Plural policing and the safety–security nexus in urban governance: The expanded cohesion agenda in Malmö

[Forthcoming in special issue of Nordic Journal of Migration Research on ‘Planning for pluralism’ (eds. R. Gressgård and T.G. Jensen), 5(4) 2015]

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Abstract
Based on a study of policy frames in Malmö, this article discusses the safety–security nexus in urban governance. It argues that feelings of safety are constituted as an index of order, and that security politics becomes a means to this end. Security politics forms part and parcel of an expanded cohesion agenda that chain-links criminal justice, immigration control and integration. Urban security politics is not about order maintenance per se. The problem of security is about cancelling out the inherent dangers of circulation through coercive as well as empowering modes of power. The cohesion agenda involves plural forms of policing, enabled by partnership agreements between the police, local authorities as well as non-governmental actors. In conclusion, the article argues that the inherited structures and institutions of the welfare state seem to offer favorable conditions for plural policing in urban space.

Keywords
urban governance; safety–security nexus; expanded cohesion agenda; plural policing; partnership agreements

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In her critical analysis of recent tendencies in European urban governance, Margit Mayer (2012: 78) points out that ‘accelerating trends of privatization of public goods and services, proliferation of surveillance and policing measures, the spread of segregated zones, and the dismantling of municipal infrastructures have all contributed to … the vanishing of spaces for collectivization’. Concomitantly, discourses on social cohesion and civic integration have taken a stronghold in European governance in general, urban governance in particular. In the present article, focus of attention is on how discourses of cohesion link security to order and civic integration. I shall argue that security symbolizes political objectives of order and integration, and demonstrate how security politics is in many cases a means to an end,
namely, order (although security might be both a means and an end) (Hills 2009: 14, 216, 222).\(^1\) Yet, urban security politics is not all about order maintenance and risk management. Parallel to an expansive penal apparatus and disciplinary techniques of enclosure and control, many urban security initiatives seek to break down barriers and facilitate connectivity in a physical as well as a social sense. The problem of security, as Michel Foucault (2007: 65) defines it, is that of ‘allowing circulations to take place … but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out’. Accordingly, the planned development of the city is a matter of maximizing the positive elements and minimizing what is risky and inconvenient (while knowing that the negative elements will never be completely suppressed) (Foucault 2007: 19).\(^2\) Importantly, security politics aims to convert dangerous difference into prosperous diversity for the city (as a whole), thus serving the purposes of economic growth (pertaining to circulation) and social control (pertaining to order) at the same time (Gressgård 2015a/b/c). Or, as Dahlia Mukhtar-Landgren (2008: 162f., 2012) notes in her discussion of Swedish urban politics, the twofold goal of the politics of economic growth and the politics of internal cohesion is conjoined in the focus on security and safety.

In the first part of the article, I will probe into the safety–security nexus from a theoretical point of view, arguing that crime prevention has less to do with preventing people from violating the law and more to do with securing order in local areas that are considered to be disharmonious (McGhee 2003: 390). I intend to demonstrate, in accord with Mustafa Dikeç (2007), how practices of articulation (national and local policy documents, polls/statistics, media representations, spatial designations etc.) constitute urban spaces as objects of policy interventions. Precisely because the safety–security nexus relates to the broader environment of which it is a part, I will analyse demands for safety and security in relation to the conjoined political and economic context. Based on a study of policy frames in urban governance in Sweden, with a special focus on Malmö,\(^3\) I proceed to discuss – in Part II – how partnership programmes between the police and local authorities involve plural policing in in deprived, immigrant-dense areas of the city. Plural policing consists in a combination of force-based crime-fighting and crime prevention by way of empowerment programmes. My principal argument is that plural policing becomes the answer to social problems, while obscuring structural mechanisms of marginalization and covering over political antagonisms, as well as covering up ever more repressive security practices, such as excessive use of police force. In so far as the expanded social cohesion agenda entails a securitization of welfare in terms of crime prevention in designated areas, it renders entire
subpopulations legible as dangerous ‘others’ against which society – or the city – must be defended.

**Part I**

*Construing the city as an entity to be defended*

Images of the city as an entity to be defended are often established in discourses on competition, ‘rhetorically bolstered through recourse to the establishment of external enemies’ (Massey 2005: 158). The external enemies could for instance be other cities and regions that compete in the same marked, or it could be the national government which allegedly pursues a policy that privileges other national cities and regions at the cost of one’s own city, thus making the city less successful than it otherwise would be. In Malmö, such a message is conveyed in the former social democrat mayor (between 1994 and 2013), Ilmar Reepalu, who takes issue with the national government’s unwillingness to change the country’s asylum legislation that enables refugees to choose freely where to live while waiting for their asylum applications to be processed. In Reepalu’s view, the asylum legislation can be blamed for the city’s problem of segregation and, in effect, for raising the level of (organized) crime that threatens the inhabitants’ security and feeling of safety (Sydsvenskan 2012a, 2012b; cf. Dagens Arena 2012). In this line of reasoning, the cumulative effects of the asylum legislation (national immigration control) are segregated and criminalized ethnic minority communities that do not contribute to the city’s positive development.

To increase the city’s economic productivity and attractiveness, while decreasing street crime and unsocial behaviour, it is imperative that problematic and threatening difference gives way to more prosperous diversity. Accordingly, diversity is in Malmö City’s comprehensive plan and other policy documents depicted as a potential asset that fuels the city’s economy, provided that problems are converted into resources for the city (Malmö City Planning Office 2013; see also Gressgård 2015a/b). The corresponding view is that economic development for the city eventually benefits all inhabitants, including the least privileged subpopulations (Massey 2005). The city’s positive development is believed to hinge on security measures that come to grips with differences that impact negatively on the city as a whole. Ultimately, urban governance aims to recreate the urban characteristics that are needed for the city to be whole once again (Tunström and Bradley 2015: 77; cf. Gressgård 2015a/b).
The enemies of the city are hence not only – and not primarily – external enemies but include also unwanted migrants and minority groups in its midst.

**Security and the expanded cohesion agenda**

In urban politics across Europe, social cohesion is entangled with immigration regulation and prevention of immigrant-associated crime to make the city safer and more attractive. The link between criminal justice, immigration control and integration is perhaps less striking in Swedish cities than in many other cities, but the connection Reepalu makes between urban segregation (disintegration), immigration politics and crime in Malmö is indicative of an expanded social cohesion agenda that has evolved in Europe over the past decades. In a British context, Anne-Marie Fortier (2010) sees the prevalent chain-linking of criminal justice, immigration and civic integration as an expansion of the remit of cohesion from the management of diversity to involving the fight against crime and security threats. Willem Schinkel and Friso van Houdt (2010: 707) point to a similar nexus of immigrant integration and crime control in Dutch politics, manifested in a ‘safety chain’ of collaborative partners (e.g. the justice department, police, local municipality, housing corporations and citizens) that work together at the local level of the neighbourhood, especially where large number of so-called non-western migrants are ‘concentrated’. Because crime is regarded as a ‘social’ problem resulting from both lack of responsibility and lack of cultural adjustment and community, Dutch policy-makers have concurrently emphasized the need for ‘normative attachment’ to society and more ‘functional surveillance’ (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010: 708, 709; Schinkel and Van den Berg 2011). Based on an analysis of the turn to cohesion politics in France, Germany and the UK, Jan Dobbernack (2014: 128, 175) observes that the agenda setting around cohesion has extended the domain of problematic behaviour, accompanied by (discursively asserted and constructed) anxieties of declining levels of trust, decaying norms of collective conduct and loosening communal ties.

Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Aleksandra Ålund (2011: 56) note that Swedish policy documents echo contemporaneous cohesion discourses in the UK, the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe when arguing for cultural unity rather than for cultural plurality backed by equity or equality. To secure social cohesion, they critically comment, ‘a shared vision and sense of belonging must be extended to those who live “outside society”’ (Schierup and Ålund 2011: 56; cf. Dikeç 2007). Fortier (2010: 21) contends that politics aimed at increasing people’s attachment to a community entails not only a political will to unity in terms of an
oversimplified sense of shared belonging, but involves also a post-political framework of a ‘shared future vision’ (Fortier 2010: 24; cf. Gressgård 2015a/b; Tunström and Bradley 2015).

In Sweden, there has been a welfare state critique following an area of social-democratic dominance, accompanied by a gradual political reorientation from a ‘strong’ welfare state towards a politics that places much stress on civil society as a moral collectivity (see e.g. Kings 2011; Lozic 2010; Tunström and Bradley 2015). Whereas the traditional welfare state redistributed public goods and services to citizens on the basis of their given membership in ‘the social’ (where the social was identified with the nation-state), more recent neo-liberal governance is preoccupied with the building of responsible communities (O’Malley 2004: 74). This transformation of the state gestures towards a moralization of citizenship by which people are made personally responsible for their belonging to ‘the social’, which is particularly evident in the context of debate and policy on immigrant integration (Kofman 2005; O’Malley 2004; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). According to Schinkel and Van Houdt (2010: 697), the moralization of citizenship pertaining to cultural assimilationism is intertwined with the responsibilization of citizenship characteristic of neo-liberal form of governing. Moralization and responsibilization come together in transformations of the concept of citizenship with its emphasis on moralized notions of the ‘good’ or ‘active’ citizen. Another way of putting this – paraphrasing Pat O’Malley (2004: 74) – would be that the cultural assimilationist moralization of citizenship and the neo-liberal responsibilization of citizenship come together in social cohesion discourse with its emphasis on the responsibility people own to society and their communities. Community is thus not simply the territory of government but also a means of government (Cruikshank 1999: 93; Rose 1999).

We shall see below how community is promoted as a way of both preventing and combating crime, and how the supposed restoration of community is regarded as necessary for a smoothly functioning economy. In Part II, we shall see how collaborative authorities in Sweden have initiated preventive empowerment programmes with a view to enabling the formation of local community bonds and capabilities, in combination with intensified preemptive order enforcement by the police. First, however, I shall elaborate on how the security–safety nexus, through cohesion discourse, works to extrapolate from peoples’ fear of being attacked by criminals with an immigrant background to society being under attack as a whole by immigration.
Fear of disintegration, moralization of citizenship and order maintenance

Les Back and Shamser Sinha (2012: 140) argue that it is fear and insecurity that give the racism of today its affective energy and force, connecting the personal state with the battle to secure and defend society itself. By the same token – drawing on Engin Isin’s (2004) argument about the rise of a neurotic citizen – Fortier (2010: 22, 24) asserts that the expanded cohesion agenda evolves into a form of ‘governing through affect’: ‘Emotive responses are the subject of polls, and affect becomes a mode of categorising, classifying and coding responses that then define what needs attention from the government’. She makes it clear that cohesion politics is centered on the subjects’ desires to belong on the one hand, and their emotive responses to perceived threats to cohesion, safe living etc. on the other. Subjective fear of crime and disintegration pertaining to immigration is thus at the core of cohesion discourse (Dobbernack 2014: 95, 128, 162; McGhee 2003: 380, 390).

As of 2006, the Swedish government has commissioned the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet – BRÅ), with the assistance of Statistics Sweden, to conduct an annual survey on people’s felt security and vulnerability to crime (based on approximately 15,000 respondents between 16 and 79 years old from the general population of Sweden) (Statistics Sweden 2013a). The Swedish Crime Survey, as it is also called, focuses on inhabitants’ attitudes to – and experiences of – victimization, fear of crime and confidence in the justice system. Among the questions are: ‘Were you threatened last year in such a way that you were frightened?’; ‘Are you anxious about crime in society?’ and ‘What is the extent of your confidence in the way the police carry out their work?’ (BRÅ 2013a). Malmö City and the police also conduct their own annual survey on the security–safety situation in various urban districts, supplemented by other polls that map inhabitants’ experiences of – and attitudes to – issues of safe living. In addition to experienced safety, these surveys focus on risk factors that are believed to impact negatively on people’s conduct and – by way of cumulative effect – pose a security risk to the city (as a whole). As will be taken up in Part II, the safety–security nexus manifests itself in so-called plural policing strategies: collaborative crime-fighting efforts that involve the police and various governmental and non-governmental actors (Jones and Newburn 2006a). Suffices it to say at this point that the results of the safety–security surveys are disseminated to the public through local media (such as Malmö City’s monthly newsletter, Vårt Malmö (Our Malmö), which is delivered to all households for free), and that the police and local authorities comment on the results to ease people’s fear of risks brought about by, among other things, immigration.
In line with Fortier (2010), it could be argued that the questionnaires are designed to address an anxious and affective subject, and that people’s fears and anxieties are being rationalized through cohesion discourse. It is also possible to argue that the measurement of inhabitants’ felt safety, fear of crime etc. is indicative of a new type of xenophobia pertaining to fear of disintegration. Bryan Turner (2007: 300) takes the idea of a new xenophobia to be part of a modern culture of fear, maintaining that ‘[t]he essential political condition xenophobia is a situation in which the majority feels that it is under attack’. As indicated above, migrants and ethnic minorities might be portrayed as refusing injunctions to care for the neighbourhood and the nation due to their supposed lack of attachment to geographical communities – their alleged lack of feelings of solidarity and loyalty (Erel 2011). As long as crime reports and apocryphal story-telling (moral panics) about risks brought about by immigration play on the intertwined registers of safety and security (see e.g. Fitzgerald and Smoczynski 2015; Schierup and Ålund 2011; Skey 2011), feelings of (un)safety can figure as an index of (dis)order, and security politics – which includes control of urban space – can be carried out as a means to this end.5

Didier Fassin (2013: xv) is among the critical scholars who have identified a shift in recent years from law enforcement to enforcing order in urban security politics. This shift entails regulation of certain territories (disadvantaged neighborhoods) and the taming of certain (racialized and gendered) populations. Focus of attention is on ‘failed populations’ in so-called failed neighbourhoods, defect places, security hot spots, combat zones or the like (see also Amin 2007, 2012; Dikeç 2007; Dobbernack 2014; Fassin 2013; Garland 2001; Joppe 2007; Schierup et al. 2014; Schierup and Ålund 2011; Van Steden and Huberts 2006; Wacquant 2008a). It should be noted, however, that order enforcement is a projection of an order more than an imposition of order on the given (Castel 1991: 295). The point to be made is that the designation of ‘populations at risk’ in places ‘out of control’ serves to construe specific spaces as objects of policy interventions (Dikeç 2007).

Part II

Plural policing by way of preemptive and preventive crime-fighting
The police are vested with statutory powers, over and above those of the ordinary citizen, which allow them to use force in their exercise of crime-fighting tasks. These powers may be
extended under special circumstances, for instance in urban areas designated as hot spots. I shall refer to such force-based crime-fighting as *preemptive*, characterized by a ‘will to power’. On the other hand, the police are involved in a number of crime *preventive* practices that do not involve force and restraining control, but contain a strong social element, characterized by a ‘will to empower’ vulnerable groups and individuals (Cruikshank 1999).

In the remaining part of the article, I shall draw attention to co-operation agreements between the police and local authorities, probing into how collaborative efforts combine preemptive and preventive crime-fighting through plural policing. Using Malmö as a case in point, I shall elaborate on how the ‘will to power’ is embedded in the ‘will to empower’, and how coercive policing become entangled in inclusive (or rather cohesive) ‘social’ policing (cf. Gressgård 2015c). I am concerned with the ways in which ‘social’ interventions in governance of crime is expanded to incorporate repressive policing, and how these new assemblages entail a transformation of welfare politics towards security politics within an extended cohesion agenda: how a long-established welfare state tradition focusing on ‘social’ issues have become enmeshed in crime prevention programmes in specific urban districts.

**Partnerships against crime**

There has been a gradual change in the policing landscape, in and beyond the heartlands of social democracy. A number of hybrid forms of crime-fighting strategies are emerging, especially in big cities, and the importance of partnerships in the provision of policing services and community safety is growing steadily (Jones and Newburn 2006b). ‘Partnerships in policing’ signal that the authorities wish to spread responsibility for public safety and security across society. Responsibility for crime prevention is devolved to a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors with a view to engender the spirit of community responsibility and active citizenship described above. Although the responsibility for safety and security is less dispersed in Sweden than in many other countries (Amin 2013), and despite that the social stance in crime prevention is still strong because of the longstanding welfare state tradition of governance, Sweden has witnessed a rapid increase in partnerships in policing in recent years.

The Swedish national Inspection report, *Police and Municipality Collaboration* (Samverkan polis och kommun) (BRÅ 2013b), underscores the importance of local crime prevention initiatives, such as the local councils for crime prevention. Crime prevention is generally understood as ‘activities that the police carry out in collaboration with other actors
or independently in order to prevent or hamper commitment of crime, criminal actions or breach of the peace’ (BRÅ 2013b: 7, my translation). The Inspection report concedes that this broad definition of crime prevention – aimed at increasing safety and preventing crime – is problematic because the relationship between safety and security is not clarified; it is just assumed (BRÅ 2013b: 35). Nevertheless, the new safety–security nexus is depicted as a robust and ‘holistic’ basis for the cities’ security politics. The overall focus is on how to improve police responses to crime, rather than questioning the broader effects of policing and the idea that policing is about safety and security for all (Lamble 2013: 239f.).

Like other Swedish municipalities, the city administration of Malmö and the local police have initiated a joint security–safety agreement called Malmö – A Safe and Secure City (Malmö – en trygg och säker stad), running from 2012 to 2016 (succeeding the Five Focal Points for Increased Safety in Malmö (Fem Fokus för ökad trygghet i Malmö) from 2011). The agreement states that it is the task for the police to decrease dangers that make people feel unsafe, alongside crime prevention that take place in collaboration with governmental and non-governmental actors (Malmö City 2012). In accordance with the expanded cohesion agenda outlined in Part I, the preventive measures aim to activate citizens and increase their feelings of trust, confidence, belonging etc. Under the rubric ‘Long-term sustainable collaboration’, it is argued that for the collaboration to work, the collaborating parties have to trust one another, develop a common view of their work and deploy a common vocabulary (Malmö City 2012; see also Gressgård 2015a/b).

Swedish urban security politics is inspired by the so-called Manchester model, which combines preemptive enforcement activities, such as crackdowns, with long-term interventions to prevent youngsters from being recruited to criminal networks (based on problem-oriented principles) (Bullock and Tilley 2008: 40). Police enforcement activities are meant for non-cooperative individuals who have been offered help and support to remain clear from offending and gang membership but who in spite of all that continue to offend. The enforcement activities function as an authoritarian threat behind the care-oriented preventive measures undertaken by other agencies. This is by some involved actors described as a ‘carrot and stick’ dynamics (Bullock and Tilley 2008: 40), resembling the power of surveillance described by Frantz Fanon (1986: 117): ‘As long as everything went well, he was praised to the skies, but look out, no nonsense, under any condition!’

Crime-fighting programmes in Sweden are tailored to the same pattern as the British, but Swedish plural policing is to a greater extent based on – and legitimized by – scientific
knowledge. The Swedish crime-fighting programmes utilize statistical data from Statistics Sweden and other commissioned research that alternately focus on subjective safety issues and pinpoint conditions liable to produce crime – so-called social risk factors. It is hardly surprising that the Swedish programmes have a significantly stronger focus on social factors than their British counterparts, given the welfare state tradition. There is a persistent focus on social problems and a robust faith in the social sciences and their professions, including social work, which attribute crime to social and psychological causes (O’Malley 2004: 42). However, when social factors are put on the political agenda, the framing of expertise knowledge tends to shift from welfare to crime prevention, designating ‘populations at risk’ and emphasizing self-governing subjects aided by an empowering, enabling state (O’Malley 2004: 57, 59, 62ff.; cf. Castel 1991). As indicated above, empowerment programmes and services are designed to prevent problems before they emerge by making targeted populations into active citizens who take responsibility for their choices and actions (see e.g. Borch 2005; Dahlstedt 2008; Dobbernack 2014). And alongside the preventive programmes, punitive surveillance, counter-insurgency and other repressive policing methods have become more prevalent (see e.g. Schierup et al. 2014; Schierup and Ålund 2011).

This is not to suggest that empowerment programmes are repressive policing in disguise. Rather, it is to argue that the ‘will to power’ is embedded in the ‘will to empower’ vulnerable populations and individuals. Attached to the preventive practices of responsibilization of subjects (who have been offered choices) is the blaming and sanctioning – the threat of penalization and incapacitating – of those who are ‘unwilling’ to comply with the norms of the inclusive, enabling state (Du Gay 2000: 120; Miller and Rose 2008: 105). However, the judgments about behaviours of ‘others’ and the involvement of civil society in crime prevention is not to be confused with the more common citizen participation/activation programmes and community policing schemes (Monahan ed. 2006). As will become clear in the following, crime prevention in Sweden is a continuation more than a break with a long-established welfare tradition. Indeed, welfare is – in the words of Tove Dannestam (2008: 364) – often used as a rationale for legitimizing interventions that otherwise might be seen as controversial. We shall see that the social inclusion of ‘good’, responsible citizens is conditioned on symbolic and often spatial exclusion of ‘bad’ citizens or non-citizens who do not belong to the city (or society) – who do not have the ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre 1996/1969). What we see in Malmö is an affective mobilization of responsible people who
belong to the city against internal and external enemies. This, in turn, serves to construe the city as an entity to be defended.

**Collaborative efforts in Malmö**

One example of collaborative efforts in Malmö is the campaign ‘Heja Malmö!’, which took place in 2012. The campaign blog urged the city’s inhabitants to ask for a receipt when buying alcohol or taking a taxi in order to undermine ‘the black economy’ associated with criminal gangs and networks. The slogan ‘Heja Malmö!’ is an encouragement to join in the cheers: ‘Come on, Malmö!’ The campaign attempts to create enthusiasm and love for the city by promising ‘a good strong dose of Malmö love’ (Heja Malmö website 2012; Vårt Malmö 2012a). One of the campaign blog headings was ’We love our city’ – a common statement from the then-mayor and social democrat, Reepalu, and the leader of the conservative, oppositional party at the time, Anja Sonesson. On behalf of the municipality, the politicians promised to do whatever they can, in collaboration with the police, to prevent youngsters from being recruited by the criminal networks, but they need help from the local community:

> Together with the police, we will support persons who want to change their life style and leave their criminal life behind ... But even here we need help from Malmö’s inhabitants, associations and businesses that want to back up the youth with support, work experience placement and employment ... We love our city. And to the criminal gangs we say in unison: You are not welcome in our lovely Malmö!’ (Heja Malmö website 2012).

The campaign blog and leaflet also established that civilians are the best detectives – in popular discourse called ‘The detective civil society’ (*Detektiven Allmänheten*) – when it comes to reporting and combating crime. An interviewed police officer, cited under the heading ‘The best detective is oneself’ (*Själv är bästa detektiv*), commented that the police are increasingly tipped by people who suspect crime or observe criminal activities. On the other hand, he explained, there are groups of people who do not feel that they belong to society and therefore do not feel solidarity. It’s about loyalty and what people identify with, he concluded (Heja Malmö website; Vårt Malmö 2012a).

There have also been other collaborative efforts that address ‘the black economy’ in Malmö. One example is a programme that targets illegal businesses which are considered to form a major part of the city’s crime scene (Sydsvenskan 2011a). This crime-fighting effort
includes collaboration with the tax authorities but is chiefly concerned with preemptive crime-fighting in urban micro-places, so-called hot spots, where the risk of crime is considered to be particularly high. In the summer of 2011, the police set off in pursuit of the criminal gangs in the street Norra Grängesbergsgatan, a street in the southern inner city dominated by small migrant-run businesses and minority associations and clubs, some of them illegal (in popular discourse referred to as 'black clubs'). The city authorities gave the police permission to close the street for traffic between 9 pm and 5 am, and those who did not comply with the restrictions risked having their cars searched by the police (Polisen website 2011). In an interview with the local newspaper, Sydsvenskan, the commander-in-chief of the programme declared that the police will be more visible in this particular area of the city, and the undercover police will actively target Malmö’s criminal underworld. According to the newspaper article, this is an established method; other streets have previously been closed for traffic during night time to prevent street prostitution. The article also listed a number of other criminal acts that are associated with ‘the underworld’, including shootings, rapes, trafficking, attacks and assassinations by explosives. The crime-fighting strategy has had a smoothing effect on the whole area, the police representative reassured (Sydsvenskan 2011b), thereby suggesting that ordinary citizens have reason to feel safe when visiting or residing the previously dangerous neighbourhoods.

The above examples illustrate that incivility is associated with criminal networks (consisting mainly of so-called alienated young men with immigrant or ethnic minority background) that pose a threat to ‘our city’ and jeopardize the inhabitants’ safety. The appeal to the city’s inhabitants – here used as a generic term – reflects a view of civil society as basically homogenous and, as a whole, worthy of protection from destructive forces (Mayer 2012: 74). Through interpellation, the campaign seeks to engage civil society; it uses a narrative of belonging to mobilize people for the city, against criminal gangs and networks. The campaign thus affectively plays upon and exacerbate distinctions between loyal inhabitants worthy of protection, and failed citizens or non-citizens who are either figured as disloyal (feel no solidarity), or the cause of insecurity (and therefore must be controlled) (Lamble 2013: 231). The latter category should either be voluntarily enrolled in empowering programmes, or – alternatively – forcefully excluded, in accordance with the politicians’ proclamation that criminal gangs are not welcome in ‘our city’. As for the safety–security nexus, we could infer that when civilians are made into detectives, suspicion of crime is inevitably directed towards targeted groups of people in specific areas of the city. It also
seems pertinent to note that the marginalization of so-called failed neighbourhoods associated with failed citizens and non-citizens (in a moral register) is more or less disconnected from wider structures and processes in society (Schierup and Ålund 2011: 55, 57; Tunström and Bradley 2015: 78).

In a similar vein, the second example demonstrates how policies of security identify ethnic minority populations and immigration with criminal activities such as illegal businesses, prostitution, drug offences, violence etc. (Turner 2007: 289) – in short, the criminal ‘underworld’ that threatens ‘our city’ and make people feel unsafe in immigrant-dense areas. The designation ‘underworld’ signals that those who belong to this world exist outside of society; they do not belong to society. Taken together, the examples illustrate how (community) cohesion and integration issues are tied in with criminal justice. Media stories about the criminal underworld serve to produce spaces of intervention, thus giving legitimacy to special security measures in immigrant-dense areas. According to Mats Franzén (2001: 206), the general decline of the welfare state is being compensated for by the police’s extended authority to use situational crime-fighting techniques ‘directly aimed at inhibiting criminal and other threatening acts in particular spaces’. Most importantly for purposes of our argument, ‘social’ policing in terms of crime prevention makes it virtually impossible to discern between regular welfare politics and security politics in particular urban spaces.

The conflation of welfare politics and security politics blurs the boundary between police interventions based on concrete suspicion of crime and ‘social’ interventions that target whole subpopulations of emplaced and unprivileged people of minority background. As Robert Castel (1991: 288) notes, it is no longer necessary to manifest symptoms of dangerousness to be suspected; ‘it is enough to display whatever characteristics the specialists responsible for the definition of preventive policy have constituted as risk factors’. This, in turn, entails a potentially infinite multiplication of the possibilities for intervention (Castel 1991: 289). In line with Castel, Schierup et al. (2014: 7, 12) maintain that ‘socially marginalised places have become stigmatised and criminalised and it is enough to live in or to be present in a certain area to be subject to control’. Likewise, Kristian Borch (2005: 154, 156) questions the intertwining of public health promotion and crime prevention in Danish welfare politics, arguing that this entanglement considerably expands the field of preventive interventions. This is particularly the case in empowerment programmes that take spatially defined communities to be – by reference to John Pløger (2002) – moral unities that normatively regulate the inhabitants, accompanied by physical planning that encourages
specific forms of (responsible) conduct (Borch 2005: 169). Regarding the safety–security nexus, Borch (2005: 159) points out that people’s fear of crime can of course never be completely eliminated and safety never guaranteed entirely. The preoccupation with safety – manifested in safety polls etc. – therefore paves the way for endless critique of defective interventions, alongside demands for new and more effective security measures.10

**Partnerships for urban prosperity and attractiveness**

At this juncture, it is important to emphasize that policing in terms of punitive paternalism (at the bottom) is tied in with practices of economic liberalism (at the top) (Wacquant 2008b: 203). For instance, the above-mentioned national Inspection report assumes that the municipalities want their inhabitants to be safe because that makes the municipalities more attractive to new businesses, investments and people looking for jobs. This is a crucial argument, the report states, because it makes the municipalities more willing to co-fund the safety surveys (BRÅ 2013b: 33). Malmö is not included in Inspection report, but Sweden’s second largest city, Gothenburg, is among the evaluated municipalities. The Gothenburg partnership agreement is interesting both because it draws on the above-mentioned Manchester model and because it explicitly links security politics to the city’s overall development. It establishes that the collaboration between the police and other actors will contribute to a positive development of vulnerable urban districts through a combined focus of safety, employment, education and economic growth from a ‘holistic’ point of view. A positive development in all the involved areas (designated as ‘improvement areas’) is, according to the document, conditioned upon their inclusion in the development of the city as a whole, as well as that of the region (Gothenburg City 2010; BRÅ 2013b: 20ff.).11

With regard to the ‘holistic’ view on urban governance, it should be noted that partnership agreements are without a clear point of fixation. In contrast to the pre-determined purposes of traditional welfare politics, Niels Å. Andersen (2008: 122) remarks, openings are constantly created for initiations of new function systems (legal system, educational system, political system, care system, economic system etc.) in relation to a project or a programme. Quasi-contractual partnership agreements flexibly seek out possibilities for new couplings, and their open character create particular visions of the problems to be solved, not to mention post-political visions and ideas of the common future (Andersen 2008: 115; Fortier 2010; Gressgård 2015a/b; Tunström and Bradley 2015). This is indicated by the emphasis in *Malmö – A Safe and Secure City* on the importance of developing a common view and deploying a
common vocabulary. According to O’Malley (2004: 64, 71), (neo-liberal) critics of (traditional welfare state) bureaucracy imagine a different way of governing the future that embraces the intuitive, daring and imaginative; the future is waiting to be formed by the power of will and imagination, as it were. So, rather than representing dead (contract) texts that can gradually become fixed through interpretation (Andersen 2008: 123), partnership agreements appear to be about imagination. Most importantly, visionary planning aimed at moulding and strengthen a shared identity leave little room for political struggle or ideological battle (cf. Baeten 2012; Dannestam 2008; Gressgård 2015a/b; Nylund 2014), while at the same time constituting specific spaces and populations as a form of exteriority that menaces the integrity of the city or society (Dikeç 2007: 172).

**Conclusion**

We have seen that the police and various local authorities in Malmö seek to develop a common view of their work – a common future vision for the city’s development – based on quasi-contractual trust and a view of the city as an entity. Urban governance seeks to ‘holistically’ facilitate connectivity in terms of couplings between various actors, ultimately aimed at recreating the urban characteristics that are needed for the city to be whole. This holistic ambition obscures structural mechanisms of marginalization and covers over political antagonisms (contestations, struggles etc.), as well as covering up incapacitating policing.

Regarding partnership in policing, the above discussion has demonstrated how crime-fighting efforts combine preemptive techniques (‘will to power’), such as surveillance and crackdowns, with crime prevention (‘will to empower’). The latter addresses on social causes of crime and involves confidence-based community work and other supporting measures aimed at empowering people at risk of becoming criminals. However successful such initiatives might be, police involvement in ‘social’ interventions inevitably blurs the boundaries between welfare politics and security politics. The conflation of welfare and crime prevention is not an entirely new phenomenon, however; crime prevention has for a long time been integral to social-democratic welfare politics (Borch 2005). Nevertheless, as the safety–security nexus has become more articulated in policy documents, notably in the new partnership agreements between the police and local authorities, new possibilities of intervention are opened up, including new possibilities for repressive policing.

Although an important part of my argument has been that the ‘will to power’ is embedded in the ‘will to empower’, main focus has been on how ‘social’ issues have become
enmeshed in crime prevention programmes. I have argued that people of ethnic minority background who happen to live in deprived neighbourhoods are targeted for crime prevention, not on the basis of concrete imputations of dangerousness, but because their marginalized status in society is coded as a security threat. We have seen that emplaced minority groups are cast as potentially dangerous populations on the basis of a combination of factors liable to produce risk (Castel 1991: 288; Schinkel and Van den Berg 2011: 1924).

As for the safety–security nexus, I have argued that cohesion discourse extrapolates from people’s fear of being personally attacked by criminals of ethnic minority background to society (or the city) being under attack as a whole. Mediated stories about the criminal underworld versus ordinary citizens (who are loyal and love their city) affectively play upon distinctions between the inhabitants worthy of protection on the one hand, and enemies of the city who are figured as the cause of people’s feelings of insecurity on the other. The examples from Malmö demonstrate that the safety–security nexus constitutes a vital part of the expanded cohesion agenda which discursively interconnects security, criminal justice and issues of immigration and integration.

Moreover, I have argued that under the expanded cohesion agenda, crime prevention has less to do with preventing people from violating the law and more to do with securing order (Fassin 2013). This is not to say, however, that security is all about controlling disadvantaged neighborhoods and taming ‘populations at risk’. We have seen that security politics serves the purposes of economic growth (pertaining to circulation) and social control (pertaining to order) at the same time. Neither is it to say that concerns over public order have given priority to security over welfare, as Bryan Turner (2007: 295) suggests in a British context. In the Swedish case, there is evidently no contradiction between enforcing order and providing welfare (in a transmuted form) (cf. Baeten 2012: 26; Dannestam 2008). The inherited institutions and infrastructures of the social-democratic welfare state seem, on the contrary, to offer favorable conditions for plural policing in urban space.

Acknowledgement
I am grateful to Aleksandra Ālund, Lisa Kings and Kari Anne Drangsland for having commented on earlier versions of this article. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
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1 Alice Hills (2009: 12) writes: ‘Colloquially, order implies a degree of predictability, regularity and stability to social and political relationships, institutions and behaviours. Ideally, it refers to arrangements that ensure that each element in a political whole is arranged in equilibrium according to a known scheme, and that each has a
proper function … order requires the existence of an agreed set of rules; order refers to orderly and predictable
procedures…’.

2 The distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ is instructive in this context: whereas uncertainty often denotes
events that are not statistically predictable and forecasting methods that are not based calculation (i.e. estimation
of the possible), the term risk normally implies probabilistic prediction (typical of order maintenance) (O’Malley
2004: 3ff.).

3 The work on this article was conducted within the research project ‘Planning for pluralism in Malmö’
(PLANPLUR), supported by a research grant from the Meltzer fund, University of Bergen. The empirical part of
the article refers mainly to local media reports and various local and national policy documents published
between 2011 and 2015, but the empirical material of the entire PLANPLUR study included stakeholder
meetings, public debates, city walks, film screenings, exhibitions, briefings, blogs, residents posting comments,
media debates etc. between the pre-launching of Malmö’s comprehensive plan in 2011, when it was circulated
for public comment, and its official approval by the Malmö City Executive Board in 2013 (see Gressgård
2015a/b).

4 According to Katarina Nylund (2014: 52), the concept of social cohesion was introduced for the first time in
Malmö’s recent comprehensive plan (Malmö City Planning Office 2013). However, the security politics
associated with cohesion discourse is not new; it has evolved since the mid 1980s in Scandinavian countries (see
e.g. Borch 2005). Cohesion discourse has now probably reached its pinnacle in European politics (Dobbernack
2014), but in some parts of European governance, including Swedish urban politics, the cohesion discourse is
still gaining ground.

5 Interestingly, the Swedish generic term for authorities that maintain law and order, including the police, is
‘ordningsmakt’, which literally means ‘order-force’, and the term for crowd controller is ‘ordningsvakt’, which
literally means ‘order-watch’. (To work as a crowd controller, one has to be certified by the police.)

6 Here, the ‘will to power’ is associated with the exercise of coercive power, as distinct from Nietzsche’s
conceptualization of will to power in terms of a primordial force (Kraft). It involves exercising authority over
others through constraining techniques of power, centered on prohibitions and disciplinary rules, as distinct from
powers of (self)regulation by way of empowerment.

7 The distinction I make between preemptive and preventive crime-fighting strategies converges with the
conventional distinction between reactive and pro-active policing inasmuch as preemptive policing include
techniques characteristic of reactive policing. However, both preemptive and preventive policing are pro-active in that they are aimed at preventing crime from taking place.

8 Similarly, Tijen Uguris (2004) notes that urban governance in London in the late 1990s was based on a philosophy of empowerment of groups and individuals so that they become active agents of change, but this ‘will to empower’ vulnerable groups of people through encouragement was just one side of the coin in Tony Blair’s ‘welfare crusade’, since those who failed to satisfy the demands of the self-help initiatives were penalized.

9 People who want to ‘leave their criminal life behind’ are eligible for support from Malmö’s Consultation Team (Malmö’s Konsultationsteam), which is a collaboration between Malmö City, the police, local crime prevention authorities (Kriminalvården) and a national institution for crime prevention among youths (Statens Institutionsstyrelse) (Vårt Malmö 2012b: 3; see also Malmö City 2014).


11 In Gothenburg, the collaborations have been established within the frame of ‘Partnership for local Development Agreement’ (Partnerskapet för lokalt utvecklingsavtal, LUA), which is sponsored by the government’s work on urban development, and co-funded by EU. Involved are also the Council for Safer and more Human-friendly Gothenburg (Rådet för Tryggare Mänskligare Göteborg) and the steering group of Knowledge Centre against Organized Crime (Styrgrupp för Kunskapscenter mot organiserad brottslighet) (BRÅ 2013b: 20).