

**“Governing through security? Institutional discourse,
practices, and policies in the metropolitan city of
Milan”**

Monica Colombo - monica.colombo@unimib.it

Andrea Molteni - andrea.molteni@unimib.it

Fabio Quassoli - fabio.quassoli@unimib.it

University of Milano-Bicocca

© by the author(s)

Paper presented at the RC21 International Conference on “The Ideal City: between myth and reality. Representations, policies, contradictions and challenges for tomorrow's urban life” Urbino (Italy) 27-29 August 2015. <http://www.rc21.org/en/conferences/urbino2015/>

1. Governance, security and the city

In Foucault's definition, governmentality comprises institutions, procedures, tactics and *savoirs* generating a very specific and complex form of power for which the main target is the population(s), the main form of knowledge is "political economy", and the basic *techne* are apparatuses of security (Foucault 1982, in Rabinow & Dreyfus 1982). Foucault understands governing also as an "order of 'problematization' where 'problematization' means the ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices that make something enter into the play of true and false and constitute it as an object of thought (Foucault; quoted in Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 18). The notion of *dispositif* is also crucial for understanding 'technes' of governance. A *dispositif* can be regarded as a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions (Foucault, 1980: 194).

In Foucauldian terms, security can be regarded as a set of governmental devices (*dispositifs*) which in modern states have ensured management of the population and have allowed the ordinary and regular functioning of liberal societies. In this framework, *security devices* can be interpreted as sets of governance techniques that emerged in the eighteenth century in order to act on the population, defined as a phenomenon which can be regulated according to a criterion of statistical normality and not according to a norm. The series including *population* – i.e. the object of government in the stead of the former unit constituted by the *territory* – and *security devices* – i.e. sets of technologies with which to manage the population – is integrated by the notions of threat and risk, which become key elements of governance in liberal societies (Foucault, 2008).¹

1

Subsequent studies have focused on the controversial relationship between security and freedom, which characterises Foucault's notion of security. Two main theoretical approaches have emerged: *governmentality studies* (Rose, 2000) and *surveillance studies* (Marx, 1988, Lyon, 2001). The former approach has continued the Foucauldian sociological and genealogical research project focusing on the different forms

Studies on urban security show that a sort of transnational approach to neo-liberal urban governance has emerged over time. It is characterised by the creation or expansion of municipal by-laws targeting the urban poor and the informal economy, by the aggressive enforcement of these laws via order maintenance policing, by the privatisation of security, by the literal or *de facto* privatisation of public space, and by the emergence or re-emergence of an often racialised discourse on the poor as dangerous and criminal (Amster, 2003; Caldeira, 2000; Herbert and Brown, 2006; Robins, 2002; Samara, 2010; Wacquant, 2002).

As far as Italy is concerned, over the last two decades, many crucial issues regarding the govern of Italian cities – traffic, immigration, work, environment, criminality, peripheries, freedom of religious expression, etc. – have been reframed thanks to the a new semantic umbrella: *urban security* (Maneri 2014, Procacci 2013). This semantic shift has generated the same consequence that Elspeth Guild noted about what happened with the general concept of security: «the more widely the concept of security is defined, the more state activities fall within its remit» (Guild 2009, 7). This shift is remarkable for at least five reasons.

1.1. Urbanisation of security

Despite the fact that public discourse on governing urban security traces back to the development of the modern city, the recent growing “urbanisation” of security has generated both new specific problems/risks and new kinds of people/behaviours that need to be governed. Since the beginning of the nineties, discourse and worries concerning urban insecurity mushroomed in Milan metropolitan area as in many other cities in Central and Northern Italy, where an increasingly widespread “feeling of insecurity” became one of the key issues in political and media debates (Maneri 2011): newspapers, newscasts and opinion polls started describing citizens as terrified and worried about their safety. Numerous alarmist campaigns took place throughout the last twenty years, at different times taking up a wide range of issues such as illegal immigration, drug-dealing, street prostitution and, more broadly, repeated protests over the deterioration of local neighbourhoods and widespread micro-criminality (Dal Lago and Palidda, 2010). Such campaigns went on also in recent years reaching an apex in the final period of the last decade strongly influencing the political agenda (ordinances against window-cleaners, informal trade, begging, clearing of gypsies’ camps not to talk about a plethora of injunctions approved in many town and cities of Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto).

of governance in the so-called post-neoliberal societies. The latter approach has focused on the complex set of procedures which have the population as their object, such as monitoring techniques, personal data filing, surveillance and profiling practices that use increasingly sophisticated techniques based on an obsessive risk prevention logic.

In public discourses, the complex issues of urban coexistence and city government, especially in the suburbs, have been increasingly introduced and discussed starting from the identification of a specific threat, a behaviour, a situation or a particular ethnic group (a "type of person") representing a risk to the orderly management of life in the city. Identifying and discussing an issue as a threat is a trigger for those requests for urgent and exceptional measures that underpin the process of securitization (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998). Hence, several issues concerning city government have been gradually taken over by securitization discourse and policies (Molteni and Marchetti 2013, 48). Through a specific decree, the Home Secretary has defined what is meant by urban security, namely "a public good to be protected through activities designed to safeguard, within local communities, the rule of the law governing civil life, to improve living conditions in urban areas, civil coexistence and social cohesion". This definition, which is consistent with the public discourse on urban security that has developed over the years (Selmini 2004), gives security a power that may potentially extend to all aspects of city government. As reported in a manual aimed at those planning or deciding on urban security (Cardia and Bottigelli 2011), the factors of insecurity range from the risk of aggression or violence, to behaviours described as "incivilities", from degradation of urban areas to the perception of insecurity linked to environmental factors, to fear as a subjective feeling. All these factors, grouped under the semantic umbrella of urban security, lead to great social alarm, according to Italian city mayors (ANCI-Cittalia 2009) and are often associated to the behaviour, or the mere presence, of marginal and marginalized ethnic groups: beggars, people with mental health difficulties, prostitutes, squatters, alcohol or drug users, and, especially, nomads and migrants.

1.2. Securitisation of urban governance

While issues concerning urban insecurity, disorder and crime came into view and made a fast career in public discourse on city governance a growing securitization of urban life has been accomplished through a shift from a conception of urban policies centred on social problems to a different one centred on situational prevention and criminalization of urban problems, conflicts and groups. In Milan, such a shift have regarded, for instance, street prostitution, drug consumption and sale, drinking alcohol in public places, begging, graffiti writers, public decorum or even the mere presence in public places of groups of migrants and gypsies. This shift is also exemplified by the flows of public funding allocated to security-related projects throughout the country: "As a result, most regions have passed laws aimed at promoting integrated systems of security in their cities, and an explicit right to security has appeared for the first time in Italian legislation" (Menichelli, 2015: 264). When worries about the consequences of crime prevailed over concerns about its social causes,

“securitarian” and situational prevention policies rapidly overtook welfare ones (Garapon and Salas, 1996). The safeguarding of both neighbourhood decorum and inhabitants safety justified increasingly muscular crime policies under the aegis of the zero tolerance ideology, as if any problem that could be framed in terms of safety could be magically solved with more policemen on the streets and stronger penal sanctions. In Milan, such an approach have informed policies and projects in the field of urban security that were promoted by the three right-wing coalitions that have been ruling the city from 1993 to 2011. The usual corollary of such policies was an appeal to local communities concerning their role keeping the neighbourhood in order. In turn, the focus on local communities was meant to serve two purposes: on the one hand, to discourage breaches of the law and the spread of incivilities and, on the other, to stimulate civic participation.

1.3. Reconfiguration of governmental devices

Both urbanisation of security and securitarisation of urban governance triggered off a deep reconfiguration of a heterogeneous complex of institutions, norms and practices meant to address, regulate and govern these “new” generalized forms of risk.

On the one hand demands for local autonomy in matters of security have increased, promoted by city mayors, by their coordinating and representative bodies, both at a national level, such as the ANCI (National Association of Italian Municipalities), and specific, such as the Italian Forum for Urban Security, or even, in some cases, through *ad hoc* coalitions, like the fifteen mayors of medium to small cities who signed the Charter of Parma to claim more powers and resources together with a greater involvement in the management of security and aspects of "degradation and urban disorder". On the other hand, the competences and the geographical distribution of powers in matters of public order and management of security in cities have been gradually redefined, provincial committees for security and public order have been set up, and "local pacts for urban security" have been signed, i.e. formal agreements between Prefect (the local representative of the Ministry of the Interior) and city mayor, who used to be in charge of citizens' security at local level, which aimed at strengthening the relations between the (national and local) police forces, third-sector associations, and private actors by promoting a variety of actions intended to make city neighbourhoods safer, reassure citizens, enhance their quality of life, and encourage civic participation (Colombo and Quassoli forthcoming). The latter instrument was introduced with the aim of giving substance to local community involvement in setting up urban policies through participated forms of realization of the public good.²

² According to some scholars, the increasing involvement of localities in the co-production of security can be regarded as a reaction to the growing demand for safety expressed by

1.4. Redefinition of central/local powers and competences

The reconfiguration of governmental devices has led to a significant reorganization of roles and competences between national and local authorities, as well as among political and institutional actors at the local level. More precisely, as Menichelli (2013) has recently suggested, in Italy the notion of urban security has been used to shift sovereignty from national to local authorities. This has been made possible by the political and legislative processes of the past decade, which have opened up a space of autonomy where local authorities can assume a proactive role in the provision of security to citizens.

On the one hand, the strong leadership of mayors, who have demanded and obtained more powers in this area in recent years, was dictated by the introduction of direct mayoral elections in 1993 and of the 2001 constitutional reform, which redistributed the responsibilities between state and local authorities. On the other hand, "classic" decision-making powers (top-down) in matters of security have been reshaped, and a more prominent role has been given to local government. (Pavarini 2006).

In 2008, a "security package" was made into law, which, among other things, amended the Consolidated Law on local government, giving the mayor the power to adopt, as a government officer, "extraordinary and urgent" measures to prevent and address the "serious threats to public safety and urban security". This triggered a short flurry of ordinances, often rejected by the administrative courts, which was ended by a Constitutional Court ruling which has, in fact, significantly reduced the ability of mayors to act with extraordinary measures to deal with ordinary situations and events. As we shall see in the next paragraphs, in recent years, as a result of repeated rejections by administrative courts, ordinances have gradually lost importance as a key tool in managing urban security and, in parallel, a new power shift between state and local authorities is emerging.

1.5. The perception of insecurity as a transversal political issue

Two corollaries should be added to conclude our overview of the basic characteristics of security policies in Italian cities and especially in Milan.

Firstly, public discourses at all levels (political, institutional and media) assume a clear-cut divide between objective conditions of risks and its subjective perception in order to both promote local government as the main institutional actor that has to take on citizens' security needs and to strengthen police powers against serious threats (either objective or perceived) that put at risk public safety. Perceptions, fears, and a sense of threat seem to play a key role in the ensemble of discursive practices that in this case make definitions of urban security enter the 'order of

local populations (the "citizens' committee" phenomenon), and to the crisis of the traditional political parties which used to channel social demands to the State (Germain and Poletti, 2007).

problematization' which, according to Foucault, is implied in any form of governance (Foucault, 1991). More precisely, the construction of urban security in terms of subjective perceptions, the management of urban security is matched with the management of citizens' fears and unease. It allows for "a form of 'governing through affect' that draws on and targets the affective subject for certain strategies and regulations aimed at designing people's behaviours and attitudes in the public domain" (Fortier, 2010: 17).

Secondly, urban security has been generally highlighted, in public discourse, as a neutral and depoliticized issue framed in terms of citizens' needs and rights (Zedner 2009). The usual way of doing this is by saying that: "security is neither a right-wing nor a left-wing affair". Far from being an issue that affect -or is affected by -citizens' political affiliation it is conceived as a basic right that any coalition in power must protect. Then again, who would not agree with the idea that everyone has a right to feel safe? The concept of security, therefore, seems to respond fully to the characteristics of those that Laclau called *empty signifiers* (Laclau 1990): catch-words that can have different meanings depending on who uses them, and which are the subject of contention in the struggle for power in public discourse.

2. Institutional discourses, practices, and policies in the metropolitan city of Milan: between continuity and change

In the following pages, we aim at pointing out the way the most relevant institutional actors currently define the security agenda for the Milanese metropolitan area, which kind of goals they try to pursue, upon which instruments and resources they can rely, which division of labour and forms of cooperation they try to putting into practices. Along with analyzing who is governing and what is governed through security, our purpose is to highlight some recent changes in the governance of urban security in the Milanese metropolitan area. We draw from an analyses of both official documents by the main public institutions involved in the governance of security in Milan and semi-structured interviews to the members of the Comitato provinciale per l'ordine pubblico e la sicurezza - a board that gather the president of the province, the mayor of the province capital (plus mayors of other cities and towns of the province who can be involved on an ad hoc basis), the representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Prefetto), and the local chiefs of all the national police forces (National Police, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza).³

³ We interviewed Francesco Paolo Tronca, Milan Prefect; Luigi Savina, Milan Police Commissioner; Maurizio Stefanizzi, Provincial Chief of the Carabinieri; Edmondo Bruti Liberati, Public Prosecutor of the Milanese Public Prosecutor's Office; Marco Granelli, Assessor for Security of the Milan City Council; Mirko Mazzali, President of the Commission for security of the Milan City Council; Antonio Barbato, High Officer of the Milanese Local Police; Walter Summo, Coordinator of the Proximity Police Project for the Milanese Local Police; Sergio Chillemi, Police Commissioner for the Milanese Local

In the interviews, three main topics have been explored: a) the definitions of urban securities; b) the most important actors and their functions, competences and responsibilities; c) continuities and changes concerning the governance of security in the Milanese metropolitan area.

2.1. One city, many kinds of securities

The notion of insecurity emerging from the interviews is in itself multidimensional. The semantic field organized around the notion of "urban security" does not only refer to the threats and risks connected to crime and deviance, but also to a variety of other dimensions that impact on the city neighborhoods and on the quality of social relations within them: from crime (both petty and serious/organized) to decay (especially in the peripheries), from immigration to public order during demonstration. Comparing definitions of security provided by the different actors interviewed, we can see that, for those who have the responsibility of governing the city and must confront the challenges presented by citizens on a daily basis, the issue of security concerns all the different areas of city life, almost coinciding with the ideal of good city governance:

"In a general sense, security is to ensure peace in the city [...]. A city is safe when there is no crime, no degradation, when the city is a "paradise". It is clear that this isn't the case in Milan, the larger the city, the harder or more unattainable the dream of having a safe city is [...]." (Mazzali - Chairman of the Committee on Security and Social Cohesion)

"The concept of urban security is very broad and not always well-defined, and it affects all aspects of society. When we talk about urban security, we refer to the problem of the suburbs, where there are no efficient services, all the way down to security connected to large- and small-scale crime" (Barbato - Head of Cabinet, Local Police of Milan).

On the other hand, for those who must ensure security and public order at a local level, the concept of security seems to have a narrower and more specific -more technical -meaning, until it almost coincides, tautologically speaking, with the tasks assigned to each actor by the legal system:

"By the term security we can refer to all the tasks, particularly in such a complex metropolitan area as Milan, performed by many people, not only the police forces. These forces, managed by the Prefect, try to best coordinate their activities

Police – Zona 8;; Luigi Minelli and XXX Di Stefano, Coordinators of the Proximity Police Office – Zona 8.

to help achieve security [...]. Both we and the Police, who are the two forces with general competence in terms of security, take care of prevention, *in the first place*, and then restraint, i.e. investigation when a crime is committed in order to ensure justice". (Stefanizzi, provincial commander of the *Carabinieri*)

This distinction, which involves on the one hand the local/national level and on the other the political/technical one, is reflected also in the identification of problems and threats that affect urban security. The national police forces see the various situations that represent a threat to security, for the most part, as linked to crime:

"The problems that we have in Milan are small- and large-scale crime and organized crime" (Savina, Chief of Police, Milan).

"(...) All the problems from squatting to drugs, thefts, robberies, need to be addressed in the same way, because even if they aren't very significant, they can cause serious consequences" (Tronca, Prefect of Milan).

For those involved in the government of the city, the problems comprised under the semantic umbrella of 'security' are broader:

"For sure one of the most difficult issues is that of small-scale crime, even if the numbers are down; it is a crime that affects people personally (...) Another aspect of degradation is noise and civil coexistence, as the nightlife in Milan has expanded, leading to the presence of drunken youths and numerous acts of vandalism throughout the year. Another pressing problem in the Milan area is begging, which has been addressed by introducing a policy that provides for an increase in the number of shelters. We have also closed down several Roma camps "(Marco Granelli, commissioner for security of the City of Milan).

Even though everyone is clear that:

"Milan has some security problems which are typical of metropolitan areas, the problems have increased over time and involve the redevelopment and renewal of peripheral areas that appear less privileged, of neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Milan which demand their fair share of attention, this is a common theme in all great metropolitan areas" (Stefanizzi, provincial commander of the *Carabinieri*).

The result is that security ends up being an ordinary instrument of territorial government:

"Never underestimate anything, this is the right approach. You must be aware of everything and not overlook situations that may be irrelevant at the time but that may escalate. A Prefect needs to be able to identify a problem before it turns into one: signs of potential escalation, so as to act on the risk, not the danger. Anticipating risky situations and carrying out prevention activities to avoid them escalating into a public order emergency" (Tronca, Prefect of Milan).

As a consequence, a set of heterogeneous events, practices, situations and places are redefined as generalized forms of risk, thus over-simplifying the complex problems posed by the different forms of social insecurity and reformulating them as threats (Bigo 2006; Simon 2007). This eventually fuels a very "frustration over security" (Castel 2003). Danger becomes a cultural product (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982), linked to those risk narratives that represent a significant element of contemporary Western societies. These narratives contribute to create generalized anxiety about "security", which eventually ends up comprising a wide and varied combination of urban problems and governmental practices, marking the emergence of a style of thinking that Nikolas Rose called *riskthinking* (Rose 2000, 332).

In the interviewees' discourse other elements are constructed as significantly associated to urban in/security: the continuously changing socio-demographic composition of the population, the transformations occurring in the economic tissue of the city, the conflicts arising among groups competing for the use of public spaces. All these elements are at the core of the demand for more security and social control.

"[In the past] Milan was different, the percentage of foreign population was lower... There was less poverty and less unemployment" (Tronca, Prefect of Milan).

The discrepancy between crime rate and perceived insecurity, which is widely mentioned in the interviews, is well documented in literature. How is this discrepancy dealt with in discourse and which functions it performs? In the interviewees' discourse, perceived insecurity is not connected to an increasing rate of crime, but it is explained in terms of the ongoing physical and social transformations occurring in the city neighbourhoods. The citizens' demand for security is attributed to a widespread perception of loss of control on everyday life conditions on behalf of the population. According to this interpretative repertoire (narrative), the perception of

insecurity would be connected to the perception of the context as unfamiliar and out of control. In their discourses, the interviewees explicitly draw on the divide between objective conditions of risks and the subjective perception of it to legitimize the citizens' demand for intervention, to present it as an evidence and to position the city administration among legitimated "urban security actors".

Even in a city that all respondents portray as very safe, compared to other European and Western cities, local administrators aim (also) at increasing the perception of safety, even where it is not considered possible to further increase actual safety, seen as the likelihood to be the victim of a crime.

Milan, compared to other cities, has fewer security problems to face [...]. From this point of view I do not think that the situation is particularly serious, what we have noticed in recent years has been an increase in crimes affecting citizens personally such as street crimes, supermarket thefts and burglaries (Stefanizzi, provincial commander of the *Carabinieri*).

"Certain types of crime have decreased, while predatory crime, which bothers people most, is a bit on the increase. The reason behind robberies and looting is linked to the economic crisis. I believe that in recent years safety has neither increased nor diminished, despite the opposition trying to paint the city of Milan as the Wild West. (...) Then, but this is well known, it is necessary to distinguish between real and perceived safety, which is equally important. Especially for those in government, the problem that must be tackled is also to ensure perceived safety, i.e. the one citizens regard more subjectively, rather than objectively." (Mazzali – Chairman of the Committee on Security and Social Cohesion).

In this last extract, the interviewee refers to the fact that insecurity issues have been politicized (both from the right and the left-wing) and have been used as a means for covering up other problems (the «ignored insecurities») on the agenda, and as an effective tool of ideological manipulation. This 'ideology of safety' has turned the demand for living in safe communities into an attempt to legitimize racist and xenophobic behaviours and exclusionary practices. Neighbourhoods with a high percentage of both foreign residents and city users are often associated with urban blight and depicted as depleted and unsafe places. Immigrants living there are represented through highly stereotyped and racialised images and addressed to as a "social problem" or a "threat" to citizens' safety (Aramburu 2002, Dal Lago 1999, Petrillo 2003, Quassoli 2004, Santamaría 2002).

"Milan is an important player within the nation, and it's also the provincial capital managing the largest number of immigrants" (Savina, Chief of Police, Milan).

Whereas the right-wing and Northern League administration immediately and explicitly presented the issue of the presence of foreigners as a security threat, or at least as a fundamental element in the perception of insecurity, with the centre-left administration governing the city the lines are more blurred, though the presence of foreigners continues to be associated with the perception of insecurity.

"The immigration issue that affects numerous citizens of Milan first hand; foreigners are seen as enemies because they take jobs away from the Milanese themselves. Another problem is the strong presence of Roma who are accused of carrying out several thefts in the area, many of which go unreported because of fear or because making a complaint against persons unknown is not considered useful" (Barbato, Head of Cabinet, Local Police of Milan).

The "problem" remains of the presence of Roma camps, which are identified as an actual security threat, an important element in the increased perception of insecurity and disturbance of the public order and decorum in the neighbourhoods. Several respondents indicate among their priorities evacuating illegal camps or inspecting legal ones for security.

Urban security policies aimed at protecting citizens (autochthonous residents) from threats and dangers coming from various social groups, among which foreign immigrants occupy the center of the scene reinforce at the local levels the politics of exclusion overtly supported by the right-wing and populist parties at national and cross-national levels.

The emphasis with which the control of the 'migrant other' is continually linked to urban security policy is matched only by the silence of the 'insecurity' professionals and politicians on how those activities linked to the control of the flows of people have not only extended their reach but have been strengthened by the adding of extra imperatives to the security agenda by extending urban security into a wide range of disparate phenomena that are constructed as mutually constitutive; extending control to any citizen who does not correspond to the social image that one holds of his national identity (Bigo 2006). As a consequence, control goes beyond the parameters of conventional control measures and policing of foreigners to include persons deemed at 'risk', who are put under surveillance because they correspond to an identity or behaviour more

likely to make them predisposed to that risk: the migrant 'other' then as a possible threat.

A final element of significance, which emerged from the interviews, is the link that many of the respondents detected between the increase in certain crimes, especially survival and predatory crimes, and the economic crisis which has affected and changed the economic and productive fabric of the city and reduced job opportunities for large sections of the population. An analysis of the interviews revealed three different discursive types implying a cause-and-effect link between the economic crisis and urban insecurity. The first is a direct link, so that the increase in certain crimes is represented as a direct result of the economic difficulties which have affected the weaker sections of the population of Milan:

(...) Burglaries have increased significantly as a result of the economic crisis and affect mostly people belonging to the lower classes: the weaker sections. Today an outcast, an illegal immigrant, a local crook will burgle the elderly taking away a little money, some jewellery. In recent years there has been an increase in predatory crimes, particularly certain types which prove the existence of small-scale crime such as muggings" (Savina, Chief of Police, Milan).

The second is an indirect link, which derives from a kind of pessimism caused by the crisis:

In actual fact, in this period, as a result of the economic crisis, everything can look bleak, small-scale crime has shown signs of being absolutely contained, but the negative feelings resulting from lack of work lead to significant social unrest and exacerbate the security problem (Stefanizzi, provincial commander of the *Carabinieri*).

The last is linked to social conflicts triggered or exacerbated by employment and economic difficulties, which are presented and portrayed as threats to the public order:

"The management of the public order is a big problem, a number of street protests by workers and others following the severe economic crisis have required numerous patrols in recent years" (Savina, Chief of Police, Milan).

2.2. Actors, roles and responsibilities in the governance of urban security

Collaboration between prefectures and local administrations on urban security has materialized by setting up the Provincial Committees on Order and Public Safety, which have carried through a process of redefining the relationship between the central government - which used to control local areas through the prefectures - and local administrations started by Tambroni in the second half of the Fifties (Tosatti 2009). Since 1981, the Committee has been the key forum for collaboration between the Prefect, police forces and local administrations. During its meetings, coordinated by the Prefect, operational priorities and strategies, the allocation of duties and forms of cooperation are defined:

"The Prefect plans the public security strategies throughout the province and has coordinating powers in matters of public safety over Prefects of the provinces which are part of the region. The Chief of Police, on the other hand, exercises authority in security matters but on a technical level: he makes the most appropriate decisions to manage an event from a technical perspective. The Prefect gives the basic guidelines on how to handle an event." (Prefect of Milan)

"Following the appointment of the new Prefect in August 2013, we have enlarged and reviewed the Committee on Public Safety turning it into a body that meets every week and in which the municipality participates regularly, not only when invited by the Prefect as before. Inside the committee there is greater sharing of strategies, tasks and objectives and this collaboration between local police and law enforcement agencies has allowed us to review progress on strategic situations and to have common lines of approach." (Municipal Councillor for Security)

All respondents emphasize the quality of cooperation that has developed in Milan between the different institutions and police forces participating in the Committee meetings. What emerges from their account is an extensive and constant collaboration which, based on a shared representation of priorities and operational methods to ensure the safety of the city, has evolved around the issue of monitoring the area - and the populations that live in it and/or use it - in all its different aspects.

"In my opinion, security and public order in the city of Milan can be given a clean bill of health because the area is well-managed by all law enforcement agencies and the local police and because the Committee that meets every Wednesday is very

active and all actors have an equal footing and are very cooperative; therefore the area is managed very neatly and professionally." (Head of Cabinet of the Local Police of Milan)

"Considering that the local administration's powers to manage the public order is limited, as this should be taken care of by the police forces, if I have to assess its administrative performance, I believe that we must do everything we can to eliminate areas of degradation [...]. I notice that citizens also dislike the peaceful occupation of squares, where some individuals live permanently using public benches and behaving inappropriately (washing, stripping), which leads to these people being seen as possible perpetrators of thefts occurring in that area. The occupation of one's own area is seen as a problem caused by lack of security." (Chairman of the Committee on Public Safety)

This is the shared core around which the roles, responsibilities and responsibilities of the various players involved are defined. At an operational level, the cooperation between the national police forces (Police and *Carabinieri*) is organized by area. The city is divided into quadrants, which are managed in rotation by the Police and the *Carabinieri* (the Police being the stronger presence). In the provinces, however, thanks to their capillary presence, it is the *Carabinieri* who take most action.

"In Milan, the area is managed alternately: the city is divided into quadrants, three of which are allocated to the Police and one to the *Carabinieri* and there is rotation, which means we are well distributed throughout the area, we like to think that we are one with the other police forces to ensure better control of the area." (Chief of Police of Milan)

"This type of coordination in the metropolitan area requires a strong partnership between the police and the *carabinieri*. Outside the cities normally the *Carabinieri* operate alone, while in the city <...> all calls are dealt with by an independent unit, which then redirects them to the police forces according to their responsibilities in the area. This is an initial coordination effort; we alternate our rapid response actions with the Police in the areas the city has been divided into." (Provincial commander of the *Carabinieri*)

The division of tasks with the Local Police, however, is mainly based on the different responsibilities assigned by law, as well as those acquired over time, especially in the fight against crime. The local police, in fact, over the

past two decades has set up special units and investigation units and, although it now seems more oriented to develop its specific skills of traffic (in urban areas) and administrative police, it is clear from the interviews we made to officers that there is a desire to work alongside other police forces also in the fight against crime, based on greater knowledge of the area acquired by its presence and by its constant collaboration with residents.

"The local police does exactly what it's supposed to do under the rules and codes, and therefore it has a wide remit: we are directly responsible for administrative and traffic police duties. There are differences between the tasks of the Local Police, the Judicial police and the *carabinieri*, but let's say, it's not so much a legal issue as a question of competence and trust between us and the local administration. As a rule we deal with small-scale crime, while for large-scale crime and more specific issues that require certain skills, the exclusive action of other law enforcement agencies is requested. [...] today the Local Police is used to solve problems that were previously assigned to the police and the *carabinieri*." (Head of Cabinet, Local Police of Milan)

Even with regard to operations involving different police forces at the same time (large operations to combat crime in some neighbourhoods, major events, demonstrations, evacuations, etc.), the Local Police claims a specific role, once more calling upon its best knowledge of the area.

"We can distinguish two types of operations: individual and joint. The first only requires our presence according to our specific skills, while the latter requires more institutions and the cooperation of all police forces in the area. For example, in some contexts our help as local police is necessary because we know all areas and streets of the city in detail." (Head of cabinet, Local police of Milan)

This cooperation comes about by forming specific technical meetings, purposely convened at the time of special occasions or events, and local coordination meetings involving all police forces, which reproduce, in the individual areas into which the city is divided from an administrative point of view, on a more immediately operational level, the forms of cooperation tested at provincial (now metropolitan) level by the Provincial Committee on Order and Public Safety.

"At the behest of Chief of Police [...] for about two years now, every month, at our station we have been calling a so-called multi-police meeting, to tackle problems that are a bit more

complex than ordinary ones. It is attended by the local police and the various heads of the area's police stations, the *Carabinieri* and the *Guardia di Finanza*. At this meeting, which usually takes place once a month, we discuss certain, somewhat more serious issues [...]. There have also been several occasions when, in order to deal with specific problems, similar meetings have been set up, other than the monthly multi-police coordination meetings, which involve the Councillor, the citizens' committees and representatives of law enforcement agencies in the area, just to understand and agree on the necessary measures to solve a problem." (Local Police - area 8 Station)

2.3 The means used in the governance of security

An apparatus (*dispositif*), says Foucault (1977), consists of a system of relationships that develop between heterogeneous elements (discourses, practices, artifacts, texts, rules, institutions, administrative measures, metrics, etc.) and responds to an urgent political need, an emergency. At the same time the apparatus is the place in which a discourse gains meaning and effect. One of these effects is to give visibility to particular objects, places, situations, behaviours and populations, in order to be able to control, regulate, govern them (Rabinow 2003). In this regard, it seemed important then to investigate: (1) what means are used, in Milan, by the various police forces to collect, quantify, map, distribute and visualize those events which then become the strategic objectives on the basis of which priorities are determined and operations are planned; (2) how the data which drives urban security policies is produced (collected, organized and analyzed), and then used, in argumentation terms, as a tool of government and rationalization of public action (Desrosières 2008).

In this paragraph, we focus on what according to our interviewees are the two most important *dispositifs* to control both the metropolitan territory and populations: the first one - and more consolidated - is video-surveillance (cctv-systems); the second one - more recent and innovative - are risk maps. But, before going deeper into their analysis we would like to spend some words on the "device" that better clarifies the basic lines politicians and administrators followed in Milan over the first decade of the years 2000s: the use of "ordinances".

2.3.1. The ordinances

As we already mentioned, since 2008 and thanks to law 125/2008, injunction powers of Italian mayors were extended in order to allow prompt interventions with regards to "serious dangers that put at risk public safety and urban security". In the province of Milan, ordinances

became the basic device to cope with urban insecurity and decay. Between 2008 and 2010, the majority of the mayors in the province of Milan issued at least an ordinance concerning urban security. They addressed consumption and sell of alcoholic beverage (25%), street prostitution (23%), vandalism (13%), urban decay (11%) annoying begging (9%); almost 8% of them concerned illegal camping, bivouac and public gatherings, 6% drug purchase, consumption and sell, and, less frequently, night noise and informal trade activities. Thanks to an ordinance: (1) a set of conducts are defined as unacceptable from the point of view of urban decorum or because of the feeling of insecurity that they generate among a minority of citizens; (2) prevention/suppression actions are deployed by local police which is the most important partner of the City Council in implementing ordinances; (3) prevention/suppression activities indiscriminately address a) crime (e.g. drug dealing), deviant and undignified behaviours (e.g. drinking alcohol in public places, street prostituting, night noise), as well as legal and normal activities (e.g. reduced open hours of shops and pubs, time limits to selling alcohol); (4) administrative sanctions and penal ones, whenever is possible, are provided in order to control and discourage such activities.

As far as the use of ordinance is concerned, the case of the city of Milan is really emblematic: between 2008 and 2009 eight ordinances were enacted. They concerned “phenomena and behaviours” such as street prostitution, damage to public and private properties, overindulge in drink, begging, purchase, consumption and sell of drugs. Afterwards, in 2010, seven more injunctions were issued with regard to the management of shops and the decay of some urban areas and neighbourhoods. Finally, the mayor issued an *ad personam* ordinance: it addressed just one block that were considered a residence and gathering place for irregular immigrants and a sort of headquarters for drug dealers that were operating in the area.

Ordinances’ main target were immigrants, regular immigrants as well as irregular ones. In some cases, they are addressed in a direct way, as far as they are believed to be key players in drug dealing, prostitution, begging and in other kinds of illegal behaviours. In other cases, they are a sort of hidden target, like when open hour limits affect area either full of “ethnic” shops (kebab shops, phone centres, ethnic pubs and restaurants) or that are gathering places for foreign people; or when local police systematically checks commercial licences, toilet facilities and management of some types of shops (again: kebab shops, phone centres, ethnic pubs and restaurants). Together with immigrants young people are another privileged targets, either as the guest star of the Milanese movida or as wannabe artists cutting their teeth as graffiti writers.

In this respect, the new municipal administration has been steering towards a redefinition of its tasks and functions. The use of ordinances has been greatly reduced, apparently not only due to the Supreme Court decision which has significantly curtailed the ability of mayors to issue

ordinances on security, but also by political choice and due to a new concept of urban security and of the role of local government in keeping the public order.

"No specific ordinances on security have been passed for legal reasons, since the task of public administration is not primarily to keep the public order, which is the responsibility of the Police authorities. This is extremely difficult to explain to people who see the public administration as responsible for security." (Chairman of the Committee on Security and Social Cohesion).

In addition to being used very sparingly, this tool has been used to deal with urgent, unpredictable and temporary situations, thus avoiding the use of extraordinary measures to deal with ordinary business.

"We made some urgent and targeted ordinances [...] using them for their specific nature [...]. I think that for prostitution and begging an ordinance is not practical because it only deals with the administrative side, thus resulting ineffective or not very incisive." (Municipal Councillor for Security)

2.3.2. CCTV-Systems

Among the actions cited by the municipality, particular emphasis is placed on intensifying video surveillance:

"The number of CCTV cameras has grown substantially and they perform the function of increasing perceived safety, though they are no deterrent." (Chairman of Committee on Security and Social Cohesion).

"Since the local government changed hands from a right-wing to a left-wing coalition, there have been significant practical differences concerning evacuations of Roma camps and urban security. For instance, as regards urban security, a number of agents has been replaced by technological devices, such as the many CCTV cameras that surround the main areas of Milan (former 'ZTL' area, now known as 'C area'). The problem is the same but it is dealt with in different ways." (Head of cabinet, Local Police).

Actually, the massive installation of video surveillance cameras, as well as the testing of the so-called "smart" cameras - able to recognize behaviours, objects or faces and activate automatically or send a signal in case of "suspicious" events – had been started and taken forward by the previous center-right administration, with a different councillor but the same chief

of the local police. The increase in electronic surveillance of the city centre, the streets and areas considered "sensitive" has not stopped with the new administration. Indeed, it is claimed as one of the most significant efforts in the field of urban security, with an expansion of the territorial area covered by video-surveillance and greater effectiveness of the system, also due to the cooperation between the operating units of the various law enforcement agencies.

"Another very important element is the cameras, we have about 1,700 cameras in the city connected with our operations unit, we have defined a protocol with the prefecture and with all law enforcement agencies and we have connected the system so that our cameras are viewed and can be operated simultaneously by all law enforcement agencies and the prefecture. This means that it is a system everyone can benefit from, and, in fact, it has improved the effectiveness of our work. These cameras do not work as early warning signals but are critical to investigate crimes and because citizens just need to see the cameras and they somehow feel more secure and protected by the institutions." (Municipal Councillor for Security).

CCTV cameras, however, are not used only as tools for investigation, prosecution and punishment, with the aim of ensuring the identification of those who commit the allegedly criminal act. The strategies that underpin and justify their use are based on processes and classification mechanisms that oversee and organize the collection of information and its management (Cole 2001; Harcourt 2007; Simon 2007), helping to identify specific ethnic groups, situations or groups to be subject to special supervision regardless of their actual behaviour. Then:

"It is important to remember that classification does not merely 'sort things out' in an objective or neutral way. It is based on practices of meaning-making and judgment calls and is the medium through which those practices continue to occur. In the spaces of the city, surveillance helps to classify areas as, for instance, 'hot spots'—whether these are defined by police, marketers or sports fans—and to determine who should be present when and where, who is 'out of place', and who is likely to be visible to whom while they are there." (Lyon 2007, 94).

The use of the cameras - the choice of where and how to place them and direct them according to different events and occasions - can therefore be indicative of government's thinking which is at the heart of urban security policies. The answers of respondents, however, show that the cameras –

being visible and tangible - seem to have primarily a communicative function: they reassure citizens, responding to their anxiety for security and their perception of insecurity.

As far as the perception of insecurity is concerned, the divide between objective risk and the subjective perception of it involves a psychologization process according to which urban in/security is framed as a problem which deals with individual subjective perceptions, fears and anxieties, which in turn allows for the inclusion under the urban security rubric of a wide range of phenomena in addition to crime.

As a consequence of the construction of urban security in terms of subjective perceptions, the management of urban security is matched with the management of citizens' fears and unease that, in turn, allows for the definition/legitimization/naturalization of the objects of these fears (what is to be feared) and of the (supposed) threatening actors (who is to be feared), and of the conditions which can determine a risk (where and when).⁴

2.3.3. *Risk Maps*

Each of the different police forces uses their own tools for data collection, geo-referencing and analysis, based on which they plan and organize their operations and presence in the area. All the data is used and shared at the meetings of the Provincial Committee on Order and Public Safety, to define priorities and coordinate operations.

The Local police, for example, have been using its own risk map for several years, which is updated daily with the data collected by the patrols operating in the city.

"We have our own, formalized risk map, we have analyzed a series of filtered data in very specific contexts in order to get, as a local Police, a clear picture of the Milan area which can provide useful guidance for immediate action by the police forces. It is constantly updated on the basis of our information. Through the use of data, images and video a specific situation can take shape and this allows us to divide the city into sectors so as to position the various law enforcement agencies based on their specific responsibilities. Once a problem has been identified, the effort of the police forces is intensified and, after a short time, we can determine whether the problem has been dealt with positively. This, in all cases, has proven to be highly effective, from dealing with urban security, to managing Roma camps, in [facing] conflicts and tensions." (Head of cabinet, Local police of Milan)

⁴ In the absence of objective risk, discourse and practices of urban security allow for a shift from the subjective perception of a potential risk to the construction of actual risk. Consistently with this shift, it is through a process of foregrounding/backgrounding that some phenomena are constructed as in/security and other are ignored.

Similar systems are also used by other police forces, with the aim to identify crime hot-spots and risk situations, and to try to act to prevent crimes.

"All police forces have an identical system. When someone files a report, he /she [fills out] a module that is identical for all police forces; these all end up in a database and are categorized according to crime. By querying this database we can get a specific map of the situation in Milan. This data is used to plan police force activities; it can assist the geolocation of crimes. I know how many crimes are committed in a given area, in which time range and on which day. This allows us to draw a map of some serial crimes, and we can often figure out what time of day the criminal is going to strike." (Chief of Police of Milan)

For certain types of crime (in particular "serial" robberies), moreover, the Milan Police HQ has been testing a software program of *predictive policing* ("Key Crime") for some years, developed internally by an officer, which, on the basis of the analysis of recurrence and of the common elements of criminal acts and their perpetrators, and of other data, should allow us to predict the place and time of a future crime with greater precision than traditional investigative methods and other software of predictive policing used in Anglo-Saxon countries.

Basically, we are talking about risk assessment tools related to situational prevention, which rely on the ability to collect and act on information analyzed using actuarial instruments, which aim to research and identify the likelihood of criminal behaviours and places at risk of victimization (Braga and Bond 2008; National Institute of Justice, 2005; Yang 2010). These analyses allocate risk profiles to individuals and ethnic groups (Castel 1991; Rabinow 2007; Rose 2007), through the use of risk assessment technologies and tools designed to provide the government with an identity and classification of individuals, groups, situations and places, which are then allocated different levels of crime probability (Harcourt 2007). In any case, these are methods that support and give shape to prevention policies based on the ever-increasing use both of devices and techniques for monitoring and control, and at the same time of tools and devices for identification.

Up-to-date data collecting tools informed by probabilistic models of crime risk factors allow police to deploy preventive actions minimizing the commission of crimes. Such probabilistic models, in turn, incorporate a notion of crime risk that, obliterating any consideration for the social causes of crime, both support security policies that are exclusively focused on a situational prevention approach and risk to reinforce dangerous stereotypes concerning social groups and urban areas.

As a whole, such technological devices show how crucial the notion of risk has become for the governance of urban settings. As far as this point is concerned, we agree with Le Galès (2002) who argues that the fact that risk as a notion has entered the realm of urban governance can be seen « as an effort to depoliticize public problems, to suggest technical solutions to often complex issues, to redefine rules of accountability, and finally to promote a modern approach to the resolution of urban problems – in line with a general trend that characterizes organizations, public and private alike » (pp. XX).

2.4. The 'Exposition universelle': Enlarging and upscaling urban governance

In interviews, a topic keeps cropping up, and it's become increasingly important over time: the 'Exposition Universelle' (the Expo). The preparation of the security system for the Expo – which has been on the agenda for several months, in meetings of the Provincial Committee – has been long and complex. As pointed out by the *Carabinieri* commander: "the prefecture has made a tremendous effort in recent months so we do not leave anything out, by planning everything very thoroughly" (provincial commander of the *Carabinieri*).

With regard to the role that the Expo has played in shaping security organization and management in the metropolitan area of Milan, we can underline three aspects: 1) the planning and changes to the ways and means of managing security; 2) the long-term changes arising from it; 3) practical implications and the impact on local security.

In this context, we would like to make some observations concerning the first aspect. As explained by the Prefect, in fact:

"The city has been preparing for months, with specific working groups which address different aspects of problems also from the point of view of security, by which we do not only mean *security* but also *safety*, [visualizing and analyzing] all possible scenarios and the best strategies to manage them." (Prefect of Milan)

The possible scenarios are built on the basis of the experience in managing security locally, of shared experiences in managing major events with other countries, and of the specific local situation. A model for security planning developed by the Rand Corporation for London 2012 Olympics seems of particular importance on this respect. Such a model is based on the construction of "possible future security environments", but at the same time, it considers the fact that, being the future security environment unclear, "security requirements (...) must be developed in the face of

uncertainty” (Rand Corporation 2007). In similar terms, the local authorities interviewed, are conscious that:

"Anything can happen, when you have planned for 100 possible situations and a new one suddenly emerges, you panic and this must not happen. Experience has taught us that we must be ready for anything. The key is to be able to create a flexible organization that can handle more serious scenarios and monitor each situation." (Prefect of Milan)

What matters then is the organization of a system, based on the ability to visualize everything that could happen – regardless of an accurate assessment of the probability of each scenario - and ready, therefore, to take swift action even in the face the unpredictable.

This represents a “style of thought” (Fleck 1979; Rose 2001) based on the construction of a superabundance of scenarios, for which security threats are unpredictable, and denote a shift from the logic of prevention to a logic of precaution, where «security risks proliferate and exceed the capacity for officials to fully manage or even identify, meaning that it becomes a pressing challenge to maintain the *appearance* of absolute security» (Boyle e Haggerty 2009, 262). As a matter of fact, attention is paid to the construction of “governmental technologies” (Rose e Miller 1992) that allow to cope with security issues, which cannot be neither foreseen nor prevented and for which:

"The speed of an operation is very important [and] it requires quick thinking, it is a mental process which those who are used to handle emergencies develop automatically, there must be great determination to avoid confusion of roles and there must be unity and coordination in decision making." (Prefect of Milan)

Planning how to manage security emergencies regarding the Expo (the exhibition site, but also the city in general), is based on setting up two central coordination units: the Joint Operations Centre, a central control unit managed by all police forces, which involves:

"All the stakeholders in the management of all events and aspects of Expo activities", and the Rescue coordination centre, an operations room coordinating the actions of all those involved, which can take immediate action "whenever anything critical may happen." (Prefect of Milan)

Thus, Expo end up being «a laboratory where new security formula can be tested» (Prefect). Modalities and tools for cooperation among all the public

institutions and the police forces involved in the production of security for the metropolitan city bring with them consequences that spread “well beyond what occurs on the days of any individual happening. Mega-events foster a legacy of knowledge, networks and habits that have a bearing on the lives of considerably more individuals than those in attendance” (Boyle e Haggerty 2009, 265).

Finally, this emphasis on planning, which also emerges in interviews with other members of the Committee, recalls, to some extent, also the myth of a 'purified' city. A myth founded on the image of a city that can plan its own defense against any threat, any unexpected event, whose soul however is built on the "fear of losing control" (Sennett 1970, 98; Cohen 1985, 217) the implication of which is excessive protection, based, according to Sennett, on intolerance and the elimination of differences. And in fact, as expected, planning for the Expo has meant:

"(...) also an inevitable restyling of the area, which included, for example, the recent evacuation of the Roma camp in via Barzaghi, [which] to some extent was part of the Expo area project." (Local Police Commissioner, area 8)

Conclusive remarks

We have tried to give an account of the first elements that emerge from research on the most recent transformations of urban security policies in Milan. This research was carried out when the city and its institutions were getting ready for the upcoming opening of the Expo and, at the same time, the government of the new metropolitan city was being organized. The main focus of the research was the operations of the Provincial Committee on Order and Public Safety, which involved the strategic coordination and management of the policies and police operations and protection of public safety in the metropolitan city of Milan. Although, with its population of just over three million inhabitants, the metropolitan city of Milan is a far cry from the largest megacities of the north and south of the world, its area of 1,575 sq km, the level of urbanization, the complexity of the area and its importance in the regional and national context, make it a particularly interesting case study. We therefore interviewed key institutional actors, collecting and analyzing their definitions of what is meant by safety and urban security, their description of the main problems of public order in the city and security threats, the situations that generate insecurity, what they are doing to address these and the instruments they use.

We first tried to understand what, and who, is managed by security means, and what we found were the "usual suspects": the poor, beggars, squatters, travellers, noisy and "drunk" youths, foreign immigrants. We

could, by applying to this security domain the hypothesis that Melossi (1993) formulated for the penal system, consider the security policies as some sort of "gazette of morality", whose first victims "tend to be those who are less socially protected, the poor, drug addicts, immigrants, ethnic minorities, etc., [...] simply because they [the agents of social control] can act much more effectively towards this sector of the population" (Melossi 1997, 59). In the case of Milan, the emphasis of the security discourse is placed on those groups and behaviours which are believed to be responsible for the perception of insecurity, degradation and social alarm (instead of, for example, administrative offences, corruption, respect for employment standards, etc.). This process feeds on itself, because the tools through which control is exercised and urban security is managed, end up generating their own targets, we might say due to excessive surveillance: the more control of a particular area, of particular groups or types of people, the greater the amount of interventions, arrests, fines, or even simply of information and "news", which end up fuelling this security system with data and metrics which are then used to identify and define emergencies and priorities. Data, tools and instruments are 'bearers of values, of a certain interpretation of the social fabric and specific notions of the way to control that is contemplated from time to time' (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2004, 13).

Operationally speaking, the city is divided, with regard to the Local police, into nine areas, which correspond to areas of administrative decentralization of the city council, while, as regards the Police and the *Carabinieri*, it is divided into four quadrants, which are monitored in rotation by the two police forces. The largest metropolitan area of the city is then divided into 134 municipalities, each with its own local police force and capillary presence of the *Carabinieri*. Management of security is therefore based on an activity of *quadrillage* (Foucault 1975), in order to achieve capillary control, police visibility, rational distribution of resources, and efficient coordination between police forces. The division of the area does not correspond entirely to a decentralization of functions, since some of these, particularly those of coordination of the rapid response patrol allocated to central operations, are still centralized (or have been re-centralized in recent years, as in the case of the Local police of Milan), also due to the potential and efficiency of the electronic technologies that are employed.

The *governance* of urban security and public order in Milan is a process in constant flux. For sure the new centre-left government which has been in office since 2011, while reiterating, even in the department's own name, a link between security and social cohesion, has tried to distance itself from the previous fifteen years, during which different centre-right governments have been operating under the premise that the policies and operations should be subject to security. Faced with this change of direction, urban security remains, however, the instrument with which issues that cannot

be solved with other (social and, more broadly, urban) policies are dealt with and represent a good case study to understand the condition and the fate of all those who are governed by it (Le Galès, Vitale 2015).

As we have shown, the different institutions that are legally authorized to carry out policing and monitoring functions in the area are gathered and coordinated by the Prefect in the Provincial Committee on Order and Public Safety. The objectives, roles, strategies and forms of cooperation of the Committee have changed over time, as a result of regulatory and socio-economic developments, changes of government or of the heads of different institutions, or, still, special events taking place, as is the recent case of the Expo. Following the change of the national government, the new city administration and the arrival of the new Prefect, for example, relations between the Prefecture and local government have been reshaped. In previous years, City mayors' claims for greater autonomy, endorsed and supported by an interior minister belonging to the Northern League party, had been accompanied, in the public debate on urban security, by a discrediting (more symbolic than actual) of the authority of the Prefect, in favour of greater power to the mayor. Now the discussion seems to have reversed, and the local administration has partly redefined its responsibilities, fully recognizing that the Prefect is in charge of managing crime and public security operations, and strengthening collaboration with the Police and the *Carabinieri* on the basis of a better division of tasks and roles.

In this sense, Expo has then acted as a lab to define the new structure of security management in the emerging metropolitan city, making it possible to set up new instruments and experiment with different forms of multi-police coordination and new models of security management. The emphasis on the ability to build multiple scenarios – even all conceivable ones - that would allow to deal with any threats, identifying them in terms of their possibility rather than their probability, has supported the creation of new tools for coordination and government of urban security, based on the ability to act in order to manage, if you can't predict or prevent it, any danger or disturbance to the public order, even unimaginable ones. This desire to protect from the unpredictable mirrors, of course, the fear that is gripping cities and Western societies since 9/11 and reveals the dream of an ideal city which, if it can't be purged of all risks or threats, can at least be perfectly under control.

References

- Amster, Randall. 2003. Patterns of exclusion: sanitizing space, criminalizing homelessness. *Social Justice*, 30(1), 95–221
- ANCI-Cittalia. 2009. «Oltre le ordinanze: i sindaci e la sicurezza urbana.» Roma: ANCI.
- Aramburu, Mikel. 2002. *Los otros y nosotros: imágenes del inmigrante en Ciutat Vella de Barcelona*. Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, Subdirección General de Información y Publicaciones.
- Bigo, Didier. 2006. «Globalized (in) security: The Field and the Ban-opticon.» In *Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: The (In) Security Games*, 5–49. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Boyle, Philip, and Kevin D. Haggerty. 2009. «Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex.» *International Political Sociology* 3 (3): 257–74.
- Braga, Anthony, and Brenda J. Bond. 2008. «Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: a Randomized Controlled Trial.» *Criminology* 46 (3): 577–607.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub.
- Caldeira, Teresa. 2000. *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in São Paulo*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cardia, Clara, and Carlo Bottigelli. 2011. *Progettare la città sicura. Pianificazione, disegno urbano e gestione degli spazi pubblici*. Milano: Hoepli.
- Castel, Robert. 1991. «From dangerousness to risk.» In *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality*, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Eds.), 281–98. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- . 2003. *L'insécurité sociale. Qu'est-ce qu'être protégé ?* Paris: Seuil.
- Cohen, Stanley. 1985. *Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and Classification*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Cole, Simon A. 2001. *Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification*. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Colombo, Monica and Quassoli, Fabio (forthcoming). Intersecting governmentality studies and critical discourse analysis: A case study of urban security discourses and practices, in P. McIvenny, L. Lindegaard, J. Zhukova (eds), *New Perspectives on Discourse & Governmentality*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Dal Lago, Alessandro. 1999. *Non-persone. L'esclusione dei migranti in una società globale*. Milano: Feltrinelli.
- Dal Lago, Alessandro and Palidda, Salvatore (Eds.). 2010. *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The Civilisation of War*, London: Routledge.

- Desrosières, Alain. 2008. *Gouverner par les nombres. L'argument statistique II*. Paris: Les Presses des Mines.
- Douglas, Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1982. *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fleck, Ludwik. 1979. *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Fortier, Anne-Marie. 2010. Proximity by design?: affective citizenship and the management of unease. *Citizenship Studies*, 14(1), 17-30.
- Foucault, Michel. 1975. *Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison*. Paris: Gallimard.
- . 1977. «Le jeu de Michel Foucault.» *Ornicar? Bulletin périodique du champ freudien*, n. 10: 62–93.
- . 1977-1978. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-1978*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
- . 2008. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978-79*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
- Garapon, Antoine and Salas Denis. 1998. *La repubblica penale*, Liberlibri.
- Germain, Séverine and Poletti Cristian. 2007. Local security policies in Italy: new key institutional players, transformation of policing and professionalization of municipal forces. In *Explaining major shifts in policing, an international perspective*. Available at: <http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00374004/>
- Guild, Elspeth. 2009. *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*. Polity.
- Harcourt, Bernard E. 2007. *Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- Herbert, Steve and Brown, Elizabeth. 2006. Conceptions of space and crime in the punitive neoliberal city, *Antipode*, 38(4), 755–777.
- Laclau, Ernesto. 1990. *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*. London - New York: Verso.
- Lascombes, Pierre, and Patrick Le Gales, a c. di. 2004. *Gouverner par les instruments*. Paris: Presses de Sciences-po.
- Lyon, David. Lyon. 2001. *Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life*. Buckingham: Open.
- . 2007. *Surveillance Studies: An Overview*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Maneri, Marcello. 2011. Media discourse on immigration. The translation of control practices into the language we live by. In Palidda, S. (ed) *Racial Criminalization of Migrants in the 21st Century*, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 77-93.
- Marx, Gary. 1988. *Undercover. Police Surveillance in America*. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

- Melossi, Dario. 1993. «Gazette of Morality and Social Whip: Punishment, Hegemony and the Case of the Usa, 1970-92.» *Social & Legal Studies* 2 (3): 259–79.
- . 1997. «Andamento economico, incarcerazione, omicidi e allarme sociale in Italia: 1863-1994.» In *La criminalità*, Luciano Violante (Ed.), 12:37–63. Storia d'Italia. Annali. Torino: Einaudi.
- Menichelli, Francesca. 2015. The national picture: The reconfiguration of sovereignty, the normalization of emergency and the rise to prominence of urban security in Italy. *European Journal of Criminology*, 12.3, 263-276.
- Molteni, Andrea, and Chiara Marchetti. 2013. «La regione securitaria.» In *La ragione politica. 2. I discorsi delle politiche*, Vando Borghi, Ota De Leonardis, and Giovanna Procacci (Eds.), 48–81. Napoli: Liguori.
- National Institute of Justice. 2005. *Mapping Crime: Understanding Hot Spots*. US Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.
- Pavarini, Massimo. 2006. *L'amministrazione locale della paura. Ricerche tematiche sulle politiche di sicurezza urbana in Italia*. Roma: Carocci.
- Petrillo, Antonello. 2003. *La città delle paure: per un'archeologia dell'insicurezza urbana*. E. Sellino.
- Quassoli, Fabio. 2004. Making the neighbourhood safer: social alarm, police practices and immigrant exclusion in Italy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30.6 (2004): 1163-1181.
- Rabinow, Paul. 2003. *Anthropos today: Reflections on modern equipment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 2007. *Marking Time: On the Anthropology of the Contemporary*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rand Corporation. 2007. «Setting the Agenda for an Evidence-based Olympics.» Cambridge: Rand Corporation.
- Robins, Steven. 2002. At the limits of spatial governmentality: a message from the tip of Africa. *Third World Quarterly*, 23(4), 665–689.
- Rose, Nikolas. 2000. «Government and Control.» *Br J Criminol* 40 (2): 321–39.
- . 2001. «The Politics of Life Itself.» *Theory Culture Society* 18 (6): 1–30.
- . 2007. *The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rose, Nikolas, and Peter Miller. 1992. «Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government.» *The British Journal of Sociology* 43 (2): 173–205.
- Samara, Tony Roshan. 2010. Policing Development: Urban Renewal as Neo-liberal Security Strategy. *Urban Studies*, 47(1), 197–214.
- Selmini, Rossella (Ed.), 2004. *La sicurezza urbana*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Sennett, Richard. 1970. *The uses of disorder: Personal identity and city life*. New York: Knopf.

- Simon, Jonathan. 2007. *Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tosatti, Giovanna. 2009. *Storia del Ministero dell'Interno. Dall'Unità alla regionalizzazione*. Bologna: Mulino.
- Yang, Sue-Ming. 2010. «Assessing the Spatial–Temporal Relationship Between Disorder and Violence.» *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 26 (1): 139–63.
- Wacquant, Loïc. 2002. Toward a dictatorship over the poor? Notes on the penalization of poverty in Brazil. *Punishment and Society*, 5(2), 197–205.
- Zedner, Lucia. 2009. *Security*. Abingdon: Routledge.