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Contentious Urban Governance: The case of Berlin’s creative industries
Janet Merkel, Hertie School of Governance Berlin
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Abstract
In my paper, I want to address a particular empirical case that highlights the mutual relationship of urban politics and its antagonistic potential from a micro-sociological perspective on a concrete urban policy situation: the governance efforts for creative industries development in Berlin's economic senate. What makes this case interesting is that these new political actors were literally invented by urban politics since there was no collective actor 'creative industries' to address in the first place and the partners to govern with needed to be constituted by the economic senate. Thus, these governance efforts opened up a field of socio-political interaction that has not existed before. And ultimately, had a catalytic function for political self-organisation and empowerment within and across the creative sectors. By taking part in these governance efforts, creative industries actors developed collective forms of identification and eventually, began to publicly contest Berlin’s urban politics through public claim-making and thus, finally made ‘creativity’ a truly political matter in the city. Contentions and conflicts mainly emerged from the different meanings that were attached to these industries for Berlin's growth, the right political instruments and strategies to support them, and overall Berlin’s inconsistent politics towards supporting cultures contribution to urban development. My paper draws on two case studies of governance arrangements I conducted for my PhD research on the urban governance of creative industries in Berlin (2007-2011). The aim of the paper is to show the emergence of this mutual relationship and to present outcomes in terms of local policy transformations. A particular focus will be on how and why these actors turned the political rhetoric of ‘Being a Creative City’ into a political opportunity structure and use it to influence Berlin’s urban politics.

1 Introduction
In the last decade, creativity had been viewed as the new key resource of urban development. Policy-makers and urban scholars worldwide indulged in a ‘new urban growth ideology’ that had creativity at its core. This is evidenced by a multitude of
concepts, such as the ‘creative city’ (Landry and Bianchini, 1995), ‘creative economy’ (Howkins, 2001), ‘creative industries’ (Caves, 2000) and ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2004), which are restructuring the current research discourse in relation to urban development and whose ‘policy formulas’ had been readily adopted by urban governments throughout the world (Peck, 2011a). Nevertheless, there’s hardly any research on the urban governance of creative industries and how the creative city idea has translated into new governance processes. Thus, the objective of this paper is to introduce an empirical-descriptive analysis of two governance arrangements between creative industries stakeholders and public bodies in Berlin. These unfolding governance arrangements share objectively several productive features for success and policy innovation in that particular policy field: they combine a diversity of new actors and stakeholders in open and inclusive designs, exhibit passion and endurance of key actors, display a common interest and are matched by supportive, new strategic objectives from the two urban governments. Nevertheless, they also miss several features: a common frame of reference for defining a problem and for integrating disparate knowledge between all stakeholders, no prior cooperation experiences, hardly any financial resources, and eventually, a rather opportunistic and week commitment by urban governments. By bringing together urban governance and social movement research, the paper argues, that these governance processes functioned as a mobilization structure that led to a strong self-organization of creative industries sectors and provoked contentious politics that ultimately culminates in the question of who develops the city and whose responsible for Berlin’s creativity?

2 Urban governance of creative industries as a research field

While there’s an abundance of research on creative industries development in inner-city areas (Hutton, 2008), the global discourse on creative cities (Peck, 2005), creative city-branding (Hospers and Pen, 2008), creative industries support strategies on the urban and national level (Evans, 2009), or the distinctive features of cultural and immaterial work (Gill and Pratt, 2008) and the cultural production system (Caves, 2000), there’s hardly any empirical research on the political dimension of the ‘creative city’ or more concretely, on the urban governance of creativity and creative industries. A possible
explanation could be that creative industries as a policy field are new to urban governments and until recently, there’s been only little political interference on the urban level. Creative industries relied on regulatory frameworks, protectionism and lobbying on the national level, especially concerning copyright and cultural goods protection (Costa et al., 2008). Besides, historically, creative industries sectors showed a „relatively high degree of socio-political autonomy“ (Kooiman and Vliet, 2000). With the risen political interest in urban creativity, creative industries suddenly took center stage in urban revitalization and development strategies. As part of the knowledge-intensive economies, they were seen as crucial in restructuring urban economies in the ‘post-industrial city’ (Scott, 2008). These sectors are identified as a major source of creativity and innovation, which influences not only the development of the creative industries themselves but other economic sectors too, whether through knowledge spillovers, direct cooperation or in their demand of specialized manufacturing. In addition these industries are said to be relevant for the overall cultural development of cities (Andersson et al., 2011). And indeed, creative industries showed tremendous growth rates within the last decade, which is mainly explained by the rise of information and communication technology (ICT) and a stronger aestheticisation of consumer demands (Lash and Urry, 1994). Overall, these sectors have a strong affinity to inner-city locations where they form clusters, enable the emergence of creative milieus and have strong transformative effects on the urban environment.

To date, the discussion about creative industries, creative cities, and urban creativity is mainly driven by city governments and in the research literature until now, there’s only little evidence for governance arrangements between creative industries actors and urban administration and politics (Grodach, 2011; Peck, 2011b; Indergaard, 2009; Ponzini and Rossi, 2010). Therefore, a central research question was when I began my PhD research in 2008, whether there is actually a new socio-political field emerging or not. In line with urban governance (Cars et al., 2002) and social movement (McAdam et al., 1996) literature, one of the main assumptions was that the discussion about creative industries could provide a “window of opportunity” (Tarrow, 1996) for cultural sectors and creative industries groups that might alter existing institutional arrangements, help new institutional forms of governance to emerge an new problem solutions. Particularly, Patsy Healey (2004) pointed out that some governance modi have the
potential to unfold creative processes: „Governance processes may be ‘creative’ in a double sense. In one sense, new governance capacities can be developed, whether through struggle, learning or evolution. In a second sense, some ways of doing governance have better potential than others to foster the innovatory, creative modes sought by the advocates of economic and cultural creativity.“ (2004: 87). Consequently, in the last decade emerged a literature that regards governance networks as “collaborative governance” (Newman et al., 2004) or “creative spaces” (Lowndes, 2005), mostly under a neo-institutionalist framework (Lowndes, 2001). Behind these cooperative governance forms lies not only the assumption of resource interdependence but the idea of a “collaborative advantage” (Huxham and Vangen, 2000) that could breed more innovative governance forms.

For the research project, I was concerned with micro behaviours and the actual doing of governance (who is doing what, why, and in what form with whom? How do they perceive their interactions and relations with each other?). The particular focus was on creative industries representatives, but on public stakeholders too. The term governance arrangement refers here to concrete constellation of public and private actors that purposefully meet to stimulate local economic development within these sectors. This definition is oriented on what Jan Kooimann has defined as socio-political governance: “All those interactive arrangements in which public bodies as well as private actors participate aimed at solving societal problems, or creating societal opportunities, and attending to the institutions within which these governing activities take place.” (1999: 70). Furthermore, I was only interested in a particular mode of governance: co-governance, which means horizontal relations between stakeholder as in networks, public-private partnerships or co-management schemes. For my research questions a case study approach seemed useful, since it focuses on context-dependent knowledge and constitutes an in-depth-approach towards information gathering with multiple methods for data collection such as expert interviews, observations and document analysis that were used. Furthermore, a case study approach is sensitive to complexity and historical specificity and suitable for problems where context and phenomena are deeply intertwined (Yin, 1994). Berlin and London were chosen as case studies because both cities exhibited strong creative industries agendas as early as 2004, both had a significant creative industries base and thus, could provide information-rich cases.
More than 70 interviews were conducted in both cities, lasting 45 to 120 minutes, with directors and officials from municipal and quasi-public agencies, state agencies, non-profit-organisations, researchers and consultants who had been involved in authoring creative industries reports and of course with creatives who had been engaged in these governance arrangements. Documentary sources included creative industries reports and strategies (local, urban, national), self-descriptions and newspaper articles. Observations helped to develop context-sensitivity, especially in the London cases where governance arrangements have a strong spatial focus on single neighbourhoods or boroughs. I took part in at least 50 formal and informal meetings (whether evening discussion, roundtable meetings, networking events, conferences or industrial hearings) between urban government representatives and creative industries. Especially, informal meetings and discussion rounds gave me the opportunity to collect arguments besides the concrete governance arrangements and to get in contact with a greater diversity of opinions. These meetings introduced me to the whole scope of discussion from “we are artists, leave us alone and do not threaten our autonomy” towards “urban governments are obliged to acknowledge our contribution towards social inclusiveness, cultural vibrancy and economic growth”.

The following paragraphs will sketch two governance arrangements from Berlin and why these governance efforts turned into mobilization structures for widespread contention in the cultural sector, but general problems for an urban governance of creative industries will be addressed first.

3 Urban Governance of Creative Industries as a Wicked Problem

From a governance perspective creative industries support and especially the promotion of creativity constitute a ‘wicked problem’. Following the seminal article of Rittel and Webber (1973) about societal problems as ill-defined, Weber and Khademian (2008b), define a wicked problem as unstructured, cross-cutting and relentless, which means the actual problem is difficult to define, has vertical and horizontal cross-cutting dimensions, is closely connected with other problems and cannot be solved once and for all. One particular feature is that cause and effect cannot be determined unambiguously. I will put forward four specific challenges to support this claim. Consequently, it’s not
only the novelty of this particular policy field, but also its complex nature that calls for new forms of governance.

3.1 Heterogenous stakeholders

The term creative industries is a policy-driven ‘invention’ that covers a diverse range of economic sectors that are in cultural production (Pratt, 2005; Pratt and Hutton, 2012). It became a category in economic policy that creative industries sectors mostly ignored, not respond to, sometimes even dismissed, and only occasionally used in an opportunistic manner (e.g. for funding purposes or for turning the creativity discourse of urban governments in controversial planning projects against the city). It was not part of the self-image or the identity of these economic sectors. They rather position themselves along different lines of distinction within their respective art worlds (Becker, 2008) or creative fields (Bourdieu, 1983). In short, creative industry makes a ‘fuzzy’ concept not met by its targeted audience. Some of the interviewees even referred to big companies as creative industries. For them, ‘corporate creatives’ constitute creative industries, self-employed creatives are regarded as artist and thus not as part of creative industries. Additionally, there was a widespread confusion with the established term ‘cultural industries’, which has been part of cultural politics for a long time (Pratt, 2005). Particularly cultural institutions felt threatened by the new economic lens behind the creative industries concept since it could undercut not only their funding but rationales and justifications for cultural policy in general. Market-failure and cost decrease have been two important rationales for public support for cultural production (Frey, 1999) that have now become pressurized, as the efforts for proofing the social, cultural and economic value of the arts already shown in UK (Belfiore and Bennett, 2007). Thus the label ‘creative industries’ is not only masking the diversity and heterogeneity inside these individual sectors as well as between these sectors, but also bringing forward serious struggles in institutional arrangements between cultural and economic policy. This provides in turn a highly controversial and even adversarial environment for governance efforts and divergent vantage points for a shared problem definition (Potts and Cunningham, 2008).
3.1 Cross-sectorality
Creative industries as a policy field sits uncomfortably between different political resorts: culture and economic, but also planning and education. It needs cooperative arrangements and the reciprocal exchange of ideas and actions between these different departments – a ‘joined-up’ approach – otherwise it will be pounded between the responsibilities of different administrative and political institutions. Furthermore, cultural departments used to have responsibilities for the high art, the non-profit art sector but also for supporting cultural industries. For example in the 1980’s Berlin already had a commissioner for rock music who oversaw a fund that was created in order to support music production with local bands, to finance gigs and for the organisation of competitions and the senate even had its own record studio (Zöllner, 1994). Then, there’s a long tradition of supporting media content production, such as movies, screenplays or animated cartoons. Almost every federal state in Germany has its own film production fund, whereby Berlin has one of the largest (see http://www.medienboard.de/). Ultimately, there do already exists support structures for these sectors, which have been turned over since the creative industries agenda focus more on economic development of cultural activities. To overcome this fractured political responsibilities seems to be the greatest challenge, because it does not only mean getting the different departments to talk but also to change ‘how things are done’ within the different departments. Especially between the cultural and economic department there are different logics of support for cultural production (aesthetic-artistic/societal value vs. economic value).

3.2 Coordination with microenterprises
Creative industries differ significantly from other economic sectors (Caves 2000). They are mainly small sized firms (80% of all businesses have less than 5 employees, see (SenWTF, 2008)) and have a high share of self-employed people or freelancer, which makes it difficult to coordinate them and even to know how many there are, which is important to justify and to set up targeted policies. A high share of these businesses is officially ‘invisible’ because they work below the VAT lines and hence, are not measured statistically. In addition, only a few of these sectors have institutionalised forms of collective representations. If so, most of these professional organisation work
nationally and focus more inwards than outwards which means they care for quality of work and set collective standards in prices but do not lobby for working conditions or market regulation. Let alone, there is not any interest group for creative industries. In turn, this means that urban governments primarily deal with individuals. Thus, questions of representation and legitimacy (on what basis do they claim to speak for others?) arise when these individuals are appointed into steering committees. In that characteristic, creative industries resemble problems in deliberative processes or more concrete in the question “how to enable citizens to voice their interests, experiences and identities in the deliberative process” (Newman et al., 2004: 205). But it too raises a more practical question for urban governments: How to constitute partners from creative industries sectors to govern with? Understanding power as socially produced is a key characteristic of governance theory. As Clarence Stone (1993) explained, the main challenges is, how the different actors gain the capacity to act together or the ‘power to’?

### 3.3 Uncertainty

The notion of uncertainty refers here to different characteristics of creative industries and the lack of knowledge by urban governments. On of the central features of cultural goods is the ‘nobody knows’ property (Caves, 2000) which means that consumer choices are not predictable at all. Coping mechanism in these sectors are overproduction and gatekeeper selection (Hirsch, 1972). So there’s a high degree of uncertainty about which good will be economically successful. In contrast, urban governments only do know little about the complex organisation of these sectors, their interdependencies, and embedding in urban environments, what stimulates growth or what these sectors relation to the local cultural infrastructure is. As mentioned earlier, even gathering data is a huge problem because of inconsistencies in the statistical definitions for these sectors (GLA, 2004).

Whether to nourish creativity in general or to support creative industries in specific, both are ill-defined “problems” where cause and effect cannot be determined. And both require innovative policies and governance solutions since there are many stakeholders, that have to be included and the sharing of knowledge across boundaries of departments
and organisations has to be facilitated. Following these four characteristics, there were several assumptions that led to an exploratory study in my PhD research. First, if cities want to support creative industries they have to turn to these sectors within the city because creative professionals and businesses control valuable resources for appropriate policy-making. The most important resource is knowledge, such as knowledge about the sector, its local composition and embedding, and relations to other creative sectors or the urban economy. In contrast land use and funding schemes could be incentives for creative professionals to engage in negotiations with city governments. Due to the dynamic, complex, and heterogeneous nature of creative industries, the small-sized character of creative businesses and the lack of organized interest in creative industries sectors the governance of creative industries needs new governance forms that match the institutional environment in which they are to have effect. Moreover, there is likely variation in governance arrangements in different cities because of creative industries sector composition and the institutional and urban development context. That’s why I have chosen an embedded multi-case study as a research design with Berlin and London as my cases. Though in this paper, I concentrate on two embedded cases in Berlin.

4 Urban Governance of creative industries in Berlin

4.1 Co-Steering: Steering group creative industries economic senate Berlin

Following Berlin’s first cultural and creative industries report in 2005, based on the joint initiative of the cultural and economic senate, a steering committee at Berlin’s economic senate department was created in 2007 to steer new policies and to devise new instruments for creative industries development. Individuals or representatives from interest groups or networks from all eleven creative industries sectors had been invited and appointed by the economic senate into this committee for two years. In general, there are two representatives from every sector, but there can be more as in the case of music where one person represents the independent music labels, one major labels and a third the newly founded network of clubs and music halls owner, Music Commission, whose creation was financially supported by the economic senate. In order to address the cross-sectoral nature of creative industries development, representatives from the planning and the cultural department as well as other public bodies for
economic development are also present. This adds up to quarterly meetings of between 30 and 60 people. The agendas for meetings are set by the economic senate who also chairs these meetings. Since, there is no budget and no plan for the committee to oversee, the overall function is not steering, but talking. However, talking across public departments and between administration and creative industries people means orchestrating different languages and poses a challenge, especially, since there’s no shared vision among participants that could act as a communication bridge. Interviewee mentioned several times that important decisions regarding creative industries concern have not been discussed within the committee but instead have been presented as final decisions. Even the cancellation of the prestigious Art Forum in 2011 had not been discussed before with the representatives of the art sector. Hence, most of the creative industries participants expressed frustration that their cultural and economic contribution to the city and above all their knowledge are not taken seriously and thus doubt any real interest from the city government. There were many more incidents that cannot be presented here, but that support these claims and that ultimately call into question the actual intentions and interests from the economic senate and the government.

Astonishingly, most of the interviewees framed their participation as civic engagement for the city and not as the representation of economic interest for their respective creative industries sector or their own business. The reason they gave was pretty simple: from an economic point of view this cooperation makes no sense. It’s too demanding, time consuming, ambiguous and not rewarding. Still, they see this opportunity as important to deploy their vision for the city. In their opinion, culture is seen as the main asset of the city and the urban government is not acting accordingly. Especially land use and property sales in inner-city areas are regarded as the most counterproductive political decisions for stimulating cultural production and hence, need to be changed. So, they use this chance in the steering committee to acquire ‘institutional knowledge’ (Heinelt, 2009) about formal and informal rules in politics and administration in order to find ways to influence decision-making processes in the future.

4.2 Co-Production: Berlin Music Week

In 2009, Berlin’s music sector was in danger of a serious setback when the organizers of the Popkomm (the world’s 3rd largest music fair and congress) announced on short
notice that the annual fair will not take place because of the credit crunch and in order to protest against absent government regulation for copyright fraud in the internet. The fair brings more than 14,000 music executives into the city and showcases Berlin not only as a place of music consumption (with its famous clubs for electronic music) but also a place of music production. In less than a day several actors from Berlin’s music scene agreed to set up their own ‘un-conference’ and coordinated an alternative music fair, since most club owners have been planning the accompanying music and club festival anyway. Inspired by this self-organisation capacity, the economic senate declared a Berlin Music Week for 2010 – a weeklong image campaign for Berlin’s music industry that should comprise the Popkomm, the un-conference, workshops, a music festival and club nights.\textsuperscript{ii} A public body from the cultural department was appointed as the central organizer while budget control went to the Popkomm organizers, a public owned company – a decision, which most actors interpreted as a sign of “mistrust”. There were bi-weekly meetings of all participants that lead quickly to an overload and a fatigue with participants. Moreover, meetings brought to the surface latent points of divergence and became arenas for ‘proxy wars’ between conflicting club owners, indie and major labels and with the newly founded Berlin Music commission (that claims to have ‘invented’ the concept of the music week), who was regarded as a direct intervention from the economic senate and hence, as a representative of the senate and not as a legitimate voice for the music industry in the city. During the second year, these overall meetings have been cancelled and the organisation became more hierarchically coordinated with only a few strategic meetings to avoid more internal conflicts to emerge. While the Music week happened thrice, one could interpret this form of co-production as a success. But most of the interviewee agreed that a huge chance in value creation for the music sector has been missed out through strict public guidelines and the contradictory agendas of different public bodies involved. But, despite their frustration, they explained their engagement with a familiar argument from game theory: the shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1984). Taking part in this cooperation meant to advise oneself for future cooperation. This explanation points towards a strategic behaviour in trust building on the part of music sector participants.
4.3 Boundaries, obstacles and failures in these governance efforts

While these two cases display great differences in purpose and structure, they share some common features: Both governance efforts had been initiated through public actors and participants from creative industries were invited to take part. They aimed at creating opportunities for creative businesses on the urban level and therefore have been open and inclusive in design. Thereby the purpose of creative industries participation was not just consulting but co-governance and co-production. However, there was only little perception of interdependence among the stakeholders and these arrangements resembled voluntarily experiments rather than purposeful governance efforts in managing or solving concrete problems. Yet, there was something specific about them: For economic governance these arrangements reached a tremendous breadth of stakeholders, since economic governance is mostly connected with tight-knit long term regimes, bargaining networks or corporatism (Gissendanner, 2004). In fact, these governance arrangements sit between governance forms that can be found in economic governance and in participatory urban planning projects. Drawing on a wealth of literature on single case studies in urban governance and on collaborative governance efforts (Huxham and Vangen, 2000; Ansell and Gash, 2008; Weber and Khademian, 2008a; Cars et al., 2002), the next section sketches out the barriers that prevent these stakeholders from collaborative processes and ultimately, in coming up with new ideas for this emerging policy field. Furthermore, this barriers and the growing discontent of creative industries actors led to serious contention around the urban governance of creative industries in the city.

Lack of trust:

Both governance arrangements included stakeholders with no prior cooperation experience. Thus, building up trust between them, should have been a high priority (Ansell and Gash, 2008). In fact, public stakeholders expressed ambivalent and sceptical opinions about the governance capacity of creative industries participants in terms of engagement, reliability and trust. These governance arrangements were rather seen as experiments not as partnerships or collaborative efforts. In contrast, creative industries stakeholders often expressed the wish to be taken seriously but did not know how to achieve this. Especially, their regular way of doing things seem to prevent from a reciprocal two way communication and indeed, these governance arrangements rather
reinforced ‘stereotypes’ (such as creatives as project oriented, quick with decisions and without long term commitment, in contrast, public bodies were seen as tardy and conservative) than overcoming them. Furthermore, there were severe problems of representation. While governments did not want independent organisations to oversee their creative industries agendas, sectors preferred cluster manager that are trusted in the industries and not administrative persons.

*No shared understanding of mutual interdependencies:*

While public stakeholders often acknowledged the valuable knowledge of creative industries participants, there was no real perception of interdependencies among the stakeholders. In interviews public representatives mainly spoke about doing something *for* creative industries but not *with*. As in the case of the steering committee they did not even inform the participants about important political decisions concerning their sectors. In contrast, most creative industries stakeholder had clear assumptions about mutual interdependencies. But due their frustration, the feeling of powerlessness and a lack of self-confidence, they were shy about expressing them.

*No joined problem definition or shared vision:*

Among the participants, there was no common purpose or vision nor a shared understanding of what the collaboration is aiming to achieve. While there was some ‘social learning’ through interaction, which means that public and private actors have learned a bit about the actions that are needed to address creative industries support, there was no common knowledge production. The reason was that they did not define a common problem around which knowledge exchange and mutual knowledge production could have taken place. Interviewees presented highly divergent assumptions about the purpose of these governance arrangements. For example, creative industries participants were mostly interested in an integrated development approach of the city rather than in economic policy issues alone. However, as Rittel und Webber explained “The formulation of a wicked problem is the problem!” (1973).

*Power imbalances*

While power imbalances are a commonly noted problem between stakeholders in co-governance efforts (Ansell and Gash, 2008), they are hardly mentioned in urban governance analysis because of the so called “problem solving bias” (Mayntz, 2009;
Offe, 2008). Among participants from creative industries there was a widespread dissatisfaction with their involvement in these governance arrangements. They did not feel recognized as valuable, trustworthy, and experienced partners for the public bodies. There was not only a lack of trust but they also felt weak on resources and voice. Another imbalance occurred between different departments and public agencies. Astonishingly, cultural departments did not feel responsible for creative industries agendas and thus, did not claim their stake in the governance arrangements or appeared in the public urban debates around creative industries. Even though they were the most experienced public body with the cultural industries, they had only little resources to challenge the economic department. While they did take part in the steering committee, they only played a minor role. Furthermore, creative industries participants often complained that they did not know about the status and legitimacy of these co-governance forms within the particular urban government framework.

**Lack of commitment from urban governments and no supportive policy framework**

During the research, it became very clear, that these governance efforts are difficult to sustain in the absence of supportive policy frameworks and a long-term strategy behind. Commitments from the mayor or public bodies were rather weak – a stark contrast to the public picture that was disseminated with the creative industries reports, festivals and the euphoric political rhetoric about ‘Berlin as being a Creative City’. Furthermore, this lack of commitment from the city governments undermined incentives for long-term cooperation with creative industries sectors and pushed them towards stronger self-organization and to collaborate with other private partners. Even though these governance arrangements present novel attempts to construct collaborative forms of governance for creative industries sectors in Berlin, they miss several features to induce qualitative change in creative industries support: a common frame of reference for defining the problem and for integrating disparate knowledge between all stakeholders, no trust, hardly any financial resources, and eventually, a rather opportunistic and weak commitment by urban governments. A conclusion that Jamie Peck noted in his findings about Amsterdam’s creativity policy too: “Creativity discourses as they touched down in Amsterdam, seemed to carried with them the allure of apparently governing in fundamentally new ways, with new stakeholders and new strategic objectives… while at the same time changing very little” (Peck, 2011b: 11). Peck characterizes
Amsterdam’s approach as a “do nothing” policy and as a mere “repackaging local policies under the sign of creativity” that were nothing more than the “makeover of the discursive representation” of existing policies (Peck, 2011b: 11). However, taking part in these governance arrangements led to the self-empowerment of creative industries participants.

5 Unintended Outcomes and Contentious Urban Governance

Since the purpose of these governance arrangements was more on consensus building and problem definition, the forms of self-organisation and self-governance described in the cases can be regarded as unintended outcomes of these governance efforts. Social movement theorist would describe these new governance spaces as a ‘political opportunity structure’ (Tarrow, 1996) whereby new actors can use new opportunities to alter existing institutional arrangements, bring in new ideas and challenge established practices. Creative cities agendas and the accompanying discourse on creative industries support has facilitated these new opportunities for creative industries stakeholders. Ever since, self-organized alliances and network based patterns of coordination within but also across creative sectors emerged in Berlin. More and more, coalition building takes place inside these sectors, concerted public claims are made and concrete political strategies are formulated which make use of the already acquired institutional knowledge and which expose the city’s symbolic commitment to it’s cultural creativity. So far, the music sector has developed the strongest voice and successfully negotiated a discrete music board with 1 Million EUR of annual funding to oversee and its own advisory board with representatives from administration and the music sector (see http://www.berlin.de/musicboard/). Whether this recent development of individual sectors claim making denotes the ‘fragmentation of the creative industries concept’ or if it’s just the expression of a lack of an overall institutional structure for creative industries interests remains an open question, since the processes described here occurred within the last two years. But, as Patsy Healey ascertained “the timescale of real governance transformation is that of a generation and more” (2004: 99). However, it can be concluded that the expansion of spaces for creative industries participation in governance has facilitated the creation of new political actors and political subjectivities. Both governance arrangements can be described as an effort to
institutionalize creative industries and can critically be regarded as „institutionally enabling the disciplining of cultural actors“ (Ponzini and Rossi, 2010: 1053). But more importantly, they have become a breeding ground for contentious politics. Instead of providing a political opportunity structure they turned into a mobilization structure for contention, the making of claims in episodes of public collective struggle, in the cultural sector. For example, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) define contentious politics as: „episodic, public, collective interaction among maker of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (McAdam et al., 2001: 5). Several strategies or “repertoires of contention” (Tilly, 2008) that actors from the arts and creative industries used to make their public claims against the government can be distinguished for the Berlin case. Coalition building and mobilizing support within and across creative industries sectors has been widely taken place. In 2011 the Independent Scene Coalition was founded by more than 60 representatives from the performing arts scene, such as independent theaters or dance companies, and proposed a new cultural policy framework. And as of May 2013, the coalition plans extensive artistic interventions in the city with the campaign „bye bye berlin?“ to „bring into visibility how deeply the Independent Scene matters for Berlin.“ (http://www.berlinvisit.org/). Another cross-sectoral network that was created is the Initiative for Rethinking the City (Initiative Stadt Neudenken) – a group of architects, urban planners, business owners and cultural professionals – who specifically targets the city’s policies concerning public properties and public space (http://stadt-neudenken.tumblr.com/). Furthermore, protest actions and demonstration were repeatedly used to contest the Mediaspree development area (Scharenberg and Bader, 2009). Another strategy that creative industries actors used is boycott as in the case of the „Achievement Show of Young Berlin Art“ in 2011, that was later renamed into „based in Berlin“ and whose aim was to present Berlin as a center of contemporary arts production (Jakob, 2013). The total costs of this single event were almost half of the annual budget for artistic production in Berlin, but also the curatorial model with four international curators was heavily criticized from the arts scene. Most artists rejected the exhibition as the instrumentalization of the arts for city-marketing and used it to stir a discussion on the production and presentation conditions for contemporary art in Berlin by publishing two influential public manifestos („Have and Need“ by The Berlin
association of fine artists and „Culture makes Berlin“ by the Council for the Arts) that further stimulated resource mobilization.

*Alternative events creation* can be considered as a contentious performance as well. Several gallery owners founded the abc contemporary art fair and the Gallery Weekend because they became discontent with the annual Art Forum. The Berlin Music Days (BerMuDa) a music festival lasting several days has been initiated by clubs and independent music companies as a protest against the city’s Berlin Music Week (see http://bermuda-berlin.de/). A last strategy that can be identified is *directly engaging in politics and political lobbying*. For example, there was a successful campaign among creative industries businesses to elect their own representatives into the Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s (IHK Berlin) parliament to foster agenda setting within one of the most powerful actor in Berlin’s economic governance regime. Subsequently, in 2012 the Independent Scene Coalition teamed up with the chamber to further strengthen their claim for a new cultural policy (!) in Berlin (IHK, 2012). They also fostered the discussion around the introduction of a city tax for the arts (a daily cultural tax paid by tourists) with the slogan „We are the 95%“ and demand that this tax is only used for supporting artistic production in the city. The Initiative for Rethinking the City accomplished several roundtables on Berlin’s property fund and its allocation practices at the parliament. The music sector and the design sector expressed their need for more specific support by *developing their own economic support strategies*, so called master plans. While the music sector successfully negotiated a music board with its own funding, the design sector could not mobilize enough political support for its strategy.

In most of these concerted efforts public claims are framed around more than just particular sector needs such as the shortage of affordable workspace. The main argument in all of these different initiatives is to contest the current policy framework for supporting cultural consumption, urban development and the sellout of public properties as this statement from the manifesto “Have and Need” exemplifies:

“… it is of importance to avoid limiting our demands to the attainment of open urban spaces and affordable studios, to the augmentation and reorientation of public art funding; instead, it is crucial to make a connection with current discussions on urban development and planning, on property and rental policy, and
to take up a position with respect to concepts and realities of work, productivity, and the Commons.” (BBK, 2012: 1)

The contention here is not just about particular demands of artists or creative industries sectors the city is not willing to negotiate, but about urban social life itself. Drawing on the old community debate question in urban politics research of “Who governs?” (Judge et al., 1995), the political contestation comes down to the questions of who governs Berlin’s creativity, who develops the city and how do we want to live as an urban society? So the contemporary contention around ‘creative city’ ideas in Berlin challenges the ‘post-political’ consensus that Erik Swyngedouw (2009) has carved out in his analysis and specifically targets the urban redevelopment agenda the Senate pursues and its underlying governance structure.

6 Conclusion

Even though Grodach and Silver claim in “The Politics of Urban Cultural Policy” (2013: 9) that in many cities arts organizations and cultural industry organizations have started to “rewrite“ the creative city script, it remains to be seen whether policy is indeed responsive to claims participants make. Creative industries actors in Berlin could yet not challenge existing governance arrangements around urban regeneration agendas. Here, as in many other cities, the idea of a ‘creative city’ was rather used a ‘rhetorical device’ (Fischer, 2003) by urban politics to refashion existing policies instead of appropriate policy-making that supports cultural production in its multifaceted ways. However, these symbolic commitments by the city governments have now come under pressure, as the Berlin case shows or the artist-led activism around the occupation of the Gängeviertel in Hamburg in 2010 (Oehmke, 2010).

In conclusion, the Berlin experience sheds light on how ‘creativity’ grow contentious in Berlin and thereby, how contention and governance overlap and are thus not mutually exclusive categories. The paper tried to show that contention arose in part out of the governance efforts that helped to establish cross-sectoral relations between creative industries actors but also with the urban administration and politics. But instead of providing a political opportunity structure these governance efforts functioned as a
mobilization structure and thus, urban politics played a constitutive role in creating these new political subjects. The aim was to show why these governance efforts incited contentious forms of political participation, how actors from the arts and creative industries undertake collective actions to make concerted public claims and what strategies they use to contest the current policy framework of Berlin’s city government. We finally witness that creativity as an urban development formula has become a politically contested concept in the city.
References


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Notes:

i This paper is not the place to discuss a critical perspective on creative industries research in urban studies, such as the strong focus on inner-city dynamics of these sectors while neglecting peripheral locations and vernacular forms of creativity (Edensor et al., 2009). Overall, particularly research in urban sociology only focuses on effects such as gentrification but not on social economies around creative industries that actually cause the emergence of creative milieus.

ii The format of a „week“ has become one of the favorite instruments for supporting creative industries in Berlin, there’s now a biannual Fashion Week, a Design Week, a Music Week and since 2012 an Art Week.

iii The term 95% refers to the fact that 95% of Berlin’s annual cultural budget is awarded to the institutionalized scene, 5% to the independent scene. That means that 95% of artists in Berlin live off the 5% of the entire cultural budget.