Theories of segregation and policies for integration: travel of ideas and concrete consequences in Chicago (US) and Santiago (Chile)

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Introduction
The legacy of the Chicago School has marked the study of residential segregation in the US, and consequently, has inspired most policies for integration in this country, promoting the dispersion and displacement of poor families to higher-status areas. In Chile, a country that has been open to intellectual flows from Chicago since the 1970s, the recent study of segregation has adopted the dominant US methodological and conceptual frameworks. Although policies for integration have not been implemented yet, the attention of public policy debates has been monopolized by the assumptions of “neighborhood effects”. This way, urban policies of dispersion and public housing demolition are also being outlined as a nostrum to solve the problem of ghettos. Today, integration (or desegregation) policies are part of the toolkit of most local and national governments, or at least are under intense academic and political debate. However, not much is said about how these policies were framed, and in which theories are grounded.

Chile and the US have been strongly connected from the establishment of neoliberalism. In this article, I show how this historical connection maintains its influence in terms of the design of neoliberal urban policies. As a theoretical and political transfer, it is important here to see the relation between cultural backgrounds and socio-political contexts, at national and transnational levels. In the next two sections then, I describe the theory-policy trajectories in the US and in Chile through their most important milestones, following the way in which intellectual circumstances interacted with political circumstances, opening room to specific public policies.

United States: from the Chicago School to a new generation of policies
A first step in this trajectory is marked by the rise of the Chicago School, which laid the foundations for an individualist, functionalist and positivist urban sociology, both quantitative and qualitative. This approach, referred also as Human Ecology, was influenced mainly by the work of Emile Durkheim on the division of labor and his empirical-positivist methods (Saunders, 1986), and by a Social Darwinist understanding of competition, dominance and subordination (Flanagan, 1993). This approach is widely recognized for the connection of social phenomena with spatial patterns, the interactionist perspective studying emergent forms of association, and the study of the role of individual attributes explaining urban problems (Gottdiener & Hutchison, 1994). The human ecology framework was focused on two levels of association (Saunders, 1986; Gottdiener & Hutchison, 1994). On one hand, there was a focus on symbiotic associations, in terms of organization and competition for land, which influenced the branch of factorial ecology and the use of quantitative methods. At this level of analysis, the analytical constructs of invasion-succession and tipping points were created. On the other hand, there was a focus on social associations, in terms of symbolic and psychological adjustments and consensus, which influenced symbolic interactionism, community studies and the use of qualitative methods. The Chicago School relied heavily on the social disorganization paradigm (Carey, 1975): the inevitable influence of urbanization on human beings, resulting from rapid changes in population volume and density, in an ecological process of competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation. Social disorganization was
explained by the decreasing influence of existing rules of behavior and the breaking down of attachments (Park, 1915; Carey, 1975; Gottdiener & Hutchison, 1994; Burgess, 2008).

The explanation of segregation from these scholars is the well known assumption of a ‘natural’ phenomenon. Segregation is said to be a mere incident of urban growth, locational changes and urban metabolism; a condition that the city inevitably produces in a context of competitive cooperation, and as normal elements of city life (Park, 1915; Park, 1926; Burgess, 1928). The Chicago School’s account of segregation has been criticized on three aspects; the ecological fallacy, the positivist emphasis, and the overlook of political-economic factors (Saunders, 1986; Flanagan, 1993; Gottdiener & Hutchison, 1994). In other words, they did not provide an analytical model to explain the ‘natural’ occurrence of segregation, they did not address class and racial oppression, and the use (and overuse) of the social disorganization paradigm became a morally charged and ethnocentric viewpoint to separate the normal from the pathological.

In terms of intellectual circumstances, the Chicago School was the dominant and unquestioned paradigm of urban sociology until the writings of Marx (and Marxists scholars) were introduced to the US audience in the 70s, which influenced the developing approach of Urban Political Economy. And in terms of objective circumstances, US cities were heavily divided by racial lines until the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement. Thus, the studies on residential segregation used the methodological and conceptual tools of the Chicago School and focused exclusively on racial and ethnic segregation across class lines (see Johnson, 1943; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1963).

A second step in this trajectory appears when conservative sociology raises the idea of a “culture of poverty” (Lewis, 1959). Basically, this idea sustains that poverty persists after anti-poverty programs due to individual characteristics of poor people. Beyond the lack of resources, it is the value system of an autonomous subculture in which children and youngsters are socialized that perpetuates an inability to escape the ‘underclass’ situation. Lewis (1959) emphasizes the feelings of marginality, detachment and a lack of class consciousness. Even though the “culture of poverty” idea was largely discredited in following decades, the concept was highly pervasive to some politicians in the 1960s. First, it directly influenced the Moynihan Report (1965), a document directed to President Lyndon Johnson which sustained that a destructive ghetto culture led to a rise in single-mother families, thus obstructing economic and political equality. Second, and more generally, both “culture of poverty” and the Moynihan Report were highly influential in the construction of the War on Poverty, a legislation introduced by Lyndon Johnson in response to elevated poverty rates.

A third step would be a movement of reaction and resistance. The Civil Rights Movement had been growing for several years and peaked in the 1960s, struggling to abolish all forms of racial discrimination against African-Americans in two ways: through racial integration and through self-determination (black power). During those times, documents like the Moynihan Report were criticized by progressive scholars for “blaming the victim” (Ryan, 1976); an ideology used to justify racism and injustice, thus diverting responsibility for poverty from structural factors to the cultural patterns of the poor. In other words, the cultural explanation of poverty worked more to serve the interests of political and scientific groups wanting to keep the wages of the poor low, rather than to describe poverty (Stack, 1974). This harsh criticism led academia the discredit the idea of a culture of poverty and to recognize racism and isolation as the main factors.

Another milestone in this line was the so-called Kerner Report (US Riot Commission, 1968), which was requested by President Lyndon Johnson to investigate the causes of the race riots in 1967, providing a
powerful explanation: “our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separated and unequal”. In other words, it was an urgent call for diversity and desegregation (Betancur and Herring, 2013). However, Johnson ignored the report and rejected its recommendations. The times of the Civil Rights Movement also marked a first generation of housing dispersal programs; the first public policies that directly addressed residential segregation. According to Goetz (2003), the end of the 1960s was marked by the open housing movement and fair housing policies, which aimed at reversing past discrimination, creating a unitary housing market and promoting integration.

A fourth step in this trajectory occurs right after the Civil Rights Movement. Although the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act brought a formal relief to centuries of exclusion and discrimination, several mechanisms of resource distribution and accumulated disadvantage continued marking differences (Betancur and Herring, 2013). The white population of inner cities escaped through suburbanization, and thousands of black workers became unemployed through deindustrialization. Thus, the incipient progress achieved after the Civil Rights Movement stopped and declined, and poverty in recent decades grew deeper and more marked by racial lines. The problem of segregation persisted but in a new fashion: the strict racial barriers that enclosed multi-class ghettos waned slowly, black middle-classes moved to the suburbs, and inner cities became the space for the most disadvantaged poor blacks. In this context of decreasing power, William Julius Wilson, a connoted black researcher resumed the poverty-culture relationship in his book “The Truly Disadvantaged” (Wilson, 1987). This book marked the reappearance of the term ‘pathology’ and ‘underclass’ to describe the specific culture and behavior in ghettos (Small et al, 2010), reestablishing a connection with the social disorganization paradigm. Thus, a new wave of research on residential segregation emerged, focused on “concentrated poverty” as a new problem. Two additional books can be highlighted in this phase: Massey and Denton’s (1993) “American Apartheid”, and Paul Jargowsky’s (1997) “Poverty and Place”. Within this dominant literature, the Chicago School account of the causes of segregation as something ‘natural’ was decidedly rejected, which could be an achievement of Urban Political Economy. But the consequences of segregation were explained in a way that aligned with the Chicago School tradition, inaugurating a new “cottage industry” of research: neighborhood effects (Slater, 2013). ‘Neighborhood effects’ refers to an analytical tool aimed at explaining the social problems generated by the physical aggregation of poor individuals; basically that “where you live affects your life chances” (Slater, 2013).

A fifth step in this trajectory was marked by a new round of public reports and reactive policies. The reemergence of the poverty-culture relationship opened room for more attacks on the poor with questionable sociology: the description of a self-perpetuating culture of poverty, and a self-fulfilling prophecy of social atomism, community disorganisation and cultural anomie (Bennet & Reed, 1999). Two attacks are important to highlight here. First, Robert Putnam’s (1995) assertion that the poor lack social capital, thus suggesting that physical proximity to upper class neighbors will enhance the quality and quantity of social networks (DeFilippis and Fraser, 2010). Second, Galster and Killen’s (1995) notion of “geography of opportunity”, which assumes (as natural) that services and resources are not well provided in poor neighborhoods, then shaping life decisions.

In the same vein, and more on the public policy front, public housing was attacked for its design (high number of units, high rises) vacancy rates (above 15%), and household composition (families with children). Again, a national report marked the public debate (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, 1992), but this time, with much more concrete consequences: widespread demolition of public housing specially targeted to African American communities (Goetz, 2013). In this context, a second generation of integration policies emerged (Goetz, 2003): at the end of the 1970s, taking concentrated poverty as a new problem, public policies emphasized residential mobility and the
redevelopment of public housing with socially mixed projects. In the words of Iris Marion Young (1999) then, this represents moving “people-to-resources” (i.e. attacking the symptoms) instead of moving “resources-to-people” (i.e. attacking the causes).

Social mix policies have emerged at particular times in history (Sarkissian, 1976; Arthursorn, 2012); in mid-19th century Britain under utopian visions of reunification, under egalitarian ideals after WWII, and recently to address the social problems of concentrated poverty. Within this, mixed-income housing\(^1\) emerges as an idea that encompasses four major assumptions (Joseph, 2006): i) social networks and social capital, ii) social control and social organization, iii) role models, and iv) an improved political economy of place. After the trajectory I have presented so far, it is not difficult to see where these assumptions come from (DeFilippis & Fraser, 2010): the first from Putman’s conception of social capital, the second and third from Wilson’s “underclass” and Lewis “culture of poverty”, and the last from Galster and Killen’s notion of “geography of opportunity”.

The second generation of integration policies not only included mixed-income housing, but mostly mobility programs like Moving to Opportunity. Then, either in mixed-income housing and mobility programs, the idea behind is that dispersion will solve the problems of poverty concentration, an idea that Steinberg (2010) criticizes for not separating the structural forces that creates poverty from the spatial clustering of poor individuals. In summary then, I sustain that four persistent ideas have become the foundation for recent desegregation policies; i) the portrayal of ghettos as pathological social forms (see Wilson, 1987; Massey & Denton, 1993; Jargowsky, 1997), ii) the link between poverty concentration and social problems or “neighborhood effects” (see Sampson et al, 2002; Sampson, 2012), iii) the implicit suggestion that “geographies of opportunity” follow the more powerful groups and trickle-down to the rest (Galster & Killen, 1995; De Souza Briggs, 2005), and iv) the assumptions that socially mixed environments would create a ‘virtuous’ circle of social networks, social control, and role models (see Joseph, 2006).

A sixth step in this trajectory is marked by discussions on urban design and its potential influence on collective behavior. The discussion of design principles is a foundational theme in normative-deterministic theories of urban design. These principles work as prescriptions intended to address aesthetic and efficiency issues, but also to solve some social problems. Then, urban design theory became in some sense a theory of social control by the environment, where the use of concepts and ideas taken from social sciences becomes more controversial. Three of the major problems addressed by these theories are design for human contact (Alexander, 1972), design for vitality (Jacobs, 1961; Whyte, 1980), and design for the defense of space (Newman, 1972).

An example of a comprehensive set of ideas taking most urban design prescriptions and generating their own ones is New Urbanism. This movement created prescriptions regarding physical design, land use, demographic diversity, transportation measures, safety measures, and architectural symbolism (Lennertz, 1991; Duany & Plater-Zyberk, 1993; Congress for the New Urbanism, 1996). One of the main arguments for the application of New Urbanist principles for the HOPE VI program in the US\(^2\), is that according to experience, socioeconomic development and urban design cannot work separately to prevent the formation of ghettos (Congress for the New Urbanism, 1996). But these set of theories were widely criticized for their physical and architectural determinism; that is, because designers believe that spatial configurations determine human behavior and could alleviate social problems, underestimating

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1 Mainly within the Hope VI program
2 The main program creating mixed-income housing
the complexity of social processes (Brown et al, 1998; Grant, 2006). Moreover, since these theories are based on common sense, some of their prescriptions reproduce racism and discrimination, like the proposal of racial quotas below the traditional “tipping points”\(^3\).

A final step in this trajectory is marked by the advance of the neoliberalization process and its impact on housing policies. From the 1970s, to the 1980s and 1990s, there is a general retrenchment of the state; the wage-labor relationship is fragmented, poor neighborhoods are disconnected from national and global economies, and the welfare state is reconfigured in polarized cities (Wacquant, 2007). While the economy was increasingly deregulated, the welfare state was increasingly criticized. The ideological pressure to reduce assistance to the poor led to a reform that “ended welfare as we know it”, as President Clinton described in 1996. This welfare reform separated the poor between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, cutting several social programs, destroying the safety net, increasing poverty, lowering income for single mothers, and increasing homelessness (Edelman, 2001). Public housing also changed dramatically during these years: i) deteriorating existing projects and ii) transferring new projects to the market. In the first case, Goetz (2013) stresses the staggering mismanagement from local housing authorities and other institutions that led to a concerted effort of failure in public housing projects, especially in Chicago. One example was the practice of what he calls “de-facto demolition”, by which housing authorities leave inhabited units to increase deterioration. At the same time, new programs were emerging with the implicit goal of privatizing the provision and management of public housing (inclusionary housing, mixed-income housing, and so on).

This large process, here briefly sketched in seven steps, led to policies of public housing demolition and poverty dispersion. These policies were intended to break with social isolation and poverty concentration, and to improve the behavior and interaction of the poor without more state intervention, providing social buffers against disorganization. But that strong rhetoric did not meet reality. Recent research on mixed-income housing has shown more symbolic than instrumental benefits (Joseph & Chaskin, 2010). This is, despite more satisfaction with the physical environment of the neighborhood and less stress with crime, there has not been an increase in opportunities, and there is too much isolation and imposition of rules of behavior. And these results confirm prior observations: desegregation policies (dispersal and mixed-income) have generated disconnection from existing networks, decrease in social capital, and forceful assimilation of poor blacks to white middle-class lifestyles (Cashin, 2004; Greenbaum, 2008). All of this has led to a sort of “integration exhaustion” on African Americans due to the stress of this imposed diversity (Cashin, 2004). On a macro level, desegregation policies have also caused gentrification in high-poverty sites, and increasing housing deficits due to the slow replacement of demolished units.

**Chile: flows from Chicago, spread to Latin America, influence on new policies**

The trajectory in Chile is less extended in time, but not less intense. Between the 1920s to the 1970s, like in many Latin American countries, Chile experienced a process of inward growing, widening the role of the state, and opening to citizen participation. In economic terms, import substitution industrialization was the term to call the state-led promotion of inward development aimed at reducing foreign dependency. Sociology in those times was centered in the question of underdevelopment, and the study of it was led by international institutions and research centers, creating some development recipes (Dockendorff, 2007).

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\(^3\) The so-called “tipping points” in urban sociology, have been commonly used in the US to denote the maximum percentage of blacks (around 30%) after which whites escape a neighborhood.
In terms of urban studies, there were two broad research paradigms in Latin America during the twentieth century (Carrión, 1991). On one hand, there is a generalizing paradigm that did not present much territorial differentiation. Two approaches are important here. First, there are Latin American functionalism and marginality theory, which were highly connected with the work of the Chicago School (particularly Louis Wirth’s) and with Oscar Lewis’ culture of poverty (Germani, 1969, 1988a, 1988b). And second, there are the authors working on Dependency Theory, influenced by Marxism and World Systems Theory, which despite their overgeneralization were highly influential even out of Latin America (Quijano, 1968; Nun, 1988; Slater, 1988; Singer, 1988). And on the other hand, there is an empiricist paradigm, represented by ecological, demographic, anthropological and cultural works, somewhat influenced by the Chicago School. The main approach here was the collaborative efforts of many authors working under the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, or CEPAL in Spanish). The works of CEPAL took modernization theory, created the Latin American developmental paradigm, and were the main influence for the impulse to the process of Import Substitution Industrialization (Prebisch, 1986; Williams, 2006). The extension of this second paradigm, though evolved in a different way, would mark the first step in the theory-policy trajectory in Chile.

A second step in this trajectory is marked by the forced arrival of neoliberalism and the growing influence of the US. The general process of inward development and import substitution industrialization came to a peak with Salvador Allende’s government (first Marxist democratically elected in the world) and his social and economic reforms. But all of this was rapidly and violently stopped by a coup d’état in 1973 and a long military dictatorship, financed and supported by the United States. Initially, the military operated as the armed forces of the economic elites, trying to recover their lost power. But they were in need of a major ideological input, which came from Chicago. Thus, the foundational step in theoretical transfers for Chile, whose influence is more alive than ever today, was the work of the so-called “Chicago Boys”; a group of young Chilean economists, most of them trained at the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman. The training was part of the “Chile Project”, organized in the 1950s by the US Department of State to influence Chilean economic thinking, which became influential right after the military coup as a reaction to the process of state growing. Then, before the United States with Ronald Reagan and before the United Kingdom with Margaret Thatcher, Chile became the laboratory of a new economic model: neoliberalism. The Chicago Boys’ ideas were condensed in a book called “El Ladrillo” (the brick, De Castro, 1992), becoming the basis for Pinochet’s neoliberal economic policy, and reasserting Friedman’s neoclassic approach.

From the second half of the 1970s, policies were implemented to create rapid and extensive privatization, deregulation and reductions in trade barriers. Thus, the role of the state was increasingly reduced, and competition and individualism were encouraged for labor relations, social security, health and education. Seven years after the coup, in 1980, a new constitution was imposed by the armed forces. This constitution promoted individual liberties and individual achievement over any social right. But the pure “monetarist experiment” lasted until 1982, when a deep economic recession forced the military government to change the course, passing to a more pragmatic phase with less power of the Chicago Boys. The IMF and the World Bank put pressure for structural changes, like they did in several Latin American countries. While the original idea of the Chicago Boys was to give no role to the state, an important ideological concession after the crisis was to create the basis for a more subsidiary role.

A third step in this trajectory is marked by the neoliberalization process in the urban realm, during the military dictatorship. The initial vision for this came from major changes in urban legislation. The new National Policy of Urban Development, in 1979, was intended to achieve goals of urban development mainly through the functioning of the land market, complemented with some public investment on
infrastructure and facilities. The main assumption here, was that free competitiveness in space will efficiently assign activities and define the urban-rural transition, regulating the growth of cities (Trivelli, 1981). In other words, there will be no urban boundaries set by legislation, but by the “natural” functioning of the land market. Another substantial transformation was the changing definition of “social housing” (or public housing) through the different governments in the last 40 years (Bravo, 1992). Eduardo Frei Montalva’s government (1964-1970), leaned to major social reforms under his slogan of “revolution in liberty”, defined social housing as a “… necessity good to which every family has a right, giving preferential assistance to the poorest and stimulating self-construction”. Salvador Allende’s government (1970-1973), promoting a “Chilean (or pacific) Way to Socialism”, defined social housing as an “… inalienable right that the state has to provide for the people, it cannot be subject of profit, but of necessity”. Finally, the neoliberal reforms left the most enduring legacy from Pinochet onwards. Social housing was defined then, and it is still defined that way today, as a “… good that is acquired with the efforts of the family for savings, and with contributions from the state through a subsidy”.

It is the production of housing indeed, where the neoliberalization process left its biggest legacy. A policy of mass production of social housing was introduced, with the supposed imperative of reducing housing deficits, based on a set of subsidies from the state to support the demand. But the subsidies ended up being more helpful for big Real Estate companies (i.e. subsidies for supply), in a powerful alliance with the state to fuel the economy (Sugranyes, 2005). According to this policy, urban land is assigned to social housing projects if it is cheap enough to fit the value of the subsidy (less than US$45 per square meter, approximately). Thus, social housing projects were built in massive volumes (over 300 units), with very low standards of construction and urbanization, and in the least desirable places of Chilean cities, extensively increasing the levels of residential segregation. In addition to this, the military government executed major plans of squatter clearance and resettlement, in which extremely poor families were forcefully moved from high-income neighborhoods to the poor peripheries (Sugranyes, 2005).

But there is still more. Several changes in the functioning of some key institutions, part of the neoliberal project, had a drastic impact on the urban realm, causing what Prévôt-Schapira (2001) calls “social fragmentation”. First, with the goal of decentralization, there was a major reform of municipal devolution, in which the main services provided by the state (education and health) were delegated to local governments. The central government provides basic subsidies, and local governments are in charge of administering those services and co-finance them with their own revenue. Obviously, huge inequalities arise between poor are rich municipalities, and the quality of public education and health becomes a direct expression of the wealth of their residents (Larrañaga, 1996). Second, and in the same vein, the state allowed the private provision of education and health, opening room for profits in those basic services. This generated a strong segregation and wide differences of quality in education and health assistance, between those who can pay a private school or hospital, and those who do not (Puga, 2011; Valenzuela et al, 2008; Gideon, 2001). Third, in the case of Greater Santiago, the territory was fragmented and passed from 16 to 34 municipalities, under a criterion of social homogeneity, thus creating richer and independent municipalities on one hand, and poorer and financially-dependent municipalities on the other (Rodríguez & Winchester, 2001). And fourth, social policies passed from universalism to resource targeting (Barozet, 2011). An important example of this is the Chilean housing policy by itself, which separates the poor from the rest establishing a discrete division in the housing market (Posner, 2012).
A fourth step in this trajectory is less practical and more ideological, and it refers to the political groups and their changes during and after the military dictatorship. Allende’s government and the following military dictatorship were part of the Cold War. The coup d’état against Allende meant a victory for the US influence over Chile, like it happened with several dictatorships in Latin America (the US ‘client states’). But the development of the Chilean dictatorship was more complex for the US. While the macroeconomic changes and neoliberal reforms were viewed as something positive, the human rights situation drew increasingly less support. In addition, the science of neoliberal economics was being taught in all universities, spreading the legitimization of the model. However, political economy was eradicated from all curriculums. Critical authors were persecuted, and some of them killed, tortured or exiled. Moreover, some schools were closed, and some universities completely intervened. During the dictatorship then, the struggle and the recovery of democracy was studied by a marginalized and militant sociology, settled in some NGOs or in exile (Dockendorff, 2007). However, conservative thinking (mainly influenced by Anglo-Saxon academia) started to predominate in several areas of knowledge and political discussion. Under internal and external pressures, and due to the decline of socialist regimes, the political left was divided between radicals, who wanted to return to socialism and emphasized confrontation, and liberals, who negotiated a transition to democracy without touching the funding pillars of the neoliberal project. The “restoration of democracy” was planned in the 1980s constitution, providing several undemocratic stipulations to protect the model until these days. Thus, with the support of the international community (including the US), liberal, center-left political forces took office, and continue the expansion of the so-called social market economy. The radical left was excluded by their decrease in numbers (disappeared or exile) and by their exclusion by the binomial voting system, which promotes negotiation and consensus between large opposing sides of government and excludes small forces. The end of the Cold War, happening at the same time the dictatorship ended, reinforced the influence of the US in the Chilean economy, academia, and culture.

A fifth step in this trajectory is about political contingencies, and is marked by the development of the “transition to democracy” and the current situation of Chile in present days. The four administrations that followed the military rule were part of Concertación, a large political coalition that includes center-left to right-wing political parties. Their main goals were economic growth and poverty reduction, which are their main achievements. Growth in real GDP averaged 8% from 1991-1997, decreased a little after that, and then kept around 5-7% over the past several years. Poverty decreased from 45.1% in 1987 to 11% by 2011 (mainly through increases in social spending). But the achievement of these goals came at the price of preserving stability, according to what they defined ‘as possible’. In a restricted democracy, full of authoritarian enclaves inherited from the dictatorship and its 1980’s Constitution, the discourse of “growth with equality” degenerated in the achievement of the first at the expense of the second. The so-called social market economy (or ‘Third Way’), did not change the macroeconomic policies, and reduced poverty while maintaining, and even increasing, income inequalities. In addition, social policies made their social spending more efficient by defining vulnerable groups and targeting their resources, thus creating artificial divisions within the Chilean society, ending with universalism and promoting competition. In this context of post-dictatorship, the return to democracy was studied by a practical sociology, which promoted problem solving and was instrumentalized by the state (Dockendorff, 2007). Universities and research centers were more concerned with professionalization than research, emphasizing consulting work in several areas of development. In addition to this, new theoretical currents were embraced in Chilean sociology, like systems theory and postmodernism, not necessary linked to critical stances.

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4 The Chilean binomial voting system resembles very closely the two-party system of the United States or the UK.
From 2006, Chile has the highest nominal GDP per capita in Latin America and has recently been recognized as a high-income economy by the World Bank: GDP per capita went up from $4,500 in 1985 to U$22,655 in 2013 (Durán & Kremerman, 2013). But the flip side of this is social inequalities. The richest 5% have an income that is 260 times the poorest 5%, and this gap has grown 100% in the last 20 years (Durán & Narvona, 2013). Between 2007 and 2012, Chile appears as a strange case in which both employment and inequalities are increasing (Durán & Narvona, 2013). In historical terms, when developed countries had the size of the present Chilean economy (U$22,000 per capita, approximately), their minimum wage was between 1.4 to 4 times Chile’s minimum wage (Durán & Narvona, 2013). But in political terms, after 20 years of “neoliberalism with a kind face” (the center-left who maintained the model), the true colors of right-wing politics appeared when they took office in 2010. Then, the almost inexplicable legitimization of this highly unequal model started to wane very fast: there was an explosion of social movements in education, regional development, ethnic issues, environment, labor, and so on. And their expectations increased from short-term demands to the ambitious goal of a constitutional assembly. In this context, today’s Chilean sociology shows the presence of two old traditions in Latin America: a conservative sociology -or science of crisis-, and a critical sociology -or science of change (Dockendorff, 2007). On one hand, the science of crisis defines a society that is subjected to the evolution of economic structures; an example of this is a Chilean sociologist that explains current social movements as “post-material” demands, after reaching a GDP of U$15,000 per capita. And on the other hand, the science of change explains the social as self-determined by the actors and pressure groups, building conditions for a new society: this is illustrated by two other thinkers who explain the actual moment as a “pre-revolutionary state”, emphasizing the new meaning of politics during the so-called ‘Chilean Spring’.

A sixth step in this trajectory is marked by the study of residential segregation in Chile. Empirical studies on segregation in Latin America just appeared in the late 1990s (Schteingart, 2001). But, what happened with researchers if the problem of segregation was present from a long time ago? I sustain that three reasons explain this late arrival. First, there was (and there still is) a lack of data at a disaggregated level, which has been one of the main reasons why social science in -the 60s and 70s-- so generalist and structuralist. Second, Marxist scholars were persecuted and censored during the 70s and 80s, leaving the continent almost devoid of critical thinking, and with an imposed anti-Marxist and pro-US ideology. And third, the neoliberal crisis and its consequences in cities during the 1980s and 1990s, were studied under the new theoretical flows from the US (Wilson, 1987; Massey & Denton, 1993; Jargowsky, 1997). And these new flows were congruent with the less critical scholarship that was encouraged before. Then, if the two mentioned research paradigms coexisted during the 50s, 60s and 70s, the Marxist approach almost disappeared after the persecution of critical thinkers. Thus, the empiricist paradigm evolved as a more positivist approach, and predominates today in segregation studies, very influenced by US theoretical frameworks (for Chile, see Sabatini et al, 2001; Rodríguez, 2001; Rodríguez & Arriagada, 2004). That is, the theory and methods of the dominant US literature of the 1990s, were embraced by liberal scholars under a neoliberal center-left government. Indeed, the empirical studies produced in Chile, by a particular group of researchers, was even influential in several Latin American countries, reproducing many questionable theoretical constructs like ‘underclass’, ‘social disorganization’, ‘geography of opportunity’ and ‘neighborhood effects’, without much debate and criticism to this scholarship. In addition, they have an exclusive focus on class, rather than race, segregation, thus leaving Chilean racial history and present differences unquestioned. Moreover, they compare class segregation in Chile with race segregation in the US, using the same methods. The problem here is ignoring a fundamental difference between class and racial structures: class offers social trajectory, while race does not. And this complicates any direct comparison (Ruiz-Tagle & López, 2014 forthcoming).
A seventh step in this trajectory is marked by a particular academic-political campaign for dispersion policies. From the second half of 2000s, the same group of influential scholars studying segregation, embarked in a campaign to influence public policies. Beyond research projects and papers circulated in different circles, they organized conferences, seminars and talks in which they include both the public and the private sector: that is, politicians and developers. What was their goal?: to introduce the idea that “residential integration is possible and compatible with Real Estate business” (Sabatini et al, 2013; Pro-Urbana, 2008). For them, developers are the big problem. According to the dynamics that were installed during the neoliberal reforms, land for social housing projects is assigned through the land market (the cheapest lots). And within this context, developers try to maximize their profits, separating social classes as much as they can. Developers defend themselves blaming residents, who supposedly would only live with their peers, based on the old classism that has divided Chilean society. Against this belief, the mentioned scholars moved their entire research agenda from the study of residential segregation to the study of the potential coexistence between different social groups: that is, a forced research plan against the classism of developers (see Sabatini & Brain, 2008). The problem here is that they do not question the functioning of the neoliberal housing market or the neoliberal reforms that had influence in socio-spatial differentiations. They just try to sustain that “social integration does not mean quitting the Real Estate business” (Sabatini et al, 2013). This is due to the mentioned theoretical grounding in US conservative research, and to the sponsorship of specific neoliberal institutions, like the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Thus, the research of these scholars emphasizes the attraction of Real Estate investors for mixed-income projects (Brain et al, 2007), and the disposition of social groups to live together (Sabatini et al, 2012). As an empirical subject to base their proposals, they have committed to study the situation of wealthy gated communities that have been built in poor areas; the only cases of spontaneous ‘integration’ that have been observed in Chilean cities. The appearance of these cases has been explained in terms of the dispersion of elites through a particular mechanism done by developers; that is, buying cheap land in poor peripheral areas and building enclosed neighborhoods (Sabatini & Salcedo, 2007). However, the Chilean authors studying gated communities in poor areas (Salcedo & Torres, 2004; Sabatini & Salcedo, 2007) tend to reify these cases as the only dynamic that is actually reducing socioeconomic segregation, and as the only (possible) examples of diversity, falling in the same problem (observed in the US) of equating physical proximity with integration. They insist in highlighting the idea of a geography of opportunity, referring to the informal functional exchanges between classes (mainly domestic work) occurring in these spaces of encounter. But they do not acknowledge that these gains in informal employment are just a comparative advantage for being a minority among the poor. In other words, if all the poor are dispersed throughout the city, the general levels of unemployment will not necessary change. In addition, they almost do not discuss that the opportunities for effective social mobility of the poor are almost unmodified in these areas; that is, subordinate contact does not necessarily imply better relations, or better possibilities for upward mobility.

Based on these cases and on the dominant US literature, this group of authors have sustained that there are only two ways to create urban social integration (Pro-Urbana, 2007): by colonization of low-income areas by high-income projects (already happening with gated communities), and by the inclusion of low-income families into mixed-income projects. Therefore, at the end of 2000s, partly influenced by these scholars, two types of legislation have been discussed. First, there is a proposed law (bill) that would create an obligation for developers to assign 5% of land for social housing projects (following the French system of 20%). However, there has been strong opposition to this, and the idea has been almost discarded. And second, the government created a new type of housing projects for social integration, in
which an additional bonus (subsidy) is given to developers for building mixed-income projects (to be spent on the middle class units).

A final step in this trajectory is marked by intense debates, theoretical assumptions, and policy transfers. With the arrival of the right-wing government in 2010, the urban debate was monopolized by the assumptions of ‘neighborhood effects’. That is, it was clear for a large group of scholars and policy makers that the problem of Chilean ghettos is a problem of physical concentration which, as in the US, deserves ‘brick and mortar’ solutions. In this context, an influential right-wing think tank, based on what had been studied on segregation, wrote a report on Chilean ghettos, highlighting “the largest ghetto in Chile” (Atisba, 2010). Then, like in the US, the trajectory from a report to a new public policy was very fast. First, sensationalist TV shows were broadcasted about the situation of these ghettos. Although these TV shows had been stigmatizing poverty in all its forms from the last decade, stressing the issue of crime, this time they were more explicit. And second, a presidential committee was appointed for the creation of a new National Policy of Urban Development 5, and the main measures to be taken after the committee were: demolition of large social housing projects and dispersion of poverty. To this day, again like the US, the program that has worked better is social housing demolition. But this program, called “demolition of blocks, second chance”, already shows some problems. First, it just represents a physical intervention, aimed at lowering density and creating green areas. Second, it does not have any guarantee to prevent gentrification. Third, it does not ensure that the new location offered to the displaced residents would be better than the existing. Actually, residents are already complaining that the money offered to them is not enough to buy a decent new home 6. And fourth, it is based on the same system of subsidizing developers, in an incipient example of creative destruction.

The government commented that those policies have been successful in Europe and in the US, and that it was time to practice that in Chile. Therefore, the right-wing government obtained the best tool to impose their terms (demolition and poverty dispersion) and criticize 20 years of massive public housing construction of the former center-left governments. Therefore, the policies of social housing demolition and dispersion have acquired certain level of support and consensus in Chile. But this nearly hegemonic influence is highly problematic; first, because its assumptions are founded in questionable premises; and second, because most of its empirical grounding does not belong to the Chilean context, but to the United States. In other words, the so-called “dispersal consensus” (Imbroscio, 2008) has arrived to Chile, but with even less debate than in its origin.

**Conclusions: policy transfer in a context of constant socio-cultural assimilation**

The two trajectories outlined so far shows how academia has influenced policy in different contexts. Thus, once some concepts are put by scholars, politicians find easy to further attack low income areas, with several objectives: reactivate capital (creative destruction), gentrify neighborhoods, blame the poor for their problems, leave the solutions to the trickle-down of resources from higher-income residents, and continue with the retrenchment of the state. In addition, these trajectories show how national politics shapes the limits of academia so as to maintain the status quo, like the training of the Chicago Boys and the persecution of radical scholars during the Chilean dictatorship. The case of the US illustrates how pervasive has been conservatism in both academic and political debate, influencing theory and policy. But the case of Chile is not just about the influence of internal conservatism, but also about cultural neocolonialism and policy transfer from the US.

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5 With the participations of professional associations, political representatives, developers, deans of schools of architecture and planning.

6 The Chilean housing policy works on homeownership, so subsidies are given to buy a house.
The US has acted as a hegemonic power, exerting some sort of cultural imperialism, ‘invading’ with cultural products and ‘conquering’ Third World’s local cultures (Alexander, 2003). Cultural influences are established for economic reasons, reflected in the control of values and perceptions through the media, language, education and religion. Regarding language for example, the supremacy of English can only be understood by the influence of the British Empire from the 18th century, and the US neocolonialism since the mid-20th century. The simultaneous (and usually forced) usage in economic, political, military, scientific, cultural and colonial relations led English to be the language of international discourse and communication. Something very similar happened with the practice of science. After World War II, the US became not only an economic and military superpower, but also a scientific one (Krige, 2006). Together with Cold War’s political and ideological agenda, financial and political support was given to science in order to model practices and institutions. This scientific dominance operated as a form of consensual hegemony, with the help of local elites, not just for the postwar reconstruction, but also as a way of maintaining US leadership (Krige, 2006). Sciences thus, and mostly hard sciences, merged in the US way and practices, influenced by power relations. And this, coupled with the supremacy of English and the large US university system, established a hierarchical system for the production of knowledge that works as a virtuous cycle; i) the more predominance of English, the more importance for Anglo-Saxon academia, ii) the more importance of Anglo-Saxon academia, the more scholars want to study, research and publish in English, and iii) the more scholars involved (directly or indirectly) in Anglo-Saxon academia, the more important the cultural hierarchy. Moreover, the flow of international scholars leaving the United States and returning to their home countries adds the complexity of what Appadurai (2008) calls semantic and pragmatic problems; semantic, in terms of the difficult translation of concepts along different contexts, and pragmatic, in terms of the different conventions and meanings that words represent for each public politics. Therefore, the world is not only forced to speak the same language, but to do research and to think in the same parameters.

Beyond neocolonialism, policy transfer refers to the process in which ideas on institutional arrangements are used to shape institutions and policies in other political contexts. In general terms, Latin America could be said to be built in terms of policy transfers, or policy mobilities as geographers like to call them. Different models of development have always arrived late, from a different context, and brought by certain type of elite. But as I have shown, neoliberal policies have not always followed top-down trajectories (developed to developing country). And this case is not unique, since other scholars have shown how policies have travelled in more complex ways (Peck & Theodore, 2010). From Chile to the US, macroeconomic policies were influential in a general sense. Chile was used as a laboratory by a transnational elite of Chilean and US scholars and policy makers, to introduce and test policies of labor relations, social security, health and education. And from the US to Chile, the flow has been equally important in terms of urban theory and urban policy.

This does not mean that policy (or theory) transfers are linear sequences of emulation within particular countries. On the contrary, countries where several policies are being thought and implemented, like Chile, present complex rounds of reevaluation and reform, co-existing with other policy or theory circuits (Peck & Theodore, 2010). Political contexts offer fertile grounds to receive certain theoretical flows. The beginning of the Chicago School would have not been possible without the confluence of theoretical flows from Europe (Simmel from Germany and Durkheim from France) and the local beliefs of Social Darwinism and the search for scientific laws of behavior (Carey, 1975). Likewise, the arrival of the Chicago Boys to Chile would have not been that “successful” if there were no elites, eager to recover their economic and political power. Theories and policies travel in a way that is similar to how a
paradigm becomes dominant; their journey is shaped by the cultural background of a community and by the socio-political context of a historical moment. And both forces have local and global circumstances.

But times are changing. While race and class discrimination still marks differences in cities, powerful social movements are emerging in both Chile and the US. Thus, the circumstances are much better to propose urban policies for social justice.

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