

“Republican Models for a Just City: Aristotle, Harrington, and Pettit”

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Paper presented at the RC21 International Conference on “The Ideal City: between myth and reality. Representations, policies, contradictions and challenges for tomorrow’s urban life” Urbino (Italy) 27-29 August 2015. <http://www.rc21.org/en/conferences/urbino2015/>

Although numerous models for a just city or society exist, Aristotle, James Harrington, and Philip Pettit offer some of the most provocative yet practical in the Republican tradition. Aristotle focuses his model on the end of the development of virtue, Harrington on balance, and Pettit on non-domination. Although, Harrington and Pettit rely on Aristotle in crucial ways, neither adequately comes to terms with the concentration of wealth that Aristotle warns undermines a polity.

Interpretation and application of Aristotle's just city is hampered by a failure to recognize that the *Politics*, like the *Metaphysics*, is organized around a *pros hen* analogy.¹ The term "best" in "best regime" is *pros hen* analogous because there is a core instance of the best city and various derivative best cities, adapted to circumstances.² The core instance, the City of Our Prayers (henceforth CP), allows for both wide-spread political participation and the rule of the virtuous. Notoriously, to achieve his end Aristotle excludes many from citizenship. The oft-cited mixed and middle regimes are only derivative best regimes for Aristotle, compromising the goals of political participation and rule of the virtuous found in the CP.

Aristotle develops the notion of the best regime as *pros hen* analogous because he wants to discuss the best regime not only as an ideal, but one that can be applied (1288 36–7). In a *pros hen* analogy, there is both a core sense of a term and various derived senses. Although, not recognized by commentators, there is a *pros hen* analogy at work in Aristotle's ethical and political theory, because the notion of the good is *pros hen* analogous. It functions much as the *pros hen* analogous notion of being does in the *Metaphysics* (1005 b 13–18).

To illustrate *pros hen* analogy, Aristotle uses the term "medical". The term medical refers primarily to the art of medicine, but it can also be used to describe an instrument. The term "medical" applied to an instrument is not merely equivocal, because it is related to the core sense of medical art. Still, it is derivative because it is medical art that makes an instrument medical (*Metaphysics* 1030 a 35–b 3).

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle notes that the term "friend" is *pros hen* analogous. It applies primarily to perfect friendship based upon virtue and secondarily to friendships of utility and pleasure (1236 a 18–21). In his theory of friendship, *pros*

hen analogy allows Aristotle both to save the appearances, because analogous friendships are still genuine and not merely equivocal friendships, and to establish a coherent theory through a hierarchy of friendships with perfect friendship at its core. Because perfect friendship is at the core, it has more pleasure and utility than lesser forms of friendship (1237 b 4–5).

The key concept in Aristotle's ethical/political theory is the good, which too is *pros hen* analogous. The good in Aristotle's ethical theory is the happiness that is found in a life of contemplation. Although a life of contemplation is the core good, Aristotle's *pros hen* analogy recognizes other genuine goods as well. Friends, virtue and external goods are all goods related to the good of contemplation, because they serve to further it. However, the first two are not merely instrumental. They are also good in their own right because they are choice worthy (NE 1097 b 2–4). So *pros hen* analogy allows for a unified, comprehensive theory of the ethical good.

In political theory, Aristotle's analysis of the best regime is also *pros hen* analogous. Given that the goal of political activity is also the good, we should expect it to be. There are different goods to which given regimes can aspire. The core best regime works toward virtue among its citizens, but there are derivative best regimes directed to lesser goods appropriate to their circumstances. Therefore, Aristotle looks not only to an ideal best regime, but also useful adaptations.

Aristotle believes that only in exceptional circumstances can virtue serve as the end for politics, because in most cities only a few virtuous people can be found. To be virtuous in Aristotle's sense requires education and leisure, so only those with means can have sufficient time to cultivate virtue. The CP has abundant resources and so can support a class of leisurely contemplators. In Aristotle's CP, only they will be citizens. He excludes from citizenship women, slaves, merchants, and laborers, feeling them incapable of virtue. So Aristotle adopts draconian measures to ensure his citizens are virtuous.³

The CP is characterized by wide-spread citizen rule and rule of the virtuous (1332 a 33–5). Thereby, it unites in itself the best features of polity—rule of all citizens in turn—and aristocracy—rule of the virtuous.⁴ Aristotle says it better deserves the

names polity and aristocracy than observable polities and aristocracies (1295 a 22–5), because it better instantiates the principles of rule of the many and of the virtuous. It is the best regime in the core sense. In lesser circumstances, Aristotle considers derivative best regimes. They are regimes that best approximate the ideals of widespread participation and rule of the virtuous, given their conditions.

In sum Aristotle, discusses three main circumstances: 1) the archaic city where only one person or family of virtue can be found; 2) the middle city with a large middle class; 3) the polarized city where there are many poor and few rich. For the archaic city, monarchy is the best regime. Thus, Aristotle sacrifices the ideal of widespread participation in favor of the principle of the rule of the virtuous. Aristotle notes that it was the prevailing condition in archaic times, thus explaining the earlier historical predominance of monarchies.

In the second circumstance, the middle city, a large middle class predominates. Although he does not hope that citizens of the middle city can attain full contemplative virtue, Aristotle thinks they can achieve military virtue while also avoiding the vices of the rich and the poor. Aristotle thinks that the wealthy seek to dominate and the poor become servile, thus neither makes good citizens. A good citizen knows how to rule and be ruled, which the middle class do (1295 b 12). They can also achieve two other ends, political friendship and deliberative truth. They can have political friendship because they have shared interests and recognize one another as equals. They can achieve deliberative truth because they are not too “servile.”

In the famous “summation” argument, Aristotle says that the many can better perceive the truth than the few because they bring numerous perceptions to bear. He illustrates his point through the analogy of a common meal that is better if it is supplied by many rather than by a single “purse” (1281 b 2–3). He also argues that the users of an art are better judges than the artisan, so the denizen is a better judge of the utility of a house than the builder (1282 a 19–21). However, Aristotle appends an important caveat. The many collectively are better judges if they are not too “servile” (1282 a 15). Aristotle thinks that labor makes one servile and so the poor, who labor, are not good at finding deliberative truth and so the capacity for deliberative truth is a

characteristic of the middle regime. Because of its capacity for deliberative truth and its political friendship, the middle city best approximates the core best CP.

Most cities are not so fortunate. They are instead characterized by many poor and few rich. In the polarized city, Aristotle recommends a mixed regime that draws on elements from both democracy and oligarchy.⁵ In the polarized city, one class or another tends to dominate leading to oligarchy or democracy and creating strife. Aristotle teaches that cities vary in both quality and quantity. By quality, he means the goods that a class possesses, “freedom, wealth, education, good birth.” By quantity, he refers to the “superiority” (*huperochen*) of numbers (1296 b 17–19)—or in Harrington’s terms “overbalance”. A city with a small number of wealthy or educated people may overcome the numerical advantage of the many poor and become an oligarchy (31–3).

Aristotle recommends balancing the competing interests by employing both oligarchic and democratic means. For example, in assemblies, oligarchies fine the rich for non-participation and democracies pay attendees to encourage the poor to participate. Aristotle suggests doing both to ensure that all participate (1297 a 38–41), thus approximating the ideal of wide-spread participation. Still, the polarized city struggles because of the conflicting interests of its citizens and so Aristotle enjoins the legislator to empower the middle class as a mediator between the rich and poor and better imitate the middle city, although he does not spell out specific ways to empower the middle class (1296 b 35–6 & 1297 a 5–6). However, where the middle class is numerous, they can sway the balance (*rhopen*) and prevent a preponderance of power going to the wealthy or the poor (1295 b 38–9).

Aristotle cites other means to mix democracy and oligarchy. He notes that elections are oligarchic because people of note tend to be elected, while sortition is democratic. Both means can be employed in a mixed regime (1298 b 22–3). He also indicates that a smaller, more elite body can propose legislation for approval by a larger, more democratic assembly, but Aristotle holds that such an arrangement is oligarchic (1298 b 26–30). He suggests that a polity in which all can vote, but with a

property requirement for high office will be well run because the best will serve in high office, but that all we be enabled as voting citizens (1318 b 27–31).

Although Aristotle is not optimistic about the overall virtue of the mixed regime, there is one virtue which citizens of polities can display—military virtue—because military virtue can be found among the many (1279 b 1–2). So it is appropriate to limit citizenship to those that have or do bear arms (2–4).

II. James Harrington

According to John Pocock, during the renaissance, Machiavelli leads a resurgence of virtue-directed politics in the tradition of Aristotle’s republican theory. According to Pocock Machiavellian Civic Humanism holds,

If *virtue* could only exist where citizens associated in pursuit of a *res publica*, then the *polity* or constitution—Aristotle’s functionally differentiated structure of participation—became practically identical with virtue itself.⁶

As a result a person could only become virtuous within the context of participation in a republic. Furthermore, the republic becomes the locus for all virtue, “The republic attempted to realize a totality of virtue in relations of its citizens with one another.”⁷

Pocock credits James Harrington with bringing Machiavellian civic humanism to England. Like Machiavelli, Harrington’s “dominant purpose is the release of personal virtue through civic participation.”⁸ However, Pocock has oversimplified Aristotle’s political theory in a way that Harrington does not. As we have seen, Aristotle, looks only to the CP for the development of full contemplative virtue. His goals are much more modest for the mixed and middle regimes, focusing on the preservation of the state and the development of military virtue among the people.

Pocock’s interpretation has drawn many commentators and set the terms of the debate for the last forty years, however most of his critics have also failed to distinguish the different polities that Aristotle describes in his theory. For example, Vickie Sullivan has challenged Pocock’s contention that Harrington stands in an

Aristotelian Republican tradition. According to Sullivan, “Harrington rejects Aristotle’s politics because it relies too much on the moral virtue of the individual.”⁹ However, as noted above, Aristotle’s mixed regime relies very little on individual moral virtue, looking more to institutional balance between competing interests.

Harrington focuses on the mixed regime, sharing Aristotle’s goals of preservation of the state and the development of military rather than full contemplative virtue in the CP. Within the mixed regime, Harrington also looks to strengthen the middle class, as Aristotle suggests. Harrington does look to imitate the CP among the leisured few, who will have time for contemplation and the development of wisdom. However, they are only a few.

Scholars have traced many influences for Harrington, primarily Machiavelli,¹⁰ but also Polybius,¹¹ the Stoics,¹² Hobbes,¹³ Harvey,¹⁴ the Bible,¹⁵ and Plato.¹⁶ Harrington synthesizes many sources, but the overall structure of his thought is Aristotelian, more so than even Machiavelli. Although there is some overlap between the two, Harrington adapts from Aristotle specific means for mixing the regime that Machiavelli does not.¹⁷

Harrington shares Aristotle’s epistemological presuppositions and his analysis and contextualization of regimes. From Aristotle’s mixed regime, Harrington adopts both his ends and his means including his bicameral legislature, with a separation of powers and differing property requirements for office and voting. Finally, consistent with Aristotle’s advice to strengthen the middle class even in the mixed regime, Harrington develops his famous agrarian law.

Harrington’s principle of balance is a reformulation of Aristotle’s qualitative and quantitative measures for regimes, with a twist. Aristotle considers only cities that tend to democracy or oligarchy. For him, monarchies are a thing of the past. Harrington needs to explain the post-Cesarean predominance of monarchies in Europe, so Harrington considers balances that tend to monarchy, in addition to democracy and oligarchy. When land is in the hands of a single person, the balance tends to monarchy. In the hands of a few, it leads to oligarchy and democracy is the natural form where many hold property. Also, like Aristotle, Harrington describes

tendencies and not determinations. A governmental superstructure can be forced onto unsuitable material through force of arms, but such arrangements are inherently unstable (163–4).¹⁸

Harrington himself cites Aristotle as the source of his principle of balance, but curiously does not refer to the passage where Aristotle analyzes the qualitative and quantitative balances of power in cities. Instead Harrington offers a creative translation of *arete* (virtue) as “balance”.¹⁹ Perhaps he avoided the terms “qualitative” and “quantitative” because he did not want overly to mathematize his theory. In any case, Harrington’s principle of balance of property accords with Aristotle’s qualitative and quantitative measures. Wealth is one of the goods measured as “qualitative” by Aristotle and numbers of citizens by his quantitative measure—in other words, the same features that are measured by Harrington’s balance.

Like Aristotle, Harrington takes the end of the mixed city to be preservation of the state from faction, but also holds that the mixed regime can imitate the virtue of the CP through military virtue among the citizens. According to Harrington, the Commonwealth is composed of “arms and councils” whose practice develop courage among the people and wisdom among the few (310–11). The class of leisurely landowners will have time for contemplation and therefore can develop wisdom, so that at least part of the republic will imitate the CP in contemplative virtue. Although Aristotle does not express the same ambition for his mixed regime, Harrington’s hope is perfectly consistent with Aristotle’s principle of imitation, whereby lesser regimes should imitate the best regime to the extent possible.

Harrington's bicameral legislature with a separation of powers and differing property requirements is built on several of Aristotle's means for mixing regimes. Recall that to mix regimes, Aristotle notes that different property requirements can be imposed for voting and for service. Harrington does the same. He proposes a property requirement of £100 for eligibility to the Senate, although anyone with a property below that level can still vote (791). Like Aristotle, Harrington bans servants from citizenship (665–6).

Aristotle also notes that different bodies representing the many and the few can serve different functions in a mixed regime, as do Harrington's Senate and Assembly. Aristotle observes that the smaller, oligarchic body can propose legislation for the Assembly's approval, just as in Harrington's system. In Harrington's system, the Senate proposes and the people resolve (173–4).

Aristotle's and Harrington's separation of powers are built on the same epistemological principles—1) that wisdom requires contemplative leisure and 2) that although the people lack the ability to formulate arguments, they have the capability to judge sound arguments. Harrington takes the Senate to be the locus of wisdom in the government for two reasons. First, because of the higher property requirement, its members have the leisure time to develop wisdom. Second, and even more importantly, the people although lacking wisdom, are able to discern wisdom in others. Like Aristotle, Harrington considers election an aristocratic means, because people of note are elected (416).

Aristotle and Harrington leave decisions to the Assembly for similar reasons. As noted above, Aristotle explains that in some arts users are better judges than artists. So the occupant is a better judge of a house than the architect. Applied to politics, this means that those who have to live with a policy are better judges of the policy than the leaders who propose it. Harrington's contribution is to express this in terms of "interest". The people are better judges of their own interest than the Senate. In Harrington's polity, the Senate proposes and the Assembly, representing the people, resolves. The Senate provides the wisdom and the people judge the common interest (416–17).

Finally, Harrington proposes an agrarian law to prevent any party from accumulating an "overbalance" of land and to preserve the balance with the people, thus securing the republic. In Aristotle's terms, Harrington seeks to encourage middle class within the mixed regime. Aristotle does not specify what steps should be taken to do so, although in the CP, he bans merchants from citizenship, fearing their restless acquisitiveness (1328 b 39–40). Harrington seeks to prevent the rise of a landed aristocracy by limiting land inheritances to £2000. Along with limitations to dowries,

he calculates that under his agrarian, the land of England cannot fall to fewer than 5000 estate-holders, a large enough class to prevent a party of a few wealthy landowners to arise and threaten the power of the people (687–8).

Harrington's calculations have drawn criticism. Macpherson calls his proposal circular, because if the entire balance were in the hands of 5000, the balance would be grossly unequal, and not at all republican. So even if the agrarian were preserved, it would not serve its purpose.²⁰ However, Harrington is referring to an extreme case. Even should the land to fall into the hands of 5000, according to Harrington the balance would still be popular in the sense that no faction could dominate the government. Also, the agrarian would remain in place to prevent further centralization and if land cannot further centralize, it can only move toward decentralization.

Others have charged that Harrington's agrarian is impractical. However, there is nothing particularly impractical about limiting inheritances. In fact, it is the only way to move toward greater wealth distribution without stripping property from property holders. Jefferson and Madison both saw the need for inheritance reform in order to promote greater distribution of wealth.²¹

Others chastise Harrington for failing to account for growth of non-landed capital. However, it hardly seems fair to criticize Harrington for failure to predict the future. In his day the wealth of England was predominantly in land and Harrington would have no empirical basis to assert that the future would be any different. He was aware that it was possible to have an overbalance of wealth in money, as in Holland and Genoa, but he reasonably supposed that this was due to their small land holdings, which was neither true in most places nor in England (407).

In the end, Harrington's presents a very compelling plan for a mixed regime, Aristotelian in its epistemological presuppositions, its ends, and even in its specific means. To his credit, he simplified and thereby helped to popularize some of Aristotle's arguments, transforming Aristotle's summation argument into an argument about interest and Aristotle's quantitative and qualitative measurements into balance. He also deserves credit both with taking seriously the threat of excess concentration of

wealth and taking measures to address it, although the rise of the dominance of capital has rendered his specific proposals outmoded.

III. Philip Pettit

Philip Pettit develops a compelling theory of Civic Republicanism that includes aspects of Deliberative Democracy and Amartya Sen's Capabilities Approach. Pettit founds his theory on the goal of non-domination, but he wants his theory to be more than foundational and also guide political institutions and policies.²² To an extent he does, but his practical suggestions are hampered by inadequate attention to Aristotle's warnings about the limitations of a polarized city.

Pettit's theory is organized around the goal of non-domination, which Pettit takes to be a primary good.²³ Pettit defines domination as the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in choices that the subject of domination is in a position to make.²⁴ He distinguishes modally the Republican goal of non-domination from the Liberal goal of non-interference. A person can be under domination even if the dominator does not actively interfere with a subject—if the dominator potentially can interfere. When a dominator has an unexercised power to interfere, the subject still has to be careful to adopt strategies to avoid interference, as in the case of a slave subject to the arbitrary will of a beneficent master. The slave still knows that he must be careful to stay in the master's good graces.²⁵

Pettit further distinguishes interference from domination because domination is arbitrary in the sense that it does not track the subject's interests. Thus, a Liberal sees government interference as something to be avoided as much as possible, whereas Pettit's Republican is more open to government interference if it is non-arbitrary and tracks citizens' interests.

For a state to interfere non-arbitrarily and in the citizens' interests, Pettit says it must do so democratically. He adopts a model of Deliberative Democracy to explain how it can do so.²⁶ According to Pettit, interest group pluralism is "inimical" to the goal of non-domination because it leaves the weaker members of society exposed to the preferences of the stronger.²⁷ Instead of bargaining between self-interested parties, Pettit insists on deliberation working toward

consensus. In a Republican polity, the norm is solidarity rather than compromise.²⁸

Pettit emphasizes the role of civil society in a Republican polity. Deliberation must be supported by “society-wide” norms of civility, otherwise it collapses into “a battleground of rival interest groups.”²⁹ As with any conversation, deliberation requires some “common ground” so that the parties can recognize the force of each other’s arguments.³⁰ In short, “Republican laws must be supported by habits of civic virtue and good citizenship.”³¹

To ensure that citizens can develop civic virtues and also avoid domination, Pettit endorses Sen’s Capabilities Approach.³² The state must promote “socioeconomic independence” so that citizens are guaranteed sufficient resources to avoid domination, but Pettit stops short of calling for equality.³³ Like Sen and Martha Nussbaum, Pettit envisions the Capabilities Approach as establishing certain “minimum thresholds,” to use Nussbaum’s term.³⁴

Because he only advocates a Capabilities Approach, Pettit only avoids part of the problems of Aristotle’s polarized city. Through the Capabilities Approach, he can hope to eschew the problem of citizen’s being so “servile” that they cannot properly deliberate, but he does not escape the problem of disparate interests between the rich and poor in the polarized city.

There is every reason to believe that the rich will, as Aristotle says, seek to dominate. Since their goals and experiences are so different, it is hard to see that they are to maintain the “common ground” that Pettit correctly asserts is necessary for deliberation. Since virtue too depends on proper ends, it is also hard to see how the citizens can have the civic virtues that Pettit maintains are required to support Republican Laws. They are more likely to be motivated by sectional interests rather than the common good, except in times of emergency when interests coalesce.

In the United States, economic polarization between the rich and poor has been increasing since the 1970’s. Income inequality has returned to the highs that it reached in 1929.³⁵ Compounding the problem, large-scale states also require greater amounts of wealth for citizens to have a voice in political debates. In large-scale states, political debate must take place through media and in our present

system, that requires money. In recent years, it has required more money than ever, as campaign spending has exploded. According to the Campaign Finance Institute, the average winning Senate campaign cost \$6,426,200 in 1986 (2012 dollars) and \$10,351,556 in 2012. Over the same period the average cost for a House seat rose from \$753,274 to \$1,596,963.³⁶ As a result, politicians are ever more beholden to political donors, unless they are independently wealthy. The average citizen has no access to the media required to have her voice heard.

Advocates of Deliberative Democracy champion spending limits, public finance, or citizen vouchers to lessen the influence of the wealth in political campaigns, but none of the proposals address the more fundamental problem that the wealthy enjoy more media access than the average citizen. Either directly, through ownership or sponsorship, or indirectly through association, they exert enormous influence on the media, shaping the terms of political discourse.

Even if media control is addressed, the wealthy still retain enormous political power to advance their partisan interests in other ways. They can advance the careers of those they seek to influence and provide access to other wealthy partisans. They can hire the best lawyers and consultants. The very liquidity of money allows it to flow where it needs to go to dominate the system to protect their interests and power.

In effect, Pettit, like so many Aristotle commentators, conflates the polarized and middle regimes. Aristotle identifies three problems that undermine political deliberation in the polarized city, the arrogance and domination of the rich, the servility of the poor, and the divergent interests of the rich and poor. Pettit only deals one aspect of the problem, advocating measures to overcome the debilitating effects of extreme poverty. However, he only addresses the corrupting influence of wealth in passing, offering no proposals to cope with it other than noting the challenge “to identify measure for effectively separating the worlds of government and business.”³⁷

Until massive wealth inequality is addressed, Pettit’s Republican vision remains a dream. In the polarized city, distinct interests undermine civic virtue and wealth inequality disrupts deliberation. One either has to accept with Aristotle that given inequality among citizens, faction is inevitable and its effects

can only be mitigated³⁸ or one has to become serious about addressing inequality, as Harrington does, if one is to hope for a more democratic and deliberative polity.

¹ On *pros hen* analogy, see G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," in I. Düring & G. E. L. Owen, ed., *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century* (Göteborg: Elanders, 1960) 163–90. G. E. L. Owen, "The Platonism of Aristotle," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 50 (1965) 125–50.

See also Christopher Shields, *Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the philosophy of Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). Julie Ward, *Aristotle on Homonymy: Dialectic and science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). However, Shields tries to restrict *pros hen* analogies to relations governed exclusively by the four causes, 111. Ward replaces Shields formal cause with exemplary cause, 85. Cf. Walter Leszl, *Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle* (Padova: Editrice Antenore, 1970) who claims that in focal meaning the must be a "strict ontological dependence (that which connects things with a different status)" 321. Aristotle is much more flexible and only requires some sort of priority (*Metaphysics* 4.2, 1004 a 29), as the case of friendship shows, where there is no causal dependence of the lesser kinds upon the perfect kind.

² Because commentators have not attended to the *pros hen* analogous relations between best regimes, they have variously identified each of the correct regimes as Aristotle's best.

For aristocracy as his best see Clifford Angell Bates, Jr., *Aristotle's "Best Regime": Kingship, democracy, and the rule of law* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003) 98. Robert Bartlett, "The Realism of Classical Political Science," *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (1994) 381–402, 387–8. Carrie-Anne Biondi, "Aristotle on the Mixed Constitution and its Relevance for American Political Thought," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 24 (2007) 176–98, 181. Trevor Saunders, "The *Politics*," in David Furley, ed., *Routledge History of Philosophy v. 2: From Aristotle to Augustine* (London: Routledge, 1999) 125–46, 133–4. See also Daniel Devereux, "Classical Political Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle," in George Klosko, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 96–119, 118.

For monarchy, see Liz Anne Alexander, "The Best Regimes of Aristotle's *Politics*," *History of Political Thought* 21 (2000) 189–216, 216. P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime," *Phronesis* 30 (1985) 249–73, 252. W. R. Newell, "Superlative Virtue: The problem of monarchy in Aristotle's *Politics*," in Carnes Lord & David O'Connor, ed., *Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) 191–211, 199 & 205. See also George Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, 1st ed. 1937) 104.

For polity or democracy, see Richard Kraut, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 360–1. Curtis Johnson, *Aristotle's Theory of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) 163. Pierre Aubenque, "Aristote et la Démocratie," in Pierre Aubenque & Alonso Tordesillas, ed., *Aristote Politique: Études sur la Politique d' Aristote* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993) 255–264, 264. Michel Narcy, "Aristote devant les Objections de Socrate a la Démocratie," in Pierre Aubenque & Alonso Tordesillas, ed., *Aristote Politique: Études sur la Politique d' Aristote* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993) 265–88, 271. For some combination, see Josiah Ober, "Aristotle's Natural Democracy," in Richard Kraut & Steven Skultetey, ed., *Aristotle's Politics: Critical essays* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) 223–243, 234 calls Aristotle's ideal state an "aristocratic democracy." Cf. Ober, *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual critics of popular rule* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) 310.

David Keyt, "Aristotle's Theory of Distributive Justice," in David Keyt & Fred Miller, Jr., ed., *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) 238–78, who claims "the one constitution that is best' is a genus whose species are absolute kingship and true aristocracy,"

257 n.43. Keyt's view is endorsed by Fred Miller, Jr., *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 193.

Bernard Yack, *The Problems of a Political Animal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) claims Aristotle favors a mixed regime, 236. See also Wayne Leys, "Was Plato Non-Political," in Gregory Vlastos, ed., *Plato: A collection of critical essays* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1971) 166–73, 172.

³ As Cynthia Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The invention of politics in democratic Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) points out, "the realm of the political must be circumscribed, and all men incapable of practical reason and virtue must be excluded," 270.

⁴ See Charles Kahn, "The Normative Structure of Aristotle's 'Politics'," in Günther Patzig, ed., *Aristoteles' 'Politik'* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990) 369–84: "But the insistence in Book *H* that all citizens will rule and be ruled in turn suggest that, in this theoretical vision, the distinction between polity and aristocracy simply lapses," 376.

⁵ On the distinction between the mixed and middle regime, see Curtis Johnson, "Aristotle's Polity: Mixed of middle constitution," *History of Political Thought* 9 (1988) 189–204, 199. As Robinson, *Politics*, 90, notes that it is difficult to see how a mixture of two deviant regimes can produce a correct regime. Robinson suggests that in book 4 Aristotle has abandoned the abstract classification of Book 3, in which correct regimes—monarchy, aristocracy, and polity—rule for the common good, while deviant regimes—tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy—rule for party interest (3.7, 1279 a 28–31). Aristotle has not "abandoned" the earlier classification, because he still sees oligarchy and democracy as ruling for party interest, but he is using the term polity in a derived sense, because it is a polity that is suited to less than ideal circumstances. Perfect polity is found in the ideal city, because all the citizens partake in the rule of the city for the common good, thus fitting the full definition of polity—rule by the many for the common good. The adapted sense of polity balances competing interests so as to avoid stasis and approximate rule for the common good.

⁶ *Machiavellian Moment: Florentine political thought and the Atlantic republican tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) 157.

⁷ Op. Cit., 185.

⁸ Op. Cit., 394.

⁹ *Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 147. See also J. C. Davis, "Pocock's Harrington: Grace, nature and art in the Classical Republican Tradition," *The Historical Journal* 24 (1981) 683–97.

¹⁰ John Pocock, *The Political Works of John Harrington* v. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 15.

¹¹ Pocock, Loc. Cit.; Arihiro Fukuda, *Sovereignty and the Sword: Harrington, Hobbes, and mixed government in the English civil wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 12 & 126.

¹² Alan Cromartie, "Harringtonian Virtue: Harrington, Machiavelli, and the method of the moment," *The Historical Journal* 41 (1998): 987–1009, 995.

¹³ John Wettergreen, "James Harrington's Liberal Republicanism." *Polity* (1988) 665–687, 685–6.

¹⁴ I. Bernard Cohen, "Harrington and Harvey: A theory of the state based on the new physiology." *Journal of the History of Ideas* (1994): 187–210.

¹⁵ Eric Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish sources and the transformation of European political thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) 78–83; Ronald Beiner, "James Harrington on the Hebrew Commonwealth," *The Review of Politics* 76 (2014) 169–193.

¹⁶ Charles Blitzer, *An Immortal Commonwealth: The political thought of James Harrington* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960) 290–1; Jonathan Scott, "The rapture of motion: James Harrington's republicanism," *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain* 139 (1993): 139–63, 162. For Neoplatonist influence, see William Diamond, "Natural philosophy in Harrington's political thought," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 16 (1978) 387–398, 391.

¹⁷ For Aristotle's influence, see Vivienne Brown, "Self-government: The master trope of Republican liberty," *The Monist* (2001) 60–76; James Cotton, "James Harrington as

Aristotelian,” *Political Theory* (1979): 371-389. However, neither Brown nor Cotton allude to the *pros hen* analogy at work in Aristotle’s theory.

¹⁸ All page references are to Pocock’s edition of Harrington’s political writings.

¹⁹ 461, from Aristotle, *Politics* 3.13, 1284 a 3–22.

²⁰ C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) 184–5. See also Andrew Lockyer, “Pocock’s Harrington,” *Political Studies* 28 (1980) 458–64, 461.

²¹ On the influence of Harrington’s agrarian in the Republican tradition, see Nelson, *Hebrew Republic*, 86–7.

²² *Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 129.

²³ 90–2.

²⁴ 52. For more on non-domination, see John Maynor, *Republicanism in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003) 35–60. Cf. Maurizio Viroli, *Republicanism*, Antony Shugaar, trans. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002) 35–43. For an account of Republicanism founded on autonomy, see Richard Dagger, *Civic Virtues: Rights, citizenship, and Republican Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 31,

²⁵ 35. Cf. Viroli, *Republicanism* 10.

²⁶ 187–90.

²⁷ 205.

²⁸ 259.

²⁹ 249.

³⁰ 190.

³¹ 245.

³² 158.

³³ 159 & 161.

³⁴ Martha Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities: The human development approach* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) 76 & 93. Cf. *Women and Human Development: The capabilities approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 73. Cf. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1996) who advocate a “social minimum” for opportunity, 218. Similarly, Frank Lovett argues that non domination requires an “unconditional basic income.” See “Domination and Distributive Justice,” *The Journal of Politics* 71 (2009) 817–30. Cass Sunstein calls for “minimum welfare entitlements,” in “Beyond the Republican Revival,” *The Yale Law Journal* 97 (1998) 1539–90, 1571.

³⁵ Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-first Century*, Arthur Goldhammer, trans. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2014) 23.

³⁶ http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/vital/VitalStats_t1.pdf. Downloaded 10/28/2014.

³⁷ 194.

³⁸ Cf. James Madison, *Federalist Papers* 10.