Session 7: New urban centralities: towards a global urban studies

**ABSTRACT**

Cities of the South: Spatial Reconfiguration

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Scholarly research on cities of the global South has largely focused on the disturbing signs of permanent crisis and disorder: slum housing, lack of wage-paid employment, crumbling infrastructure, and weak governance structures. The sprawling megacities of the (so-called) global South can be therefore understood, as Ananya Roy has put it, “as the ‘constitutive outside’ of contemporary urban studies, existing in a relationship of difference with the dominant norm of the ‘global city’.” While the litany of dystopian image-categories – “planet of slums” (Davis), “slumdog cities” (Roy), “invisible cities” (de Boeck) – capture a grain of truth about the grim realities of urbanism in the so-called global South, they also tell only part of the story. Over the past several decades, the steady increase in the number of new master-planned satellite cities have significantly reshaped existing metropolitan landscapes but also reinforced the spatial boundaries separating affluent zones from impoverished wastelands. What makes these recent city-building efforts different from attempts is that they involve constructing entirely new cities out of whole cloth rather than rehabilitating the existing built environment. Unwilling to take up the challenge of refurbishing existing large metropolises, private real estate developers have begun to construct entirely new cities that are built entirely from scratch. Constructing entirely new urban landscapes enables city builders to bypass the messy problems associated with the current state of urbanism in in what is incorrectly called the “developing world”: broken-down infrastructure, crowded streetscapes, lack of land-use zoning and code regulation, traffic gridlock, and street crime. Located on the edge of existing metropolises, these new enclaves promise to deliver up-to-date services, high-quality infrastructure, and safe and secure environments.

To large extent, the ‘instant cities’ of the Persian Gulf (Dubai, Abu Dhabi) and the ‘garrison city’ of Singapore are exemplary expressions of this global trend toward enclave urbanism. Large-scale real estate developers have joined forces with technology giants (Siemens, IBM, and Cisco Systems) to roll out ambitious plans to build master-planned satellite cities from scratch. The aim of this paper is to explore how these city-building projects have contributed to patterns of spatial fragmentation where these new urban enclaves have disconnected from the impoverished metropolitan landscapes that surround them. Three key examples provide the on-the-ground evidence for understanding these new dynamics of disjointed urbanism: Sondo City (Seoul), Tatu City (Nairobi), and Buenos Aires. Hailed as a cutting-edge high-tech, ‘green city, Songdo City (adjacent to the Incheon International Airport 35 miles west of Seoul) is the most ambitious ‘instant city’ since the construction of Brasília 50 years ago. Built on an artificial island in the Yellow Sea, Songdo City is constructed on a scale to rival downtown Boston, only much taller and denser. Promoted as the “first holistic lifestyle city planned in Africa,” Tatu City is a large-scale mega-project located about nine miles north of Nairobi. Advertized as a ‘self-contained’ city that offers an integrated live, work, and play environment, Tatu City is projected to accommodate around 62,000 residents and attract an estimated 23,000 visitors a day when it is completed in 2020. The Tatu City project is only one of a number of large-scale city-building projects the Renaissance Capital (the leading investment bank in Russia and sub-Saharan Africa) has initiated over the past decade. In anticipation of future urban development, Renaissance Partners, the principal investment arm of the Moscow-based Renaissance Group, has either already acquired or has entered into negotiations for the purchase of sizeable plots of farm land on the edges of such capital cities as Luanda, Harare, Lusaka, Kampala, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, and Accra.Operating with the model of the repeatable franchise, Renaissance Capital envisions creating a portfolio of four or five of these new satellite appendages built on the outskirts of existing cities. In Buenos Aires, real estate developers about ten years ago invested in the center of the historic urban core. By adopting a form of private strategic planning which promised to “modernize” partially vacant areas, large-scale property developers transformed a huge zone of the city (consisting of Puerto Nuevo, Catalinas Norte, Puerto Madero, and Costanera Sur, eventually occupying all the land between the initial development in Puerto Madero and the coast. This application of private real estate development on a large scale created a globalized pole, a territorial nucleus for what amounted to a corridor of modernity and wealth: consisting of intelligent buildings, headquarter office complexes s for major national and international firms, five-star hotels, luxury flats and entertainment venues

**Introduction**

Looking at these three ambitious visionary city-building schemes in some details enables us to critically asses the dynamics that have produced the spatially ‘disjointed’, and socially ‘disconnected’ metropolis of the global South.

**Cities on a Grand Scale: The ‘Instant Urbanism’ of the 21st Century**

The modernism of underdevelopment is forced to build on fantasies and dreams of modernity, to nourish itself on an intimacy and a struggle with mirages and ghosts. In order to be true to the life from which it springs, it is forced to be shrill, uncouth and inchoate. It turns in on itself and tortures itself into extravagant attempts to take on itself the whole burden of history. It whips itself into frenzies of self-loathing, and preserves itself only through vast reserves of self-irony. But the bizarre reality from which this modernism grows, and the unbearable pressures under which it moves and lies—social and political pressures as well as spiritual ones—infuse it with a desperate incandescence that Western modernism, so much more at home in the world, can rarely hope to match.[[1]](#footnote-1)

In the 19th and 20th and 20th centuries, “industrialization” and “modernism” significantly defined the development and nature of city life around the world. At the dawn of the 21st century, new concepts like “globalization,” “post-industrial” urbanism, and “tourist-entertainment machines” have become signifiers of the profound shift defining the character of world-class cities and the lives of their inhabitants. At the macro level, this shift is not only about the world-class aspirations of particular cities, but the evolving role of so-called “globalizing cities” within the world economy.[[2]](#footnote-2) The unprecedented scale and scope of city building in the Asia Pacific Rim and the Persian Gulf challenge the conventional image of the modern metropolis – and even the very “idea of the city.”[[3]](#footnote-3) These “instant cities” defy the conventional understanding of urban growth and development as a slow process where creative destruction of the built environment, incremental re-building, and constant erasure and re-inscription eruption produce an ever-evolving urban form.[[4]](#footnote-4) From the outset, it should be clear that these “instant cities” have not followed urban routes or pathways laid down elsewhere and at earlier times.[[5]](#footnote-5) The city-building processes that have produced “instant urbanism” are, in short, not reducible to antecedents in North America and Europe -- or anywhere else for that matter.[[6]](#footnote-6) What defines “instant urbanism” is not linear temporal evolution or incremental gradualism, but spatial transformation that conforms to a *tabula rasa* prototype. Unlike the long processes of gradual, incremental evolution which shaped urban transformation in earlier centuries, “instant cities” are the product of a “super-fast urbanism.’’[[7]](#footnote-7) Planning theorists have no ready-made models or protocols appropriate for dealing with this new type of fast-track urbanism. With no clear hierarchy between center and margin, these “instant cities” confound the modernist expectations of functional specialization, spatial differentiation, and heterogeneous urban form. These new “instant cities” are produced by industrial processes so cherished by modernist city-builders, but they are built with such speed and they are too dynamic to be structured by the modernist principles of order, holism, and coherence. But if modernist city building clearly is not the appropriate approach for making sense of these new urban conditions, then postmodern urbanism has even less to contribute. If postmodern urbanism dispenses with seeking ideal solutions on a grand scale and is associated with the characteristics of small-scale, contextualism, pluralism, playful historicism, “instant cities” replicate the modernist enchantment with the vertical and use sheer size, scale, and monumentality to mimic the modernist quest for an overarching universal utopia, and, in so doing, disconnect the urban realm from history.[[8]](#footnote-8)

As a number of scholars have shown, large-scale, privately–built satellite cities have become an increasingly common urban development concept in India, China, Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere.[[9]](#footnote-9) For the most part, real estate developers – working in rough synchronization with municipal authorities – have followed a similar spatial pattern of surrounding the historic center of existing metropolises with privately-developed and -managed ‘global’ enclaves.[[10]](#footnote-10) What distinguishes these new master-planned satellite cities -- or what Gavin Shatkin has called ‘‘urban integrated mega-projects’’ -- from the conventional understanding of conventional city building and the modern metropolis is that they are privately-financed, holistically designed, and built entirely from scratch.[[11]](#footnote-11) In a departure from past efforts at state-driven master planning and new town development, these new mega-projects are conceived of and constructed as profit-making undertakings, often the brain-child of a single prophetic real estate developer or a consortium of property investors, sometimes in partnership or alliance with municipal or state authorities.[[12]](#footnote-12) These large-scale self-contained, mixed-use urban enclaves represent a new type of city-building that marks a significant break from our conventional understanding city building and the modern metropolis. As large-scale, profit-driven urban enclaves, these new satellite cities “represent a vision for the transformation of the urban experience through the wholesale commodification of the urban fabric.”[[13]](#footnote-13)

What propels “fast-track” urbanism is the wish-image of contemporary global capitalism.[[14]](#footnote-14) The new “instant cities” mimic what Frederic Jameson has called “postmodern hyperspace” -- that stretching of space and time to accommodate the multinational global space of late capitalism: fluid networks of capital, up-to-date telecommunications, undifferentiated airports, hotels, and office parks, and globalized commodities and their logos and franchises.[[15]](#footnote-15) Iconic, excessive, and extravagant are crucial pillars in the entrepreneurial narrative that seeks to assert the coming-of-age of “instant cities” as recognized players in the global marketplace of finance, trade, and tourism. The real estate developers behind this ‘fast-track’ urbanism have adopted a high-modernist agenda for city building -- with its belief in technical prowess, abstract rationality, social engineering, and market efficiency.

The glitzy experimental city of Dubai provides an archetype for this kind of fast-track, overnight city building.[[16]](#footnote-16) Large-scale real estate developers, financiers, and private design firms have come to play an increasingly central and vital role in the core functions of urban planning, particularly in the comprehensive implementation of regulatory regimes designed to govern land use, to oversee building typologies, and to enforce legally-sanctioned codes. This “privatization” of planning has undermined the public administration of urban space and replaced municipal authority with private governance. [[17]](#footnote-17) Equally important, these new mega-projects represent new ways of thinking about city planning and the management of urban space not as the almost-exclusive terrain of public authority but as the private prerogative of real estate developers.

The proliferation of these master-planned, profit-oriented satellite cities represents a new type of urban real estate development where large-scale corporate enterprise has become directly involved in creating urban enclaves that seek to mimic the business-led growth strategies in aspiring world-class cities around the globe. The new urban form of these enclaves rests on the distinctive feature of being globally connected and locally disconnected, both physically and socially. With their free enterprise zones relaxed financial regulation, high-technology and export-oriented production facilities, corporate office complexes, luxury residential accommodation, and upscale leisure and entertainment opportunities, these island-like enclosures are disconnected from their local surroundings, and are instead oriented to the global command and control centers of the world economy.

[[18]](#footnote-18)What distinguishes the uninhibited freedom of “blank slate” city building from conventional practice of incremental layering are the opportunities for architects, design specialists, and urban planners to make decisions with little mediation, empowered to act with impunity. While collaborative and participatory approaches to planning practice regard inclusionary decision-making processes and public participation as an unequivocal benefit, architects often see this process of negotiation as interference with their creative vision and real estate developers rankle at compromise because it threatens to undermine the bottom-line of profitability.[[19]](#footnote-19) Under circumstances where “competitive advantage” has become the new mantra of urban governance, large-scale mega-projects not only offer a built environment geared to the highest global standards of up-to-date infrastructure and sophisticated technology, but also provide “a specific kind of global image that can be marketed in the global market place.”[[20]](#footnote-20)

**Private Lifestyle Cities: the Prescriptive Urbanism of Tatu City (Nairobi)**

**Figure 3:**

**The Master Plan for Tatu City**



In 2008, Renaissance Capital, the banking subsidiary of the Renaissance Group, unveiled ambitious plans to build a $5 billion office, residential, and leisure complex outside of Nairobi in partnership with local real estate investors. The Tatu City project is only one of a number of large-scale city-building projects the Renaissance Capital (the leading investment bank in Russia and sub-Saharan Africa) has initiated over the past decade. In anticipation of future urban development, Renaissance Partners, the principal investment arm of the Moscow-based Renaissance Group, has either already acquired or has entered into negotiations for the purchase of sizeable plots of farm land on the edges of such capital cities as Luanda, Harare, Lusaka, Kampala, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, and Accra. [[21]](#footnote-21) Operating with the model of the repeatable franchise, Renaissance Capital envisions creating a portfolio of four or five of these new satellite appendages built on the outskirts of existing cities. The sheer scale of these mixed-use mega-projects indicates that the Renaissance Group has identified urban Africa as the next frontier for outside real estate investment as economic growth stalls in North America and Europe.[[22]](#footnote-22)

Renaissance Capital has claimed that Tatu City is the first privately developed city in urban Africa. After an initial acquisition of 2,500 acres of land, Renaissance Capital injected an estimated $5 billion into getting the project underway. Along with its local Kenyan investment partners, Renaissance Capital created a separate company, Tatu City Ltd., to oversee the development of a master-plan for the project and to facilitate the installation of requisite bulk infrastructure as a way to jump-start the construction process. At the start, Tatu City Ltd. enlisted the services of London-based Capita Symonds to assist in translating the strategic vision for this new mega-project into reality.[[23]](#footnote-23) Capita Symonds assumed the task of overseeing the entire building program from pre-construction, project and design management, and stakeholder management through to procurement and overall program management in the post-construction phase. As an initial step, Capita Symonds focused specifically on ensuring the installation of all appropriate infrastructure facilities, including power, water (clean and waste) services, roads, gas and IT. Construction is well underway for what will eventually become close to 100 kilometers of new roads, along with a central sewerage and waste disposal, power distribution, solar-powered recycling, and water purification systems.[[24]](#footnote-24)

In line with global trends where satellite cities appended to existing metropolises are built to absorb the growing pressures of rapid urbanization, Tatu City Ltd. hopes to use its up-to-date infrastructure and entrepreneurial approach to urban governance to attract corporate investment in office properties and well-to-do residents interested in a safe and secure environment. In their promotional materials, real estate developers behind Tatu City have hailed this large-scale mega-project as the “first holistic lifestyle city planned in Africa,” and a “trail-blazing enterprise the like of which has never been seen on the African continent.”[[25]](#footnote-25) Property developers have claimed that this new satellite city is the single largest foreign direct investment in Kenya. Constructed on the site of four coffee plantations about nine miles north of Nairobi, the centrally-planned Tatu City project consists of an assemblage of such standardized components as high-rise office blocks, upscale shopping malls, industrial and manufacturing zones, well-manicured homes, parklands and playgrounds, a signature technology park, and a hospital. The life cycle of this mega-project, staggered into ten phases, is expected to take seven to ten years to complete. With the completion of each construction phase, real estate developers will sell individual properties as a way to finance further building. Promoted as a ‘self-contained’ city that offers an integrated live, work, and play environment and serviced with a full complement of world-class infrastructure, Tatu City is projected to accommodate around 62,000 residents and attract an estimated 23,000 visitors a day when it is completed in 2020.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Tatu City is an exemplary expression of the power of harnessing private-sector resources, including financing and skills, to jump-start a city-building project that would otherwise not get off the ground. In both conception and magnitude, and aesthetic appeal and spatial scale, the Tatu City project is comparable to Sandton, the premier business and exclusive high-end shopping destination in the Johannesburg northern suburbs. But unlike Sandton that developed through fits and starts from an upscale residential suburb at the metropolitan fringe into a genuine ‘edge city’ in its own right, Tatu City has come into existence de novo, thereby bypassing the incremental, piecemeal steps that characterize conventional city-building processes. It is a “purely private sector driven plan” -- unencumbered by negotiated compromises with local public authorities and not hemmed in by surrounding residential suburbs --that promise to accomplish in a single leap forward what took place in Sandton over four decades.[[27]](#footnote-27)

The design specialists who drew up the original spatial plans for Tatu City stressed from the outset that the secret to the financial success of a project of this magnitude is the initial outlay of capital to construct the requisite up-to-date bulk infrastructure in order to create a well-serviced urban environment. The large-scale real estate developers behind this privately-managed city-building project have empowered their subsidiary, Tatu City Ltd., to retain an oversight role in order to assure quality control into the foreseeable future. They have made sure that this new “city-within-a-city” is a self-reliant, self-governing, and self-financing precinct where taxes and levies collected within its boundaries reverts back to the on-site management company to cover costs of maintenance, security, and upgrading.[[28]](#footnote-28) Putting full administrative authority in the hands of Tatu City Ltd. has enabled property owners to minimize public oversight and the regulatory role of municipal agencies.

**Songdo as an integrated urban development project**

Take a man-made island, roughly twice the size of Central Park. Fill it with state-of-the-art schools, hospitals, apartments, cultural amenities, and universities. Replicate architectural features from around the world, including Venice's canals and New York's parks. Make English the lingua franca and - presto - you have the world's newest city: it is Korea’s answer to Shanghai and Dubai (…) Financing it with recycled real-estate profits sounds like an act of lunacy. Yet this is what is happening in South Korea, and strangest of all, it appears to be working.[[29]](#footnote-29)

As the third largest metropolitan city in South Korea (after Seoul and Busan) and with 2.7 million inhabitants, Incheon has emerged as a centerpiece an ambitious “business hub” strategy. At first, Incheon emerged in the last decades as a manufacturing hub, attracting people from the countryside and businesses from abroad. The creation of the Incheon Free Economic Zone (IFEZ) – the first of its kind in South Korea -- envisaged a plan to locate Incheon as a global hub for logistics, business, leisure and new “high-tech” clusters.[[30]](#footnote-30) Constructed on land reclaimed from the sea, IFEZ consists of three non-contiguous “new cities”: Songdo, Yeongjong and Cheongna. One of these “new cities”– the new Songdo district – is planned to become a fully fledged global business hub and knowledge location by 2020, with 250 thousand new residents, in an area of 50 km2. Despite the fact that construction only started in 2003, Songdo as a “planned knowledge location” has already developed a reputation in international business studies as a vibrant business center,[[31]](#footnote-31) in real estate finance as an innovative mega-project, and as an exemplar of an environmentally friendly and sustainable city.

The current design and vision for Songdo resulted from an organic process of development, in reality not in the hands of any single developer but a group of actors. At the start, developers looked at Songdo as a housing location, but this vision changed overtime. At present, developers envision Songdo as a functionally integrated functional business and knowledge location. IFEZ aims to become what has been termed a “new-generation free economic zone”, going beyond the more conventional manufacturing and office functions that characterize earlier variant of “free trade zones.” The mega-project consists of a comprehensive functional mixture in its dense and compact precincts, integrating housing, working and leisure activities, in addition to many social amenities like parks, concert halls, hospitals, schools, and the like.

IFEZ is the first development of its kind in Korea. It close physical proximity to Seoul and to the international airport makes Incheon a “natural” location for this type of mixed-use mega-development. In its comprehensive plan, the IFEZ envisions a polynucleated and non-contiguous new urban area (with a total of 209 kKm2). The overall spatial configuration requires the planning of three different yet complementary “new cities”, with distinct functions and ambitions. The business and residential components for the IFEZ are straightforward. The aim is to attract tertiary advanced functions, high-tech and science-based industries along with the requisite white collar “knowledge workers.” Songdo already attracted a very significant number of both global and national companies. In particular, the targeted clusters of “high-tech” and “bio-pharma/medical device” specialties have already attracted a substantial number of well-known global corporations, in addition to companies in the fields of “digital content” and “alternative energy.” The IFEZ has retained a rather open admission criteria consisting of a broad range of “high-tech” and “knowledge intensive” businesses.[[32]](#footnote-32)

Located on the periphery of Seoul, Songdo represents what might be called an “edge city to an edge city.” However, physically, there are important differences between the traditional American edge city and the planned Songdo district. While edge cities in postwar United States typically emerged more or less spontaneously and without a great deal of foresight, Songdo was carefully planned as a holistic, inter-connected assemblage of precincts. The overall spatial design of Songdo is clearly inspired by western reference models, but it contains a number of hybrid features which blend with the local Asian-Korean context. As a spatial product with a holistic design, Songdo assimilates the state-of-the-art in physical urban planning. Contrary to the dominant model that defines the mono-functional, office-based character of edge cities, the design specialists that envision Songdo plan to generate a project that excels in multi-functionality that aspires to the mantra of “life, work, and play.” Songdo combines residential housing that span income levels and densely-packed, high-rise office space in conjunction with plenty of leisure areas. The core of Songdo unfolds around an Central Business District, consisting of high density, high-rise office blocks where every functional specialty should be accessible within a 5 minute drive. Built on the model of a compact city and the principle of “smart growth” Songdo represented a cutting edge, “new-generation edge city”. The core feature of the whole concept consists of landmark architecture and aesthetically-pleasing, “beautiful” buildings. There are a large variety of planned amenities like golf courses, a flashy concert hall (inspired in the Opera of Sydney), urban parks (inspired in part by reference to New York’s Central Park) which blend classical features with references to Korean landscapes), and water canals (modeled after Venice. On balance, planners have conceived of Songdo as a highly integrated, multifunctional, and spatially variegated city. Its designers and planners have payed close attention to international best practices and have adopted these to the local Asian-Korean context.[[33]](#footnote-33)

**Privatized Urbanism and Fragmented City: Buenos Aires**

Over the past three decades under the influence of liberalization and globalization, Buenos Aires has experienced the expansion private entrepreneurial activities alongside the increased inequalities.[[34]](#footnote-34) The privatization of state regulation has taken place not only in the provision of urban services but also in matters relating to territorial expansion. These processes, together with the growing political fragmentation of the city-region, have given shape to new forms of metropolitan governance.[[35]](#footnote-35) Over the past three or four decades, metropolitan expansion has largely taken place in the virtual absence of public guidelines and public oversight. There are two parallel processes at work that overlap and intersection to produce a hybrid mixture of privatized planning combined with public retreat. One process consists of market transactions, planned and oriented to the upper-middle and high-income urban residents. The steady growth in the number of private enclaves has shaped the urban landscape in ways that have led to increased fragmentation, spatial unevenness, and segregated inequalities. The logic of the market provides the leading platform for the private production and operation of the city. The incapacity of local governments to meet the demands of the upper-middle and higher-income groups has reinforced the process of fragmentation and segregation. Starting about a decade ago, a specially created private company called Viejo Puerto Madero Corporation – to which the municipality transferred ownership of the land -- took responsibility for the regeneration of the Puerto Madero docklands area in the metropolitan center. The company decided to invest in the historic downtown core of the city center on land surrounding Puerto Madero. The driving force behind this decision was a kind of private strategic planning which sought to “modernize” partially vacant areas in the name of economic revitalization. A number of private initiatives were cobbled together, thereby fundamentally transforming a considerable part of the urban landscape. This newly refurbished zone consisted of Puerto Nuevo,Catalinas Norte, Puerto Madero, and Costanera Sur. As a result, private real estate developers have developed the land between the initial development in Puerto Madero and the coast. This cluster of mega-projects created a globalized pole, a territorial nucleus for what might be called a “corridor of modernity and wealth”: “smart growth” office blocks, headquarter buildings for major national and international firms, five-star hotels, luxury apartments and condominiums, and entertainment venues. This kind of spatial planning was the result of the application of private real estate operations on a large scale in which the state authorities and city officials participated in the restricted capacity as enabling agent.[[36]](#footnote-36) Outside the downtown city center and moving towards the metropolitan periphery, the process of suburbanization has shown a predominance of private planning. Patterns of land use and infrastructure supply reinforce the territorial and social fragmentation of the city because services close to the center are adequate while those on the periphery (where low-income residents live) are poor.[[37]](#footnote-37)

This subordination of urban spatial production to private real estate interests has taken place because of the lack of state regulation. The processes of physical expansion lie beyond the control of local authorities. Metropolitan guidelines and general frameworks for land use are virtually non-existent. This lack of oversight in much of the metropolitan area has opened up opportunities for real estate operations seeking private economic gain. Real estate developers have resorted to the principles and models of urban planning, no longer as operational tools to serve the public interest, but as a means to produce and shape the built environment in ways that have satisfied particular private needs. The urban landscape has thus become the socially constructed product of a market “rationalization” of individual operations, buttressed by a privatized “notion of planning of all the stages of each development, with the aims of enhancing

the quality of the final product (the development) and increasing profit margins.”[[38]](#footnote-38) This new approach to city-building, based on the prevailing logic of private project planning, obeys only the laws of the capitalist marketplace. The overall shape of the urban built environment has increasingly come to resemble the sum of the accumulation of private real estate developments and their interstices.[[39]](#footnote-39)

The construction of urban enclaves catering for the affluent in Buenos Aires reveals three features of city building in the contemporary era. The first feature is that these urban enclaves resemble cities-within-the-city in that they bring together a full range of urban amenities from office complexes, to residential accommodation, to leisure and entertainment venues. Yet these holistic projects hide the fact that their existence is only possible within the city that provides them with the means of tapping into services and infrastructure. A reliable supply of high-quality services and infrastructure for those who live there means that it is almost unnecessary for residents to leave the confines of the sequestered redoubts, except possibly for work or leisure. The second feature is that the type of isolated, privatized planning that underpins the production of urban enclaves leaves the rest of the city in a sort of limbo, virtually unaffected and untouched by metropolitan-wide planning policy decisions. A distinctive kind of “private governance” has taken shape in these enclaves where the administration of post-public space has fallen into private hands. In this way, the city has come to reflect the logic of the global marketplace: “messy competition outside and heavy rational planning inside.”[[40]](#footnote-40) This state of affairs has reinforced social segregation and social inequalities not as a consequence of deliberate policies but in result of market competition. Third, the urban chaos which results from the private production of fragmented space has reinforced the marginalization and social exclusion of the urban poor. The imposition of strict urban zoning bylaws, land use standards, and building guidelines has created a strict demarcation between affluent zones and the surrounding cityscape.[[41]](#footnote-41) Scholarly writing on Buenos Aires reveals how the shifting modes of municipal governance have converted existing public space into a sort of visual spectacle, an ethereal space that provides the illusion of genuine social mixing masking the reality of the space itself as accessible to only a privileged few.[[42]](#footnote-42)

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