

Urban Marginality in Times of Economic Crisis and Welfare State Austerity: A Comparative Analysis between Malmö and Genoa.

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Abstract. The degree of resurgence of the issue of urban marginality in national social policy debates does not seem to be associated with the magnitude of crisis-related problems in different EU countries. The paper explores this seeming contradiction and, following Loïc Wacquant, explains urban marginality as a phenomenon independent from the economic cycle and whose characteristics are ultimately determined by the macro-scale arrangements of welfare states. In particular, the paper develops a comparison between Malmö and Genoa, two port-cities with similar urban histories but with considerable differences in their patterns of social polarization. The post-industrial transformation of Malmö resulted in the exclusion of a large proportion of immigrants from the labour market and in their spatial concentration in certain distressed neighbourhoods. The increase in immigration to Genoa instead led to an ethnic segmentation of the labour market but also to a decrease in the level of residential segregation.

1. Introduction

Although the impact of the global financial crisis differed cross-nationally, immigrants have been particularly exposed to the worsening of economic conditions in all EU countries. Immigrants tend to be overrepresented in sectors which are more sensitive to business cycles, to be employed in less secure jobs than natives and, for this reason, to be more vulnerable to layoffs in periods of economic downturn (OECD, 2009; OECD, 2011a). The global financial crisis is also expected to exacerbate the competition in domestic labour markets between natives (and earlier immigrants) and newcomers, to lead to an intensification of exclusionary and discriminatory practices against immigrants and to increase the potential for xenophobic political mobilization (Castles, 2011; Castles, 2012).

Interestingly enough, the recent rise in importance of immigration-related issues in national policy agendas does not seem to be associated with the gravity of crisis-related labour market problems in EU countries. For instance, in Sweden and Italy the level of public attention to immigration issues does not seem to be related to the level of exposure of these countries to the global financial crisis.

Italy is one of the EU countries which have been hit hardest by the recession and it had also been one of the main recipients of immigration flows to the EU in the period prior to the crisis. In the aftermath of the recession, Berlusconi's government enacted a very restrictive "Law on Security" (Law No. 94/2009) which redefined unauthorized immigration from administrative irregularity to criminal offence (Di Martino et al., 2013). The centre-right coalition did not seem nevertheless to succeed to exploit immigration as an electoral issue, as shown by the record low support for populist parties at the general elections of February 2013. In fact, in contrast to previous electoral cycles, immigration remained a marginal issue during the last electoral campaign.

Sweden has been internationally celebrated for its fast capacity of recovery from the crisis and for experiencing one of the strongest economic growths in the EU. While Italy shifted towards a more restrictive immigration policy, Sweden instead liberalized its labour immigration policy in 2008 in order to facilitate recruitment of workers from outside the EU (OECD, 2011b)¹. Although Sweden did not face the same crisis-related problems as Italy, recent political debates have been dominated by an anti-immigration drive which was fuelled by the electoral growth of the xenophobic party of the Sweden Democrats. When this party doubled its votes in the 2010 elections and entered for the first time into the Swedish parliament, it was clear that, although Swedish immigration policies continued to be seen internationally as a model (Wiesbrock, 2011), they had become subject of criticism by a significant part of the population. Immigration became a major political issue in the political agenda also because, in the aftermath of the crisis, Sweden was shaken by a wave of youth riots which took place in many immigrant-dense neighbourhoods of the largest metropolitan areas (from Rosengård in Malmö in December 2008 to Husby in Stockholm in May 2013).

The parallel developments in the two countries seem to add evidence to Loïc Wacquant's hypothesis that, in post-industrial societies, urban marginality tends to be a phenomenon "increasingly disconnected from cyclical fluctuations and global trends in the economy" (Wacquant, 2008:236). The aim of this paper is to develop further this hypothesis about the disconnection between the emergence of urban marginality and business cycles by comparing Malmö and Genoa, a Swedish and an Italian port city which, in the last three decades, have followed parallel trajectories of urban restructuring, as a consequence of the decline of the shipbuilding industry. The two cities display similar urban structures and have also experienced similar changes in their population as a consequence of a sharp increase in immigration. However, these similarities are accompanied by considerable differences in patterns of social polarization.

¹ Since that year, Swedish trade unions lost their veto power and, therefore, cannot limit the number of immigrant workers admitted in the country.

The paper is structured as follows. The second section reviews the debate about the relationship between the level of welfare state development and the degree of social polarization in cities. Following Wacquant, it is argued that a key determinant of differences in the patterns of social polarization needs to be identified in the institutional settings of welfare systems which operate as “major producers and shapers of urban inequality and marginality” (267). The comparative analysis between Malmö and Genoa is then developed in the third and the fourth section. In particular, the third section describes how, in the first post-war decades, the two cities followed parallel paths of urban and demographic development as a consequence of their dependence on port-related activities. The fourth section instead explains how the post-industrial transformation of the two cities has been associated with substantial differences in the ways in which immigrants are incorporated into their urban restructuring economies. Discussions and conclusions follow in the fifth and last section.

2. The welfare state as a ‘generator’ of urban marginality

A great deal of urban research focused on the relationship between immigration and economic restructuring in Western cities. For instance, according to Wilson, in Northern American cities, economic restructuring engendered a social polarization between those who are employed and a jobless and welfare dependent ‘underclass’ living in areas of concentrated poverty (Wilson, 1987; Wilson, 1996). According to the theorists of the ‘global city’, the post-industrial transformation of cities would have instead led to the growth of a low-skilled service sector which, in turn, operated as a magnet for international immigration flows (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Sassen, 1991; Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991).

Many European scholars criticized these ‘demand-side’ accounts of social polarization for ignoring the role played by European welfare states in curtailing the emergence of ‘dualisms’ within the labour market, or between those inside and those outside of it, as well as in preventing the creation of residential ghettos (Hamnett, 1994; Hamnett, 1996; Préteceille, 2000; Häußermann and Haila, 2005). In particular, the absence of ghettos in European cities has been seen as a feature inhibiting tensions between ethnic groups and preventing the erosion of the social fabric of cities (e.g., Goldsmith, 2000).

The main problem with the European ramification of the social polarization debate is that it has mainly gravitated around the hypothesis of the existence of a trade-off between the level of welfare state development and the degree of social polarization in cities. Accordingly, in comparative urban studies, the diversity in social polarization has been usually explained in relation to the type of

(national) welfare regime and, implicitly, to level of ‘generosity’ of social policies (e.g., Murie, 1998).

More recently, in *Urban Outcasts*, Loïc Wacquant provided an alternative account of the importance of welfare states for social polarization. According to Wacquant, post-industrialization resulted in the demise of the socially-integrative properties of labour markets and in the creation of a new type of (‘advanced’) urban marginality, whose growth dynamics tend to be disconnected from fluctuations in the economic cycle. At the same time, the welfare state would have become “a generative and not merely as a remedial institution, a force that not only can cure but paradoxically coproduces (and can therefore better pre-empt) the very problems of which neighbourhoods of relegation are at once receptacle, crucible and emblem” (Wacquant, 2008:270). Therefore, according to Wacquant, welfare states do not prevent the emergence of urban marginality in post-industrial societies but they ultimately operate as (‘generative’) mechanisms of social (and spatial) sorting which determine its characteristics in different urban contexts.

Indeed, recent developments in Italy and Sweden seem, on the one hand, to indicate the absence of correlation between economic growth and the manifestation of urban marginality and, on the other, to challenge the hypothesis that a well-developed welfare state (like the Swedish one) may function as an ‘antidote’ for social polarization.

In the last years, in Sweden, political debates have rather focused on those that are increasingly perceived as ‘negative’ consequences of generous welfare provisions. In fact, conservative politicians and think-tank affiliated commentators succeeded to shift the attention of the public opinion to what they defined as an allegedly growing area of ‘outsider-ness’, or *utanförskap* as it is called in Swedish (Davidsson, 2010). This term has been rather vaguely used to indicate as the non-employed segment of the population, in receipt of various types of either means-tested or non means-tested welfare benefits, which tend to be residentially concentrated in specific ‘areas of outsidersness’ (*utanförskapsområden*). In particular, according to this view which has become dominant in political debates, the high levels of residential segregation of immigrants lead to their detachment from ‘mainstream’ Swedish society, contributing to the perpetuation of social problems in immigrant-dense neighbourhoods. The spatial segregation of immigrants is in fact believed to decrease their opportunities of interaction with natives and, therefore, to diminish their chances to be ‘acculturated’ into the host society. A wide range of social problems (unemployment, welfare dependency, crime, etc.) tend thus to be explained in cultural terms on account of the fact that, in ethnically segregated neighbourhoods, immigrants retain their own traditional culture and do not fully embrace Swedish culture: “[A]llegedly dysfunctional lifestyles and deviant values are

underlined as a root cause of the overall state of misery, with the cultural frames of reference of the excluded seen as causal in their own right” (Schierup and Ålund, 2011:55).

An analogous view linking ethnic residential segregation to the integration problems of immigrants has not (yet) been widely established in Italy. In the first place, in this country, as in other Southern-European countries, the marginalization of immigrants is not as ‘visible’ as it is in Sweden in terms of spatial concentration in ‘segregated’ neighbourhoods: “[In Southern European cities] clear images of an urban space patterned according to ethnic and social lines are apparently less clear than in the cities of the North” (Malheiros, 2002). However, as it has been noted, the scattered patterns of spatial distribution of immigrants within Southern European cities “often hide a real problem of marginalisation and social exclusion when associated with poor quality housing, rent exploitation, precarious living conditions, overcrowding and poor access to infrastructure” (Arbaci, 2008). In the second place, although in Italy many immigrants have recently lost their jobs because they were employed in sectors which have been hit hard from the crisis (construction and tourism in particular), immigrants of certain ethnic groups, and women in particular, succeeded to keep their jobs in sectors which remained relatively ‘sheltered’ from the crisis (the private care sector). Accordingly, in the years immediately following the beginning of the crisis, between 2008 and 2010, the employment rate fell more among immigrant men in Italy (-4.5%) than in Sweden (-3%), but more among immigrant women in Sweden (-2.6%) than in Italy (-1%) (OECD, 2011a:81).

The reason why the worsening of labour market situation of immigrants in Sweden and in Italy did not seem to be strictly related to the magnitude of the effects of the global financial crisis can be explained by the different characteristics of their immigrant populations and, by and large, of their immigration policy regimes.

Sweden has a long history of immigration and, since the trade unions obtained a ban on labour immigration in 1972, refugees and asylum seekers (together with relatives of earlier immigrants) have constituted the major component of international immigration to the country (Schierup et al., 2006). A gradual deterioration of the labour market position of immigrants was noticeable during the first half of the 1990s, when Sweden was hit by an economic crisis and, since then, the tendency has become even stronger. In fact, even during the economic recovery of the late 1990s and early 2000s, immigrants continued to experience difficulties in finding an occupation (Bevelander, 2010). The employment gap between natives and non-natives and, in particular, between foreign-born young adults and the rest of the working-age population, widened further following the global financial crisis (Öhman, 2011).

Immigration is a more recent phenomenon in Italy and the growth of immigration has been mainly determined by endogenous pull-factors rather than by push-factors from the country of origin. Since

the beginning of the 1990s, immigration flows largely responded to a labour shortage in specific low-productivity and labour-intensive occupational sectors (Ambrosini, 2012; Ambrosini, 2013). The creation of this labour shortage was an effect of the rise in the educational levels of native workers (especially among the younger cohorts) which lessened the competition in the labour market with immigrants (Reyneri, 2003). Whereas ‘culturalized’ discourses prevail in the Swedish context, the Italian debate on immigration has instead been characterized by the acceptance of what has been defined a “subordinate integration”: “[I]mmigrants are relatively well accepted in the labour market and, gradually in society too, as long as they remain at the lowest levels of the social and professional scale, ready to perform the least pleasant tasks” (Ambrosini, 2013:183)

Despite the recent change in Swedish labour immigration policy, in the last years immigration flows to the two countries continued to be of a substantially different nature. For instance, according to the last *International Migration Outlook* of OECD (2013, Chapter 5), only 6.6% of immigrants who moved to Sweden in 2011 for labour market reasons, while they were 33.4% of the total in Italy. In the same year, only 2.3% of immigrants who moved to Italy for humanitarian reasons, while they were 17.6% of the total in Sweden². Despite the differences in the effects of the crisis in the two countries, the unemployment rate was higher among immigrants in Sweden (15.9% among men and 14.5% among women) than in Italy (respectively: 10% and 13.3%).

The differences between the modes of incorporation of immigrants into the labour markets of the two countries can be thus explained by the institutional differences between their immigration policy regimes. Following Wacquant, it can be thus argued that the macro-scale arrangements of the Swedish and Italian welfare state have somehow ‘pre-empted’ the characteristics of immigration flows. The following sections of this paper explain how the institutional settings of the welfare systems of the two countries have contributed to the emergence of different patterns of social polarization in Malmö and Genoa, a Swedish and an Italian city with similar urban histories and that have faced similar challenges after deindustrialization, and they.

3. Post-war urban developments in Genoa and Malmö: from the ascendancy to the decline of the two port-cities

Genoa and Malmö are two cities which have historically been located in a similar position within the urban hierarchies of their countries. In fact, the two cities were the most important port-cities in Italy and Sweden in terms of import and export volumes and their urban structures developed subsequently to accommodate the needs of shipping and port-related activities. Like in other

² Immigration for family reunion accounted for 27.9% of the total in Italy and for 37.7% in Sweden.

European port-cities (Lawton and Lee, 2002), the concentration of these activities in the historic city centres resulted in a densification of their urban structures.

In Genoa, urban expansion has been limited also by geographical and morphological constraints, since the city is somehow wedged between the Mediterranean sea and the mountains. Genoa has traditionally been considered one of the ‘corners’ (together with Turin and Milan) of the ‘industrial triangle’ of Italy and its port has been for a long time the most important international trade node in the country³. Until beginning of the 1970s, the majority of industrial activities were directly or indirectly dependent on the port and the local economy was dominated by a single engineering and shipbuilding conglomerate, Ansaldo. Given the strategic importance of the port, the state had nevertheless traditionally supported local industries with subsidies as well as by purchasing a large part of the industrial and service output (Rodgers, 1958). During this phase, the economic development of the city was associated with a demographic growth that was exclusively due to internal immigration, especially from less economically developed Southern regions. In fact, Genoa would have lost population without these flows of immigrants due to its negative natural demographic balance (the number of deaths already exceeded the low number of births) (Calza Bini et al., 2010).

In the same period, Malmö was already the third largest city in Sweden but continued to gain population from internal migration (especially from the rural areas of the country) as well as from labour immigration from abroad. Like in Genoa, the influx of immigrants was rapidly absorbed by the local labour market and, accordingly, until the beginning of the 1970s, the employment rate of foreign inhabitants even exceeded that of natives (Ohlsson, 1975). Kockums AB, the local shipyard, was the largest private employer in Malmö and, until the mid-1970s, about one fifth of the industrial workers living in the city were employed in the shipbuilding sector (Stråth, 1987).

Despite the differences in population dynamics (since, at that time, Italy was not already an immigration country), Genoa and Malmö followed similar patterns of socioeconomic and demographic development until the early 1970s. The two cities presented the typical ‘Fordist’ characteristics of urban inequality and the bottom of their local social structures was occupied by a large, highly unionized, predominantly male and full-time employed working class⁴.

Malmö had a long-lasting tradition of social democratic policies and, for this reason, the city was seen as some sort of ‘prototype’ of the Swedish welfare state. The commitment to consensus and compromise in industrial relations and in all other areas of political life which came to underpin the

³ Today the port of Genoa is still the second most important Italian port in terms of freight in Italy, after the port of Gioia Tauro.

⁴ This was also the case of Malmö where, until the beginning of the 1970s, Swedish women were predominantly employed in part-time jobs and had lower employment rates than immigrant women (Ohlsson, 1975).

Swedish 'model' had in fact been seen in Malmö before the rest of the country (Billing and Stigendal, 1994).

Compared to other Italian cities that had not benefited from large-scale industrial development, Genoa was characterized by a low level of segmentation in the labour market and unemployment was held down to a relatively low level. It is also important to remark that, in Italy, workers of large and unionized industries like those present in Genoa enjoyed high levels of job stability and security and they were entitled to full access to social security benefits.

A major change in the demographic developments in the two cities nevertheless occurred from the early 1970s onwards. After having reached a peak in the population in 1971 in Genoa (817,000 inhabitants) and in 1970 in Malmö (265,000 inhabitants), the two cities began to shrink as a consequence of deindustrialization. The economic downturn associated with the oil crises of the 1970s in fact led to a fall in demand for manufacturing goods as well as to a change in world trade routes. Furthermore, the emergence of low-cost competitors in South-Eastern Asian countries caused a drastic contraction of the shipbuilding sector in all Western countries (Cho and Storper, 1986).

Between end of the 1960s and the mid-1980s the volume of trade passing through the port of Genoa decreased progressively. The city started to lose its importance as an industrial and maritime centre when Ansaldo closed its shipbuilding plant in Genoa in 1966 and transferred the production to Trieste (a city in the North-East of Italy). Furthermore, when containerization became the dominant support of sea-based trade, the lack of additional space constituted an obstacle for the enlargement of the port and for the upgrading of its logistic infrastructure (Hillman, 2008). The restructuring of the shipbuilding industry continued during the 1970s and affected others sectors of the local economic structure due to a cascading effect. Accordingly, at the beginning of the 1980s the number of workers in the manufacturing sector decreased to one third of the value of the early 1950s (Calza Bini et al., 2010).

Deindustrialization had a dramatic impact also in Malmö where the central government, after having nationalized Kockums AB in 1979, decided to cease all shipbuilding activities in 1987 (Stråth, 1987). A new SAAB automobile factory was built in the dock area where the shipyard had previously operated. However, this factory was closed down after a few years when SAAB was merged with General Motors. For this reason, at the beginning of the 1990s, the economic crisis which hit the country was felt in Malmö more intensively than in any other Swedish city, over 25% of workplaces were lost and the unemployment rate became the highest in Sweden (Holgersen, 2013:6).

Malmö lost 13% of its population in the period between 1970-1984 but part of this decrease was also a consequence of the residential suburbanization of wealthy households (which had serious repercussions for the fiscal revenues of the city) (Salonen, 2012). Unlike Malmö, Genoa continued to lose inhabitants until recent years and the population shrank by 30% between 1971 and 2011. Also in Genoa, a process of suburbanization took place since the 1980s and concerned low-middle-class households moving to the smaller urban centres of the hinterland but also well-off households moving towards the coastal areas (Calza Bini et al., 2010).

The most visible consequence of deindustrialization in the two cities was thus that many factory buildings, warehouse and dockland areas became superfluous after that they lost their functions. At the same time, depopulation was associated with to the abandonment of residential buildings. These vacant dwellings came to become the destination for the 'new' flows of immigrants which arrived in the two cities in the early 1990s.

4. The post-industrial transformation of Genoa and Malmö and the emergence of new patterns of social polarization

In response to socioeconomic decline, the local governments of Malmö and Genoa attempted to regenerate the disused port-areas, following the example of other port cities facing similar challenges (Marshall, 1991). Urban regeneration projects were thus launched in order to transform the decaying seaside neighbourhoods into thriving mixed-used districts.

In Genoa, the urban regeneration project launched in the early 1990s aimed at renovating the physical environment of the city centre close to the port (Hillman, 2008). At that time, the city centre was in fact characterized by the presence of dilapidated buildings and by a high concentration of social problems. However, due to its historical heritage, this area of the city was considered to have potential for touristic development. Genoa also came to host a series of high-profile international events as part of a strategy aimed at boosting the image of the city as a vital and dynamic place and as an attractive touristic destination.

The urban regeneration project launched in Malmö at the beginning of the 2000s was perhaps even more ambitious. In Malmö, the former shipyard area (the western district of Västra Hamnen) was in fact fully converted into a wide range of new urban uses through the establishment of a new university and the construction of cultural venues, business spaces and housing facilities for the 'creative class' (including Turning Torso, a residential skyscraper that became the new city landmark) (Holgerson, 2012). In a similar manner, the opening of the Öresund bridge (in 2000),

connecting the city with Copenhagen, was seen as another initiative for “rescuing Malmö from the stigma of industrial decline” (Vall, 2001:328).

In Genoa and Malmö, the redevelopment of the former port-areas was thus associated with a post-industrial reorientation of their socioeconomic structures. In particular, the waterfront regeneration projects aimed at attracting well-educated professionals with high incomes to settle in the former port-areas. However, associated with an increase in immigration, the two cities also came to attract other ‘types’ of individuals and households.

In Malmö, the population started to grow again since 1984, matching the peak level of 1970 in 2002 and then reaching about 300,000 inhabitants in 2011 (Salonen, 2012:14). This increase in population was largely driven by international immigration. In fact, since the early 1990s, immigration to Sweden increased markedly as a consequence of a large flow of refugees (from former Yugoslavia and Iraq in particular) but also due to an increase in labour immigration from other EU countries (Schierup et al., 2006). Malmö became an attractive destination for immigrants after a change in regulation which allowed refugees to choose the initial place of residence in the country (Andersson and Solid, 2003) but also as a consequence of the opening of the Öresund bridge, which made it possible to commute daily to Copenhagen and, by and large, facilitated movements to and from other European countries. A large number of Danes moved to Malmö, attracted by the lower housing price, while continuing to work in Copenhagen. Between 1990 and 2011, the share of foreign-born increased from 17% to 32% of total population (Malmö Stad, 2012). In 2010, the largest ethnic groups were represented by refugees from former Yugoslavia (18,000) and Iraq (10,000), followed by Danes (9,000) and Poles (7,000) (Malmö Stad, 2011).

From the beginning of the 1990s onwards, the number of immigrants rose sharply also in Genoa even if the population of the city continued to shrink. In 1991, immigrants were less 1% of the population and Northern Africans (mostly from Morocco) represented the largest ethnic group. The ethnic composition of the immigrant population changed at the end of the 1990s, when Northern Africans were outnumbered by Latin Americans, and immigrants became 2.7% of the population. In 2010, immigrants reached 8.3% of the population and the largest ethnic groups were Ecuadorians (17,000) and Albanians (5,400), followed by Moroccans (3,800), Romanians (3,750) and Peruvians (2,780) (Comune di Genoa, 2010).

Table 1 shows that, between 2000 and 2010, the share of natives on total population decreased in both cities. However, natives also decreased in absolute numbers in Genoa as a consequence of continuing out-migration from the city, while the number of Swedish-born continued to increase in

Area of birth	Genoa				Malmö			
	2000 (n.)	2010 (n.)	2000 (%)	2010 (%)	2000 (n.)	2010 (n.)	2000 (%)	2010 (%)
Natives	604,063	559,331	97.3	91.7	157,223	160,325	75.7	69.6
EU	1,806	6,350	0.3	1.0	17,956	20,208	8.6	8.8
Other European countries	2,288	8,468	0.4	1.4	14,545	18,437	7.0	8.0
Africa	4,691	7,854	0.8	1.3	2,012	3,775	1.0	1.6
Southern America	5,268	21,081	0.8	3.5	2,412	3,241	1.2	1.4
Northern America	509	925	0.1	0.2	379	584	0.2	0.3
Asia	2,266	5,703	0.4	0.9	12,961	23,473	6.2	10.2
Oceania	16	15	0.0	0.0	86	189	0.0	0.1
Stateless/Unknown	13	19	0.0	0.0	24	38	0.0	0.0
Total immigrants	16,857	50,415	2.7	8.3	50,375	69,945	24.3	30.4
Total population	620,920	609,746	100.0	100.0	207,598	230,270	100.0	100.0

Table 1. Population of Malmö and Genoa, by area of birth, 2000-2010

Source: Comune di Genova (2010), LISA dataset for Malmö

Malmö, albeit at a slower pace than immigrants. The table also show that the immigrant populations of the two cities display different ethnic ‘profiles’ which can be explained on account of differences in the motivation for immigration. In fact, whereas the bulk of recent immigration to Malmö was for humanitarian reasons, immigration to Genoa has predominantly been for labour market reasons, as also indicated by the change in the ethnic composition of flows.

North African immigrants arrived to Genoa at the beginning of the 1990s and were to a large extent men, working as self-employed street vendors or in other informal and off-the-book occupations (Fravega and Bonatti, 2005). Latin American immigrants steadily increased in number from the end of the 1990s onwards and were instead to a large extent women who moved to Genoa in order to work as private family carers (or *badanti*, in Italian). Interestingly, in 2010, almost one third of immigrants in the city were Ecuadorians but the latter accounted for only 2% of total immigrants in the country. Therefore, the immigrant population of Genoa shows a specific ethnic profile but also a distinctive mode of incorporation and adaptation to the local labour market.

The conditions of the creation of a large private care sector in Genoa were determined by a combination of demographic, economic and institutional factors. Firstly, Genoa has one of the oldest populations among Italian cities, since residents over 65 years of age are 26.7% of the population and a large proportion of them live alone (18.9% of men and 40.0% of women) (Comune di Genova, 2010). Secondly, before retirement, many of these elderly were employed in the large manufacturing firms of the city and, therefore, they belonged to what can be considered as the ‘core’ of Italian labour force. In Italy, these workers have traditionally benefited from generous

retirement conditions and pension replacement rates, even compared to other Western countries (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Thirdly, in Genoa, the municipal social service sector remained relatively underdeveloped and, for this reason, home care services are able to meet the needs of only a small fraction of the elderly in need. However, many of the elderly in need of care receive pensions which allow them to employ family carers directly.

According to a recent study (ARS Liguria, 2010), there were about 13,200 private family carers in Genoa in 2010. Nine out of ten of them were immigrants, Latin American women were three-fourths of the total and this value was more than double the national value⁵. One-third of private carers were undocumented immigrants and only 40% had a regular employment contract. By and large, this sector of employment tends to be characterized by low wages, poor employment conditions and career opportunities. What is also peculiar of Genoa is that the majority of private carers live-in with the households for which they work (two-thirds of the total compared to one-third in Italy). Since the growth of this sector of employment has been almost entirely fed by pensions and other types of welfare benefits (Da Roit and Sabatinelli, 2012), it tends to be relatively ‘sheltered’ from economic downturns and, for this reason, it has not been affected by the global financial crisis. One consequence of this has been that, for example, private care jobs have started to become more attractive to many native women, living in Genoa and its hinterland, who lost their jobs as a consequence of the crisis (La Repubblica, 2011).

In Genoa, the incorporation of immigrants into the labour market was thus associated with process of ethnic segmentation. In this respect, Table 2 allows a comparison between the patterns of ethnic labour market segmentation in Genoa and Malmö in 2001, the last year for which comparable data are available⁶. For both cities, the three largest ethnic groups have been taken into account: immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Iraqis and Poles in Malmö and immigrants from Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe for Genoa (since only aggregate data are available for this city). Therefore, the degree to which individuals of each ethnic group are over- or underrepresented in each sector of employment in relation to native workers has been estimated by using an Ethnic Segmentation Index⁷.

⁵ The majority (56.3%) of private carers in Italy are from Eastern Europe.

⁶ Data are available for the years 1991 and 2001 because they were census years in Italy.

⁷ The Ethnic Segmentation Index (*ESI*) is based on the Ratio Index developed by Maria Charles (1992) and is given by the following equation:

$$ESI = \frac{1}{n} \times \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \ln \left(\frac{F_i}{N_i} \right) - \left(\frac{1}{n} \times \sum_{i=1}^n \ln \left(\frac{F_i}{N_i} \right) \right) \right|$$

where F_i is the number of immigrant workers in the sector i , N_i is the number of native workers in the sector i , and n is the number of sectors. The more ethnically segregated a labour market is, the higher the value of *ESI* tend to be.

For each sector of employment i , sector-specific parameters S_i are calculated by deviating the ratio of immigrants to natives in the sector i from the corresponding ratio averaged across all sectors:

Sector of employment	<i>Genoa</i>				<i>Malmö</i>	
	Latin America	Africa	Eastern Europe	Former Yugoslavia	Iraq	Poland
Manufacturing	-0.328	-0.022	-0.099	0.529	-0.365	0.157
Construction	0.571	0.772	1.163	-0.627	-0.990	-0.652
Trade	-0.766	0.031	-0.515	-0.280	0.718	-0.083
Tourism & catering	0.153	0.126	0.260	0.871	0.850	0.784
Domestic & cultural services	2.112	0.707	0.549	-0.404	-0.283	-0.417
Other private services	-0.941	-0.740	-0.788	0.107	0.317	0.021
Public sector	-0.801	-0.873	-0.569	-0.196	-0.246	0.190
Ethnic Segmentation Index	2.249	1.596	1.756	1.538	1.713	1.390

Table 2. Ethnic Segmentation Index and sector-specific parameters for ethnic segregation, immigrants of selected nationalities, Genoa and Malmö, 2001

Source: ADELE Laboratory of ISTAT for Genoa, LISA dataset for Malmö.

The table indicates that, in 2001, Latin Americans had the highest index value in Genoa but all three ethnic groups were overrepresented in three sectors: domestic and cultural services, construction and, to a lesser extent, tourism and catering. In Malmö, immigrants seemed instead to show some sort of ethnic-specific modes of incorporation into the labour market, even if all nationalities were overrepresented in the tourism and catering sector and in the other private services.

Compared to Genoa, what especially distinguishes the situation of immigrants in Malmö is their degree of exclusion from the labour market, rather than the level (or ‘type’) of ethnic segmentation. As mentioned before, the growth of population occurred in Malmö during a period of rising unemployment and after that many natives had abandoned the city because of difficulties in finding a job. The outflow of population resulted in an increase in the number of vacant apartments, especially the in public housing estates built as part of the so-called Swedish Million Programme, between 1967 and 1974. The refugees coming from the Middle East in the mid-1980s and from former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were especially located in these public housing areas. Therefore, as a consequence of the economic and demographic changes which occurred from the mid-1980s onwards, Malmö experienced a sharp increase in the share of social assistance recipients which, since then, remained consistently above the level of other Swedish big cities (Giertz, 2004). In particular, a sharp increase in the unemployment and in social assistance dependency rates was visible after the crisis of the early 1990s in the public housing neighbourhoods which had received the largest numbers of refugees (Andersson et al., 2007).

$$S_i = \ln\left(\frac{F_i}{N_i}\right) - \left(\frac{1}{n} \times \sum_{i=1}^n \ln\left(\frac{F_i}{N_i}\right)\right)$$




Figure 1. Residential concentration: immigrants in Genoa, 1991 and 2001

Source: ISTAT

Figure 1 and Figure 2 allow a comparison between the patterns of residential segregation in Genoa and Malmö in 1991 and 2001, which are the only years for which comparable data exist. Data for the year 2010 are only available for Malmö but the comparison with Genoa for that year will be developed below by relying on municipal data on the resident population. Residential segregation is measured by the Locational Quotient which allows the identification of patterns of spatial




Figure 2. Residential concentration: non-Western immigrants in Malmö, 1991, 2001 and 2010

Source: LISA dataset

concentration of immigrants within the two cities⁸. Neighbourhoods are grouped into three categories: neighbourhoods with a share of immigrants equal to or lower than half of share of the city as a whole (light grey); neighbourhoods with a share of immigrants higher than half but equal to, or lower than, the citywide share (dark grey); neighbourhoods with a share higher than the share of immigrants in the entire city (black).

The maps show that, in the period 1991-2001, the waterfront regeneration projects led to a decrease in the level of spatial concentration of immigrants in the port-areas. However, there are substantial differences in the ways in which the patterns of spatial distribution of immigrant populations evolved in the two cities during the period in question.

In Genoa, the gentrification of the port-area brought about “a partial replacement of the local population and the long-term coexistence of gentrifiers and vulnerable groups” (Arbaci, 2008:601). Unlike Malmö, and like other Southern-European cities (Allen et al., 2004), public housing traditionally accounted for a residual share of the housing stock in Genoa. For this reason, a large number of immigrants (Northern Africans in particular) still reside in privately rented and poorly maintained apartments located in historic centre. Although the share of immigrants residing in the historic centre decreased between 2000 to 2010 from 25.7% to 11.0% of total immigrant population, their absolute number increased from 4,332 to 5,531 (+27.7%) (Comune di Genova, 2010). The decrease in the share of immigrants residing in this area was thus caused by the overall increase in the number of immigrants residing in other parts of the city. In particular, the widespread cohabitation between immigrants private carers and the households they work for contributed to the scattered pattern of spatial distribution of the immigrant population (and of immigrant women in particular) within Genoa.

By contrast, in Malmö, the regeneration of the waterfront site did not result in a process of de-concentration of immigrants. The gentrification of the port-area was in fact accompanied by an increase in the level of spatial concentration of immigrants in the neighbourhoods located in the south of the city centre. This has been particularly the case of Rosengård, a neighbourhood of high-rise and multi-storey buildings constructed between the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s which accounted for about 7% of the population of the city and where foreign-born individuals are 60% of the residents, while those born from foreign-born parents are 26% (Malmö Stad, 2009).

⁸ The Location Quotient (LQ) is an index given by the following equation:

$$LQ = \frac{f_i / F}{p_i / P}$$

where f_i is the number of immigrants in the neighbourhood i , p_i is the total population of the neighbourhood i , F is number of immigrant in the entire city, while P is the total population of the entire city. Therefore if $LQ=1$, the immigrant distribution in the neighbourhood corresponds to that of the city as a whole, if $LQ<1$ the immigrant distribution is lower than in the rest of the city and if $LQ>1$ there is relative over-representation of immigrants in a neighbourhood.

Since the early 1990s, the change in property of parts of the dwelling stock, which have been sold to profit-oriented private landlords, contributed to a further deterioration of housing and socioeconomic conditions in the neighbourhood (Lind and Blomé, 2012). For instance, child poverty increased from 52,3% in 1991 to 62.3% in 2010, a value five times higher than in the country as a whole (Salonen, 2012). The riots which took place in Rosengård in December 2008 (after the eviction of the local mosque) and July 2009 (after that Swedish media reported taped conversations between police officers using racist slurs to refer to the local inhabitants of the neighbourhood), and which received international media coverage, have clearly raised doubts about the social sustainability of urban developments in Malmö.

5. Discussions and conclusions: towards a ‘Mediterraneization’ of the Swedish immigration policy regime?

The global financial crisis seems to have placed an extreme burden on the capacity of EU countries to cope with immigration flows. Despite the cross-national variation in the impact of the crisis, the central governments of all EU countries enforced an austerity regime which is exerting a downward pressure on their social expenditures and, accordingly, seems to be aggravating the negative consequences of the worldwide economic downturn on their labour markets.

The comparative analysis developed in this paper nevertheless emphasized how an economic downturn is not immediately (or necessarily) translated into an exacerbation of social polarization in cities. In this respect, the ways in which the living conditions of immigrants have been affected by the global financial crisis cannot be solely explained by the degree of vulnerability of the national economies of hosting countries. In fact, as shown in the previous pages, the institutional settings of welfare systems play a pivotal (‘generative’) role in defining the modes of social incorporation of immigrants into urban contexts. Welfare states do not only affect the distribution of income within societies but they ultimately contribute to the spatial patterning of social inequalities within cities.

For instance, despite the similarities in their urban histories as port-cities, Malmö and Genoa are characterized by different patterns of social and spatial polarization. The post-industrial transformation of Malmö resulted in the exclusion of a large proportion of immigrants from the local labour market and in their spatial concentration in certain distressed neighbourhoods, separated from the regenerated and gentrified waterfront area. The increase in immigration to Genoa instead led to an ethnic segmentation of the local labour market but it was also associated with a decrease in the level of residential segregation. As seen before, the expansion of the private

care sector was the major factor contributing to the economic and residential integration of immigrants in this city. The institutional differences between the welfare states of the two countries explain why the private care sector did not develop in Sweden (which has a large public service infrastructure) to the same extent as in Italy (where the public provision of care services is residual). However, another crucial determinant of this difference between the two countries can be identified in the different ways in which the private care sector has been regulated in the two countries. In Italy, this sector was divided along ethnic lines already in 1972 when a law established that immigrants were allowed to be employed as private carers only on live-in contracts (Sciortino, 2004:118). Although this restriction is no more valid, live-in arrangements are still a prerogative of immigrants who tend to accept these restrictive conditions of employment as a first step into the Italian labour market. At the beginning of the 1970s, in Sweden, the inclusion of the private care sector in the general labour laws determined an increase in wages which, in turn, contributed to the crowding-out of these jobs from the labour market and, therefore, to their ‘replacement’ with public care services (Platzer, 2006). The situation nevertheless changed since 2006, when tax deductions for households who purchase private care services have been introduced with the purpose of encouraging the expansion of this sector, as a measure to create jobs and reduce unemployment among the most vulnerable groups and among immigrants in particular. At the same time, the liberalization of labour immigration policy seemed to indicate the willingness of the central government to accept an increase in the level of segmentation in the labour market and “to respond to pressure from business and public services for continued cheap (and today often undocumented) migrant labour” (Schierup and Ålund, 2011:60). Since a recent study has shown that the recent increase in support for the xenophobic party of Sweden Democrats has especially occurred in those municipalities where immigrants and low-skilled natives compete in the labour market (Rydgren and Ruth, 2011), it is unclear whether these policy initiatives will result in an alleviation or, on the contrary, in a further exacerbation of social polarization tendencies in Swedish cities.

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