resettlement scheme was not as straightforward as “demolition leads to sterilization, leads to plot,” but it is safe to say that those who were ‘voluntarily’ sterilized were more likely to be allotted a flat than those who were not. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more textbook example of Foucauldian discipline; the poor were classified into a countable population group through which they could be identified as ‘out-of-place’ in certain parts of the city, screened out of the population at large and relocated to their ‘proper’ place across the Yamuna River at a suitable distance from Delhi’s grand boulevards. With a single intervention the state corrected the maldistribution of this population and limited its members’ biological reproduction. This is no longer how Delhi authorities discipline the poor, and in the following section I show how Delhi’s contemporary political economy has given rise to a new disciplinary regime.

Out-of-Place in the World-Class City

India’s postcolonial development trajectory involved familiar tropes of rural to urban migration, industrialization, and socio-spatial ordering. In the course of managing the nation’s progress, the ‘sublime’ state (Blom Hansen 2009) occasionally induced social and economic turbulence – e.g. resettlement programs – which it managed with Foucauldian discipline. In this sense Nehruvian developmentalism was dialectically related to discipline and together they comprised a totality infused with the telos of modernity. It has become clear, however, that development in India differs from the ‘classical’ case of England and idealized versions of modernity in (at least) one fundamental respect; an enormous surplus population has emerged in urban areas. Its emergence has pierced the development/discipline unity that had characterized post-independence India – this population is dispossessed as a result of ‘development,’ but it is far too large for any development intervention to facilitate its absorption into the formal economy as wage laborers.

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3 Tarlo (2009) cites official statistics that put the number of resettled persons at 700,000, and sterilizations at 161,000.
Kalyan Sanyal (2007) argues forcefully that for many Indian peasants their transformation into wage-laborers is never completed (see NCEUS 2007; GOI 2002); they are dispossessed of the means of production, but instead of becoming part of a reserve army permanently on hand to be thrown into production processes in response to increased demand the poor eke out subsistence livelihoods in the informal economy. It is worth quoting him at length (2007: 52-53):

Direct producers are estranged from their means of production…but not all those who are dispossessed find a place within the system of capitalist production. Bereft of any direct access to means of labor, the dispossessed are left only with labor power, but their exclusion from the space of capitalist production does not allow them to turn their labor power into a commodity. They are condemned to the world of the excluded, the redundant, the dispensable, having nothing to lose, not even the chains of wage-slavery. Primitive accumulation thus produces a vast wasteland inhabited by people whose lives as producers have been subverted and destroyed by the thrust of the process of expansion of capital, but for whom the doors of capital remain forever closed.4

The Indian economy has experienced growth since the 1980s, which accelerated after economic reforms were launched in earnest in 1991, but expansion of the formal economy has been sluggish. Scholars have shown that economic growth has in fact been ‘jobless’ (Kannan and Ravendran 2009), with the added jobs accruing in the informal sector (NCEUS 2007). Both public and private manufacturing sectors have generated employment in the informal sector through the utilization of casual labor, as well as through outsourcing and sub-contracting (Sanyal and Bhattacharya 2009; see Parry 2003). A 2002 report by the Planning Commission highlights the importance of the informal sector vis-à-vis the formal sector (GOI 2002: 4):

In the year 1999-2000, the total contribution to employment by the organised sector was only 8 per cent of which private sector segment’s contribution was hardly 2.5 per cent. Rest 92 per cent came from the unorganised sector. On this basis, one can see even if the organised sector grows at 20 per cent per annum and the private organised sector at 30 per cent per annum, their contribution to total employment will increase hardly by 1.5 to 2 per cent of the total over the Tenth Plan.

Studying the informal economy has proved challenging, due to its diversity and size, so recent studies have disaggregated it in one way or another, preferring to focus on a sub-sector such as rural non-agricultural production (Marjit and Maiti 2006), interaction between the formal-informal sectors (Chakrabarti and Kundu 2009) in particular sectors such as the auto industry (Shaw and Pandit 2001), and the urban informal economy (Kudva 2009). Ranis

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4 Chatterjee (2011) has suggested that in Europe, out-migration to the colonies reduced this population of dispossessed and unemployed peasantry. Similarly Marx (1990: 579) understood out-migration to colonies as an important valve for laborers who were made redundant by the introduction of mechanized production: “By constantly turning workers into ‘supernumeraries’, large-scale industry…spurs on rapid increases in emigration and the colonization of foreign lands.”
and Stewart (2006) distinguish between the “modern” informal sector which is connected to capital-intensive production networks, and the “traditional” informal sector which includes those who subsist in the need economy – i.e. workers who lack capital and cannot sell their labor for a wage in the formal economy. Scholarly research has tended to focus on the “modern” sector, and particularly on production rather than services (Agarwala 2008; Maiti and Sen 2010; Chari 2004; Kudva 2009; Sudarshan et al. 2007). However, many of the poorest urban residents who exist in Sanyal’s wasteland work in the informal service sector (ISS); this includes street hawkers (Anjaria 2006; 2011), food vendors (te Lintelo 2009), wastepickers who collect and sell recyclable material (Gill 2010; Hayumi et al. 2006), cycle rickshaw pullers (Baviskar 2011; Sood 2012), domestic servants (Qayum and Ray 2011), etc. The ISS is regularly overlooked by scholars with a macro-focus, and much of the scholarly research on these various groups has been done by anthropologists, sociologists and geographers. This research has provided insightful ‘thick descriptions’ of everyday life in various a sub-sectors of the ISS, but by studying these populations as insular entities, much of this research fails to interrogate how the ISS is a product of development processes.

The National Sample Survey focused on the ISS from July 2006 to June 2007, and the data showed that the service sector is “the backbone of the economy” in Delhi contributing approximately 79% of the state GDP and 54% of employment (GNCTD 2005: 1). According to Delhi’s City Development Plan, over 80% of migrants from rural areas work as street hawkers (Ministry of Urban Development 2006: 2-4). The City Development Plan attributes the growth of the ISS to increased demand: “the growing population, coupled with the growing per capital income is fuelling the growth of the services sector” (ibid.: 3-1). Indeed, demand from the growing middle class is an important pull-factor, but many retrenched laborers were pushed into the ISS after the Supreme Court ordered the Delhi government to close ‘hazardous industries’ in 2000 and 2001. Menon and Nigam (2007) conclude that approximately two million laborers were suddenly rendered unemployed after 98,000 industrial units were closed. The ISS is highly fragmented, yet its sub-sectors exhibit a number of similarities. De Neve (2005: 17) argues that labor is “remarkably immobile” among sectors, so the only avenue for advancement for ISS workers is within their respective sectors (see Gill 2010; Mitra 2006). Furthermore, workers in the ISS face unique challenges; unlike small-scale producers who face a shortage of capital, the most important means of

5 For the purposes of this survey, enterprises were classified as ‘unorganized’ if they employed less than 10 people and used electricity, or 20 people and did not use electricity (this distinction is made in the Factories Act 1948). This is a broad definition that includes some relatively large firms whose employees are essentially wage-laborers, so it is important to disaggregate this figure according to sector and size of enterprise. First, most of the workers in the need economy who would have been surveyed would fall into a single category Other Community, Social and Personal Services. This category does not overlap perfectly with the need economy, however, because it includes many non-need economy occupations (e.g. hairdressers and employees of commercial photography studios), while it omits many need-economy occupations (e.g. street hawkers, domestic servants, babysitters, night watchmen, etc.). Enterprises in the need economy are typically small, and are operated by a single individual/family, and these fall into the survey category Own Account Enterprises (OAE) (enterprises in the OAE category are 25 times more likely to operate without fixed premises than non-OAE enterprises). In Delhi, approximately 9% of surveyed enterprises are OAEs and Other Community, Social and Personal Services, and they employed 4.5% of the workers in the ISS. Again, this figure is a baseline and in reality much higher; it does not, for example, include street hawkers, of which there are an estimated 500,000 in Delhi (SEWA 2012).
production for most workers in the ISS is urban space. While workers in small-scale factories can theoretically be relocated to peripheral areas, ISS workers secure a comparative advantage by operating in close proximity to their clientele. This gives rise to conflict as multiple interest groups – including the state – seek control over prime real estate (see Goldman 2011). This explains why public space – rather than the shopfloor – has become an arena of intense conflict.

It is clear that the ISS differs significantly from the peasantry-cum-proletariat who were the main targets of discipline in industrializing Europe and its colonies. The seemingly endless growth of the ISS poses a time-/place-specific challenge to Indian authorities who view it as an “undifferentiated mass” that cannot conceivably be transformed into a working class.

Urbanization in Delhi: from modern to ‘world-class’

The vast ‘accumulation of men’ who subsist as ISS workers may be beyond ‘improvement,’ but they must nevertheless be managed. This management must be understood in the context of rapid urban transformation. Delhi’s City Development Plan (Ministry of Urban Development 2006: 3-1) asserts that Delhi is “rapidly emerging as a world-class metropolis,” and the most recent Master Plan (DDA 2009: 1) states its vision is to “make Delhi a global metropolis and a world-class city.” This discourse has emerged alongside India’s increasing geopolitical importance, and its emphasis is on quality of life issues (see Dupont 2011; Brosius 2010; Fernandes 2006). In particular, one of the main goals of urban planning has become the creation of spaces in which the so-called ‘new middle class’ can enjoy the cosmopolitan lifestyles upon which its class identity is based (see Savaala 2010). This requires considerable transformation, and indeed, passengers arriving at the recently built airport are promised ‘A New Delhi Everyday’.

At the core of the world-class discourse is an assumption that the transformation of the built environment is an overriding objective. Implicit is a shift of emphasis from population to territory as the object of development, and the rejection of social goals explicit in Nehruvian developmentalism (see Gidwani and Reddy 2011; Corbridge and Harriss 2000). While the modern city was inclusive in terms of people in the sense that “each individual has his own place; and each place its individual” (Foucault 1995[1977]: 143), the world-class city is all-encompassing in terms of space and at first glance it holds out a promise of inclusion.

Asher Ghertner (2008; 2010) has shown how urban development initiatives informed by the world-class city discourse operate according to a logic of aestheticism – what he calls “aesthetic governmentality” – instead of rational calculation based on measurement and classification that predominated in the modernist city. Since places that do not appear “world class,” quite simply, are not, the state is able to dispense with the gathering of data, dividing and classifying spaces/populations, and planning for each of these separate

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6 In Delhi only 5.67% of enterprises surveyed said shortage of capital was a constraint to their growth (GNCTD 2010: 61).
spaces/populations accordingly. Instead of this multiplicity of classifications, there is only world-class space and non-world-class space, and the former – such as the metro, flyovers, parks and shopping centers (see Siemiatycki 2006; Randhawa 2012; Voyce2007) – expands at the expense of the latter. Tellingly, Delhi has received more public investment than any other Indian city from 1995-2010 (Shaw 2012). The ‘world-class spaces’ that emerge as a result of this investment are a material embodiment of what Laclau and Mouffe (2001) call a ‘chain of equivalents’, which unite the city in a single classificatory framework. They render the world-class city discourse visible and serve as a symbolic register against which non-world-class space is compared; space which is inconsistent with the world-class aesthetic is quite easily identifiable, considered problematic and acted upon.

The world-class city discourse informs a logic of transformation that encompasses the entire urban fabric. The transformation it drives leaves a trail of dispossession in its wake, and this exposes the limitations of the world-class city’s inclusivity. The demolition of slums is undoubtedly the most poignant example of how the aesthetic logic of urban transformation is intertwined with anti-poor policies of exclusion and dispossession. As many as 300,000 people were evicted from slums along the Yamuna riverbank between 2004-2006 to make way for a park as part of Delhi’s ‘Clean and Green’ campaign (Dupont 2011; 2008; Bhan 2009; Padhi 2007). Thus, while the state focuses on transforming the build environment, there is not an ‘appropriate’ space for ‘undesirable’ groups who work in Delhi’s ISS such as Bangladeshi waste collectors. This is a stark contrast from the modernist city in which there was an appropriate place for every population group where it could be observed, studied, and acted upon (e.g. sterilized). Indeed, some slumdwellers are relocated to remote areas on the urban periphery that lack the most basic services, but even there they are not granted legal land tenure (Rao 2010). The point that must be emphasized is that most ISS workers remain in limbo, permanently out-of-place in the world-class city.

**Disciplining the ‘hawker menace’**

In this section I demonstrate that this population of out-of-place ISS workers is subjected to an emerging disciplinary regime characterized by disengagement with the state, dispersion and forced mobility. This section draws on 10 months of fieldwork in 2011 and two follow-up visits in 2012, in which I interviewed more than 70 hawkers, as well as government officials and other stakeholders such as representatives of resident welfare associations and non-governmental organizations. In the course of my research I interviewed a candidate running for an elected position of a resident welfare association in an affluent area. I said that the neighborhood seemed very well-maintained and orderly, and I remarked that there did not seem to be many street hawkers. He quickly assured me that “the vendor menace is there.” Street hawkers are viewed as a ‘menace’ because they number approximately 500,000 in Delhi (SEWA 2012), and serve as a constant reminder that the world-class vision is presently unattainable; according to Rajagopal (2001: 95) they are “a symbol of metropolitan space gone out of control”.

There are many policy makers who favor regulating street hawking with familiar Foucauldian disciplinary tactics. The National Advisory Council is an influential think tank staffed by highly-connected policy makers, and it urged the Government of India (GOI 2004) to pass a National Policy regarding street hawking, through which hawkers would be
identified, fixed, observed and acted upon. The primary goal of the policy is to “provide and promote supportive environment for earning livelihoods to the Street vendors, as well as ensure absence of congestion and maintenance of hygiene in public spaces and streets.” To this end various types of spaces are envisioned, such as ‘natural markets’, hawking/non-hawking zones, and licensed hawkers would operate in clearly demarcated spaces. Thus, in this scheme “each individual has his own place; and each place its individual” (Foucault 1995[1977]: 142), and once these markets are established hawkers can be acted upon. The policy quickly moves from identifying space and populations to inculcating particular behavior; hawkers are encouraged to receive various types of training, and calls for them to ‘self-regulate’ in areas such as hygiene and cleanliness.

The regulation of street hawking differs from city to city (Bhowmik 2001), and existing scholarly research indicates that there is a general trend toward refusing to recognize street hawkers as legitimate users of public space (see Anjaria 2006; 2010; Bandypadhyay 2011). In Delhi this refusal to recognize is evident in policy that discursively distinguishing hawkers from citizens. Two of the salient features of the New Delhi Municipal Council’s scheme to regulate street hawking illustrate this point (NDMC 2007):

i. The right to use the pathway, footpath etc. is that of the citizens;

iii. the hawkers are large in number, but the population of citizens is many times more than that of hawkers and, therefore, the fundamental rights of the citizens cannot be put in jeopardy by permitting hawkers and squatters to block roads, footpaths, public parks, etc.

This policy affords the state flexibility to determine land-use, but it also makes it difficult for the state to include hawkers in schemes that could be considered examples of governmentality – e.g. microlending – which could generate a modicum of support for the world-class city vision among ISS workers. Instead, the state’s only recourse is to coercively disperse the hawker “menace,” and enforce perpetual mobility.

*Dispersion and enforced mobility*

Municipal authorities in Delhi raid places where hawkers are known to operate, and the wares of encroaching hawkers are confiscated. This strategy is highly ineffective in the sense that it does not impose the world-class city order because most hawkers are able to evade capture and return the moment the authorities depart. It does represent a departure from earlier disciplinary tactics, however, because rather than segregating deviants and fixing them in a controlled space where they can be observed and acted upon, hawkers are dispersed in all directions. Furthermore, the threat of raids forces hawkers to remain highly mobile so that they can flee at the first sign of authorities. The combination of dispersion and forced mobility prevents hawkers from investing in their enterprises in ways that would tie them to a particular place or compromise their mobility (i.e. investing in permanent infrastructure or buying a push-cart that would hinder a quick escape during a raid), and this ensures that they remain socially and economically marginalized and in the ISS.
This research was conducted in Jawahar Market\textsuperscript{7}, which is a busy South Delhi market with both brand name global retail outlets and small shops selling generic goods. It caters to a wide range of customers. Hundreds of unlicensed street hawkers work illegally in and around this market on any given day. Many hawkers maintain mobility by carrying their goods but some display their goods on the sidewalk. On average municipal authorities raided the market once or twice per week in the course of my research, but since its employees arrived in a conspicuous blue truck and most hawkers were highly mobile, they could easily escape with their goods through alleyways. When I began my research I naively expected to hear tales of resistance, so I was initially surprised to find that hawkers simply fled. When I asked what they do when a raid commences, they seemed surprised by the question, perhaps because the answer is obvious: flee. The following answers are representative:

\textit{We run wherever, we just run.}

\textit{When police raid us we take everything and run.}

\textit{When they come they snatch away our stuff so we take our items and we go to the back [of the market], in the opposite direction.}

\textit{First we get to know when they are at the main gate, everyone removes [their things].}

\textit{MCD comes in the car, so if we see the car at the gate we know they've come so we pack up, we run.}

When the MCD trucks arrive there is pandemonium as everyone gathers their belongings and scatters, but an air of boredom quickly sets in after the initial moment of danger passes. The MCD trucks make their way through the market extremely slowly. Some of the hawkers have agreements with shopkeepers, who, for a small fee, allow them to stash their goods inside the shops for the duration of the raid. Others escape to nearby parks or alleyways behind the storefronts and chat in small groups until the raid is over. Thus, for many of the hawkers the raids have become routine, and in some cases they receive advanced warning of impending raids. One hawker said nonchalantly: “When the MCD comes we just go to sit in the park until they leave.” Others simply disguised themselves as shoppers: “They never take my stuff, [because when] they come, I put it in my pack. Who will know whether I am a shopper or not?”

The first time I witnessed a raid I was eating lunch in a \textit{dhaba} when two blue MCD trucks arrived, followed closely by two Ambassadors\textsuperscript{8} with MCD officials. The officials instructed the laborers riding in the back of the trucks what to confiscate. There was a heavy police presence to restrain the crowd that gathered, many of whom were hawkers who had returned to the market to witness the raid after stashing their goods in nearby hiding places. One street food vendor was unable to carry his small oven, so he abandoned it and instead of confiscating it the authorities destroyed it.

\textsuperscript{7}The name of this market has been changed.

\textsuperscript{8}The Ambassador is the type of automobile typically used by public officials in India.
While I was taking the above photo I was approached by police, who said they had to confiscate my camera. I protested, and argued that we were in public space, to which they replied that this was a government operation. Ultimately they allowed me to keep my camera and made me promise not to take any more photos, but in the meantime a crowd of onlookers had gathered. After the raid the hawkers who had witnessed my interaction with police were enthusiastic about sharing their stories of government harassment and some of them became long-term informants who called me when future raids took place.

Many of the hawkers have never been caught by the authorities because they have remained mobile. This typically requires a trade-off in how much stock they are able to keep on hand, but some hawkers have devised strategies that allow them to compromise their mobility and enlarge their stock. One hawker who operates a relatively large stand and sells cosmetics and personal items such as combs and sunglasses, quickly dismantles his display and moves it less than ten meters into a nearby shop when a raid commences. Others have identified clever hiding spaces. One group of hawkers who sold clothes (readymade kurtas) kept a relatively large stockpile in an unused building nearby that had a security guard who they paid to keep an eye on their things. This reduced their risk during raids, because at most the authorities could confiscate the items they had on display. One day I arrived during a raid and met one of my long-term informants who was part of this group; they had been surprised and unable to escape and six of them had their displayed goods confiscated. She was not too upset, but she explained that to compensate for this loss she would have to work longer hours in the coming days. Many hawkers gathered in a nearby alleyway as usual and I was asking
them about the raid when a commotion suddenly erupted across the street. The authorities had located the stockpiles in the vacant building and confiscated everything. In a moment six hawkers lost everything. My informant was in tears, and some male hawkers were accusing another hawker – a competitor – of tipping off the authorities about the storage space. He denied any role in the matter, and for a moment it appeared as if the situation would become violent, but then an elderly woman who was among those whose goods had been confiscated put an end to it by shouting: “I don’t know who said [where our things were], but [I hope] their children will get sick and die”.

One consequence of the authorities’ strategy is that they cannot secure the support of hawkers by involving them in programs and training, or offering micro-loans – i.e. more classical forms of governmentality. In the absence of these more subtle means of exercising power, power relations are laid bare and hawkers need not express their discontent in a hidden transcript (Scott 1990). Indeed, they openly scorn municipal authorities. One young man claimed hawkers are treated worse than thieves by the state: “It’s not allowed to walk around and sell. If I thieve and eat it’s allowed but if I sell here it’s not”. Others expressed their anger at the state more emotively; to the delight of a group of hawkers in one focus-group discussion, a young male hawker insisted that MCD stands for “mother chod Delhi”.9 In the following section I explore the strategies hawkers have developed to counter this emergent disciplinary regime.

World-class resistance: strategic (in)visibility
The emergence of this new disciplinary regime has engendered new forms of urban politics. Although the state is keen to maintain agency and flexibility when enforcing the law (see Chatterjee 2004; 2011; Randeria 2007; Roy 2009b; Goldman 2011),10 it is increasingly unlikely to declare an exception in order to allow hawkers to operate. Thus, earlier claims-making strategies based on an ethic of poverty alleviation, in which marginalized populations convinced the state to declare an exception and allow them access to space and urban services (see Chatterjee 2004; 2008; 2011) are increasingly ineffective. Instead, street hawkers try to remain invisible to the state on an everyday basis, while they reveal themselves in particular times and places in order to gain proof of their existence, such as official documents. A paper trail proving their occupation can serve as the basis for future legal claims to space, which are increasingly based on jurisprudence. In this section I demonstrate how this strategic (in)visibility is a significant departure from previous strategies employed by the urban poor.

Instead of making claims to space based on their membership in a population, street hawkers seek to remain illegible to the state on a daily basis and, over the course of a year I did not witness an act of overt resistance during a raid. This is because the raids interrupt commerce for approximately one to two hours per week in Jawahar Market, so unless they are caught hawkers’ livelihoods are hardly impacted. Instead of resisting, hawkers maintain access to space by forming complex alliances with more powerful interest groups, such as market traders’ associations, resident welfare associations, local gangs or even the police. Hawkers willingly enter into alliances as the subordinate partner because they require a

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9 This is a vulgar insult, meaning “motherfucking Delhi.”
10 These citations focus on India, while there is of course a large body of literature regarding the “state of exception” (Agamben 1998) in other contexts.
partner who is strong enough to protect them from the state and limit competition. In Jawahar Market hawkers pay between Rs. 100-600 per week to a \textit{pradhan}\footnote{A \textit{pradhan} is a local strongman who also mediates with authorities and other interest groups (see Jha et al. 2007).} (it is unclear who he represents, but it is safe to say that the police receive some money as does the market traders’ association), and in return they often receive advanced warning of raids. Hawkers who cannot meet the terms of this alliance cannot operate in the market, and hawkers who do operate there jealously guard their space from free-riders. This not only explains how hawkers maintain access to space, but it also shows why they are not organized. Agreements take place on a micro-scale and this prohibits the emergence of a feeling of solidarity among hawkers from multiple markets. Indeed, as the incident above demonstrates, many hawkers suspiciously view other hawkers as competition and, there is not a sense among hawkers that they can collectively demand entitlements from the powerful interest groups who control space. Instead, they seek to alter the agreements in their favor (i.e. pay reduced rent, secure more space) in the course of daily interactions. For example, they may plead with the \textit{pradhan} that they cannot pay the full rent one week, or they may try and occupy slightly more pavement space than they are allotted. These daily interactions are unlikely to be incorporated into formal electoral politics, so the gains secured by hawkers are minor and are unlikely to invert power relations, but they are sometimes able to improve working conditions.

Although hawkers are not recognized as a population with legitimate claims to space, some hawkers who have contested evictions have secured favorable judgments in court after proving that they had operated in the space in question for years. Thus, hawkers seek to gather evidence that proves their occupation and where they operate. If hawkers are evicted from space by authorities, they can appeal to the Appellate Authority for Squatters/Vendors for help. Judges have some leeway in deciding whether to grant them relief, and can order municipal authorities to issue them a license or allow them to operate. One judge confirmed that his decision to grant interim relief is based on a paper trail that proves the hawker has operated in that space for some time (personal communication, June 2012). The evaluation of claims to urban space based on practice that has been documented is similar to what Rao (2010: 409) discovered in a resettlement colony on Delhi’s outskirts, where “legality is established not only through the instruments and institutions of the state, but through a whole set of formal and informal dealings that produce paper trails as visible signs of urban membership”. Meanwhile, the authorities tasked with enforcing court orders commonly disobey them, while they try to avoid creating any paper trail on which hawkers could base future claims to space. In one example hawkers were evicted from one bazaar and ultimately relocated to an alternative space and forced to pay Rs. 100 to the MCD. Careful not to issue any type of document that would confer some formal recognition of the hawkers’ legitimate use of public space, the authorities provided a generic receipt of payment. Given the scarcity of such documents, however, many of the hawkers have laminated these generic receipts (see photo 2). Through these practices of “archiving” (Bandyopadhyay 2010) hawkers seek to collect documents with which they can later make legal claims to use space. Authorities attempt to limit this practice by refusing to issue documents even when the tacitly allow
hawkers to operate, or, as in this case, by issuing documents that are so ambiguous that they could not be used to support a legal claim.  

Photo 2: Generic receipt issues by MCD to a hawker which he laminated and saves for the basis of future claims.

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**Conclusion**

12 Bandyopadhyay (2010) shows how the Hawker Sangam Committee in Kolkata has mastered the art of strategic (in)visibility, by meticulously archiving its use of space. Its claims to space are based on the entrepreneurial nature of its members, who are identified as a population, in contrast with pavement dwellers who do not engage in productive labor.
In this article I have shown that India’s unique development trajectory has given rise to a large population of workers in the informal service sector who are unable to sell their labor for a wage in the formal economy and remain ‘out of place’ in the ‘world-class’ city. Municipal authorities now manage the “intrication of men and things” with the objective of transforming territory rather than improving populations. In this context street hawkers are subjected to a disciplinary regime based on dispersion and enforced mobility. This regime organizes their distribution and movement throughout the city, but it departs from familiar Foucauldian disciplinary tactics. Instead of classifying street hawkers as deviant, fixing them in space and acting upon – i.e. ‘improving’ – them, this regime is based on a refusal to recognize. Street hawkers – and ISS workers more broadly – are not considered population groups deserving of entitlements, and they are clearly distinguished from citizens. This preempts street hawkers from making claims on urban space, and they can only remain in the city by remaining strategically (in)visible; on a daily basis they seek to remain invisible to the state, while they make themselves visible in particular times and places in order to secure official recognition of their existence that can serve as the basis for future legal claims to urban space.

This case demonstrates that urban theory based on the histories of 19th and 20th century metropolises is of little value in 21st century metropolises. I have sought to underscore the importance of recognizing the unique development trajectories of 21st century metropolises. This recognition will allow for contemporary urban studies to be broadened and include spaces, subjectivities and phenomenon that are ignored because they are not reflected in EuroAmerica’s urban history. It is of paramount importance to recognize the emergence of new types of spaces (e.g. subaltern urban space (Roy2011)), new subjectivities (e.g. ISS workers), disciplines that differ from those outlined by Foucault, and new modes of resistance (e.g. strategic (in)visibility) that remain by and large unaccounted for in urban studies. Overcoming deeply rooted assumptions regarding universal tendencies of urbanization will only be possible if terms such as neoliberalism (Parnell and Robinson 2012) are discarded in favor of fieldwork-driven empirical analyses that can map new fields of power and identify new actors and modes of governance/resistance.
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